

**TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
CASE NO. 20-0001087 CAF**

**BEVELYN GIDDENS,
Complainant**

v.

**NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Respondent**

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**BEFORE THE OFFICE

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS**

DECISION AND ORDER

Bevelyn Giddens (Complainant) filed a complaint with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) seeking relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 (Lemon Law) for alleged warrantable defects in her vehicle distributed by Nissan North America, Inc. (Respondent). A preponderance of the evidence does not show that the subject vehicle has a warrantable defect. Consequently, the Complainant’s vehicle does not qualify for repurchase/replacement or warranty repair.

I. Procedural History, Notice and Jurisdiction

Matters of notice of hearing¹ and jurisdiction were not contested and are discussed only in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The hearing in this case convened on February 27, 2020, in Carrollton, Texas, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on the same day. The Complainant, represented herself. John Howell, dealer technical specialist, represented the Respondent.

¹ TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.051.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

1. Repurchase/Replacement Relief Requirements

A vehicle qualifies for repurchase or replacement if the respondent cannot “conform a motor vehicle to an applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting a defect or condition that creates a serious safety hazard or substantially impairs the use or market value of the motor vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts.”² In other words, (1) the vehicle must have a defect covered by an applicable warranty (warrantable defect); (2) the defect must either (a) create a serious safety hazard or (b) substantially impair the use or market value of the vehicle; and (3) the defect must currently exist after a “reasonable number of attempts” at repair.³ In addition, the Lemon Law imposes other requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, including (1) a written notice of the defect to the respondent, (2) an opportunity to cure by the respondent, and (3) a deadline for filing a Lemon Law complaint.

a. Serious Safety Hazard

The Lemon Law defines “serious safety hazard” as a life-threatening malfunction or nonconformity that: (1) substantially impedes a person’s ability to control or operate a vehicle for ordinary use or intended purposes, or (2) creates a substantial risk of fire or explosion.⁴

b. Substantial Impairment of Use or Value

i. Impairment of Use

In determining substantial impairment of use, the Department considers “whether a defect or nonconformity hampers the intended normal operation of the vehicle.” For instance, “while a vehicle with a non-functioning air conditioner would be available for use and transporting passengers, its intended normal use would be substantially impaired.”⁵

² TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

³ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

⁴ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.601(4).

⁵ *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).

ii. Impairment of Value

The Department applies a reasonable purchaser standard for determining whether a defect substantially impairs the value of a vehicle. The reasonable purchaser standard “does not require an owner to present an expert witness or any technical or market-based evidence to show decreased value.” Instead, under this standard, “factfinders should put themselves in the position of a reasonable prospective purchaser of the subject vehicle and determine (based on the evidence presented) if the current condition of the vehicle would deter them from buying the vehicle or substantially negatively affect how much they would be willing to pay for the vehicle.”⁶

c. Reasonable Number of Repair Attempts

Generally, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity continues to exist after being subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁷

Alternatively, for serious safety hazards, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity creates a serious safety hazard and continues to exist after causing the vehicle to have been subject to repair two or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁸

Additionally, for vehicles out of service at least 30 days, a rebuttable presumption may be established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

⁶ *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) (“[T]he Division’s interpretation that expert testimony or technical or market-based evidence is not required to show diminished value or use is consistent with the statute’s goal of mitigating manufacturers’ economic advantages in warranty-related disputes.”).

⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(1)(A) and (B).

⁸ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(2).

[A] nonconformity still exists that substantially impairs the vehicle's use or market value, the vehicle is out of service for repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁹

The 30 days described above does not include any period when the owner has a comparable loaner vehicle provided while the dealer repairs the subject vehicle.¹⁰

The existence of a statutory rebuttable presumption does not preclude otherwise finding a reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle based on different circumstances and fewer attempts.¹¹ Furthermore, the Department adopted a decision indicating that if a consumer presents the vehicle to a dealer for repair and the dealer fails to repair the vehicle, then that visit would constitute a repair attempt unless the consumer was at fault for the failure to repair the vehicle.¹²

d. Other Requirements

Even if a vehicle satisfies the preceding requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, the Lemon Law prohibits repurchase or replacement unless: (1) the owner or someone on behalf of the owner, or the Department has provided written notice of the alleged defect or nonconformity to the respondent;¹³ (2) the respondent was given an opportunity to cure the defect or nonconformity;¹⁴ and (3) the Lemon Law complaint was filed within six months after the earliest

⁹ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(3).

¹⁰ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(c).

¹¹ *Ford Motor Company v. Texas Department of Transportation*, 936 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (“[T]he existence of statutory presumptions does not forbid the agency from finding that different circumstances or fewer attempts meet the requisite ‘reasonable number of attempts.’”).

¹² *DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Williams*, No. 03-99-00822-CV (Tex. App.—Austin, June 22, 2000, no writ) (not designated for publication) (Repair attempts include “those occasions when the fault for failing to repair the vehicle rests with the dealership.” Conversely, “those occasions when failure to repair the vehicle was the fault of the consumer would not be considered a repair attempt under the statute.”).

¹³ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(c)(1). 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.204 provides that “[u]pon receipt of a complaint for lemon law or warranty performance relief, the department will provide notification of the complaint to the appropriate manufacturer, converter, or distributor.” The Department’s notice of the complaint to the Respondent may satisfy the requirement to provide notice of the defect or nonconformity to the Respondent.

¹⁴ A respondent may delegate its opportunity to cure to a dealer. A repair visit to a dealer satisfies the opportunity to cure requirement when the respondent allows a dealer to attempt repair after written notice to the respondent. *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 221 and 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012); Texas Department of Transportation, *Kennemer v. Dutchman Manufacturing, Inc.*, MVD Cause No. 09-0091 CAF (Motor Vehicle Division Sept. 25, 2009) (Final Order Granting Chapter 2301, Subchapter M Relief). An opportunity to cure does not require an actual repair attempt but only a valid opportunity. *Id* at 2.

of: the warranty's expiration date or the dates on which 24 months or 24,000 miles had passed since the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to an owner.¹⁵

2. Warranty Repair Relief

Even if repurchase or replacement relief does not apply, a vehicle may still qualify for warranty repair if the vehicle has a “defect . . . that is covered by a manufacturer's, converter's, or distributor's . . . warranty agreement applicable to the vehicle” and the vehicle owner notified the manufacturer, converter, distributor, or its authorized agent of the defect before the warranty's expiration.¹⁶ The manufacturer, converter, or distributor has an obligation to “make repairs necessary to conform a new motor vehicle to an applicable . . . express warranty.”¹⁷

3. Burden of Proof

The law places the burden of proof on the Complainant.¹⁸ The Complainant must prove all facts required for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, the Complainant must present sufficient evidence to show that every required fact more likely than not exists.¹⁹ Accordingly, the Complainant cannot prevail where the existence of any required fact appears equally likely or unlikely.

4. The Complaint Identifies the Issues in this Proceeding

The complaint identifies the issues to be addressed in this proceeding.²⁰ The complaint must state “sufficient facts to enable the department and the party complained against to know the nature of the complaint and the specific problems or circumstances forming the basis of the claim

¹⁵ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(d)(2).

¹⁶ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204; 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(b)(3).

¹⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.603(a).

¹⁸ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.66(d).

¹⁹ *E.g.*, *Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Garza*, 164 S.W.3d 607, 621 (Tex. 2005).

²⁰ “In a contested case, each party is entitled to an opportunity . . . for hearing after reasonable notice of not less than 10 days.” TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2001.051; “Notice of a hearing in a contested case must include . . . a short, plain statement of the factual matters asserted.” TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2001.052. *See* TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(b) (“The complaint must be made in writing to the applicable dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor and must specify each defect in the vehicle that is covered by the warranty.”); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(d) (“A hearing may be scheduled on any complaint made under this section that is not privately resolved between the owner and the dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor.”).

for relief under the lemon law.”²¹ However, the parties may expressly or impliedly consent to hearing issues not included in the pleadings.²² Implied consent occurs when a party introduces evidence on an unpleaded issue without objection.²³

5. Incidental Expenses

When repurchase or replacement is ordered, the Lemon Law provides for reimbursing the Complainant for reasonable incidental expenses resulting from the vehicle’s loss of use because of the defect.²⁴ Reimbursable expenses include, but are not limited to: (1) alternate transportation; (2) towing; (3) telephone calls or mail charges directly attributable to contacting the manufacturer, distributor, converter, or dealer regarding the vehicle; (4) meals and lodging necessitated by the vehicle’s failure during out-of-town trips; (5) loss or damage to personal property; (6) attorney fees, if the complainant retains counsel after notification that the respondent is represented by counsel; and (7) items or accessories added to the vehicle at or after purchase, less a reasonable allowance for use. The expenses must be reasonable and verifiable (for example, through receipts or similar written documents).²⁵ However, the Department’s rules expressly exclude compensation for “any interest, finance charge, or insurance premiums.”²⁶

B. Summary of Complainant’s Evidence and Arguments

On March 2, 2019, the Complainant, purchased a new 2019 Nissan Sentra from Trophy Nissan, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Mesquite, Texas. The vehicle had 3 miles on the odometer at the time of purchase. The vehicle’s limited warranty provides basic coverage for 36 months or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first. On October 21, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent. On September 24, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the gas did not flow properly, the car hesitated and would not pick up speed.

²¹ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(a)(3).

²² 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.42; TEX. R. CIV. P. 67.

²³ See *Gadd v. Lynch*, 258 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1953, writ ref’d).

²⁴ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604.

²⁵ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209(a).

²⁶ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.208(b)(1).

The Complainant testified that the vehicle first exhibited hesitation on the Saturday right before Easter 2019. While coming back from Oklahoma, the Complainant's sister, Pamela Edwards, had noticed slowness while driving, with the Complainant in the passenger seat. The Complainant also noticed the hesitation herself when driving. She noticed the vehicle would not pick up speed when trying to drive 60 mph. She only noticed the issue when on the highway trying to merge and pass. She noted that when driving 60 mph, the rpms would be at 3,000 and 4,000 and not go over. The Complainant last noticed the issue the week before the hearing.

On cross-examination, the Complainant clarified that she would notice hesitation when accelerating. She affirmed that vehicle would accelerate but she would feel a delay in the acceleration. The Complainant confirmed that the check engine light did not come on. Except for an instance of the radio turning itself on and off, she had no issues with the vehicle except for picking up speed, which was not as smooth as she wanted it to be.

Ms. Edwards testified that when leaving the casino in Oklahoma, she drove the subject vehicle because the Complainant was tired. When entering the highway trying to pick up speed going 65 mph, she explained that the vehicle felt like it was decelerating.

C. Inspection

Upon inspection at the hearing, before the test drive, the vehicle had 23,532 miles on the odometer. Mr. Howell attached a device to monitor the vehicle's engine speed, accelerator pedal position, throttle position, and gear ratio. The vehicle displayed warning indicators related to prior collision damage. Specifically, the wheels were straight but steering to the left because of a bent suspension, causing a diagnostic trouble code. The vehicle otherwise appeared to operate normally. The test drive ended with 23,562 miles on the odometer.

D. Summary of Respondent's Evidence and Arguments

Mr. Howell testified that the vehicle had two accelerator sensors on separate and redundant systems and they must agree with each other; if they disagree, the vehicle will not accelerate. In reviewing the graphs recording the subject vehicle's accelerator sensors, engine speed, throttle position sensor, and vehicle speed, Mr. Howell explained that the red line indicates when he hit the button (reflecting when the Complainant stated she felt hesitation) to record an eight second window of data. The graphs of the Complainant driving showed significant pedal fluctuation. In

contrast, a graph of the dealer's shop foreman driving shows a smooth line for accelerator sensors one and two. Accordingly, the throttle position was smooth and therefore the engine speed was smooth. All the data recorded of the shot for the shop foreman showed the vehicle drove smoothly. The operation of the vehicle corresponded to the data from the accelerator pedal.

E. Analysis

As an initial matter, to qualify for any relief, whether warranty repair or repurchase/replacement, the law requires the vehicle to have a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty (warrantable defect).²⁷ The Lemon Law does not require that a manufacturer provide any particular warranty coverage nor does the Lemon Law impose any specific standards for vehicle characteristics. The Lemon Law only requires the manufacturer to conform its vehicles to whatever coverage the warranty provides. In part, the warranty generally states that:

This warranty covers any repairs needed to correct defects in materials or workmanship of all parts and components of each new Nissan vehicle supplied by Nissan subject to the exclusions listed under the heading "WHAT IS NOT COVERED" or, if the part is covered by one of the separate coverages described in the following sections of this warranty, that specific coverage applies instead of the basic coverage.

According to these terms, the warranty only applies to defects in materials or workmanship (manufacturing defects).²⁸ A defectively manufactured vehicle has a flaw because of some error in making it at the factory, such as incorrect assembly or the use of a broken part. Manufacturing defects exist when the vehicle leaves the manufacturing plant. Unlike manufacturing defects, issues that do not arise from manufacturing, such as design characteristics or design defects are not warrantable defects. Because the warranty only covers manufacturing defects, any non-manufacturing problems do not qualify for relief.

²⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603(a), 2301.604(a); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204.

²⁸ Courts have affirmed that warranty language covering "defects in material or workmanship" do not cover design issues. *E.g.*, *Whitt v. Mazda Motor of America*, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00343, 211-Ohio-3097, ¶¶ 18-21 ("The manufacturer's express warranty in the case sub judice provides: 'Mazda warrants that your new Mazda Vehicle is free from defects in material or workmanship' The trial court found the warranty did not cover claims of design defects. . . . The problems about which Appellants complained did not fall within the applicable expressed warranty."); *see GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc.*, 822 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) ("the language in the contract of May 12, 1980, expressly limited TCR's recovery only for defects in materials or workmanship to damages for repair or replacement value. No mention was made in the guarantee of remedies for design defects.").

In this case, the evidence shows that the individual driver's operation of the vehicle (not any manufacturing defect) determined whether hesitation would occur. The data recordings clearly show that the alleged hesitation corresponds to the pressure on the accelerator pedal. In other words, the differences in performance resulted from differences in the individual driver's operation of the vehicle, specifically, the pressure applied to the accelerator pedal. Uneven pressure on the accelerator resulted in uneven acceleration (including hesitation). Whereas steady pressure on the accelerator resulted in smooth acceleration. In sum, individual driver operation, not a warrantable defect, caused the vehicle's hesitation. Therefore, the vehicle does not qualify for any relief.

III. Findings of Fact

1. On March 2, 2019, the Complainant, purchased a new 2019 Nissan Sentra from Trophy Nissan, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Mesquite, Texas. The vehicle had 3 miles on the odometer at the time of purchase.
2. The vehicle's limited warranty provides basic coverage for 36 months or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first.
3. On October 21, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent.
4. On September 24, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the gas did not flow properly, the car hesitated and would not pick up speed.
5. On January 3, 2020, the Department's Office of Administrative Hearings issued a notice of hearing directed to all parties, giving them not less than 10 days' notice of hearing and their rights under the applicable rules and statutes. The notice stated the time, place and nature of the hearing; the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing was to be held; particular sections of the statutes and rules involved; and the factual matters asserted.
6. The hearing in this case convened on February 27, 2020, in Carrollton, Texas, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on the same day. The Complainant, represented herself. John Howell, dealer technical specialist, represented the Respondent.

7. The vehicle's warranty was in effect at the time of the hearing.
8. Upon inspection at the hearing, before the test drive, the vehicle had 23,532 miles on the odometer. Mr. Howell attached a device to monitor the vehicle's engine speed, accelerator pedal position, throttle position, and gear ratio. The vehicle displayed warning indicators related to prior collision damage. Specifically, the wheels were straight but steering to the left because of a bent suspension, causing a diagnostic trouble code. The vehicle otherwise appeared to operate normally. The test drive ended with 23,562 miles on the odometer.
9. The individual driver's operation of the vehicle, not any warrantable defect, determined whether the alleged hesitation would occur. Hesitation in the subject vehicle corresponded to the individual driver's operation of the vehicle. Specifically, smooth pressure applied to the accelerator pedal resulted in smooth acceleration. Whereas, uneven pressure applied to the accelerator pedal resulted in uneven (hesitating) acceleration.

IV. Conclusions of Law

1. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles has jurisdiction over this matter. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.601-2301.613 and 2301.204.
2. A hearings examiner of the Department's Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over all matters related to conducting a hearing in this proceeding, including the preparation of a decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the issuance of a final order. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.704.
3. The Complainant filed a sufficient complaint with the Department. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202.
4. The parties received proper notice of the hearing. TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2001.051, 2001.052. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.206(2).
5. The Complainant bears the burden of proof in this matter. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 206.66(d).
6. The Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. The Complainant did not prove that the vehicle has a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603 and 2301.604(a).

7. The Complainant does not qualify for reimbursement of incidental expenses because the vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603, 2301.604(a); 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209.
8. The Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for warranty repair. The Complainant did not prove that the vehicle has a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.204 and 2301.603.
9. The Respondent remains responsible to address and repair or correct any defects that are covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.603.

V. Order

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is **ORDERED** that the Complainant's petition for relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 is **DISMISSED**.

SIGNED April 28, 2020



ANDREW KANG
HEARINGS EXAMINER
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES