



Texas Department *of* Motor Vehicles

HELPING TEXANS GO. HELPING TEXAS GROW.



TxDMV Board Meeting

9:00 a.m.

Thursday, February 9, 2023

**AGENDA
BOARD MEETING
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
4000 JACKSON AVE., BUILDING 1, LONE STAR ROOM
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78731
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2023
9:00 A.M.**

Link to February 9, 2023, TxDMV Board Meeting Documents:

<https://www.txdmv.gov/about-us/txdmv-board-meetings>

All agenda items are subject to possible discussion, questions, consideration, and action by the Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Board). Agenda item numbers are assigned for ease of reference only and do not necessarily reflect the order of their consideration by the Board. Presentations may be made by the identified staff, Board member, or other personnel as needed. The Board reserves the right to discuss any items in closed session where authorized by the Open Meetings Act.

PAGE

1. Roll Call and Establishment of Quorum

2. Pledges of Allegiance - U.S. and Texas

3. Chair's Reports - Chairman Bacarisse

4. Executive Director's Reports - Daniel Avitia

A. [Camp Hubbard Update](#)

B. [Awards, Recognition of Years of Service, and Announcements](#)

CONTESTED CASE

5. Proposal for Decision: Franchised Dealer's Protest of Manufacturer's Notice of Termination of Franchise; SOAH Docket No. 608-21-0988; Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Docket No. 21-0004-LIC; [McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru](#), *Petitioner v. Subaru of America Inc.*, *Respondent* - Rob Blech (ACTION ITEM)

BRIEFING AND ACTION ITEMS

- 260 6. [Specialty Plate Design](#) - Patricia Ueckert (ACTION ITEM)
Clemson University - New Design Proposed under Transportation Code
§504.851
- 263 7. **Finance and Audit Committee Update - Committee Chair Brett Graham**
271 A. [Legislative Appropriations Request \(LAR\) Update](#) (BRIEFING ONLY)
282 B. [Annual Financial Report and Non-Financial Report](#) (BRIEFING ONLY)
284 C. [Internal Audit Division Status Update: Internal and External Engagements,
including the State Auditor's Office Audit](#) (BRIEFING ONLY)
D. [FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan \(Second Six Months\)](#) (ACTION ITEM)

CLOSED SESSION

8. **The Board may enter into closed session under one or more of the following provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act, Government Code Chapter 551, including briefing, discussion, and deliberation regarding the State Auditor's Office Audit regarding Temporary Tags:**

Section 551.071 - Consultation with and advice from legal counsel regarding:

- pending or contemplated litigation, or a settlement offer;
- a matter in which the duty of the attorney to the government body under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas clearly conflicts with Government Code Chapter 551; or
- any item on this agenda.

Section 551.074 - Personnel matters.

- Discussion relating to the appointment, employment, evaluation, reassignment, duties, discipline, and dismissal of personnel, including the general counsel.

Section 551.076 - Deliberation Regarding Security Devices or Security Audits.

- the deployment, or specific occasions for implementation, of security personnel or devices; or
- a security audit.

Section 551.089 - Deliberation Regarding Security Devices or Security Audits.

- security assessments or deployments relating to information resources technology;
- network security information as described by Government Code Section 2059.055(b); or
- the deployment, or specific occasions for implementation, of security personnel, critical infrastructure, or security devices.

9. **Action Items from Closed Session**

10. Public Comment

11. Adjournment

The Board will allow an open comment period to receive public comment on any agenda item or other matter that is under the jurisdiction of the Board. No action will be taken on matters that are not part of the agenda for the meeting. For subjects that are not otherwise part of the agenda for the meeting, Board members may respond in accordance with Government Code §551.042 and consider the feasibility of placing the matter on the agenda for a future meeting.

If you would like to comment on any agenda item (including an open comment under the agenda item for Public Comment), you must complete a speaker's form at the registration table prior to the agenda item being taken up by the Board or send an email to GCO_General@txdmv.gov to register by providing the required information prior to the agenda item being taken up by the Board:

1. a completed [Public Comment Registration Form](#); or
2. the following information:
 - a. the agenda item you wish to comment on;
 - b. your name;
 - c. your address (optional), including your city, state, and zip code; and
 - d. who you are representing.

Public comment will only be accepted in person. Each speaker will be limited to three minutes, and time allotted to one speaker may not be reassigned to another speaker.

Any individual with a disability who plans to attend this meeting and requires auxiliary aids or services should notify the department as far in advance as possible, but no less than two days in advance, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Contact David Richards by telephone at (512) 465-1423.

I certify that I have reviewed this document and that it conforms to all applicable Texas Register filing requirements.

CERTIFYING OFFICIAL: Aline Aucoin, Interim General Counsel, (512) 465-5665.

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
BRIEFING ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Daniel Avitia, Executive Director
Agenda Item: 4.A
Subject: Executive Director's Report - Camp Hubbard Update

RECOMMENDATION

Briefing item only to provide an update on the Camp Hubbard Renewal Project.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The briefing will include information relating to the most recent meetings with our Camp Hubbard Renewal Project vendor, Marmon Mok, and the Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), as follows:

- Updated cost estimates for demolition of buildings 5 and 1, construction of the new building, furniture and equipment, technology needs, and moving expenses as we relocate staff temporarily and permanently between buildings.
- Updated plans for the first floor of the new building that include relocating placement of the public restrooms to move them closer to the main lobby where they are more accessible for use by the public who are attending meetings/events in the public spaces without the need to enter the secured portion of the building. The floor update also includes a few design "tweaks" to make the floor more useful and to give it better "flow."
- Presentation of Marmon Mok's "generic" interior and exterior schematic designs of shared interior areas such as lobbies, security desks, employee entrances and typical open office areas, as well as an exterior rendering including the use of terracotta, metal panels and curtain wall window systems to blend with the traditional look of the campus and to smoothly connect and integrate the buildings through design and color schemes.
- Overview of new building campus identification system.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

Not applicable.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

- In late February 2020, an assessment was commissioned to evaluate the condition of seven existing buildings at Camp Hubbard (Buildings 1 through 7) to provide recommendations for repair and updates. As part of the assessment, each building's age, size, estimated repair and replacement costs were presented to TxDMV. Information contained in the report allowed for the development of a Facility Condition Index (FCI), which was used to determine the physical condition of each facility expressed by the ratio of repair costs to replacement value of a facility. The higher an FCI rating, the poorer the condition of the facility.
- Recommendations suggested within the report were intended to bring all existing buildings up to a functional and Code compliant state, offering a renewed operating life to the buildings to allow for minimal future issues

beyond routine maintenance items. Building 1 came back with an FCI rating of 153 percent and Building 5 came back with an FCI rating of 134 percent. Both buildings were built in 1955 and are currently over 67 years old.

- TFC indicated it would be more cost effective for TxDMV to demolish some of the buildings to build a new building, to keep and renovate existing CH-6 and to keep historical CH-4. TxDMV proposed and received funding for Phase I design and planning project to review and consider the possibilities and the project was named the “Camp Hubbard Renewal Project.” TFC engaged Marmon Mok and both TxDMV and TFC have been working with Marmon Mok for the past year to create needed cost estimate and schematic design information to be presented at the next legislative session as an exceptional item for Phase II (renovation, demolition and construction) of the project.



CAMP HUBBARD RENEWAL PROJECT



INTERIOR VIEW - LOBBY

MarmonMok
ARCHITECTURE



INTERIOR VIEW – SECURITY DESK

MarmonMok
ARCHITECTURE




Interior View – Employee Entrance



Interior View – Typical Open Office Area




EXTERIOR VIEW



CAMPUS IDENTIFICATION – NUMERIC OPTION

MarmonMok
ARCHITECTURE

3 Month Look Ahead





Questions?



Texas Department of Motor Vehicles

HELPING TEXANS GO. HELPING TEXAS GROW.

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
BRIEFING ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Daniel Avitia, Executive Director
Agenda Item: 4.B
Subject: Executive Director's Report – Awards, Recognition of Years of Service, and Announcements

RECOMMENDATION

Briefing Only. Board Chair and members offer congratulations to employees receiving recognition for an award, reaching a state service milestone, or retirement.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Director announces the name of individuals who retired from the agency and recognizes employees who have reached a state service milestone of 20 years and every five-year increment thereafter. Recognition at the February 9, 2023, Board Meeting for state service awards and retirements include:

- Karen Poff – Vehicles Titles and Registration reached 20 years of state service.
- Sara Byers – Motor Carrier Division reached 30 years of state service.
- Jennifer Schrier – Consumer Relations Division reached 30 years of state service.

The following individual recently retired from the agency:

- Angela Masloff – Information Technology reached 26 years of state service

FINANCIAL IMPACT

No financial impact.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

No additional background and discussion.

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
ACTION ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Aline Aucoin, Acting General Counsel
Agenda Item: 5
Subject: **Proposal for Decision: Franchised Dealer's Protest of Manufacturer's Notice of Termination of Franchise; SOAH Docket No. 608-21-0988; Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Docket No. 21-0004-LIC; McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru, Petitioner v. Subaru of America Inc., Respondent**

RECOMMENDATION

This contested case is between two license holders. Department staff are prohibited from making a recommendation in this case because the department is not a party to the case.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) issued a Proposal for Decision (PFD). The Board is required to issue a final order in this case.

This contested case involves McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a/ Bert Ogden Subaru's (Bert Ogden) protest of the proposed termination of the franchise by Subaru of America, Inc. (Subaru), a distributor.

The issue presented before the Board is whether Subaru established—by a preponderance of the evidence¹ — good cause for termination of its franchise with Bert Ogden, as required in TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.453(g).

FINANCIAL IMPACT

No significant financial impact to TxDMV.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

On August 20, 2020, Subaru notified Bert Ogden of its intent to terminate the franchise. The department's Motor Vehicle Division referred this contested case to SOAH on January 8, 2021, and on January 14, 2021, the department issued a Notice of Hearing. A panel of two administrative law judges (ALJs) conducted the hearing on the merits on January 18-21, 24-28, and 31, 2022.

The ALJs closed the record of the administrative hearing on May 20, 2022, after post-hearing briefs were filed, and issued the PFD on July 19, 2022. The ALJs found that Subaru met its burden to show good cause for the termination and recommended the Board deny Bert Ogden's protest of the termination.

¹ Tex. Occ. Code §2301.453(g) requires the Board to determine whether the party seeking the termination has established by a preponderance of the evidence that there is good cause for the proposed termination. Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines "preponderance of the evidence" to mean the greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. This is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be.

On August 3, 2022, Bert Ogden filed Exceptions to the PFD, and on August 18, 2022, Subaru filed a Reply to Bert Ogden's Exceptions to the PFD. The ALJs considered the Exceptions and the Reply, and issued their Exceptions Letter on October 17, 2022. The ALJs' Exceptions Letter did not recommend any changes to the PFD and stated that the PFD was ready for consideration by the Board.

The Board has jurisdiction to consider the contested case and enter a final order. In determining whether Subaru established good cause for the termination, Texas law requires the Board to consider:

- 1) seven specific statutory factors,
- 2) all existing circumstances, and
- 3) whether the termination is based solely on the desire for market penetration.²

The ALJ's analysis of the statutory factors under TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.455 are summarized in the following chart:

Summary of ALJs' Analysis	
Factor	Evidence in Favor of:
<p>Factor 1: Dealer's Sales in Relation to the Sales in the Market – PFD pp. 17-41, 87-89</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bert Ogden has consistently been the lowest-performing dealer in its zone, achieving an average minimum sales responsibility (MSR) of 41.3% for the period 2016-2020; 100% is considered average. Bert Ogden's lower sales than the rest of the district or zone were not the result of Subaru's inventory allocation. Bert Ogden's sales in relation to the market supports termination. 	Termination/Subaru
<p>Factor 2: Dealer's Investment and Obligations – PFD pp. 41-46, 89-90</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bert Ogden itself did not invest much in the dealership, so its investments would not be greatly harmed by termination. This factor does not weigh in favor of or against termination. 	Neither Party
<p>Factor 3: Injury or Benefit to the Public – PFD pp. 46-54, 90-91</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ranked against other dealers in the Dallas-based zone (DFW Zone), Bert Ogden placed at or near the bottom in purchase satisfaction scores from 2017-2021. Bert Ogden also ranked below the DFW Zone in service satisfaction for most of 2019, all of 2020 and most of 2021. There is little public benefit to continuing Bert Ogden's dealership agreement considering the dealership's consistently low purchase and service satisfaction rankings. 	Termination/Subaru

² Tex. Occ. Code §2301.453 and §2301.455.

Summary of ALJs' Analysis	
Factor	Evidence in Favor of:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The possible inconvenience to customers during the transition to a new dealer, and the lack of benefit of leaving Bert Ogden's dealership agreement in place, is outweighed by the benefit to the public of a new Subaru dealer. This factor weighs in favor of termination. 	
Factor 4: Adequacy of the Dealer's Service Facilities, Equipment, Parts, and Personnel in Relation to Those of Other Dealers of New Motor Vehicles of the Same Line-Make – PFD pp. 54-63, 91-92 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no evidence that Bert Ogden's service facilities are inadequate in relation to other dealers. Bert Ogden had inadequate service parts, equipment, and personnel in relation to other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make. This factor weighs in favor of termination. 	Termination/Subaru
Factor 5: Whether Warranties are Being Honored by the Dealer – PFD pp. 63-68, 92 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The evidence did not establish that Bert Ogden refuses to perform warranty work. This factor weighs against termination. 	Against Termination/Bert Ogden
Factor 6: Parties' Compliance with the Franchise, Except to the Extent that the Franchise Conflicts with Occupations Code Chapter 2301 – PFD pp. 69-80, 93 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bert Ogden failed to comply with Subaru's staffing requirements, including those requiring exclusive sales and service staff, as well as the requirement for a certain number of sales consultants. Bert Ogden did not fully comply with the franchise agreement. This factor weighs in favor of termination. 	Termination/Subaru
Factor 7: Enforceability of the Franchise from a Public Policy Standpoint, Including Issues of the Reasonableness of the Franchise's Terms, Oppression, Adhesion, and the Parties' Relative Bargaining Power – PFD pp. 81-82, 93 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The dealer agreement contains standard terms and is not an unconscionable contract of adhesion. Bert Ogden's owner is an experienced and sophisticated business owner. 	Termination/Subaru

Summary of ALJs' Analysis	
Factor	Evidence in Favor of:
Whether the Desire for Market Penetration is the Sole Basis for Termination – PFD pp. 83, 93 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subaru is not seeking termination solely to increase market penetration. 	Neutral/Neither Party

Board Authority in this Contested Case

1. TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.453 establishes the requirements for a distributor's termination of a franchise.
2. TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.453(g) imposes the burden of proof on the distributor to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is good cause for the termination of the franchise.
3. TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.455 provides factors the Board must consider when determining whether the distributor established good cause for the proposed franchise termination.
4. TEX. OCC. CODE §2301.709 requires the board to issue a final order in this case.
5. TEX. GOV'T CODE §2001.058(e), allows an agency to change a finding of fact or a conclusion of law made by the ALJ only if the ALJ:
 - a. misapplied or misinterpreted applicable law, agency rules, written policies provided to the ALJ by the agency, or prior administrative decisions,
 - b. relied on a prior administrative decision that is incorrect or should be changed, or
 - c. made a technical error in a finding of fact that should be changed.

The Board must state in writing the specific reason and legal basis for a change made to a finding of fact or conclusion of law.

Attachments

The following documents are attached to this Executive Summary for consideration by the Board:

1. July 19, 2022 SOAH ALJ PFD
2. August 3, 2022 Bert Ogden's Exceptions to the ALJ PFD, Including Attachments A and B
3. August 18, 2022 Subaru's Reply to Bert Ogden's Exceptions to the PFD, Including Exhibit A
4. October 17, 2022 SOAH ALJ Exceptions Letter

FILED
608-21-0988 TxDMV Board Meeting eBook
7/19/2022 8:36 AM
STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Pegah Nasrollahzadeh, CLERK

February 9, 2023

21



ACCEPTED
608-21-0988
7/19/2022 11:07:08 am
STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Pegah Nasrollahzadeh, CLERK

State Office of Administrative Hearings

Kristofer S. Monson
Chief Administrative Law Judge

July 19, 2022

Daniel Avitia, Director
Motor Vehicle Division
Texas Department of Motor Vehicles
4000 Jackson Ave.
Austin, TX 78731

VIA EFILE TEXAS

Re: SOAH Docket No. 608-21-0988.LIC; Texas Department of Motor Vehicles No. 21-0004-LIC; McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru v. Subaru of America Inc.


Dear Mr. Avitia:

Please find enclosed a Proposal for Decision in this case. It contains my recommendation and underlying rationale.

Exceptions and replies may be filed by any party in accordance with 1 Texas Administrative Code § 155.507(b), a SOAH rule which may be found at www.soah.texas.gov/administrative-rules-and-laws.

Susan Rodriguez

Presiding Administrative Law Judge



Rebecca Smith

Presiding Administrative Law Judge

RS/tt

Enclosure

cc: James E. Cousar, Thompson & Knight LLP, 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1900, Austin, TX 78701-
VIA EFILE TEXAS
Mark T. Clouatre, Attorney At Law, Nelson Mullins, 1400 Wewatta St., Suite 500, Denver, CO
80202 - **VIA EFILE TEXAS**
Marie Medina, Docket Clerk, Texas Department of Motor Vehicle, 4000 Jackson Ave., Austin, TX
78731 - **VIA EFILE TEXAS**

SOAH Docket No. 608-21-0988**Suffix: LIC**

BEFORE THE STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

**MCALLEN JEEP, INC. D/B/A BERT OGDEN SUBARU,
PROTESTANT**

V.

**SUBARU OF AMERICA INC.,
RESPONDENT**

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SOAH Docket No. 608-21-0988**Suffix: LIC**

**BEFORE THE
STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS**

**MCALLEN JEEP, INC. D/B/A BERT OGDEN SUBARU,
PROTESTANT**

V.

**SUBARU OF AMERICA INC.,
RESPONDENT**

PROPOSAL FOR DECISION

McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru (Bert Ogden), a franchised dealership, filed a protest with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Department or Board)¹ regarding the decision by Subaru of America, Inc. (SOA) to terminate its dealership agreement for a Subaru dealership in Edinburg, Texas.

¹ The applicable statutes reference the “board” which is the Department and its governing board. Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2301.002(2), .005(a). The terms Board and Department are used interchangeably in this PFD.

After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) find that SOA has established good cause to terminate Bert Ogden's dealer agreement in accordance with section 2301.455. Accordingly, the ALJs recommend that Bert Ogden's protest be denied.

I. NOTICE, JURISDICTION, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

There are no contested issues of notice or jurisdiction in this proceeding. These matters are addressed in the findings of fact and conclusions of law without further discussion.

On August 20, 2020, SOA sent a letter notifying Bert Ogden of its intent to terminate its dealership agreement. On January 8, 2021, Bert Ogden filed its Notice of Protest with the Department. Also on January 8, 2021, the Department referred the protest to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for a contested hearing and on January 14, 2021, issued a Notice of Hearing to the parties.

The hearing on the merits was held via Zoom videoconference January 18-21, 24-28, and 31, 2022, before ALJs Rebecca Smith and Susan Rodriguez. At the hearing, Bert Ogden was represented by its counsel, Dan Worthington, James Cousar, and Brent Bishop. SOA was represented by its counsel, Mark T. Clouatre, Steven B. McFarland, and Adrienne L. Toon.

Fifteen witnesses testified live at the hearing. SOA presented testimony from (1) Troy Poston, Vice President of SOA's Eastern Region; (2) David Adams, the

current director of SOA's DFW Zone; (3) Michael Teti, SOA's Director of Sales Planning and Analysis; (4) Casey Griffin, Vice President of SOA's Central Region; (5) George Dubinsky, SOA's National Owner Loyalty Manager; (6) Richard Yannella, District Sales Manager for District 3 from 2016-2020; (7) Hector Flores, District 3's District Service and Parts Manager; (8) Elise Seoles, Zone Retailer Marketing Manager; (9) Mason Delapp, District Sales Manager for District 3; (10) expert witness Jay Lytle; and (11) expert witness Sharif Farhat. Bert Ogden presented testimony from (1) Geoff Mauldin, Bert Ogden's General Manager; (2) Natasha del Barrio, the CEO of the Bert Ogden Group; (3) Robert Vacker, the owner of the Bert Ogden Group and President of Bert Ogden; and (4) expert witness Joseph Roesner. The parties also presented testimony from the following witnesses in the form of deposition excerpts: David Boyer, SOA's Retail Development Manager for the DFW Zone; Chris Hurst, SOA's Manager of Insights; Miguel Castillo, Bert Ogden Group's Digital Marketing Director; Marsha Green, Bert Ogden Group's Vice President of Marketing; Robert Lucio (former CEO of the Bert Ogden Group); and Johnny Rodriguez, Bert Ogden Group's Public Relations Manager.

The record closed on May 20, 2022, after the parties' post-hearing briefs and response briefs were filed.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Texas Occupations Code (Code) chapter 2301 grants the Department statutory authority to regulate franchise relationships between dealers and motor vehicle manufacturers. Among other things, the Code contains limits on a manufacturer's ability to terminate a franchise agreement with a dealership, requiring that any protested termination must first be approved by the Department.² Specifically, Code § 2301.453 provides:

- (a) Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise, a manufacturer, distributor, or representative may not terminate or discontinue a franchise with a franchised dealer . . . unless the manufacturer, distributor, or representative provides notice of the termination or discontinuance as required by Subsection (c) and:
 - (1) the manufacturer, distributor, or representative receives the dealer's informed written consent;
 - (2) the appropriate time for the dealer to file a protest under Subsection (e) has expired; or
 - (3) the board makes a determination of good cause under Subsection (g).

In determining whether to there is "good cause under Subsection (g)" to approve a franchise termination, the Department must determine, following a hearing, whether the manufacturer has established, by a preponderance of the

² Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453.

evidence, that there is good cause for the proposed termination.³ Code § 2301.455 lists the factors that inform the Department’s good-cause determination. It states:

- (a) Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise, in determining whether good cause has been established under Section 2301.453 . . . the board shall consider all existing circumstances, including:
 - (1) the dealer’s sales in relation to the sales in the market;
 - (2) the dealer’s investment and obligations;
 - (3) injury or benefit to the public;
 - (4) the adequacy of the dealer’s service facilities, equipment, parts, and personnel in relation to those of other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make;
 - (5) whether warranties are being honored by the dealer;
 - (6) the parties’ compliance with the franchise, except to the extent that the franchise conflicts with this chapter; and
 - (7) the enforceability of the franchise from a public policy standpoint, including issues of the reasonableness of the franchise’s terms, oppression, adhesion, and the parties’ relative bargaining power.⁴

The Code states that “[t]he desire of a manufacturer, distributor, or representative for market penetration does not by itself constitute good cause.”⁵

³ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(g).

⁴ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a).

⁵ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(b).

If a dealer files a timely protest, then the Department is required to notify the manufacturer, a hearing must be held, and the manufacturer may not terminate the franchise until the Department issues a final decision finding good cause for the termination.⁶

SOA has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is good cause to terminate Bert Ogden's franchise.⁷

III. BACKGROUND

A. SUBARU OF AMERICA

SOA is the United States distributor of Subaru vehicles.⁸ SOA is divided into three regions—east, central, and west—which are, in turn, each broken into four zones.⁹ In the central region, the zones are based in Chicago, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Dallas.¹⁰ The Dallas-based zone, which SOA calls the DFW Zone, includes 44 retailers in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, as well as Jackson, Mississippi and Memphis, Tennessee.¹¹ Each zone is broken into geographically-defined districts containing between 10 to 12 retailers.¹²

⁶ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(a)(3), (f)(1)-(3).

⁷ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(g); 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.427.

⁸ Transcript (Tr.) Vol. 1 at 58.

⁹ Tr. Vol. 1 at 59.

¹⁰ Tr. Vol. 1 at 59-60.

¹¹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 297.

¹² Tr. Vol. 1 at 60.

Sales of Subaru vehicles have increased dramatically in recent years. According to Bert Ogden expert Joseph Roesner, “Subaru years ago was considered more of a niche product, and it’s, you know, now become a mass market . . . , one of the fastest growing.”¹³ Troy Poston, the former director of the DFW Zone, testified that in 2009, approximately 7,500 Subaru vehicles were sold in the DFW Zone; by 2019, sales of Subarus in the zone totaled 45,000.¹⁴ SOA vehicles, with the exception of the BRZ, are all-wheel drive¹⁵ and have traditionally been more popular in snowy regions.

SOA witnesses testified about some of the differences in the way the company approaches its business as compared to some other manufacturers. SOA intentionally operates on a lower days’ supply¹⁶ than many other brands, so there is not excess inventory. Mr. Poston distinguished SOA’s approach and explained it as part of SOA’s emergence as a stronger brand and as a way to create value:

You know, part of the transformation that we made as a brand really back in 2006 and 2007, is that, you know, we knew we needed to fundamentally change. We weren’t going to out Toyota, Toyota, or out Honda, Honda, or out Nissan, Nissan, and so we really changed our game and our products and our value statement, what we were all about, and we sought out to lower our supply, so improve the value, crank down the days’ supply.

¹³ Tr. Vol. 9 at 2389.

¹⁴ Tr. Vol. 1 at 68-69.

¹⁵ Tr. Vol. 2 at 441.

¹⁶ As discussed in greater detail later, days’ supply is an auto industry measurement that is calculated by comparing how much of something is sold per day to how much of that item is in inventory.

....

Ours is a little different at Subaru where we come up with what we believe we can sell based on the market. We go back to our parent company and ask them for that level of production. But we manage our inventory to a lower level.

....

Through history, you know, over the last 10, you know, 12 years or so, other brands like Nissan, Chrysler/Dodge, others, so they typically run with a lot higher days' supply on the ground and they also have units that are readily available, vehicles that are already produced that are sitting someplace and so very different. You know, someone can pick up the phone with one of them and say, Hey, I need some cars. Well, they may have cars sitting somewhere that they can ship over to them. We don't have fence cars, if you will. We haven't had that in over a decade. We sell future production so a vehicle that's not actually built from a domestic perspective and we sell to our retailers imports, cars, once they land at port, that way, you know, we only promise what we think we can deliver the next month.

....

That is our goal. We want to do that. When things equalize [after the chip shortage], we will continue to manage to a lower days' supply because we like that. We like the value statement that that provides, proves profitability for our retailers, it cuts down incentives, and it really supports the overall health of your brand.¹⁷

¹⁷ Tr. Vol. 1 at 142-44.

According to Mr. Poston, this difference is important for a dealer to realize: “If you try to go to market with Subaru the way you do Nissan, it’s not going to work.”¹⁸

B. BERT OGDEN SUBARU

Bert Ogden is owned by Janet Ogden Vackar and Robert C. Vackar,¹⁹ who is its president and dealer principal.²⁰ Bert Ogden is part of the Bert Ogden Group, which owns 23 other franchises and operates 19 different dealerships throughout the Rio Grande Valley area of Texas.²¹ Mr. Vackar is the group’s chairman of the board; Natasha del Barrio is its CEO. Bert Ogden is located within the DFW Zone’s District 3, which contains dealerships in Houston, San Antonio, Selma, Nederland, Bryan, and Corpus Christi, Texas.

The Bert Ogden dealership shares a location with the Bert Ogden Group’s Volvo and Mazda dealerships.²² The Mazda dealership is housed in its own building. The Volvo dealership and Bert Ogden share a building, but a customer cannot walk between those two dealerships without physically leaving the building and re-entering.²³ Bert Ogden Group’s Subaru, Volvo, Kia, and two Mazda dealerships all share the same general manager.²⁴ Since at least 2012, Bert Ogden

¹⁸ Tr. Vol. 1 at 145.

¹⁹ Bert Ogden Ex. 437 at 4622.

²⁰ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1836; SOA Ex. 11.

²¹ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1862.

²² Tr. Vol. 6 at 1500.

²³ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1969.

²⁴ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1664.

has not had a general manager devoted only to Subaru.²⁵ Geoff Mauldin, who holds the general manager position testified, however, that his primary focus is on Subaru.²⁶ As of the date of the hearing, the same general sales manager oversees sales at Bert Ogden Group's Subaru, Mazda, and Volvo dealerships.²⁷ All Bert Ogden Group salespeople may cross-sell other makes of vehicles.²⁸ Thus, from the same location, Bert Ogden salespeople could sell a customer a Mazda or a Volvo.

C. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SOA AND BERT OGDEN

After being recruited by SOA, Bert Ogden first entered into a dealer agreement with SOA on September 23, 2009.²⁹ The agreement contains standard provisions setting out SOA's expectations for all its dealers. Those provisions include establishing a goal of achieving the highest level of customer satisfaction possible; requiring the dealer to use its best efforts to aggressively, actively, and effectively promote the sale of Subaru products; requiring the dealer to effectively sell Subaru products to customers in its area of responsibility (AOR); and providing that those sales would be evaluated relative to SOA sales objectives and against other Subaru dealers.³⁰

²⁵ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1972.

²⁶ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1684.

²⁷ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1973.

²⁸ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1254; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1798.

²⁹ Tr. Vol. 1 at 67-68; SOA Ex. 1.

³⁰ Tr. Vol. 1 at 73-78.

Although the Bert Ogden dealership is located in Edinburg, TX, its AOR is called the Pharr AOR. The Pharr AOR covers the western portion of the Rio Grande Valley, including Edinburg, McAllen, and Harlingen, but stopping just on the far side of Harlingen, thus excluding San Benito, Brownsville, and most of Cameron County.³¹ This area has a growing population, and growth is expected to continue.³² Mr. Vackar described the Rio Grande Valley as “growing by leaps and bounds.”³³ The current population of the AOR is almost one million people.³⁴ Mr. Mauldin described the area around McAllen, Edinburg, and Mission—where the AOR is centered—as “some of the most affluent areas in the Rio Grande Valley.”³⁵

On May 20, 2014, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into a Sales Performance Addendum to their contract.³⁶ At that time, Bert Ogden was behind its minimum sales responsibility (MSR)—a measure of sales that will be discussed later—by 288 vehicles. In the 2014 sales addendum, Bert Ogden agreed to reach its MSR, which was 547 vehicles, unless the market conditions in the AOR decreased.³⁷ By December 2015, Bert Ogden was at 35.44% of its MSR, having sold a total of 269 vehicles during 2015.

³¹ SOA Ex. 188 at 22.

³² Tr. Vol. 6 at 1555.

³³ Tr. Vol. 8 at 2100.

³⁴ Tr. Vol. 8 at 2099.

³⁵ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1694.

³⁶ SOA Ex. 5.

³⁷ Tr. Vol. 1 at 1106-08.

On June 23, 2015, the parties entered into an Owner Loyalty Program (OLP) Performance Addendum, which required Bert Ogden to improve its purchase and service experience satisfaction scores by December 31, 2016, to a level equal to the Central Region's average scores.³⁸

Bert Ogden entered into a new dealer agreement with SOA on July 1, 2017.³⁹ At the same time, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into a second Sales Performance Addendum.⁴⁰ When the agreement was signed, Bert Ogden's MSR—the measure of vehicles SOA expected it to sell—was 860 vehicles, but it had only sold 359 vehicles. The 2017 Sales Performance Addendum required Bert Ogden to reach 50% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2018; to reach 60% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 20, 2019; and then to reach 70% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2020. Casey Griffin, SOA's Vice President for the central region, testified that other than for Bert Ogden, he never signed an agreement that allowed a dealer to perform at 50% of MSR, nor has he signed a sales performance addendum lasting three years for anyone else. Mr. Poston, the DFW Zone Director at the time, testified that a three-year sales performance addendum “was a big reach” for SOA, but SOA wanted Bert Ogden to get a degree of success and then work from there.⁴¹ Mr. Griffin understood that the addendum was something SOA had worked with Bert Ogden on because Mr. Vackar wanted

³⁸ SOA Ex. 7.

³⁹ SOA Ex. 11.

⁴⁰ SOA Ex. 12.

⁴¹ Tr. Vol. 1 at 114.

more time to be able to improve and hit sales targets, and SOA accommodated that request.⁴²

Mr. Griffin also testified that he discussed Subaru's business model with Mr. Vackar because he wanted to be sure that Mr. Vackar understood that Subaru's model is not to open lots of stores but rather to put in successful stores that are able to grow the customer base.⁴³ Mr. Griffin said he did not think Mr. Vackar had a good understanding of Subaru's business model and philosophy.⁴⁴ Mr. Vackar took Mr. Griffin to his Nissan dealership and discussed the volume of business at that dealership.⁴⁵ Mr. Griffin said Mr. Vackar does a large volume of business at his Nissan dealership, but that Nissan's business model is the opposite of Subaru's: Nissan has more inventory than demand, whereas Subaru prefers to have more demand than supply because high demand keeps inventories, and, therefore, costs low.⁴⁶ Mr. Poston testified he also explained SOA's model to Mr. Vackar.⁴⁷

SOA expressed concern with turnover, staffing, and focus at Bert Ogden. Dave Adams, the current DFW Zone Director and former zone market development manager, described the issues as:

⁴² Tr. Vol. 3 at 686-87.

⁴³ Tr. Vol. 3 at 678-79.

⁴⁴ Tr. Vol. 3 at 679.

⁴⁵ Tr. Vol. 3 at 679.

⁴⁶ Tr. Vol. 3 at 679-80.

⁴⁷ Tr. Vol. 1 at 144-45.

We had a lot of staffing turnover with finance and insurance managers. We had a tremendous amount of turnover with the salespeople in general, we had tremendous turnover in sales management. We never really had any exclusive focus on the brand. We would constantly be shared with finance managers from Mazda, customers from Volvo and basically just a lack of focus.⁴⁸

He added that SOA frequently had to chase Bert Ogden employees to get certified and that the issue was particularly acute with finance and insurance employees who were unfamiliar with Subaru products and features.⁴⁹

SOA's frustration was not one-sided. In her testimony, Ms. del Barrio testified that SOA was the only manufacturer that would not pick up the phone and call the company.⁵⁰ Mr. Mauldin and Mr. Vackar testified that they wanted more inventory than SOA was providing them.⁵¹

D. NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE

Eventually, SOA decided to terminate its dealer agreement with Bert Ogden. Mr. Griffin testified that SOA takes the proposed termination of a dealer very seriously. Terminations are infrequent, and SOA tries to give dealers an opportunity to resolve problems, as it did with Bert Ogden's three-year sales addendum.⁵² The decision to terminate was made after reviewing sales data, MSR

⁴⁸ Tr. Vol. 2 at 303.

⁴⁹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 304-05.

⁵⁰ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1982-83.

⁵¹ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1714; Tr. Vol. 8 at 2070.

⁵² Tr. Vol. 3 at 688.

data, customer satisfaction data, and a Better Business Bureau report.⁵³ Mr. Griffin testified that he also reviewed the number of additional vehicles SOA provided to Bert Ogden, sales agreement results, OLP information, and the opinions of employees in the DFW Zone.⁵⁴ The sales agreement results that were reviewed included the results under the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum.⁵⁵

Mr. Griffin signed the August 20, 2020 Notice of Intention to Terminate, which informed Bert Ogden that SOA intended to terminate the dealer agreement, effective the 61st day following receipt of the letter.⁵⁶ The notice listed three specific grounds for the termination: failure to comply with sales performance obligations; operational deficiencies in the dealership; and Bert Ogden's failure to achieve acceptable levels on SOA's customer satisfaction measurement tool.

Since the termination notice was issued, Bert Ogden increased its sales. For a few months, it was a significant increase. Beginning around August or September 2020, Bert Ogden's sales performance almost doubled in a 90-day period.⁵⁷ Since that time, however, the rate has slowed down. The total number of vehicles Bert Ogden has sold has increased from the number at the time of the termination notice. For example, in 2017, Bert Ogden sold 337 new vehicles; in 2021,

⁵³ Tr. Vol. 3 at 687-88.

⁵⁴ Tr. Vol. 3 at 711, 730-31.

⁵⁵ Tr. Vol. 3 at 711-12.

⁵⁶ SOA Ex. 172.

⁵⁷ Tr. Vol. 3 at 599.

Bert Ogden sold just shy of 500 new vehicles.⁵⁸ The 2021 sales remain below the MSR, and below the numbers the 2017 sales performance addendum required after the first year.

IV. TERMINATION NOTICE

Code § 2301.453 provides that a manufacturer cannot terminate a franchise agreement unless written notice is sent to the dealer “stating the specific grounds for the termination or discontinuance.”⁵⁹ Bert Ogden argues that, based on this requirement, only the “specific grounds” set out in the termination notice can be examined.

The ALJs disagree. The Code requires a consideration of all existing circumstances, including the enumerated good-cause factors. The analysis is not limited to those reasons set out in the termination notice.

Bert Ogden does not raise any objections to the notice, other than that it should limit the considerations at hearing, and the ALJs find that SOA met the Code’s notice requirements.

⁵⁸ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1866. In its briefing, Bert Ogden suggests the 2021 number is actually higher, pointing to Exhibit 64, which is dated September 2021, and lists a rolling-year-to-date sales total of 515. Because it is a rolling-year-to-date number, it includes the totals from the end of 2020. (*See, e.g.*, SOA Ex. 172 at 3 n.1 (“Rolling-year-to-date or RYTD means the prior 12-month period ending on the month indicated.”)) The ALJs do not interpret Exhibit 64 as suggesting that Bert Ogden sold greater than 515 new vehicles in 2021.

⁵⁹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(c). The statute also requires that notice be sent, via registered or certified mail; be received at least sixty days before the effective date of the termination; and that it contain prominent information notifying the dealer of its right to file a protest. Bert Ogden does not contest SOA’s compliance with these elements.

V. STATUTORY GOOD-CAUSE FACTORS

The legislature has directed that SOA bears the burden of establishing that good cause exists to terminate Bert Ogden's franchise, and that good cause takes into consideration "all existing circumstances."⁶⁰ Each statutory factor is discussed below.

A. SALES IN RELATION TO THE MARKET

The first of the statutory good cause factors is Bert Ogden's "sales in relation to the sales in the market."⁶¹ SOA generally argues that Bert Ogden has consistently been the lowest-performing dealer in the DFW Zone (and thus, in the district). Bert Ogden, in contrast, argues that SOA measures sales inappropriately, particularly given the specific characteristics of the Pharr AOR.

The metric SOA uses for evaluating a dealer's sales performance is called MSR.⁶² This nationwide system was in place when Bert Ogden signed its dealership agreement.⁶³ According to SOA expert Sharif Farhat, the MSR is "nearly identical" to the methods used by other manufacturers.⁶⁴ The MSR is calculated by geographic area and is based on segments—groups of similar, competitive vehicles in terms of size, configuration, and price. SOA only looks at segments in which it

⁶⁰ Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2301.453(g), .455(a).

⁶¹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(1).

⁶² Tr. Vol. 1 at 81, 82.

⁶³ Tr. Vol. 1 at 81.

⁶⁴ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1488.

sells vehicles; for example, it does not consider pickup trucks.⁶⁵ Based on the vehicles it distributes, SOA uses the following segments: compact crossover utility vehicle (CUV), compact conventional, compact sporty, midsize conventional, and midsize CUV.

For each of these segments, SOA determines the MSR by first calculating the percentage of new registered vehicles in the relevant area that are Subaru vehicles. In a 2014 example Mr. Poston presented in his testimony, the Subaru Forester's market share of the compact CUV segment was 5.09%. Therefore, Bert Ogden's MSR for Foresters (a Subaru compact CUV) would be 5.09% of the total number of new compact CUV vehicles registered in the Pharr AOR for a rolling 12-month period. In the 2014 example, 4,869 compact CUVs were registered in the Pharr AOR, and 5.09% of 4,869 is 248. Accordingly, Bert Ogden's MSR for Foresters for that period was 248.

Although its MSR was 248 Foresters, during that period, Bert Ogden sold 98 Foresters.⁶⁶ Sales anywhere would be counted toward the MSR. Thus, if Bert Ogden sold to someone outside its AOR—as it did for some of the vehicles in the 2014 example—those sales would be counted toward its MSR. Likewise, as Bert Ogden points out, other dealers' sales outside their AORs count toward their MSR achievement.

⁶⁵ Tr. Vol. 1 at 85.

⁶⁶ SOA Ex. 57.

Through 2017, SOA used the DFW Zone as the benchmark for the MSR. In other words, the 5.09% discussed above was based on the percentage of new Subaru registrations in the entire zone. In 2018, SOA changed its benchmark and began using registrations in the district—in Bert Ogden’s case, District 3.⁶⁷ According to Mr. Farhat, this change reduced the expectations SOA put on Bert Ogden.⁶⁸

SOA considers a retailer who achieves 100% MSR to be an average retailer.⁶⁹ For the 2014 example Mr. Poston described, Bert Ogden’s achieved only 43.14% of its overall MSR.⁷⁰ It is undisputed that Bert Ogden has been below its MSR the entire time it has been a Subaru dealership.⁷¹

Although SOA considered a retailer who achieved MSR to be average, Bert Ogden’s expert, Mr. Roesner, testified that SOA’s charts indicate that very few dealers had sales right at 100% MSR.⁷² Most dealers scored above the MSR; some were below.

As discussed previously, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into two different sales performance addendums to their contract.⁷³ The first was entered into in May 2014, following a time when Bert Ogden was behind its MSR by 288 vehicles.

⁶⁷ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1520.

⁶⁸ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1521.

⁶⁹ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1205.

⁷⁰ Tr. Vol. 1 at 89; SOA Ex. 57.

⁷¹ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1992. *See also* Tr. Vol. 1 at 96 (describing Bert Ogden’s 10-year sales performance as “very poor”).

⁷² Tr. Vol. 8 at 2224-25.

⁷³ SOA Exs. 5, 12.

In the 2014 sales addendum, Bert Ogden agreed to reach its MSR (547 vehicles) unless the market conditions in the AOR decreased.⁷⁴ By December 2015, Bert Ogden was at 35.44% of its MSR, having sold a total of 269 vehicles during 2015.

SOA and Bert Ogden entered into a second sales performance addendum in July 2017.⁷⁵ At that time, Bert Ogden's MSR was 860 vehicles, but it had only sold 359 vehicles. The 2017 Sales Performance Addendum required Bert Ogden to reach 50% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2018; to reach 60% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 20, 2019; and then to reach 70% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2020.

Bert Ogden did not reach 50% of MSR in the initial one-year period of the 2017 sales performance addendum.⁷⁶ As of December 2018, Bert Ogden was selling at 44.10% of MSR, which ranked in the bottom 10% of the DFW Zone retailers.⁷⁷ In fact, Bert Ogden had the lowest MSR rank in the DFW Zone for the period 2016-2020, achieving an average of 41.3% of its MSR.⁷⁸ The second-to-lowest

⁷⁴ Tr. Vol. 1 at 1106-08.

⁷⁵ SOA Ex. 12.

⁷⁶ Tr. Vol. 1 at 118. As discussed later, Bert Ogden points out that it came close to meeting the first year's requirement.

⁷⁷ SOA Ex. 113.

⁷⁸ SOA Ex. 188 at 043.

dealership's MSR average for that period was 60.3%.⁷⁹ Mr. Farhat also testified that for 2020, 31 of the 43 dealers in the DFW Zone met or exceeded MSR.⁸⁰

Mr. Farhat testified that there was also a "pretty high" level of in-sell into the Pharr AOR. In-sell means that a new Subaru vehicle was registered in the Pharr AOR but was purchased somewhere other than at Bert Ogden. Mr. Farhat called this level of in-sell at a remote dealership "surprising."⁸¹

SOA presented evidence about other issues related to sales. For example, in 2019, of all the District 3 dealers, Bert Ogden took the longest time to respond to leads.⁸² Rich Yannella, SOA's former District 3 manager, described walking into the dealership and finding no employees in the showroom.⁸³ Mr. Yannella also testified that he conducted a mystery shop and sent in an internet lead.⁸⁴ He received a response regarding a Subaru Outback, but after that he received a response offering him a Mazda.⁸⁵ He sent another mystery shopper to submit an internet lead to Bert Odgen; this shopper received information about a Volvo.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ SOA Ex. 188 at 045. The second-to-lowest was in the DFW Zone but in a different district than Bert Ogden. The second-lowest performing dealership in District 3, Bert Ogden's district, averaged 60.9% of MSR for that period.

⁸⁰ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1523; SOA Ex. 188 at 035.

⁸¹ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1568.

⁸² Tr. Vol. 4 at 882; SOA Ex. 70.

⁸³ Tr. Vol. 4 at 886.

⁸⁴ A mystery shop is a method of using an undercover employee or contractor posing as a potential customer in order to check on a dealer's customer service. It is discussed in greater detail in the section on warranties, Section E.

⁸⁵ Tr. Vol. 4 at 896.

⁸⁶ Tr. Vol. 4 at 898.

Although SOA argues that Bert Ogden's low sales, as reflected by the low MSR percentage it achieved, supports termination, Bert Ogden argues that the MSR is an inherently inappropriate and unreliable metric and that it is unfair to compare the Pharr AOR to anywhere else. It also argues that SOA cannot terminate the contract of a dealer whose sales are increasing, that it received insufficient inventory to sell vehicles effectively, that previous retailers in the AOR have done poorly, and that it is being punished for the success of other Bert Ogden Group retailers.

1. Use of MSR to Measure Sales in Relation to the Market

Bert Ogden argues that caselaw supports its position that MSR, in general, is an unfair method for measuring sales effectiveness. The first case it cites is one that notes the New York high court held it unreasonable for GM to use a statewide performance standard to determine compliance with a franchise agreement.⁸⁷ In the second case it cites, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered a similar method in the context of compliance with the agreement.⁸⁸

Notably, however, both cases analyze a statewide (in the case of *Beck*), or region-wide (in the case of *Nissan*) sales metric in the context of whether a dealer has breached the dealership agreement, not for the statutory factor of sales in relation to the market. Whether or not it is an appropriate tool for measuring compliance with a contract, MSR seems to the ALJs to be a helpful tool in

⁸⁷ *Beck Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors LLC*, 845 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing *Beck Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors LLC*, 53 N.E.3d 706, 713-14 (N.Y. 2016)).

⁸⁸ *Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 592 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.).

measuring a dealer's sales in relation to the market. Additionally, although Bert Ogden argues against using the MSR for this purpose, it does not propose an alternative.⁸⁹

And as SOA has pointed out, the MSR is no longer a Zone-wide measure. Instead, since 2018, MSR has been based on other dealers within District 3, which does not include any snowy, mountainous regions. Assuming without deciding that a statewide comparison could be considered unfair, there is no reason from the evidence that a comparison based on sales data from other dealerships in District 3 is unfair. SOA has to be able to use some kind of comparative sales metric to be able to examine sales in relation to the market.

The ALJs find that MSR is a relevant and useful tool for analyzing Bert Ogden's sales in comparison to the market.

2. Flaws with the Benchmark

In its Closing Argument, Bert Ogden contends that, even if the MSR could generally be used, the benchmark SOA used for the MSR is flawed because the sales of models in the benchmark do not accurately track the actual sales of those vehicles in the Pharr AOR. It amplifies this argument and provides significantly greater detail (including an appendix) in its Reply Brief.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Bert Ogden correctly points out that it does not have the burden of proof. However, it should suggest an alternative metric for the factor if it is going to argue that the only metric proposed is inappropriate.

⁹⁰ The evidence, in different form, was attached to Mr. Roesner's report, Bert Ogden Ex. 467.

In its Closing Argument, relying on a December 2016 report, Bert Ogden indicates that in the Pharr AOR, Nissan Sentra exceeded the Zone-wide benchmark by a significant amount. The Nissan Sentra represented 28.39% of the AOR share for the compact conventional segment, but the benchmark indicated it should be 12.16%. On the other end, Bert Ogden points out that although the Toyota Corolla's Zone benchmark share for the same segment was 17.02%; in the Pharr AOR, sales of the Toyota Corolla were only 14.27% during that period. Similarly, the Honda Civic, with a benchmark share of 16.91%, only made up 9.53% of the segment sales in the Pharr AOR during the 12 months before December 2016.⁹¹ According to Bert Ogden, these latter two are particularly significant because SOA's own research indicates that those two models are the most common seriously-considered models when comparing the Subaru Impreza to other models. In its reply brief, Bert Ogden delved even deeper into this comparison of all the differences between the benchmark and the actual sales in the Pharr AOR.

Bert Ogden's argument relating to the compact conventional benchmark is based on Zone-wide SOA research indicating that the two vehicles most seriously considered as substitutes for the Subaru Impreza (a compact conventional model) were the Honda Civic and the Toyota Corolla.⁹² Bert Ogden expanded this discussion beyond the Impreza. Mr. Roesner testified that because the sales of the vehicles that purchasers in the Zone considered to be the most-seriously considered alternatives, segmentation does not account for all differences in a market. In its reply brief, Bert Ogden spends 19 pages setting out differences

⁹¹ Bert Ogden's Closing Argument at 33.

⁹² Tr. Vol. 9 at 2257.

between AOR sales of various models and the benchmark, and then adds a 43-page appendix. Bert Ogden's brief also highlights a chart entitled "Top 5 Seriously Considered Vehicles (Subaru Excluded)" for the Impreza.⁹³ According to the chart, 10% of people who purchased an Impreza considered a Honda Civic, 7% considered a Toyota Corolla, 5% considered a Toyota RAV4, 5% considered a Toyota Camry, and 4% considered a Honda Accord. This, on its face, shows a total of 31% of Impreza purchasers considering a Toyota or Honda. It says nothing about what the remaining 69% considered. Additionally, Mr. Roesner agreed that it was not surprising for Honda and Toyota to be the most commonly considered alternatives as they are among the largest volume manufacturers nationally.⁹⁴

Although Bert Ogden has established that the benchmark does not perfectly match the actual segment sales in the Pharr AOR, the ALJs do not find that point to have the significance Bert Ogden suggests. Again, the ALJs note that Bert Ogden has never suggested another metric for the "sales within the market" factor that the statute requires to be considered. It only argues that because Nissans and Buicks sell better in the Pharr AOR and Toyotas and Hondas sell worse, Bert Ogden cannot be expected to match the MSR because surveys list Toyotas and Hondas as the most common seriously-considered alternatives for people who end up buying Subarus.

Bert Ogden is not arguing that the segments are improperly created—that Subaru vehicles are placed in the incorrect segments or that other competitive

⁹³ Bert Ogden's Closing Argument at 34 (citing Bert Ogden Ex. 467, tab 7 at 12).

⁹⁴ Tr. Vol. 9 at 2381.

vehicles should be considered. It is also not expressly arguing that Subaru sales should only be measured against Honda or Toyota sales. Nor is it saying the number of registered vehicles in the AOR for each segment is inaccurate.

The ALJs decline to find that because Honda and Toyota sales are lower in the Pharr AOR than in the SOA benchmark and because other vehicles, such as Nissans, have higher sales, the MSR cannot be used to examine Bert Ogden's sales. The suggestion that because Hondas and Toyotas underperform in the Pharr AOR, Subarus must, as well, is not supported by the evidence indicating that 31% of Subaru buyers seriously considered purchasing a Honda or Toyota.

3. Demographic and Geographic Characteristics

Bert Ogden next argues that the demographics and other features in the Pharr AOR make the use of the MSR particularly inappropriate for measuring its performance. Bert Ogden contends that the Pharr AOR is younger, less educated, less Caucasian, and lower-earning than the standard Subaru purchaser in either the rest of District 3 or the DFW Zone. Bert Ogden also argues that the geography of the Rio Grande Valley makes it particularly challenging to sell Subaru vehicles there. Objecting to SOA's use of the word "opportunity" in its briefing, Bert Ogden analogizes its business to a manufacturer of upscale snow tires opening a franchise in Miami and argues that such a franchise could not be considered an opportunity.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 14. Mr. Roesner, Bert Ogden's expert witness, also used the word "opportunity" when, for example, testifying that MSR is "a measure of market opportunity within the dealer's area." Tr. Vol. 8 at 2225.

SOA argues that, by comparing sales to other segment sales in the AOR, the MSR sufficiently adjusts for preferences in the local market. SOA has argued that segmentation focuses on the specific types of vehicles being purchased in an AOR. It continues, “Because local consumer preferences are reflected in the actual number of vehicles registered within each segment, this process expressly accounts for any socioeconomic factors (such as age, income, or local economic factors) that may impact the specific type of vehicles that consumers decide to purchase in a particular market.”⁹⁶

a) Evidence

At hearing, Bert Ogden presented expert testimony from Mr. Roesener. One of the topics he addressed in detail was the ways in which the Pharr AOR was both demographically and geographically different from other AORs within the DFW Zone. For example, he created a chart ranking the AORs in the Zone by annual snowfall. The highest by far was Santa Fe’s annual 22.68 inches.⁹⁷ Bert Ogden’s AOR, with an annual snowfall of 0.04 inches, had the fourth-lowest annual snowfall in the Zone. Mr. Roesner also testified about, for example, the absence of ski areas within 4 hours of the Pharr AOR. He also testified that the median income was significantly lower in the Pharr AOR relative to the other AORs, as was the percentage of the population without a high school diploma.⁹⁸ He did a significant number of regression analyses showing correlation between sales and various demographic factors and Subaru purchases.

⁹⁶ SOA’s Reply Brief at 6.

⁹⁷ Bert Ogden Ex. 467, tab 20 at 3.

⁹⁸ Tr. Vol. 9 at 2321-22.

Yet Mr. Roesner also agreed, on cross examination, that he could not say there was a statistically significant correlation between median household income and MSR achievement or between what percentage of the population is Hispanic and MSR achievement.⁹⁹ Also, based on his snowfall chart, none of the dealers in District 3 had annual snowfall of over 0.24 inches. From his chart, it was also apparent that the second-lowest performer in the Zone, the dealership in Midland, had the 10th highest average annual snowfall.

The parties both agree that MSR is the factor with the highest correlation to sales, although they disagreed about what that correlation was.¹⁰⁰ SOA presented testimony to effect that this correlation makes sense: dealers in larger markets sell more vehicles than dealers in smaller ones.¹⁰¹

Mr. Farhat, Mr. Lytle, and to a lesser extent Mr. Roesner, agreed that the correlation shown in a regression analysis does not show causation.¹⁰² In other

⁹⁹ Tr. Vol. 9 at 2421. To the extent Bert Ogden complains about the lack of Spanish-language television advertising or not being part of a pilot program for television ads in Spanish, Mr. Vackar described advertising on Spanish-language television as “ineffective” and agreed that Bert Ogden did not itself spend money on it. Tr. Vol. 8 at 2162.

¹⁰⁰ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1491-93; SOA Ex. 188 at 20-21. In his report, Mr. Farhat found the R^2 (a measure of correlation) of retail sales and MSR to be 0.9132, a very high level of correlation. Mr. Roesner objected to Mr. Farhat forcing the y-intercept through zero in his original report. Mr. Farhat ran a second report, without forcing the y-intercept through zero, and found a R^2 of 0.5476 for 2020 and 0.6942 for 2021, a less strong correlation. SOA Ex. 189 at 002-003. Mr. Farhat testified that he forced the intercept through zero because otherwise it would not make sense; if there was no demand (zero MSR on the x-axis), there would not be sales greater than zero. Tr. Vol. 6 at 1655-56. The ALJs do not need to resolve the conflict, but note there is a meaningful amount of correlation between MSR and dealer sales.

¹⁰¹ Tr. Vol. 6 at 1493.

¹⁰² Tr. Vol. 6 at 1450; Tr. Vol. 10 at 2521.

words, the regression analysis cannot show that, for example, having a population with a higher level of education leads to greater sales.

For its part, SOA presented testimony calling the significance of these differences into question, noting for example, that there are no ski areas within four hours of Austin, whose Subaru dealer sells the largest number of vehicles in the United States. SOA also obtained testimony from Mr. Roesner agreeing that an all-wheel drive vehicle might be fun on the beach at South Padre Island, which is close to the Pharr AOR.¹⁰³

SOA also points to Mr. Vackar's testimony that he wanted to build a second Subaru dealership in the Valley, between Harlingen and Brownsville, and noted that Mr. Vackar also testified that he has confidence that Subaru vehicles can sell in the Rio Grande Valley.¹⁰⁴

b) Analysis

The ALJs note that by changing the MSR to reflect a district benchmark, SOA is no longer comparing Bert Ogden's sales to those in Santa Fe or Fayetteville, another location with a focus on outdoor activity. Sales in a snowy location are no longer part of the MSR. Thus, although Bert Ogden argues that "Imposing an MSR requirement on a dealer in the Rio Grande Valley that is based on market penetration in the 40 plus other markets in SOA's DFW Zone is arbitrary, unreasonable, and undermined by the false premise that 'segmentation'

¹⁰³ Tr. Vol. 9 at 2404.

¹⁰⁴ Tr. Vol. 8 at 2108.

controls all other market factors,”¹⁰⁵ Bert Ogden’s MSR is not calculated by looking at all those markets and has not been for several years. While SOA measured how well Bert Ogden was meeting its MSR compared to how other dealers in the DFW Zone were meeting theirs, Bert Ogden’s MSR does not reflect the number of, for example, all-wheel vehicles in Santa Fe.

Because District 3 sales are used to calculate the MSR, Bert Ogden is essentially arguing that, for example, its 0.04 inches of annual snowfall negatively affects its ability to sell Subarus when compared to the area with the greatest amount of annual snowfall in the district, which is 0.24 inches. In sum, average annual snowfall amounts in District 3 range between 0.00 inches and 0.24 inches. The ALJs find this argument unpersuasive, particularly given that the District 3 dealership with 0.00-inch annual snowfall performed better than Bert Ogden.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, no evidence suggested there were any more ski destinations within 4 hours of San Antonio, Corpus Christi, or Bryan than there are within 4 hours of Pharr.

And these sales in similar climates are what distinguishes Bert Ogden from a business selling “upscale snow tires in Miami.” Although all-wheel drive vehicles might be more useful in snowy climates, nothing in the record indicates that Subaru vehicles are as useless in the Rio Grande Valley as snow tires are in Miami.¹⁰⁷ In fact, many of the dealerships with an equivalent amount of snow, similarly far away

¹⁰⁵ Bert Ogden’s Closing Argument at 21.

¹⁰⁶ Two other dealerships outside District 3 with 0.00 in annual snowfall also performed better than Bert Ogden.

¹⁰⁷ To the extent that Bert Ogden views Subaru vehicles in the Rio Grande Valley to be as useful as snow tires in Miami, it is unclear why Bert Ogden would want the franchise or want to expand to a second one.

from skiing, and with young populations perform better than Bert Ogden. By focusing on the demographic and geographic differences within the entire zone, not just the district, and by highlighting differences that its own expert testified are not statistically significant, Bert Ogden has presented a case that it cannot be expected to sell Subarus. Indeed, the evidence shows that fewer Subarus are sold in District 3 than in Santa Fe, Fayetteville, or Austin. They did not, however, present persuasive evidence that it is significantly harder to sell Subarus in the Rio Grande Valley than in Corpus Christi, San Antonio, or Bryan.

In fact, the ALJs find it notable that Bert Ogden presented detailed evidence and testimony about education levels, snowfall, and income, but did not present any evidence related to dealer acts that could affect sales. Or rather, Bert Ogden did not present evidence or argument related to factors in its own control. And it did not attempt to contest the evidence—such as about the shared management structure, cross-selling, and responding to online inquiries about Subaru vehicles with advertising for Mazdas or Volvos—presented on this topic.

4. Inventory

As discussed previously, SOA dealers operate with a lower level of inventory than many other manufacturers' dealers do. Bert Ogden argues that SOA's method of allocating inventory and, consequently, the amount of inventory it received hampered its sales performance. The dealership argues that the Bert Ogden Group has had great success selling vehicles in the Rio Grande Valley by having a large inventory, in contrast to its Subaru dealership.

a) Allocation

SOA allocates vehicles, by each of Subaru's nine carlines, on a monthly basis to all of its dealers.¹⁰⁸ Three factors impact allocation. First, 50% of the dealer's allocation calculation is based on the retailer's days' supply of each carline. The days' supply consists of vehicles the dealer actually has at the dealership and future units that SOA expects the dealer to have available within the next 30 days.¹⁰⁹ This method is commonly known as a balanced days' supply.¹¹⁰

Days' supply is the auto industry's method for measuring levels of inventory and is calculated by comparing how much of something is sold per day to how much of that item is in inventory. If a dealer sells one car per day and has 30 cars in inventory, the dealer has a 30 days' supply.¹¹¹ SOA tries to consider the average inventory level across an area and tries to keep retailers as close as possible to the average based on their relative sizes. Most auto companies use this type of system.¹¹² As SOA expert Jay Lytle described it, "the idea is that all the dealers that—will have similar days' supply so [the manufacturers] try and have [the dealers] all have the same days' supply such that if no more vehicles are allocated theoretically they would all . . . run out of vehicles on the same day."¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Tr. Vol. 2 at 544, 553.

¹⁰⁹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 545.

¹¹⁰ Tr. Vol. 2 at 540-41.

¹¹¹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 541.

¹¹² Tr. Vol. 2 at 541-42.

¹¹³ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1389.

Second, 25% of the allocation is based on the retailer's sales share of its zone by carline. This calculation acknowledges that not every dealer is successful with every carline. A dealer's qualifying retail sales for a carline for the last three months is divided by the zone's qualifying sales for the same period for a particular carline.¹¹⁴ And third, 25% of the allocation is based on the retailer's sales share of its zone for all carlines, for the last three months.¹¹⁵

These three factors all depend on dealer sales and sales share.¹¹⁶ In deciding where to put product that needs to be sold, SOA wants to put its product where it can be sold efficiently.¹¹⁷ These calculations mean that dealers can increase their allocations by increasing sales.¹¹⁸ The allocation system would attempt to raise the dealer's inventory back up to the average. On the other hand, slow sales reduce allocations because a dealer already has a higher days' supply. This allocation methodology is sometimes called a "turn-and-earn" system,¹¹⁹ and is similar to those of other manufacturers.¹²⁰

As discussed previously, where SOA varies from other manufacturers or distributors is in the amount of inventory—or days' supply—it has and distributes. SOA operates with a lean inventory amount. As Mr. Adams put it, "we don't have

¹¹⁴ Tr. Vol. 2 at 547.

¹¹⁵ Tr. Vol. 2 at 547-48.

¹¹⁶ Tr. Vol. 3 at 622.

¹¹⁷ Tr. Vol. 2 at 550.

¹¹⁸ Tr. Vol. 2 at 550.

¹¹⁹ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1976.

¹²⁰ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1385.

extra vehicles sitting at the production facility. We have a very low days' supply of vehicles.”¹²¹

Thus, efficient selling is an important part of obtaining inventory allocation. SOA presented evidence about sold orders, which is one method of efficient selling. Michael Teti, SOA's Director of Sales Planning and Analysis, testified that sold orders, which are when a retailer places an order for a customer of specific vehicle with specific features, usually make up around 10% of total SOA sales.¹²² There are several benefits to a dealer from sold orders. In addition to giving SOA information about what product mix is best suited for the area, a sold order is in inventory for a shorter period of time, which can have a positive effect on the dealer's future inventory allocation.¹²³ Mr. Poston also testified about the importance of sold orders, calling them “a big part of . . . being efficient,”¹²⁴ and noted that the month before the hearing, SOA had a record number of sold orders going through its system.¹²⁵ Bert Ogden used the sold order system much less than other dealers.¹²⁶

SOA also has a separate discretionary allocation for another set of vehicles, which are called Market Action Unit of Inventory (MAUI) vehicles. Mr. Teti testified that a MAUI unit is a vehicle that is manually allocated to a dealer and does not pass through the earned allocation calculation in the month it is allocated.

¹²¹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 351.

¹²² Tr. Vol. 4 at 589.

¹²³ Tr. Vol. 3 at 589-90.

¹²⁴ Tr. Vol. 1 at 146.

¹²⁵ Tr. Vol. 1 at 145.

¹²⁶ Tr. Vol. 3 at 591.

MAUI units are supplemental to a dealer's earned allocation.¹²⁷ Zone management has discretion to assign MAUI units to a dealer to address market needs. MAUI units are frequently used as loaner vehicles,¹²⁸ but can also be used as auto show and promotional vehicles; to provide inventory to new dealerships, facility relocations, or facility construction; for corporate vehicles; and for employee sales vehicles.¹²⁹

MAUI units are sometimes provided to underperforming dealers to offer additional opportunity for the dealer to increase sales.¹³⁰ If MAUI units are provided and the dealer sells them quickly, under the earned allocation system the days' supply is decreased and sales share is increased, thereby increasing the earned allocation.¹³¹ In contrast, if MAUI units are provided and the dealer does not sell them quickly, the dealer has a higher days' supply than other dealers, and the system will try to decrease that by reducing allocation.¹³²

MAUI units are provided on a discretionary basis, and Mr. Teti emphasized that providing them on an ongoing basis would undermine SOA's allocation system.¹³³ To the extent that they are provided to help underperforming dealers, SOA's hope is that the dealers will cure their deficiencies and earn allocation

¹²⁷ Tr. Vol. 2 at 564-65.

¹²⁸ Tr. Vol. 2 at 565.

¹²⁹ Tr. Vol. 3 at 624.

¹³⁰ Tr. Vol. 2 at 566-67.

¹³¹ Tr. Vol. 2 at 567-68.

¹³² Tr. Vol. 2 at 568.

¹³³ Tr. Vol. 2 at 567.

organically.¹³⁴ Mr. Teti testified that providing a dealer with increased MAUI units creates over-allocation, causes inefficiency, and increases costs to the dealer. Moreover, it means those MAUI units cannot be provided to another dealer, which also increases inefficiency in the way the inventory is being used.¹³⁵

From 2016 through January 2021, Bert Ogden received a total of 417 MAUI units, which was 18th largest number of total MAUI vehicles in the DFW Zone.¹³⁶ Bert Ogden argues that the dealership did not receive enough MAUI units until October and November 2020—after it received the termination notice—and that its increased sales at that time reflect that it finally had sufficient inventory.¹³⁷ Yet the evidence showed a fairly consistent number of MAUI units over the years—92 in 2016, 80 in 2017, 76 in 2018, 86 in 2019, and 78 in 2020.¹³⁸ As SOA points out, the evidence shows a dramatic sales increase beginning in August and September 2020, a time when it received no MAUI units.¹³⁹ SOA presented evidence that Bert Ogden received the third greatest number of MAUI units as a percentage of its allocation—as opposed to just raw numbers—in the DFW Zone.¹⁴⁰ Mr. Teti testified that Bert Ogden received a “meaningful amount of MAUI over a very long period of time.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁴ Tr. Vol. 2 at 567.

¹³⁵ Tr. Vol. 2 at 584.

¹³⁶ Bert Ogden Ex. 510.

¹³⁷ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 41, 67.

¹³⁸ Bert Ogden Ex. 510.

¹³⁹ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 41 (chart), 67; SOA Ex. 142 (showing the rolling 90-day sales rate dramatically increased in October 2020, which reflected sales in the period before October).

¹⁴⁰ Tr. Vol. 10 at 2458; SOA Ex. 187 at 21.

¹⁴¹ Tr. Vol. 3 at 601-02.

b) Bert Ogden's Inventory

Mr. Lytle testified that Bert Ogden regularly had a greater days' supply than other Subaru dealers. He noted that from late 2016 through the beginning of 2018, Bert Ogden had between 60- and 90-days' supply, which is the level Bert Ogden said it wanted to have.¹⁴²

Mr. Lytle testified that Bert Ogden's sales increased significantly shortly after the termination notice without a significant change in the vehicles it had available. He noted that after SOA's allocation system caught up with the increased sales and provided additional vehicles to Bert Ogden, its sales dropped down again.¹⁴³ He added, "if the allocation of vehicles—the availability of vehicles was the determining factor in the dealership sales, I would expect to see in January and February those—the sales reported in those two months to be even higher than they were in October and November, and that's just not the case."¹⁴⁴ Mr. Lytle testified that every month, Bert Ogden had additional inventory that it could have used to make additional sales.¹⁴⁵

c) Analysis

The evidence is clear that Bert Ogden generally had greater inventory—measured by days' supply—than other dealers in the Zone. The evidence is also

¹⁴² Tr. Vol. 8 at 1390.

¹⁴³ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1398.

¹⁴⁴ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1398.

¹⁴⁵ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1399.

clear that—except for the year when Bert Ogden had 60 to 90 days’ supply—this inventory amount was less than Bert Ogden wanted for its high-inventory strategy. The evidence set out the methods by which Bert Ogden could have organically grown its inventory but did not. The evidence also showed that Bert Ogden received a significant amount of MAUI vehicles, although less than it wanted, and it showed a dramatic increase in sales beginning in August and September of 2020, after the termination notice and before the receipt of MAUI units in October and November 2020.

The evidence does not show that Bert Ogden was treated any worse, in terms of inventory allocation, than any of the other dealers in the district or zone. In fact, it had a higher days’ supply and received a significant number of MAUI vehicles. The evidence also shows that SOA and the Bert Ogden Group have fundamentally different concepts of dealer inventory. SOA operates on a lean-inventory model with a focus on efficient selling and inventory control. SOA has a limited number of vehicles; it does not have spare vehicles. The Bert Ogden Group, throughout all its dealerships, operates on a high-inventory model. The dealer may certainly choose to operate this way, but it cannot expect its chosen inventory model to override the distributor’s nationwide inventory allocation system to accommodate its preferences. Nor can it use its preferred model to argue that its low sales are not relevant or should not be considered in the analysis. The ALJs do not find that Bert Ogden’s lower sales than the rest of the district or zone are the result of SOA’s inventory allocation.

5. History of Success and Failure

Finally, Bert Ogden makes a series of arguments related to previous dealerships in the AOR, to its increased sales, and to the Bert Ogden Group's sales of other brands.

Bert Ogden argues that its sales should be measured by examining the fact that the many previous Subaru dealerships in the AOR have failed and that there was a history of turnover before it became the dealer.

The ALJs decline to find that a history of difficulty in maintaining a Subaru dealership is particularly significant in this factor. There was extensive testimony about the explosive growth in the Rio Grande Valley and in Subaru sales in general that distinguish a dealership that existed before 2009 from one today. Certainly, there is evidence that the Pharr AOR is not as great a market for Subarus as Santa Fe, Fayetteville, or Austin. But those markets are no longer counted for purposes of calculating Bert Ogden's MSR. The evidence does not suggest that the differences between the Pharr AOR and Corpus Christi or San Antonio are sufficiently significant to turn the dealership into the equivalent of a Miami snow-tire dealer.

As for its argument that SOA may not terminate a contract of a dealer whose sales are increasing, the ALJs find that argument unsupported by the caselaw

Bert Ogden cites.¹⁴⁶ Certainly sales after termination notice are relevant, but the Code requires an examination of sales compared to the market, not sales compared to previous years. Also, the ALJs note that although there has been an uptick in total units sold, Bert Ogden remains below its MSR and even behind the reduced numbers for the 2017 sales performance addendum.

Finally, Bert Ogden argues that measuring its performance against the MSR is unfair because the rest of the Bert Ogden Group is so good at selling vehicles:

In 2020, Bert Ogden Group sold over 30,000 new vehicles in the Rio Grande Valley- about one of every three cars sold. By relying on MSR as its only metric to evaluate sales by Bert Ogden Subaru, SOA effectively penalizes Bert Ogden Subaru for sales by other Bert Ogden dealerships in the same market—such as Nissan and Buick—which are successfully selling cars in the same MSR “segments” as Subaru. Bert Ogden Group dealerships are also selling other manufacturer’s models that compete with Subaru models in the same segment at rates that substantially exceed the SOA assigned MSR market share in the DFW Zone for those non-Subaru models.¹⁴⁷

The ALJs are not persuaded that the Bert Ogden Group’s success at selling other brands should factor positively into an evaluation of its success in selling Subarus in the market. To the contrary, this argument seems consistent with one of

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., *All Star Imports, Inc. v. Mazda Motor of N. Am., Inc.*, SOAH Docket No. 608-19-6279.LIC, Proposal for Decision at 32 (recommending termination for reasons unrelated to sales figures; evidence of sales showed a dip in 2017, but an increase from 2019 until the time of hearing); *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.*, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC at 26 (noting that overall sales increase leading up to the hearing “does not excuse past poor performance, it is an additional existing circumstance to be considered in the sales analysis”).

¹⁴⁷ Bert Ogden’s Closing Argument at 48-49.

SOA's arguments in this proceeding: that Bert Ogden is not focused on selling Subaru vehicles.

6. Conclusion

The ALJs find that the factor of sales in relation to the market supports termination.

B. INVESTMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS

The second statutory factor examines the investment and obligations of Bert Ogden's dealership.¹⁴⁸

Bert Ogden lists the following as the investments and obligations in its Subaru dealership:

- Approximately \$908,731.40 invested in the initial remodel of the Bert Ogden facility;¹⁴⁹
- Approximately \$99,133.19 invested in expanding the Bert Ogden parking lot;¹⁵⁰
- Approximately \$333,011.00 invested in equipment for the service shop;¹⁵¹
- Approximately \$4,000,000.00 invested in electronic billboards for use by the entire Bert Ogden Group, including Bert Ogden;¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(2).

¹⁴⁹ Bert Ogden Ex. 301.

¹⁵⁰ Bert Ogden Ex. 302; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1935-36.

¹⁵¹ Bert Ogden Ex. 303; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1937.

- Approximately \$10,441.31 invested in upgraded lighting at the Bert Ogden facility;¹⁵³
- Approximately \$2,500,000.00 invested in the form of service lifts and bays transferred from another Bert Ogden Group franchise to Bert Ogden;¹⁵⁴
- Bert Ogden's lease obligates it to lease the premises through 2038;¹⁵⁵
- Approximately \$20,000.00 invested in an upgrade to Bert Ogden's Reynolds & Reynolds purchasing system to allow the customer sales experience to be less time-consuming;¹⁵⁶ and
- Approximately \$1,000,000.00 contributed to charitable and educational institutions by Mr. Vackar on behalf of SOA's Subaru Loves Learning program.¹⁵⁷

SOA challenges many of the items listed as expenses or obligations, arguing that some were not investments and also that some were not actually made by the dealership. SOA also points out some areas in which Bert Ogden has made no investments. For example, Bert Ogden does not own the land where the dealership sits. That land is owned by a Vackar family member and a trust.¹⁵⁸ They also point out that the lease for the dealership is really a sublease. Bert Ogden sublets the

¹⁵² Bert Ogden Ex. 304; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1938-40.

¹⁵³ Bert Ogden Ex. 306; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1941.

¹⁵⁴ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1942; Vol. 8 at 2072-74.

¹⁵⁵ Bert Ogden Ex. 309; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1942-43.

¹⁵⁶ Bert Ogden Ex. 305; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1903-07.

¹⁵⁷ Bert Ogden Ex. 308; Tr. Vol. 7 at 1852-53.

¹⁵⁸ Bert Ogden Ex. 309.

dealership property from the Bert Ogden Group's Mazda dealership, who leases it from the trust.

SOA challenges the designation of Mr. Vackar's charitable contribution as an investment. The ALJs agree and find that while Mr. Vackar's charitable contributions are laudable, they cannot be considered an investment by the dealership for purposes of this statute.

SOA next agrees that the \$10,441.31 expenditure for upgraded lighting; the \$20,000 spent for the purchasing system upgrade; and the \$99,133.19 spent on the parking lot expansion were paid by Bert Ogden. It seems clear that these items directly benefitted the dealership, as well. Nevertheless, SOA challenges whether these items may be considered investments because they were not reported on Bert Ogden's financial statements.¹⁵⁹ Ms. del Barrio testified that the absence is a result of the Bert Ogden Group's accounting practices: "we tend to fully expense everything, and at the end of the year if our CPA feels that things need to be brought back in and depreciated, then we do that at that time."¹⁶⁰ Regardless of whether Bert Ogden's accounting properly expensed, rather than capitalized, these items, it is undisputed that they were, in fact, paid. The ALJs find that these three items—totaling \$129,574.50—are investments of the dealership.

SOA next argues that because many of these investments were not made by Bert Ogden, but rather by another Bert Ogden Group entity, they cannot be

¹⁵⁹ SOA Reply Brief at 25.

¹⁶⁰ Tr. Vol. 8 at 2010.

considered when examining the dealership's investments. SOA cites a previous case, *Cecil Atkission Orange, LLC v. FCA US LLC*,¹⁶¹ for the idea that an owner's investments in the dealership cannot be considered the dealership's investments. In *Cecil Atkission*, the dealer principal loaned his dealership money and the dealership counted those unsecured loan amounts as both dealer investment and dealer obligation. The ALJs rejected the principal's argument that his investments were the same as the dealership's.¹⁶²

The remaining items Bert Ogden listed as its investments were not paid for by the Subaru dealership. Bert Ogden's Subaru dealership was not billed at all for any share of the \$4,000,000.00 invested in electronic billboards.¹⁶³ Most of the original remodeling and the service bays were paid for by another Bert Ogden entity or entities.¹⁶⁴ It is unclear from the record who paid for the service equipment.

The ALJs do not think it accurately reflects the reality of the Bert Ogden Group's method of doing business to find that there has been little investment in Bert Ogden's Subaru dealership. The Bert Ogden facilities, for example, do not reflect the kind of neglect and lack of investment in *Atkission*, where, for years, a damaged sign was covered with a plastic bag and other dealership facilities were in

¹⁶¹ *Cecil Atkission Orange, LLC v. FCA US LLC*, SOAH Docket No. 608-15-4315.LIC.

¹⁶² *Cecil Atkission*, Proposal for Decision at 24 (June 17, 2016).

¹⁶³ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1938. Even had Bert Ogden paid for some portion of the signs, the entire \$4,000,000 of value from the signs would not be assigned to the Subaru dealership. The signs are shared by all of the Bert Ogden Group dealerships.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 8 at 2073 (describing how the Bert Ogden Group's GMC Buick body shop moved to a new service facility and provided its previous one to Bert Ogden).

very poor repair, or in another case SOA cites, *Star Motors*, where facilities were described as “barely serviceable.”¹⁶⁵

But while money has been invested by someone into the dealership, or into items the dealership uses, the nature of those investments limits the harm that would be done to the dealership’s investments in the case of termination. The dealership does not own the land or the building so would not lose that investment in the case of termination. The electronic signs advertise all the Bert Ogden Group dealerships. If termination occurs, there will be no harm to Bert Ogden—who did not pay for the sign—or the Bert Ogden Group related to those signs. Ms. del Barrio testified that the Bert Ogden Group would “not have immediate use for those service bays” if Bert Ogden’s franchise is terminated.¹⁶⁶ But that is not the same thing as evidence that those bays would ultimately have no value to the group and its 23 other franchises. Similarly, although Bert Ogden has a lease with the Bert Ogden Mazda dealership, nothing suggests that the Mazda or Volvo dealerships on the same property could not use the space. The property would still have two functioning dealerships on it.

Thus, while Bert Ogden’s actual investment is small, its parent company has made a sizable investment in items that have benefitted the dealership. However, because most of the investment has been made by other Bert Ogden Group entities,

¹⁶⁵ *Star Houston, Inc. d/b/a Star Motor Cars v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC*, SOAH Docket No. 608-16-4676.LIC, Proposal for Decision at 78 (April 2, 2019).

¹⁶⁶ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1942.

there will not be much harm to the dealership from termination. The ALJs find this factor does not weigh in favor or against termination.

C. INJURY OR BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC

The third statutory factor in determining whether there is good cause for termination requires consideration of any injury or benefit to the public.¹⁶⁷

SOA argues that because of Bert Ogden's inability to provide a high level of customer service, terminating the dealership agreement and installing a new dealer would provide benefit to the public in the form of better customer service and increased customer satisfaction from a dealer fully committed to the Subaru brand.

Bert Ogden counters that customer satisfaction surveys show that customers are more satisfied with their experiences at Bert Ogden than SOA will acknowledge; therefore, there is no benefit to be gained by terminating the dealership agreement. Bert Ogden also contends that termination would cause significant long-term injury to the public because of the time it will take a new dealership to be approved and established, leaving customers with no local Subaru dealership for up to a year, and because "the confusion inflicted on the public will return" if a tenth different Subaru dealer is installed in the Rio Grande Valley.¹⁶⁸ Bert Ogden further argues that leaving the dealership agreement in place would continue to benefit Subaru's Rio Grande Valley customers because of the Bert Ogden Group's substantial resources and presence in the market.

¹⁶⁷ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(3).

¹⁶⁸ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 63.

1. Evidence and Argument

SOA measures customer satisfaction through its Owner Loyalty Program (OLP), which is a set of surveys that measure customer satisfaction with purchase and service experiences. George Dubinsky is the national owner loyalty manager for SOA, a position he has held since 1998.¹⁶⁹ He is ultimately responsible for operation of the OLP.¹⁷⁰

One purpose of the OLP is to provide retailers with information and tools to improve their stores and help acquire and keep customers.¹⁷¹ SOA sends a purchase satisfaction survey to every customer who purchased or leased a new vehicle from any Subaru retailer. Any customer who had warranty claims or customer-paid service work performed at a retailer gets a service satisfaction survey.¹⁷²

OLP surveys are scored on a five-point scale from poor (0 points) to very good (500 points) to extraordinary (1000 points).¹⁷³ Responses are tabulated separately for purchase and service experience, and converted into scores based on the number of responses. At the end of each quarter, SOA creates a report for each dealer that includes the dealer's OLP survey data for purchase and service for the past quarter. The report includes trend information, showing how a dealer's scores for a particular metric changed from quarter to quarter, and comparison data,

¹⁶⁹ Tr. Vol. 3 at 754.

¹⁷⁰ Tr. Vol. 3 at 754.

¹⁷¹ SOA Ex. 25 at 4.

¹⁷² Tr. Vol. 3 at 756.

¹⁷³ Tr. Vol. 3 at 760; SOA Ex. 23.

which shows how a dealer ranks compared to other retailers in the same geographic region.¹⁷⁴

SOA uses this comparative ranking system to identify retailers that need help improving the customer service experience at their store, in furtherance of its goal of providing the best customer service experience possible.¹⁷⁵ Mr. Dubinsky testified that for as long as he has been involved with the OLP, it has been SOA's practice to look at the dealer's rank in evaluating OLP scores.¹⁷⁶

SOA offered several of Bert Ogden's quarterly OLP reports going back to 2017, as well as various charts summarizing OLP. Those reports demonstrate that Bert Ogden has consistently ranked lower than other dealers in the DFW Zone in purchase satisfaction. From 2017-2021, Bert Ogden ranked either last or in the bottom three of DFW Zone dealers in this category based on OLP survey responses: 42 of 42 (2017), 44 of 46 (2018), 43 of 45 (2019), and 44 of 44 (2020).¹⁷⁷ Regarding service satisfaction, in all but two quarters from 2019 through the third quarter of 2021, Bert Ogden's scores were lower than every other dealer in the DFW Zone.¹⁷⁸

SOA also presented evidence of unsolicited negative reviews left by customers on web sites including Google, Facebook, and Yahoo. One customer

¹⁷⁴ SOA Ex. 25.

¹⁷⁵ Tr. Vol. 3 at 761.

¹⁷⁶ Tr. Vol. 3 at 761.

¹⁷⁷ SOA Exs. 51 at 17; 52 at 21; 53 at 23; 54 at 23; 42B.

¹⁷⁸ SOA Exs. 53 at 46; 54 at 44; 55 at 45.

complained that it took four months to get the title for the vehicle she purchased at Bert Ogden because, she was told, there was a lien on her new vehicle.¹⁷⁹ Another customer complained that the remaining loan on the vehicle the customer traded in was not paid off by Bert Ogden in a timely manner, causing the customer concern about the potential negative impact on the customer's credit scores.¹⁸⁰

SOA further argues that the number of registrations within the Pharr AOR of Subaru vehicles that were purchased from dealers other than Bert Ogden also shows customer dissatisfaction with Bert Ogden.¹⁸¹ According to the data, 18% of new Subarus registered in the Pharr AOR were purchased from a dealer other than Bert Ogden. SOA says this shows that 18% of potential buyers chose to purchase their Subaru vehicle from another dealer at least 150 miles away because of their dissatisfaction with Bert Ogden.¹⁸²

Bert Ogden counters that even if its OLP survey scores resulted in rankings that were low relative to other dealers, Bert Ogden customers still scored the dealership closer to "extraordinary" than "very good," demonstrating a high level of customer satisfaction.¹⁸³ The data show that from 2017-2020, Bert Ogden achieved the following purchase experience satisfaction scores: 892 (2017), 776 (2018), 810 (2019), 759 (2020 quarters 1 and 2), and 785 (2020 year-end).¹⁸⁴ On the

¹⁷⁹ SOA Ex. 49 at 4.

¹⁸⁰ SOA Ex. 47 at 10, 16, 17.

¹⁸¹ SOA Closing Argument at 45.

¹⁸² SOA Closing Argument at 45.

¹⁸³ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 45, 47.

¹⁸⁴ SOA Ex. 43.

0-1000 scale put in place by SOA, these scores are closer to “extraordinary” than “very good.” According to Bert Ogden, these scores show that Bert Ogden has “consistently received ‘extraordinary’ purchase and service ‘overall satisfaction’ scores.”¹⁸⁵ Because of these scores, Bert Ogden argues that comparative rankings should be ignored in favor of evaluating customer satisfaction by scores attained, without comparing one dealer to any other.

Not only does comparatively ranking dealers ignore the true results of the surveys, Bert Ogden says, such rankings are unfair because one dealer will always be ranked last even if they achieve high scores. Like the game of musical chairs, one dealer will always finish last and be forced out of the game after every round.¹⁸⁶ This “last dealer is out” concept is not mentioned in the dealership agreement or in documentation from SOA explaining the OLP.¹⁸⁷

Regarding unsolicited online customer reviews, Bert Ogden contends that the reviews and comments highlighted by SOA were cherry-picked for their negativity and that it is not possible to confirm that the reviewers who left the comments were actual Bert Ogden customers. Some of the comments were flagged as negative, even when they included some positive feedback.

In terms of injury to the public, Bert Ogden argues that customers in the Rio Grande Valley will endure significant hardship if the Bert Ogden dealership

¹⁸⁵ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 51.

¹⁸⁶ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 71-72.

¹⁸⁷ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 76.

agreement is terminated. The complex process of installing a new Subaru dealer in the Rio Grande Valley would leave customers without a local dealership to service their vehicles for a lengthy period. Local Subaru owners would have to drive to the next nearest dealerships in Corpus Christi or San Antonio for service until a new Subaru dealer is vetted and established, which Bert Ogden says could take up to a year.

As for the benefit of leaving its dealership agreement in place, Bert Ogden argues that the organizational strength of the Bert Ogden Group puts it in a better position to protect the dealership and the public during times of economic uncertainty, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recessions, and periodic border crises.¹⁸⁸

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, the ALJs do not find that the number of Subaru vehicles purchased outside the Pharr AOR but registered within the Pharr AOR is relevant to this analysis. There was no evidence presented that any of the out-of-AOR purchasers ever visited Bert Ogden, let alone had a bad experience there, or that their decision to purchase from another dealer had anything to do with Bert Ogden.

The other evidence presented in support of this factor, however, weighs in favor of finding good cause for termination. Most persuasive of the evidence relied on by SOA is the consistently low OLP rankings achieved by Bert Ogden. The

¹⁸⁸ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 51.

scores objectively place Bert Ogden well below average in the DFW Zone for purchase satisfaction from at least 2017-2021, with little variability. At times, Bert Ogden's purchase satisfaction scores have been the worst of all retailers in the zone. In service satisfaction, Bert Ogden also performed below the average for the zone.

It is true that Bert Ogden's OLP scores tend to be closer to extraordinary than very good. Bert Ogden's disagreement with SOA's method of using comparative rankings, however, is not a reason to discount it as a useful instrument for identifying the lowest performing retailers so that SOA can help those retailers improve the customer service experience. This is a legitimate goal of the OLP program, and one that would not be served by review of a dealer's scores in isolation.

SOA has used OLP comparative rankings since at least 1998. According to Mr. Dubinsky, OLP scores are tabulated on a quarterly basis and reports are created for the dealers that include comparative rankings. As discussed in the OLP Navigation Guide, a document available to dealers, the reports set forth comparisons between a dealer and the zone across several categories, and the dealers are encouraged to consider how their scores and trends compare to the scores and trends of the zone overall. SOA's use of comparative rankings is not a recent development, and Bert Ogden should not be surprised that their consistently low rankings would eventually have some consequence.

For these reasons, the ALJs determine that SOA's use of comparative rankings is appropriate and reasonable, and Bert Ogden's consistently low rankings demonstrate that termination of the dealership agreement would benefit the public. Currently, the Rio Grande Valley is being served by a Subaru dealership that, its customers say, provides a below-average customer service experience. Although SOA did not present evidence that another dealer would perform at a higher level, Bert Ogden's consistently low OLP rankings call into question how significant a benefit the dealership provides to its customers. Similarly, even though Bert Ogden is part of the Bert Ogden Group—a large, established organization in the Rio Grande Valley—the ALJs do not find that this provides more than an abstract benefit to the public, and does not outweigh the tangible benefit the public would experience from a new Subaru dealer.

While there is the potential for injury in the form of inconvenience to current Subaru owners and potential customers if its dealership agreement is terminated, this is insufficient reason to leave Bert Ogden's dealership agreement in place. SOA has indicated its intent to quickly replace the dealership, not eliminate it, and presented evidence that the transition would not take as long as Bert Ogden warns. Any disruption to customer service would be temporary.

After considering the arguments and evidence, the ALJs find that on balance the benefit of a new Subaru dealer outweighs the short-term inconveniences that current Subaru customers and owners might experience while a new dealer is installed. The ALJs further find that there would be little benefit to leaving Bert Ogden's dealership agreement in place considering the dealership's poor sales

and service. For these reasons, the ALJs find that the injury or benefit to the public factor weighs in favor of terminating the dealership agreement.

D. ADEQUACY OF SERVICE FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, PARTS, AND PERSONNEL

The fourth statutory factor requires consideration of the “adequacy of the dealer’s service facilities, equipment, parts, and personnel in relation to those of other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make.”¹⁸⁹

1. Adequacy of Service Facilities

Regarding adequacy of service facilities, SOA said in its opening statement that it “doesn’t take issue with Bert Ogden’s current facility,” and that Bert Ogden’s service facility is “acceptable currently.”¹⁹⁰ In its closing brief, however, SOA argues that the facilities are inadequate based on negative customer feedback about the small size of the service waiting area and the unfriendly nature of some service staff members. Regardless of these complaints, the ALJs find that there is no evidence that Bert Ogden’s service facilities are inadequate.

2. Adequacy of Service Parts and Equipment

SOA next argues that Bert Ogden’s parts department lacks adequate equipment and does not have sufficient inventory of parts and accessories to efficiently complete vehicle maintenance services. Bert Ogden counters that SOA did not offer any evidence that “the number of [sic] selection of parts maintained

¹⁸⁹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(4).

¹⁹⁰ Tr. Vol. 1 at 21-22.

by Bert Ogden Subaru violated any franchise requirement or SOA policy” and that there was no evidence or testimony that addressed the statutory factor of the adequacy of Bert Ogden’s equipment and parts in relation to other dealers.¹⁹¹

SOA presented evidence of Bert Ogden’s parts and equipment relative to similar-sized dealers in the zone. As part of its evidence, SOA discussed what are called vehicles in operation, or VIOs. A VIO is a vehicle seven model years old or newer that is still in operation, being driven on the road. The number of VIOs in District 3 has grown over the last several years.¹⁹² VIOs represent service opportunity in the automotive industry because they are the vehicles most likely to return to the dealership for service.¹⁹³ One way to look at parts is to measure how many parts and accessories a dealer has on hand in inventory per VIO. This is a useful metric relating to customer service because if a dealership has inventory on hand, the service or repair can be performed more quickly than if the parts must be ordered.¹⁹⁴

Using information reported by the dealers to SOA, Mr. Lytle analyzed Bert Ogden’s parts and accessories inventory per VIO, service equipment at cost, and service equipment at cost per VIO relative to other dealers of similar size in the DFW Zone. From 2017-2020, Bert Ogden almost always had less inventory on

¹⁹¹ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 86-86.

¹⁹² Tr. Vol. 5 at 1364-65; Tr. Vol. 4 at 1014-15. VIOs were also called UIOs or units in operation by Hector Flores. Tr. Vol. 4 at 1014-15.

¹⁹³ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1364.

¹⁹⁴ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1364-65.

hand per VIO than similar-sized dealers in the DFW Zone.¹⁹⁵ While other dealers reported an average of \$35-\$53 worth of inventory per VIO over that four-year period, Bert Ogden never reported having more than \$40 of inventory per VIO, and at times had less than \$10 of inventory per VIO.¹⁹⁶

The same data demonstrates that from mid-2018 through mid-2020, as the number of VIOs in District 3 was increasing, Bert Ogden's inventory per VIO was decreasing yearly, in contrast to other dealers' increase in inventory per VIO.¹⁹⁷ In mid-July 2018 Bert Ogden reported about \$40 of inventory per VIO, which dropped to less than \$20 per VIO by the beginning of 2020.¹⁹⁸ Similar-sized dealers were reporting, on average, \$40-\$50 or more worth of inventory per VIO. Once the termination notice was served in August 2020, Bert Ogden's inventory per VIO began to trend upward until it exceeded the inventory level of same-sized dealers in December 2020.¹⁹⁹

Mr. Lytle found similar but more drastic differences in Bert Ogden's service equipment in relation to other dealers. Bert Ogden reported having far less service equipment at cost relative to other dealers of similar size in the DFW Zone.²⁰⁰ Bert Ogden reported less than \$5,000 worth of equipment at cost in December 2020, while comparison dealers reported just over \$300,000 in service

¹⁹⁵ SOA Ex. 186 at 51; Tr. Vol. 5 at 1365.

¹⁹⁶ SOA Ex. 186 at 51.

¹⁹⁷ SOA Ex. 186 at 51.

¹⁹⁸ SOA Ex. 186 at 51.

¹⁹⁹ SOA Ex. 186 at 51.

²⁰⁰ SOA Ex. 186 at 52.

equipment.²⁰¹ Similarly, Bert Ogden reported “substantially less” service equipment per VIO than the comparison dealers, around \$10 per VIO relative to about \$80-\$140 reported by comparison dealers.²⁰²

Bert Ogden argued that SOA did not present evidence of the adequacy of service equipment or parts in relation to other dealers, saying that “no discussion was made to compare Bert Ogden Subaru facilities or equipment,” and that SOA’s arguments were “limited and insufficient.”²⁰³ Bert Ogden also pointed out at the hearing that Mr. Lytle had not personally visited Bert Ogden and, therefore, did not know what equipment specifically was on site at the dealership.²⁰⁴ Mr. Lytle conceded as much, and testified that the comparisons he made between Bert Ogden and other similar-sized dealerships were based on what the dealers reported to Subaru.²⁰⁵

3. Adequacy of Service Personnel

Bert Ogden argues that SOA has not established the inadequacy of service personnel because it did not introduce evidence regarding service personnel at other dealers in the DFW Zone. It also argues that the number of service employees, and their qualifications and certifications, complied with SOA’s

²⁰¹ SOA Ex. 186 at 52.

²⁰² SOA Ex. 186 at 53.

²⁰³ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 86.

²⁰⁴ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1416-17.

²⁰⁵ Tr. Vol. 5 at 1416-17.

Minimum Standards and Operating Guidelines (MSOGs) and the dealer's obligations.

SOA argues that high levels of turnover, untrained staff, and staff who were not focused specifically on the Subaru brand contributed to the inadequacy of Bert Ogden's service personnel.

Hector Flores, District 3's District Service and Parts Manager, testified that Bert Ogden's parts and service department had a high level of turnover that was "very uncommon" for District 3 dealers.²⁰⁶ The constant turnover can negatively impact the parts department because it can lead to delays in providing service when a new employee is not yet familiar with the Subaru brand and processes.²⁰⁷

Bert Ogden also lacked dedicated staff in the parts and service department. Bert Ogden had four or five service managers in a period of three years, some of whom also held important positions with significant responsibilities at other Bert Ogden Group dealerships.²⁰⁸ At the time of the hearing, Bert Ogden had a dedicated service manager, but he had only been in that position for two weeks.²⁰⁹ Mr. Flores testified that Bert Ogden has never had a dedicated parts manager, and that other dealers in District 3 have Subaru-dedicated parts and service staff.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1011-12.

²⁰⁷ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1002.

²⁰⁸ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1006-07.

²⁰⁹ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1007-08.

²¹⁰ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1009-10, 1012.

As VIOs have continued to increase, Mr. Flores said, other dealers have added more technicians and service advisors, and have Subaru-dedicated employees in key positions such as service manager and parts manager.²¹¹ On the other hand, Bert Ogden has not made changes to its service operations in response to the increase in VIOs:

Bert Ogden is always playing catch-up . . . and they can't seem to catch up, you know. Turnover in service managers, turnover in parts managers, no focus on the brand; when I say 'no focus,' they don't have a dedicated parts manager, service manager position. They are not progressing. They are trying to catch up.²¹²

Finally, SOA argues that Bert Ogden's low OLP service satisfaction scores and rankings are evidence of the inadequacy of the dealership's service personnel, because inadequate personnel can contribute to an unpleasant dealership service experience.

In contrast, Bert Ogden argued that the evidence presented by SOA did not compare the adequacy of Bert Ogden employees with employees at other dealerships. Bert Ogden relies on SOA's MSOGs to show that its parts and service department staffing levels have complied with the personnel requirements set out by SOA since at least 2019.²¹³ The MSOGs are annual letters that, among other things, list SOA's personnel requirements and then indicate whether the dealership

²¹¹ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1015.

²¹² Tr. Vol. 4 at 1016.

²¹³ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 53-55.

is complying with them.²¹⁴ The MSOGs in evidence show that from 2017-2021, Bert Ogden either met or exceeded the requirements for having a certified Subaru service manager, a certified Subaru service advisor, and the required number of fully-trained service technicians. On the other hand, those same reports show that Bert Ogden did not have an exclusive service manager or an exclusive service advisor.²¹⁵

4. Analysis

The evidence is clear that in relation to other dealers of new cars of the same line-make, Bert Ogden's service equipment, parts, and personnel are inadequate. Multiple SOA witnesses testified about these topics, including one of SOA's experts who also conducted a comparative analysis of the equipment and parts inventory on hand at Bert Ogden. Mr. Lytle reviewed service parts inventory information, as well as the service equipment information reported to SOA by Bert Ogden and other dealers. Mr. Lytle opined that Bert Ogden reported inadequate service parts and equipment in relation to other Subaru dealerships.²¹⁶

Bert Ogden did not challenge the accuracy of the data Mr. Lytle reviewed, which came from dealer financial statements provided by Bert Ogden to SOA, and instead argued that he was not aware of the actual equipment on hand because he had never been to the dealership. If indeed Bert Ogden had more service

²¹⁴ Tr. Vol. 2 at 336.

²¹⁵ SOA Ex. 15 at 3; 16 at 3; 17 at 3; 18 at 3; 19 at 3.

²¹⁶ SOA Ex. 186 at 6.

equipment on site than it reported to SOA, it is unclear to the ALJs why Bert Ogden underreported its equipment year after year.

Regarding parts inventory, Bert Ogden argued that the comparative data relied on by SOA was too limited to demonstrate whether the service parts inventory was adequate. The ALJs disagree and find that four years' worth of data showing monthly inventory per VIO for Bert Ogden and comparison dealers is not "spotty evidence" as Bert Ogden alleges. Similarly, Mr. Lytle also reviewed four years' worth of dealer reports of service equipment at cost, and service equipment at cost per VIO. This data is more than enough information to establish that Bert Ogden's service parts and equipment is inadequate in relation to other dealers.

SOA also established that Bert Ogden did not have adequate service personnel. Mr. Flores credibly testified that in relation to other dealers in District 3, Bert Ogden had higher employee turnover and fewer Subaru-dedicated employees, especially in key positions. In addition, while other dealerships increased parts and service staffing in response to increasing VIOs, Bert Ogden did not.

Curiously, Bert Ogden points to the MSOGs for 2017-2021 as evidence that the dealership complied with required staffing levels, but those MSOGs also show consistent deficiencies in service personnel. Instead of having an exclusive service manager and an exclusive service advisor as required, the MSOGs indicate that the employees who filled those positions at Bert Ogden were shared with other

dealerships. Mr. Mauldin, who became general manager in November 2018,²¹⁷ testified that the “shared” designations on the MSOGs from 2019-2021 are incorrect because two employees, who are exclusive to Bert Ogden, have filled those roles.²¹⁸ Although the ALJs do not necessarily find Mr. Mauldin’s testimony less credible, it is remarkable that Bert Ogden would receive inaccurate MSOGs from SOA on a yearly basis but make no attempt to correct them.

Turning to Bert Ogden’s low OLP service satisfaction scores, the dealership argues that the focus should be on the scores it achieved, which it says were closer to extraordinary than very good and, therefore, demonstrate a high level of customer satisfaction. The ALJs would point out that this statutory factor requires comparison of the adequacy of Bert Ogden’s service personnel in relation to other dealers. Bert Ogden’s OLP scores alone do not provide that comparison, so they must be considered along with Bert Ogden’s ranking as compared to other dealers in the DFW Zone. The evidence shows that Bert Ogden consistently ranked lower than the zone average in service satisfaction, and its rank has been trending downward since 2017.²¹⁹ Even if the ALJs considered Bert Ogden’s OLP service scores and ignored ranking, the evidence shows that from 2019 through the third quarter of 2021, Bert Ogden’s scores were lower than the zone average scores every quarter except two.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1680.

²¹⁸ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1689-94.

²¹⁹ SOA Ex. 186 at 56.

²²⁰ SOA Ex 53 at 46; 54 at 44; 55 at 45.

High turnover, lack of Subaru-exclusive employees, and low OLP service satisfaction rankings relative to other dealers in the zone altogether provide compelling evidence that Bert Ogden's service personnel are inadequate relative to other dealers.

For these reasons, the ALJs find that SOA did not establish that Bert Ogden's service facilities were inadequate, but did prove that Bert Ogden's service equipment, parts, and personnel did not compare favorably with other Subaru dealers. For these reasons, the ALJs determine that this factor weighs in favor of termination.

E. WHETHER WARRANTIES ARE BEING HONORED BY THE DEALER

The next factor in evaluating whether there is good cause for termination, is “whether warranties are being honored by the dealer.”²²¹

SOA argues that Bert Ogden has a policy under which it refuses to service Subaru vehicles that are over 10 years old and/or that have greater than 100,000 miles, and that this policy, combined with dissatisfaction with the service experience at Bert Ogden, “demonstrates that the dealership is failing to honor Subaru warranties by turning away warranty work on certain vehicles” and that it fails to perform competent repair work.²²²

²²¹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(5).

²²² SOA Closing Argument at 62.

Bert Ogden argues that it has no such policy of refusing to perform warranty work under any circumstance, including on vehicles of a certain age or mileage, and that the dealership has never refused to provide service on a vehicle for any reason, including vehicle age or mileage.

1. Evidence

SOA introduced evidence that it says shows that Bert Ogden refuses to service vehicles of a certain age or mileage. This evidence was based on a June 2021 mystery shop call in which a mystery shopper contacted Bert Ogden and requested recall work on a 2005 Subaru vehicle with more than 100,000 miles.²²³ In a mystery shop, a third-party company initiates contact with a dealership, in this case by telephone, and makes an inquiry. The mystery shop calls are recorded and then reviewed and scored by Mr. Yannella, who then forwards the calls to the district managers for further action.²²⁴ The mystery shop tool is used by SOA to observe how dealerships interact with customers, oversee dealership customer service, and identify operational deficiencies.²²⁵

When the mystery shopper inquired about getting recall work done on a 2005 Subaru with over 100,000 miles, she was informed by a Bert Ogden employee that Bert Ogden does not service vehicles that are more than 10 years old or that have more than 100,000 miles.²²⁶

²²³ Tr. Vol. 4 at 863; SOA Ex. 135.

²²⁴ Tr. Vol. 4 at 863.

²²⁵ Tr. Vol. 4 at 865.

²²⁶ Tr. Vol. 4 at 863-64.

Concerned about this policy, Mr. Yannella forwarded the recording of the call to Mr. Mauldin, Bert Ogden's general manager. Mr. Mauldin responded that Bert Ogden prefers not to service vehicles with more than 100,000 miles because the parts can be "brittle" and may break.²²⁷ Mr. Mauldin told Mr. Yannella that Bert Ogden would make an exception for vehicles purchased at Bert Ogden or for service work involving a recall.²²⁸

According to Mr. Yannella, the vehicle at issue could have been under a warranty if there had been a warranty extension or an extended service agreement in place.²²⁹ Mr. Yannella believed the exclusionary service policy to be a widespread practice at Bert Ogden and that the mystery shop call was not just a one-time occurrence.²³⁰

Mr. Flores testified that based on the mystery shop call, he understood Bert Ogden to have a policy of refusing to service vehicles of a certain age or mileage.²³¹ When he followed up with the dealership's management, he was assured that the recall work should have been performed regardless of the vehicle's mileage.²³²

²²⁷ Tr. Vol. 4 at 864.

²²⁸ Tr. Vol. 4 at 864.

²²⁹ Tr. Vol. 4 at 866.

²³⁰ Tr. Vol. 4 at 865.

²³¹ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1022.

²³² Tr. Vol. 4 at 1022-23.

SOA also pointed to the high volume of customer complaints about Bert Ogden's service department and consistently low service OLP scores as further proof that the dealership is failing to honor Subaru warranties.²³³ Average OLP rankings in service satisfaction show that since 2018, Bert Ogden's service satisfaction scores have been trending downward. In 2017, Bert Ogden's average quarterly service satisfaction score was 917.²³⁴ In 2018 that dropped to 819²³⁵ and in 2019 and 2020 the average quarterly service satisfaction dropped again to 805 and 795, respectively.²³⁶

Bert Ogden counters that there is no exclusionary service policy and that there is no evidence of any warranty claim not honored by Bert Ogden. Mr. Mauldin testified that the dealership does not have a policy of refusing to perform warranty work on vehicles based on age or mileage and that he is not aware of any instance when Bert Ogden refused to service a vehicle.²³⁷ He explained that when Mr. Yannella informed him of the mystery shop call, he determined that the employee was recently hired and provided inaccurate information to the caller. The employee was counseled about his mistake and there have been no issues since. Aside from the mystery shop call, Mr. Mauldin said, he is not aware of any situation when a customer was told that service would not be performed because of the age or mileage of the car.²³⁸

²³³ SOA Closing Argument at 60-62.

²³⁴ SOA Exs. 51 at 33; 186 at 56.

²³⁵ SOA Exs. 52 at 40, which includes data only from the third and fourth quarters of 2018; 186 at 56.

²³⁶ SOA Exs. 53 at 46; 54 at 44; 186 at 56.

²³⁷ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1770-71, 1826-27.

²³⁸ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1770-71.

Ms. del Barrio went even further and testified that Bert Ogden has no such policy of refusing to perform either warranty work or recall work, without regard to the age or mileage of the vehicle.²³⁹ Mr. Flores said he was unaware of any instance of Bert Ogden declining to perform warranty work.²⁴⁰

2. Analysis

The evidence presented in support of this statutory factor does not establish that Bert Ogden has refused to honor warranties. Instead of citing specific examples of warranty work that Bert Ogden failed or refused to perform, SOA contends that the exclusionary service policy allegedly in place at Bert Ogden coupled with low service satisfaction scores means that the dealership refuses to perform warranty work, including on older, high-mileage Subaru vehicles covered under warranty extensions or extended service agreements. The ALJs disagree.

To establish the existence of the exclusionary policy, SOA relies on the mystery shop call from June 2021. Mr. Mauldin, however, credibly testified that the Bert Ogden employee who took the call was a new employee who was mistaken. The mistake was addressed through additional training and there is no evidence that something similar has happened again. In addition, Mr. Mauldin and Ms. del Barrio both testified that Bert Ogden has no such policy. Though Mr. Yannella and Mr. Flores both testified that they understood Bert Ogden to have an exclusionary service policy, their knowledge was based on information related to the mystery

²³⁹ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1875.

²⁴⁰ Tr. Vol. 4 at 1097-98.

shop call and neither testified to having any other independent knowledge of the policy. The ALJs, therefore, find that the evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of an exclusionary service policy.

Similarly, the ALJs do not find that customer complaints about the Bert Ogden service department support a finding that the dealership is not honoring warranties. Of the customer complaints cited by SOA in its brief, only one involved warranty work and that customer stated that Bert Ogden performed the work once under the original warranty and once under an extended warranty. None of the customer complaints cited by SOA in its brief involve Bert Ogden's refusal to perform service on vehicles more than 10 years old or with more than 100,000 miles.

To that point, it is significant in this analysis that SOA was unable to cite any specific examples of Bert Ogden's refusal to perform warranty work, either from customers, SOA witnesses, or Bert Ogden employees. This is a notable omission considering that Bert Ogden Group has had a Subaru dealership since 2009. If Bert Ogden were customarily and consistently refusing to honor valid vehicle warranties, the ALJs would expect there to be specific examples, especially if it occurred over a period of years, as alleged by SOA.

SOA has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Bert Ogden has refused to honor warranties. The ALJs conclude that this factor does not weigh in favor of termination.

F. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FRANCHISE

The next statutory factor to be considered in determining good cause for terminating a dealership is “the parties’ compliance with the franchise, except to the extent that the franchise conflicts with [Code chapter 2301].”²⁴¹

SOA argues that Bert Ogden materially breached the Dealership Agreement and the Sales Performance Addendum in three main ways. First, SOA argues that Bert Ogden failed to meet the express standards set out in the three-year 2017 Sales Performance Addendum. Second, it argues that Bert Ogden’s failure to meet its customer service obligations constituted a material breach. Third, it argues that Bert Ogden breached the contract by failing to comply with the minimum staffing requirements contained in the MSOGs.

Bert Ogden argues that the only provision of the 2017 Dealer Agreement it breached was the Sales Performance Addendum but argues that compliance was unfeasible “in large part by the actions of SOA” in not providing it sufficient inventory.²⁴² Relatedly, Bert Ogden argues that that SOA represented to it that MSR was a “long-term goal,” and that compliance was not expected.²⁴³ Bert Ogden also argues that comparative OLP rankings are not a required term of the franchise. Bert Ogden argues that SOA misrepresents the number of certified and exclusive employees at Bert Ogden. Bert Ogden also argues, for the first time in its reply

²⁴¹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(6).

²⁴² Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 58-59.

²⁴³ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 15; Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 55.

brief, that SOA breached the agreements by failing to give it notice of non-compliance with the contract and an opportunity to cure.²⁴⁴ Because Bert Ogden did not raise any allegations regarding SOA's possible non-compliance with the Dealer Agreement until its reply brief, the ALJs will not consider them.

1. Failure to Comply with the Sales Performance Addendum

The 2017 Sales Performance Addendum set out three years of step-up sales requirements for Bert Ogden. The modified sales requirements for each of those years were 337 sales in June 2018, 516 in June 2019, and 602 in June 2020.²⁴⁵ Bert Ogden's actual sales at the end of each one-year period were 327 in June 2018, 338 in June 2019, and 358 in June 2020.²⁴⁶ Thus, although Bert Ogden had modest increases in each of those years, the dealership did not meet any of the modified requirements.

Bert Ogden argues that it almost reached the Sales Performance Addendum numbers in the first year. It describes its first-year performance as having "sold 327 vehicles in the July 1, 2017–June 30, 2018 time frame against the Sales Performance target of 337 (97%)."

Bert Ogden next argues that it was not allocated sufficient inventory to meet the Sales Performance Addendum even had it sold its inventory at a satisfactory

²⁴⁴ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 89-90.

²⁴⁵ The Sales Performance Addendum expressed these numbers in terms of percentages of the MSR. The MSR for those years was 673 for June 2018, 880 for June 2019, and 871 for June 2020.

²⁴⁶ SOA Ex. 172 at 3.

sales efficiency. This argument is based solely on a single sentence in an internal SOA email noting that Bert Ogden “would have sold 124, 142, and 124 more units during year 1, year 2 and year 3 respectively if they would have just achieved average zone sales efficiency. (Attached are the calculations by month.)”²⁴⁷

It is true that selling 124 more units during the first year of the Sales Performance Addendum would have meant that Bert Ogden significantly exceeded the first-year addendum amount (instead of not-quite meeting it). However, selling 142 more vehicles than were actually sold in year two would have put Bert Ogden 16 vehicles below its second-year target.²⁴⁸ And in year three, selling 124 more vehicles would have still left Bert Ogden well behind the third-year goals.

Although the calculations are not attached to the exhibit, it seems to the ALJs that these calculations must be made by taking actual inventory amounts multiplied by the average zone sales efficiency rate. The calculations do not seem to reflect the greater inventory allocation amounts Bert Ogden would have received in years two and three had it actually sold 124 more vehicles in the first year of the Sales Performance Addendum, as that would be extraordinarily difficult to calculate. What is more, those numbers do not make sense if they include the increased inventory Bert Ogden would have earned if it had, for example, sold an additional 124 vehicles in the first year. If that calculation included the additional inventory, the number of hypothetical additional sales (based on average sales

²⁴⁷ Bert Ogden Ex. 332 at SOA004285.

²⁴⁸ Bert Ogden was actually 178 units below that second-year amount. Also, selling 142 more vehicles than were actually sold in the second year would have put Bert Ogden at 97% of its goal, a percentage it contends is largely the same as meeting the goal when discussing its first-year performance.

efficiency) would have been significantly higher the second year than the first because of the increased inventory. The ALJs do not interpret this line in an email to be, as Bert Ogden contends, an admission that SOA used inventory allocation to hold Bert Ogden back from meeting its sales goals.

Relatedly, to the extent SOA argues that failure to meet MSR was a breach of the dealership agreement, Bert Ogden argues that it cannot be held to its MSR number because it was informed that MSR was merely a long-term goal, not an enforceable standard. In making this argument, Bert Ogden relies heavily on a statement from Mr. Yannella in a June 2019 Contact Report—an internal memorandum of SOA conversation or visit with a dealer—indicating that, for Bert Ogden, obtaining MSR was a long-term goal.²⁴⁹ This statement reads:

Retailer states that they'd like to know [if] 40 units per month is the number that we keep asking them to perform at. Advised that this is based on their current SOSA²⁵⁰ information and that the number we want them hitting is actually much larger than that, but we need them to hit 40 units per month first. MSR is currently at 71 units per month, based on April 2019 RYTD registration data. Reminded them that we are providing them the additional inventory to hit 40 units per month and that our long-term goal is to be at 100% MSR.²⁵¹

Bert Ogden argues Mr. Yannella's statement means that SOA essentially waived any requirement for Bert Ogden to reach MSR. Nevertheless, Mr. Yannella

²⁴⁹ SOA Ex. 70 at 2.

²⁵⁰ The Sales Opportunity / Segment Analysis Report, or SOSA, is an internal SOA report showing what market competitors have registered in the AOR and the dealer sales related to those registrations. Tr. Vol. 2 at 355.

²⁵¹ SOA Ex. 70 at 2. Forty units per month—or 480 per year—was a significantly higher number of vehicles than Bert Ogden was selling throughout the duration of the Sales Performance Agreement.

explained that when he referred to “long-term goal” he was not saying that MSR did not matter, but was explaining the need to take incremental steps to reach MSR:

So you’re ultimately going to sell 40, and then you’re going to get the inventory to sell 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, so on and so forth. So there was no point in time where, you know, we indicated that, you know, MSR is not their ultimate goal in this case. But in this specific month, you know, 40 units was the next incremental goal that I thought they should be able to hit.

....

[W]hat I’m saying here is that 40 units per month is an incremental goal. The long-term goal here, the goal that we ultimately want to hit is their MSR, which at this point in time to get to 100 percent would have been 71 units per month. That’s going from the range that they were at, and at this point in time the 71 units per month isn’t something that’s going to just simply happen overnight. So, again, it’s a compounding effect. They sell through 40 efficiently, and they move on and sell to 50, 60, 70. That requires efficiency, though, and dedication.

....

Well, the point of me saying this wasn’t—so it’s not to simply be throwing MSR out the window because, of course, that’s the goal here. However, in this case, we had an incremental goal of hitting 40 units per month. The intention, once they hit 40 units per month is that, you know, they were to do it efficiently, again, lowering their days’ supply, organically fueling their future allocations because if they’re selling efficiently, they’re going to earn more vehicles. And that’s going to ultimately be the stepping stone to get them to 100 percent MSR.

We were supplying them vehicles at this point in time to hit 40. Again, in order to actually take advantage of those additional units, though, what they need to be doing is selling through them in an efficient manner, having an at least at zone level turn rate, which they weren't at this point in time, and that's going to fuel the allocations to ultimately get them to 100 percent MSR.²⁵²

The ALJs disagree with Bert Ogden that a statement about MSR being a long-term goal was suggesting that MSR was unimportant or did not need to be reached.

But ultimately, the breach SOA relies on is the breach of the Sales Performance Addendum, not the breach of any MSR requirement in the Dealer Agreement. And the ALJs find that Bert Ogden did not comply with that Addendum.²⁵³ Although by the third year of the Sales Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden did not have sufficient vehicles to reach those sales requirements, that shortage was due to its failure to efficiently sell vehicles in the first years of the addendum's term, which would have enabled it to earn a greater allocation.

2. Customer Service Obligations

SOA also argues that Bert Ogden breached the Dealer Agreement by not maintaining acceptable customer service standards. In particular, it points to the following provisions in the Dealer Agreement related to customer service for sales:

²⁵² Tr. Vol. 4 at 889-92.

²⁵³ Although SOA repeatedly points to statements in the Sales Performance Addendum acknowledging that failure to comply with its terms would be a material breach, the ALJs are not relying on those statements for purposes of this PFD.

4.1 Subaru Image and Customer Satisfaction. Distributor and Dealer acknowledge the importance of satisfying their customers and the necessity of promoting the image and reputation of Subaru Products in the marketplace. Distributor and Dealer further acknowledge that in the marketing, sales and servicing of Subaru Products, it shall be the goal of Distributor and Dealer to achieve the highest level of customer satisfaction possible.

4.2 Customer Satisfaction Responsibilities of Dealer. Dealer acknowledges that Dealer is the primary contact with the customer, and, therefore, Dealer shall have the principal responsibility of advancing the goals of customer satisfaction. Accordingly, Dealer agrees to keep Distributor informed about customer complaints and concerns. Furthermore, Dealer agrees to use its best efforts to resolve customer satisfaction issues in a fair and honest manner, keeping as the primary objective the courteous and expeditious treatment of the customer.²⁵⁴

In addition, SOA cites the following provision relating to service:

Dealer acknowledges the importance of proper and professional servicing of Subaru Products and the fair dealing with the consuming public in servicing of Subaru Products. Therefore, Dealer shall provide the best possible customer service to all Vehicle owners who may request such service. Dealer agrees that all service appointments shall be scheduled, and prompt and efficient service shall be provided, for all Vehicles, whether or not under warranty and without regard to where the Vehicle was originally purchased . . . Dealer shall fully cooperate with Subaru Customer/Dealer Services and shall investigate and handle all complaints received from Vehicle owners with a view to securing and maintaining a high level of customer satisfaction and the goodwill of Vehicle owners toward [Subaru Corporation], SOA, Distributor, Dealer and all other Subaru dealers.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ SOA Ex. 11 at 11.

²⁵⁵ SOA Ex. 11 at 19.

SOA argues that Bert Ogden's OLP scores show it is not complying with the Dealer Agreement. As previously discussed, Bert Ogden's OLP scores have consistently been well below average for the DFW Zone and have sometimes been the lowest of all Subaru retailers in the zone. For example, for customer satisfaction with the purchase experience, Bert Ogden ranked 42nd of 42 retailers in the DFW Zone in 2017; 44th of 46 retailers in the zone in 2018; 43rd of 45 retailers in the zone in 2019; and 44th of 44 retailers in the zone in 2020.²⁵⁶ In March 2021, Bert Ogden ranked third to last of all SOA retailers nationwide,²⁵⁷ and in September 2021, it was second to last in the DFW Zone.²⁵⁸ Although not as consistently low as its sales scores, Bert Ogden's service scores were often significantly below the zone's average scores.

The concern with low customer satisfaction scores is long-standing. Thus, in 2015, Bert Ogden and SOA entered into an OLP Performance Addendum to the Dealer Agreement.²⁵⁹ Under the OLP performance addendum, Bert Ogden agreed that by December 31, 2016, it would improve its purchase and service experience satisfaction scores to meet the region's average scores.

Bert Ogden argues that the Dealership Agreement, including the provisions quoted above, does not impose any obligation on it to achieve a particular OLP

²⁵⁶ SOA Ex. 186 at 55.

²⁵⁷ SOA Ex. 129.

²⁵⁸ SOA Ex. 137.

²⁵⁹ SOA Ex. 7.

score or ranking. It also noted that, unlike the Sales Performance Addendum, the 2015 OLP addendum was not included in the 2017 Dealer Agreement.

Under the Dealer Agreement, both Bert Ogden and SOA shall have the goal “to achieve the highest level of customer satisfaction possible.” Relatedly, Bert Ogden has “the principal responsibility of advancing the goals of customer satisfaction.” Bert Ogden is also obligated to keep SOA informed of customer complaints and concerns and to use its best efforts to resolve customer satisfaction issues in a fair and honest manner.

The ALJs agree with Bert Ogden that the 2017 Dealer Agreement does not impose a comparative OLP score requirement on it. Although there is ample evidence that Bert Ogden’s customer service scores were poor compared to other dealers in the DFW Zone, and the ALJs found that those scores should be relevant to considerations of injury or benefit to the public, those scores (or the ranking) alone do not establish a violation of the Dealer Agreement.

3. Number of Certified and Exclusive Employees

The 2017 Dealer Agreement required Bert Ogden to “employ qualified and trained sales, service, and parts personnel at least in such capacities and in such numbers as are specified in the applicable MSOGs.”²⁶⁰ It also required Bert Ogden to ensure its personnel were trained using SOA training courses. SOA argues that Bert Ogden breached these requirements in three ways: by failing to employ the

²⁶⁰ SOA Ex. 11 at 13.

minimum number of Subaru employees; by failing to employ dedicated employees to work exclusively for Bert Ogden; and by failing to ensure its employees met the minimum training requirements.

The guidelines incorporated in the Dealer Agreement changed a bit from year to year, but generally required Bert Ogden to retain: an exclusive, certified Subaru sales manager; four certified exclusive Subaru new and used sales consultants; a certified Subaru finance and insurance manager; one certified Subaru parts staff employee; an exclusive certified Subaru service manager; and an exclusive certified Subaru service advisor.²⁶¹ These annual requirements were set out in the MSOGs that were discussed previously.

Bert Ogden argues that evidence of certification deficiencies was based on employees who left or were terminated and new employees who experienced delays in obtaining certification, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that Mr. Mauldin's testimony refuted the complaint that service employees who were required to be exclusive were, in fact, shared.

Among the requirements was that Bert Ogden have an exclusive sales manager.²⁶² In its reply, Bert Ogden suggests that it currently complies with that requirement.²⁶³ For example, Mr. Mauldin referred to someone as "my primary

²⁶¹ SOA Exs. 15, 16.

²⁶² SOA Ex. 17 at 3.

²⁶³ Bert Ogden Reply Brief at 95-96.

sales manager and exclusive sales manager.”²⁶⁴ But another Bert Ogden witnesses disagreed. Ms. del Barrio testified that the current general sales manager oversees Subaru, Mazda, and Volvo.²⁶⁵ This is consistent with the previously-discussed June 2019 Contact Report, in which Mr. Yannella described a visit to the Bert Ogden dealership:

Upon arriving at the retailer, found that there [were] no employees in the showroom. When I ultimately found GSM and GM, they told me that two consultants were off dealing with personal issues, which only leaves them with one. Challenged them on this and reminded them they told me they have five, to which the GM responded they have two “in the pipeline.” Ultimately had a one on one conversation with General Manager explained that their staffing levels are incredibly concerning, and that their model of being able to have consultants sell other brands is not conducive to our volume goals at the store. GM tells me that cross-selling very rarely occurs. Their GSM ultimately told me that this is not true and that it happens much more than he’s comfortable with. GSM also tells me that their GM has been slow to hire people.

GM ultimately tells me that they are trying to hire people, but having the ability to cross-sell is something that Bert Ogden has at all of their stores. Told him that our staff is spread very thinly as well, and we ultimately want a dedicated Sales Manager. GSM is in tune with the brand, but is now covering Mazda, Volvo, and Kia.²⁶⁶

Bert Ogden questions the veracity of all the reports showing deficiencies in staffing, and again refers to Mr. Mauldin’s testimony. But the ALJs find that there was evidence of non-exclusive sales managers, along with, at times, insufficient

²⁶⁴ Tr. Vol. 7 at 1685.

²⁶⁵ Tr. Vol. 8 at 1973.

²⁶⁶ SOA Ex. 70 at 2.

numbers of sales consultants. For example, the April 2019 form shows that SOA required 4 sales consultants, but Bert Ogden only had one.²⁶⁷ While Bert Ogden questions the accuracy of that form, they did not challenge it when it was provided to them in April 2019. A shortage is also consistent with the June 2019 Contact Report described above. As discussed previously, there is evidence of non-exclusive service managers and service advisors as of March 2021, as well.²⁶⁸ The ALJs find that SOA established that Bert Ogden failed to comply with the staffing requirements of the Dealer Agreement.

SOA also presented evidence of some Bert Ogden employees lacking training, particularly those involved with finance, insurance, and internet leads. This evidence suggested, consistent with Bert Ogden's position, that the lack of training was largely temporary, and based on the high turnover at Bert Ogden. The ALJs do not find that Bert Ogden regularly failed to comply with the training requirements.

Based on the failure to comply with the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum and the failure to comply with staffing requirements, the ALJs find that Bert Ogden did not fully comply with the franchise agreement. This factor weighs in favor of termination.

²⁶⁷ SOA Ex. 17 at 3.

²⁶⁸ SOA Ex. 19.

G. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE FRANCHISE FROM A PUBLIC POLICY STANDPOINT

The final statutory factor requires the parties to address “the enforceability of the franchise from a public policy standpoint, including issues of the reasonableness of the franchise’s terms, oppression, adhesion, and the parties’ relative bargaining power.”²⁶⁹ Bert Ogden argues that the 2017 Dealer Agreement was a contract of adhesion in which it had no bargaining power and that it was subject to SOA’s allocation system and SOA’s decision whether to allocate MAUI units.²⁷⁰

SOA argues that the fact that the Dealer Agreement contains standard terms does not make it an unconscionable contract of adhesion. It further notes that Mr. Vackar is a sophisticated businessman who owns many dealerships and has significant experience in working and negotiating with motor vehicle manufacturers. SOA notes that Mr. Vackar repeatedly entered into the same dealer agreements with SOA for over a decade. It also notes that he entered into two Sales Performance Addendums.

The ALJs agree with SOA that the Dealer Agreement is not unconscionable (and thus unenforceable) simply because it is a standard contract²⁷¹ and further agree that Mr. Vackar is a sophisticated party with a great deal of experience with dealer agreements.

²⁶⁹ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a)(7).

²⁷⁰ Bert Ogden Closing Argument at 65.

²⁷¹ See, e.g., *In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.*, 195 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. 2006).

Moreover, the ALJs note that testimony suggests that Bert Ogden was given benefits not given to other dealers. Mr. Griffin testified that other than for Bert Ogden, he had never signed an agreement that allowed a dealer to perform at 50% of MSR nor had he ever signed a sales performance addendum that provided a dealer three years in which to improve.²⁷²

As for Bert Ogden's argument that the Dealer Agreement was unenforceable because it was dependent on SOA's allocation system and its discretion to award MAUI units, although that specific system was not in place when Bert Ogden first entered into a dealership agreement with SOA, Bert Ogden was certainly aware of it when entering the 2017 Dealership Agreement. The arguments about insufficient MAUI units have previously been addressed. The ALJs do not find a contract that is subject to the distributor's set method of inventory allocation to be unenforceable simply because it is not the method of allocation that a dealer prefers.

The ALJs find that the Dealership Agreement is enforceable and not an unconscionable contract of adhesion.

²⁷² Tr. Vol. 3 at 686-87.

H. TERMINATION MAY NOT BE BASED SOLELY ON MARKET PENETRATION

The Code provides that a distributor's desire for market penetration "does not by itself constitute good cause."²⁷³ Bert Ogden argues that SOA's arguments have all been pretextual and that the entire termination proceeding is based solely on SOA's desire for market penetration. SOA argues otherwise.

The ALJs note that this provision does not mean sales cannot be part of the consideration: sales and compliance with the franchise are both factors the Code requires to be examined. And while there is no real doubt that SOA would like to see sales increase, there is also ample evidence that the proposed termination reasons are not a pretextual cover for increasing market penetration. SOA offered evidence of its attempts to work with Bert Ogden. For example, it entered into two separate Sales Performance Addendums without success. The ALJs would distinguish a desire for market penetration from an interest in having a dealer who was focused on Subaru products, as opposed to sharing management with other brands, having salespeople who could sell other brands as well as Subarus, and not having Subaru leads being responded to with solicitations for Mazdas or Volvos. The ALJs find that SOA is not seeking termination solely for market penetration.

²⁷³ Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(b).

VI. CONCLUSION

As described above, SOA has met its burden to demonstrate good cause for the termination of Bert Ogden's Subaru dealership in Edinburg, Texas. Bert Ogden's sales have consistently been low, and the dealership has never come close to meeting its MSR. The dealership's focus has not been on Subaru vehicles: it does not have exclusive sales management, its sales consultants may sell other makes, and requests for information about Subaru vehicles have been responded to with information about Mazda or Volvo vehicles. Bert Ogden failed to meet any of the lowered sales requirements outlined in an initial, one-year Sales Performance Addendum as well as a subsequent three-year Sales Performance Addendum. Additionally, the dealer's customer service scores relating to both purchasing and service have been consistently lower than others in the DFW Zone. While its service facilities are adequate, its parts and service staffing have been below average. Bert Ogden's honoring of warranties and its investments—the two factors that either argue against termination or are neutral—do not outweigh the other factors indicating good cause. Accordingly, the ALJs recommend that the Department deny Bert Ogden's protest of the termination.

VII. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On August 20, 2020, Subaru of America, Inc. (SOA) sent a letter notifying McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru (Bert Ogden) of its intent to terminate Bert Ogden's dealership agreement.
2. On January 8, 2021, Bert Ogden filed its Notice of Protest with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Department or Board).

3. On January 8, 2021, the Department referred the protest to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for a contested hearing and issued a Notice of Hearing to the parties on January 14, 2021.
4. On March 17, 2021, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Rebecca Smith issued Order No. 2, setting the hearing date.
5. The Notice of Hearing and Order No. 1 contained a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing was to be held; a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved; and a short, plain statement of the factual matters asserted, or an attachment that incorporated by reference the factual matters asserted in the complaint or petition.
6. The hearing on the merits was held January 18-21, 24-28, and 31, 2022, before ALJs Rebecca Smith and Susan Rodriguez. At the hearing, Bert Ogden was represented by its counsel, Dan Worthington, James Cousar, and Brent Bishop. SOA was represented by its counsel, Mark T. Clouatre, Steven B. McFarland, and Adrienne L. Toon.
7. The record closed on May 20, 2022, after the parties' post-hearing briefs and response briefs were filed.
8. SOA is the United States distributor of Subaru vehicles. SOA is divided into three regions, which are, in turn, each broken into four zones. The Dallas-based zone—the DFW Zone—includes 44 retailers in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, as well as Jackson, Mississippi and Memphis, Tennessee. Each zone is broken into geographically-defined districts containing between 10 to 12 retailers.
9. Sales of Subaru vehicles have been increasing. In 2009, approximately 7,500 Subaru vehicles were sold in the DFW Zone; by 2019, sales of Subarus in the zone totaled 45,000.
10. Bert Ogden is owned by Janet Ogden Vackar and Robert C. Vackar, who is its president and dealer principal.

11. Bert Ogden is part of the Bert Ogden Group, which owns 23 other franchises and operates 19 different dealerships throughout the Rio Grande Valley area of Texas. Mr. Vackar is the group's chairman of the board.
12. Bert Ogden is located within the DFW Zone's District 3, which contains dealerships in Houston, San Antonio, Selma, Nederland, Bryan, and Corpus Christi, Texas.
13. The Bert Ogden dealership, in Edinburg, Texas, shares a location with the Bert Ogden Group's Volvo and Mazda dealerships. The Mazda dealership is housed in its own building. The Volvo dealership and Bert Ogden share a building, but a customer cannot walk between those two dealerships without physically leaving the building and re-entering.
14. Bert Ogden Group's Subaru, Volvo, Kia, and two Mazda dealerships all share the same general manager.
15. The same general sales manager oversees sales at Bert Ogden Group's Subaru, Mazda, and Volvo dealerships.
16. All Bert Ogden Group salespeople may cross-sell other makes of vehicles. Thus, from the same location, Bert Ogden salespeople could sell a customer a Mazda or a Volvo.
17. Bert Ogden and SOA first entered into a dealer agreement on September 23, 2009.
18. Bert Ogden's area of responsibility (AOR) is called the Pharr AOR. The Pharr AOR covers the western portion of the Rio Grande Valley, including Edinburg, McAllen, and Harlingen, but stops just on the far side of Harlingen, thus excluding San Benito, Brownsville, and most of Cameron County.
19. The Pharr AOR has a growing population, and growth in the AOR is expected to continue.
20. On May 20, 2014, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into a Sales Performance Addendum, which required Bert Ogden to increase its sales by the end of 2015.

21. Bert Ogden entered into a new dealer agreement with SOA on July 1, 2017. At the same time, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into a second Sales Performance Addendum.
22. The 2017 Sales Performance Addendum had a three-year term. A three-year term for a sales performance addendum was unusual, but SOA accommodated Bert Ogden's request for additional time to improve.
23. Bert Ogden failed to meet the requirements of either Sales Performance Addenda.
24. The August 20, 2020 Notice of Intention to Terminate listed three specific grounds for the termination: failure to comply with sales performance obligations; operational deficiencies in the dealership; and Bert Ogden's failure to achieve acceptable levels on SOA's customer satisfaction measurement tool.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Bert Ogden's Sales in Relation to the Market

25. Bert Ogden has consistently been the lowest-performing dealer in the DFW Zone in terms of meeting sales goals.
26. The metric SOA uses for evaluating a dealer's sales performance is called minimum sales responsibility (MSR). This nationwide system was in place when Bert Ogden signed its dealership agreement.
27. The MSR is calculated by geographic area and is based on segments—groups of similar, competitive vehicles in terms of size, configuration, and price.
28. The first step in determining the MSR is to calculate, by segment, the percentage of new registered vehicles in the relevant area that are Subaru vehicles. That percentage would be the MSR for Subaru vehicles in that segment.
29. Through 2017, the DFW Zone was the benchmark for the MSR. In other words, the MSR was based on the percentage of new Subaru registrations in the entire zone.

30. In 2018, SOA changed its benchmark and began using registration in the district—in Bert Ogden’s case, District 3.
31. SOA considers a retailer who achieves 100% MSR to be an average retailer.
32. Bert Ogden consistently failed to achieve its MSR.
33. When the parties entered into the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden’s MSR was 860 vehicles, but it had only sold 359 vehicles. The 2017 sales performance addendum required Bert Ogden to reach 50% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2018; to reach 60% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 20, 2019; and then to reach 70% of MSR for the one-year period ending June 30, 2020.
34. Bert Ogden did not reach 50% of MSR in the initial one-year period of the 2017 sales performance addendum.
35. As of December 2018, Bert Ogden was selling at 44.10% of MSR, which ranked in the bottom 10% of the DFW Zone retailers.
36. Bert Ogden had the lowest overall MSR rank in the DFW Zone for the period 2016-2020, achieving an average of 41.3% of its MSR.
37. The second-to-lowest dealership’s MSR average for that period was 60.3%.
38. MSR is a relevant, useful tool for analyzing Bert Ogden’s sales in comparison to the market.
39. The MSR benchmark, based on district registrations, does not perfectly match AOR registrations, but sufficiently takes into account local preferences for types of vehicles.
40. The Pharr AOR’s demographic and geographic specifics do not make the MSR an invalid tool for measuring its sales in comparison to the market.
41. SOA allocates vehicles to dealers largely based on the retailer’s days’ supply of each carline.

42. Days' supply is the auto industry's method for measuring levels of inventory and is calculated by comparing how much of something is sold per day to how much of that item is in inventory.
43. In allocating inventory, SOA tries to consider the average inventory level, based on days' supply, across an area and tries to keep retailers as close as possible to the average based on their relative sizes.
44. Dealers can increase their allocations by increasing sales, thus reducing their days' supply. The allocation system would attempt to raise the dealer's inventory back up to the average. On the other hand, slow sales reduce allocations because a dealer already has a higher days' supply.
45. SOA intentionally operates with a lean inventory amount. It has a very low days' supply of vehicles to allocate.
46. SOA also has a separate discretionary allocation for another set of vehicles, which are called Market Action Unit of Inventory (MAUI) vehicles. MAUI units are supplemental to a dealer's earned allocation.
47. Bert Ogden received a meaningful number of MAUI vehicles.
48. The Bert Ogden Group, throughout all its other dealerships, operates on a high-inventory model.
49. Bert Ogden regularly had a greater days-supply than other Subaru dealers.
50. Bert Ogden's sales increased significantly shortly after the termination notice without a significant change in the vehicles it had available.
51. Bert Ogden's lower sales than the rest of the district or zone were not the result of SOA's inventory allocation.
52. Bert Ogden's sales in relation to the market supports termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Dealership's Investments and Obligations

53. Bert Ogden invested \$129,574.50 for upgraded lighting, a purchasing system upgrade, and a parking lot expansion.

54. Other Bert Ogden Group entities paid for most of the original renovation of the dealership, Bert Ogden's current service bays, and electronic signs that advertise all the Bert Ogden Group dealerships. These items cost a significant amount of money.
55. Bert Ogden does not own the property on which the dealership is located. It subleases the property from the Bert Ogden Group's Mazda dealership. This lease's term extends through 2038.
56. Because Bert Ogden itself did not invest much in the dealership, its investments would not be greatly harmed by the termination.
57. This factor does not weigh in favor of or against termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Injury or Benefit to the Public

58. SOA uses its Owner Loyalty Program (OLP) as a way of measuring customer satisfaction.
59. The OLP consists of different surveys sent to customers who have purchased or leased a Subaru vehicle or who have had vehicle service performed at a Subaru dealership. Customers score their satisfaction with their experience at the dealership on a five-point scale.
60. Survey response scores are tabulated, and SOA comparatively ranks dealers in the same zone to identify dealers that need help improving the customer experience in their stores.
61. When ranked against other dealers in the DFW Zone, Bert Ogden placed at or near the bottom in purchase satisfaction scores from 2017-2021. Bert Ogden also ranked below the Zone in service satisfaction for most of 2019, all of 2020, and most of 2021.
62. If the dealership agreement is terminated, there will be a transition period before a new dealer is in place during which there will be no Subaru dealership in the Rio Grande Valley.
63. There is a possibility of inconvenience to the public if there is no local dealer to perform service work, including warranty and recall work.

64. SOA has indicated that it intends to quickly install a new dealer, so any inconvenience will be brief and is outweighed by the benefit the public will realize once a new dealer is established.
65. There is little benefit to the public to continuing Bert Ogden's dealership agreement, considering the dealership's consistently low purchase and service satisfaction rankings.
66. The possibility of inconvenience to customers during the transition to a new dealer, and the lack of benefit of leaving Bert Ogden's dealership agreement in place, is outweighed by the benefit to the public of a new Subaru dealer.
67. This factor weighs in favor of termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Adequacy of Service Facilities, Equipment, Parts, and Personnel

68. There was no evidence that Bert Ogden's service facilities are inadequate in relation to those of other dealers.
69. A vehicle in operation, or VIO, is a vehicle that is seven model years old or newer that is still in operation and being driven.
70. Parts and accessories per VIO is a measure of service opportunity because higher parts and accessories inventory per VIO makes it more likely that a dealership will have parts on hand to complete service work in a timely fashion.
71. For nearly all of 2017-2021, Bert Ogden reported having less service parts and accessories inventory per VIO than other similar-sized Subaru dealers in the DFW Zone.
72. From 2017-2021, Bert Ogden reported having substantially less service equipment (at cost) than other similar-sized Subaru dealers in the DFW Zone.
73. From 2017-2021, Bert Ogden reported having substantially less service equipment (at cost) and service equipment (at cost) per VIO than other similar-sized Subaru dealers in the DFW Zone.

74. Bert Ogden had higher turnover in its parts and service departments than other dealers in District 3.
75. Bert Ogden employed fewer Subaru-exclusive employees in its parts and service departments than other dealers in District 3. From 2019-2021, Bert Ogden employed at least four service managers, all of whom held positions of responsibility with other Bert Ogden Group dealerships at the same time.
76. Bert Ogden has never had a Subaru-exclusive parts manager.
77. As VIOs increased, other dealers in District 3 increased the number of service department employees and dedicated personnel in key positions like service manager and parts manager. Bert Ogden has not made similar changes to its service operations.
78. Bert Ogden did not employ a Subaru-exclusive service manager from 2017-2021. During those years, the service manager position was shared with other Bert Ogden Group dealerships.
79. Bert Ogden did not employ a Subaru-exclusive service advisor from 2017-2021. During those years, the service advisor position was shared with other Bert Ogden Group dealerships.
80. Bert Ogden had inadequate service parts, equipment, and personnel in relation to other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make, which weighs in favor of termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Bert Ogden's Warranty Service

81. The evidence did not establish that Bert Ogden refuses to perform warranty work, including on older, high-mileage Subaru vehicles covered under warranty extensions or extended service agreements.
82. This factor weighs against termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Compliance with the Franchise

83. The 2017 Sales Performance Addendum set out modified sales requirements of 337 sales in June 2018, 516 in June 2019, and 602 in June 2020.
84. Bert Ogden's actual sales at the end of each one-year period were 327 in June 2018, 338 in June 2019, and 358 in June 2020.
85. Although Bert Ogden had modest increases in each year, the dealership did not meet any of the 2018-2020 sales requirements in the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum.
86. Failure to meet the requirements of the Sales Performance Addendum was not due to SOA's inventory allocation system.
87. Although by the third year of the Sales Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden did not have sufficient vehicles to reach those sales requirements, that inventory shortage was due to its failure to efficiently sell vehicles to enable it to earn a greater allocation.
88. For extended periods, Bert Ogden failed to comply with SOA's staffing requirements—including those requiring an exclusive sales manager, a certain number of sales consultants, an exclusive service manager, and exclusive service advisors.
89. Bert Ogden did not fully comply with the franchise agreement.
90. This factor weighs in favor of termination.

Statutory Good-Cause Factor: Enforceability of the Dealer Agreement

91. That the Dealer Agreement contains standard terms does not make it an unconscionable contract of adhesion.
92. Mr. Vackar is a sophisticated businessman with a great deal of experience with dealer agreements.
93. SOA is not seeking termination solely to increase market penetration.


VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Department and its governing Board have jurisdiction and authority over the subject matter of this case. Tex. Occ. Code ch. 2301.
2. SOAH has jurisdiction over all matters relating to the conduct of a hearing in this matter, including the preparation of a proposal for decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.704; Tex. Gov't Code ch. 2003.
3. Notice of the termination was properly provided. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453; 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 215.111.
4. Bert Ogden timely filed its notice of protest. 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 215.111.
5. Notice of Hearing was properly provided. Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2301.705, .707; Tex. Gov't Code §§ 2001.051-.052; 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 215.34.
6. The Dealer Agreement is a “franchise” as defined by Texas Occupations Code § 2301.002(15).
7. A manufacturer may not terminate or discontinue a franchise with a franchised dealer unless the manufacturer provides notice of the termination and: (1) the franchised dealer consents in writing to the termination, (2) the appropriate time for the dealer to file a protest has expired, or (3) the Board makes a determination of good cause for the termination. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(a), (g).
8. SOA has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that good cause exists for the termination of Bert Ogden's dealership. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(g); 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.427.
9. In determining whether SOA established by a preponderance of the evidence that there is good cause for terminating Bert Ogden's franchise, the Board is required to consider all existing circumstances, including seven statutory factors. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a).

10. SOA met its burden of demonstrating good cause for the termination of Bert Ogden's franchise. Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.453(g).
11. Bert Ogden's protest should be denied, and the termination of Bert Ogden's Subaru franchise should be approved.


SIGNED JULY 19, 2022.

ALJ Signature(s):



Susan Rodriguez,

Presiding Administrative Law Judge



Rebecca Smith,

Presiding Administrative Law Judge

TxDOT Board Meeting eBook

February 9, 2023

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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Carol Hale, CLERK

MCALLEN JEEP, INC.
d/b/a BERT OGDEN SUBARU,
Petitioner

vs.

SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.,
Respondent

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BEFORE THE STATE OFFICE

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

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Attachment A: Objections to Specific Finding of Fact

Attachment B: Evidence Ignored

**SOAH DOCKET NO. 608-21-0988.LIC
MVD DOCKET NO. 21-0004-LIC**

**MCALLEN JEEP, INC.
d/b/a BERT OGDEN SUBARU,
Petitioner**

vs.

**SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.,
Respondent**

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BEFORE THE STATE OFFICE

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

**MCALLEN JEEP, INC. D/B/A BERT OGDEN SUBARU’S EXCEPTIONS
TO THE PROPOSAL FOR DECISION**

Complainant McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru (“Bert Ogden Subaru”) asserts the following exceptions to the Proposal for Decision ("PFD") issued on July 19, 2022, which recommends the termination of Bert Ogden Subaru’s franchise by Subaru of America, Inc. ("SOA").

**I.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE
EXCEPTIONS**

A. Bert Ogden Subaru Is Not the Type of Failing Dealership for Which Legal Precedent Supports the Imposition of the Harsh and Punitive Penalty of Termination

The PFD wrongly recommends terminating Bert Ogden Subaru’s franchised Subaru dealership in Edinburg, Texas. This PFD marks a substantial departure from the existing standards which have been required to support the termination of a franchised dealer in Texas. Bert Ogden Subaru is not the type of failing dealership for which the harsh and punitive penalty of termination is appropriate. To the contrary, Bert Ogden Subaru is a thriving dealership which has demonstrated the ability to sustain continued growth in a market with an unparalleled history of failure by SOA and its eight prior Subaru franchisees. There is no precedent for termination of a dealership under

the totality of the circumstances presented in this case and it should not be the policy of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles ("TDMV") to terminate a dealership where the dealer's investment and the dealership's achievement of consistent and substantial sales growth is without question.¹

TDMV case law has upheld termination of dealers who have been dishonest, who have falsified reports of recall work, who have consistently failed to improve sales, who have failed to maintain a functional dealership facility, who have failed to invest in their operation, and who have failed to perform warranty or recall service. None of these circumstances are present in this proceeding and Bert Ogden Subaru did not engage and was not found to have engaged in any of the types of operations or actions that have been found to be "good cause" for termination in the cited cases or in other TDMV termination proceedings.

The PFD is dismissive of this lack of precedent and rejects Bert Ogden Subaru's argument that there is no precedent for terminating a dealer with a record of improved sales comparable to Bert Ogden Subaru, providing as follows:²

"As for its argument that SOA may not terminate the contract of a dealer whose sales are increasing, the ALJs find that argument unsupported by the case law Bert Ogden cites.³ Certainly sales after termination notice are relevant, but the Code requires an examination of sales compared to the market, not sales compared to previous years."⁴

¹ The following TDMV cases were cited by the parties to this proceeding as relevant authority. None of them involves termination of a dealer with a record of sales growth remotely comparable to Bert Ogden Subaru. *Nissan North America, Inc. v. Texas Department of Motor Vehicles*, 592 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2019); *Landmark Chevrolet Corp. v. General Motors Corp.*, Docket No. 02-0002 LIC (lex. Motor Vehicle Bd. Sep. 16, 2004); *Austin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. and Motor Vehicle Div. of Texas Dept. of Transp.*, 212 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); *All Star Imports, Inc. v. Mazda Motor of North America, Inc.*, MVD Docket No. 19-0015.LIC; *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc.*, 2016 Westlaw 1534032 (Tex. SOAH Apr. 8, 2016); *Cecil Atkission Orange, LLC v. FCA US LLC*, MVD Docket No. 15-0015.LIC; *Mr. Yamaha, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corporation*, MVD Docket No. 09-0043.LIC; *Star Houston, Inc. d/b/a Star Motor Cars v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC*, MVD Docket No. 16-0018.LIC; *Sweeten Truck Center, L.C. v. Volvo Trucks North America*, 2016 WL 4979826 (Tex. App. Austin, 2016); *HFJ Group, LLC d/b/a Lone Star Emergency Group, LLC. v Ferrara Fire Apparatus, Inc.*, 2021 TX SOAH LEXIS 136, (Tex. SOAH July 23, 2021), SOAH Docket No. 608-19-5608.LIC, and MVD Docket No. 19.0018.LIC.

² See PFD P. 39-40 and fn. 146.

³ Id at fn. 146.

⁴ See PFD P. 39-40 and fn. 146.

This assertion is incorrect in several respects. In the first place, nothing in the language of the Occupations Code suggests that the relevant criteria - "sales relative to sales in the market," - limits the meaning of "market" to a narrow time frame rather than a geographic area over an extended period of time. In this proceeding, the evidence established that, as it related to sales, Bert Ogden Subaru each year sold all the units it was provided by SOA and its sales record was an ever-increasing pattern of growth for years prior to and subsequent to the Notice of Intent to Terminate ("NOIT"). This dealer's record of increasing sales was not limited to the period after the Notice of Intent to Terminate.

The PFD references the following two-dealer termination PFDs as alleged support:

- a) *All Star Imports v. Mazda of N. America, Inc.*; and
- b) *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc.*⁵

These opinions do not stand for the proposition for which they were offered and/or relied upon. *All Star Imports* involved a San Antonio Mazda dealer that was falsifying records on safety recalls, putting car owners' safety and lives in danger. The statutory termination factor of "sales relative to sales in the market" was not even an issue in the All Star Imports case, as opposed to the Bert Ogden Subaru termination proceeding, in which the essential grounds for termination was Bert Ogden Subaru's "sales relative to sales in the market" and its MSR scores on SOA's "minimum sales responsibility" metric. On page 32 of the *All Star Imports* PFD, the ALJ noted "*Mazda is not relying on World Car North's sales to justify termination and did not introduce evidence about those sales.*" (emphasis added). Other evidence in the record showed that the dealership had a precipitous drop in sales by unit from 2013 to 2017 (769 cars sold down to 239) and then an uptick for the next two years. But since sales was not a contested issue in that case it is perplexing that

⁵ *All Star Imports, Inc. v. Mazda Motor of North America, Inc.*, TMVD Docket No. 19-0015 LIC and *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.*, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC

the PFD would cite *All Star Imports* as authority that TDMV precedent authorizes terminating a dealer whose unit sales and overall sales revenue have consistently improved for a five-year period leading up to a termination hearing.

Just as important, there was no allegation in this termination proceeding that the dealer had failed to perform essential recalls and no issue as to falsification of records. *All Star Imports* is a “dishonest dealer case” and a threat to public safety case, and not a termination based on dealer sales performance. It in no way rebuts Bert Ogden Subaru's contention that TDMV policy and precedent do not support for termination of a dealer with long term, consistently improving unit sales and dollar sales revenues.

The second cited case, *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc.*⁶, (hereinafter, “*Bates Nissan*”) is even more supportive of the Bert Ogden Subaru’s contention that there is no precedent for terminating a dealer whose sales are consistently improving. Most important, in *Bates Nissan- **the dealer was not terminated.*** According to the PFD, for the period 2009-2013, “Overall, Bates Nissan was the lowest scoring (Nissan) dealer in Texas, based on cumulative RSE percentages (Nissan's version of MSR).” Bates Nissan’s performance in terms of RSE then improved from November 2013 to June 2015. But, since the PFD did not recommend termination of Bates Nissan and the TDMV denied Nissan’s termination request, *Bates Nissan supports rather than refutes* Bert Ogden Subaru's contention that there is no precedent for terminating a dealer with consistently improving unit sales and overall sales revenues over an extended period leading up to the hearing.

⁶ *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.*, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC.

One of the key issues in *Bates Nissan* was the PFD's conclusion of law that Nissan's RSE requirement (almost identical to SOA's MSR requirement) was not consistent with Nissan's contractual requirement that Bates Nissan effectively sell Nissan cars in its assigned sales territory, since RSE scores for all Nissan dealers were based on sales both inside and outside of the dealer's AOR (area of responsibility). Rather than supporting termination of Bert Ogden Subaru, this legal precedent is consistent with the contention that TDMV precedent does not support a termination of a dealer with a record of increasing unit sales and sales revenues comparable to Bert Ogden Subaru.

To summarize, TDMV case law has upheld termination of failing dealerships that have been dishonest, that have consistently failed to improve sales, that have failed to maintain a functional sales facility, that have failed to invest in their operation, and that have failed to perform recall or warranty service. TDMV case law shows that at least one dealer, Bates Nissan, retained its dealership even after an extended period in which it was the "lowest scoring dealer in Texas." TDMV case law provides **no support** for the premise that a dealer can be terminated based on "sales relative to sales in the market" when that dealership has maintained a modern functional facility and has consistently increased overall unit sales and sales revenues for more than half a decade prior to the termination proceedings.

**B. The PFD Allows SOA to Rewrite the Contract and Impose New Obligations on Bert Ogden –
Obligations Never Bargained-For By SOA
and Never Agreed to by Bert Ogden**

Nothing in the SOA franchise agreement in this case (and nothing in Texas law) supports the notion that a manufacturer may terminate a dealer because the dealer scores lower than other dealers in customer satisfaction surveys – especially when the dealer is consistently rated at or close to “EXTRAORDINARY” by its customers.⁷ Bert Ogden’s Owner Loyalty Program (“OLP”) scores have consistently achieved a level SOA characterized as “EXTRAORDINARY” for both Purchase and Service. SOA and Bert Ogden Subaru never bargained for or contractually agreed that the dealer would be required to achieve any specific OLP score as a condition for keeping its franchise.

The terms of the PFD would allow SOA to rewrite the contract with Bert Ogden and impose new obligations never bargained-for and never agreed to by Bert Ogden. Granting SOA this unilateral power to rewrite the franchise agreement is even more egregiously unfair given that the OLP "single satisfaction score" metric SOA cites as a basis for termination has now been abandoned by SOA. In short, the PFD would allow SOA to terminate Bert Ogden based on alleged non-compliance with an undefined metric never agreed to as a condition-precedent for retaining a franchise – which undefined metric was abandoned by SOA before the start of the hearing in this case.

⁷ Previously discussed in Bert Ogden Post-Hearing Brief pg. 3.

C. The PFD Allows SOA to Rewrite the NOIT Without Notice to the Dealer

1. Notice Given and an Opportunity to Respond:

Page 15 of the PFD states that the NOIT listed three (3) specific grounds:

- 1) the sales performance agreement;
- 2) the dealer's alleged failure to achieve acceptable levels of customer satisfaction per the SOA tool, and
- 3) "operational deficiencies in the dealership."

Bert Ogden Subaru was given notice of "specific grounds" so that it could respond at the hearing and address all of the grounds upon which termination was sought. Notice of these "specific grounds" is mandatory under the law as is set out in Texas Occupations Code §2301.453 (c) which requires that, "...the manufacturer, distributor, or representative **must provide written notice** by registered or certified mail to the dealer and the board **stating the specific grounds for the termination** or discontinuance."

In cross-examination, SOA witnesses admitted that the only three grounds for termination asserted in the NOIT by SOA were the following:

- 1) The Sales Performance Agreement dated July 1, 2017;
- 2) Bert Ogden Subaru's MSR scores, and
- 3) Bert Ogden Subaru's customer satisfaction (OLP) scores.

The NOIT did not invoke other unnamed "operational deficiencies." Since the SOA witnesses who drafted and signed the NOIT did not assert that it invoked "operational deficiencies" as a specific ground for termination, neither should the PFD.

Bert Ogden Subaru took the position in the hearing that the NOIT should have clearly stated any specific grounds relied on by SOA for termination, as required by the Occupations Code.

Some cases cited by the PFD assert that a manufacturer may present grounds for termination at the hearing even if those grounds have not been raised in the NOIT and have not otherwise been presented to a dealer. This misinterprets the provisions of the Texas Occupations Code that require that an NOIT state the “specific grounds” relied on by the manufacturer. At the very least, the PFD and the TDMV should give little credence to a manufacturer's post-NOIT grounds for termination which:

- 1) a dealer had no notice and chance to cure, per the Franchise Agreement; and
- 2) which were not specifically stated in the NOIT, as required by Texas law

While a manufacturer might cite grounds not raised in an NOIT in a breach of contract lawsuit, grounds not previously raised with a dealer and not stated in the NOIT should not be "good cause" for this agency to terminate a franchise.

2. This PFD Rewards a Manufacturer’s Ambush of a Dealer

The Final Hearing consisted of an airing of general grievances by SOA - not asserted in the August 20, 2020 NOIT and, in most cases, for which SOA never gave the dealer notice and an opportunity to cure as required by Section 17 of the Franchise Agreement.

Page 14 of the PFD quotes a SOA witness as testifying that “SOA takes the proposed termination of a dealer very seriously, that terminations are infrequent, and that SOA tries to give dealers an opportunity to resolve problems....” The PFD cites and relies on this self-serving testimony despite the fact that the Tribunal refused to admit Bert Ogden Subaru’s proffered evidence consisting of recent NOITs for the SOA Corpus Christi and Midland dealerships. These NOITs, which SOA objected to, contained highly relevant evidence both of the types of egregious conduct that SOA has previously considered to be grounds for termination, and the extent to which SOA afforded other dealers an opportunity to cure as required by Section 17 of their franchise

agreements.

Before serving the NOIT in this case, SOA required the dealer to enter into two side agreements related to MSR and one side agreement related to customer satisfaction scores (OLP). However, SOA never offered the dealer written notice of other alleged contractual breaches, much less written agreements tendering a chance to cure the other alleged dealer deficiencies which were not named in the NOIT but were cited as good cause for termination in the hearing.

In a glaring omission, the PFD makes no mention of the Franchise Agreement provision on notice and cure, which obligated SOA to advise the dealer of alleged contractual breaches and to afford the dealer a chance to cure them. While the PFD accepts at face value SOA's assertion that it takes termination very seriously, SOA's breach of the contractual terms requiring notice and a chance to cure belies this claim. The PFD should be amended to note SOA's failure to abide by the notice and cure provisions, to omit the language about SOA's purported approach to termination, and to note that the dealer proffered evidence of the manner in which SOA handled other recent terminations of dealers in Corpus Christi and Midland but was not permitted to put on that evidence. Those exhibits, if they had been admitted, would have chronicled conduct by the terminated dealers far more serious than anything alleged against this dealer, including loss of one dealer's financing (floor plan) and falsification of records by the other dealer. Those exhibits would have provided evidence that SOA did afford those dealers the contractually required notice and opportunity to cure, in spite of alleged dealer misconduct far more serious than the weaker grounds for termination cited in this proceeding.

3. The PFD Allows a Manufacturer to Create New Performance Standards

a) Regional and Zone Comparative Sales Ranking

The NOIT cited as a specific ground for termination Bert Ogden Subaru's sales performance as a comparative ranking between it and other dealerships within the SOA Central Region (which includes all of Texas and all or parts of 19 other states from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico). It made a similar comparison of sales performance between Bert Ogden Subaru and all the other dealers in the DFW Zone. In each instance, the performance metric cited by SOA was MSR scores.

In response to Bert Ogden Subaru's objections to the manner in which these comparisons were made - failing to take into account the demographic and geographic differences between the AORs of other dealerships in the Central Region and DFW Zone as compared to Bert Ogden Subaru 's AOR - the PFD dismissed this evidence by erroneously conflating two components of MSR. The first is the manner in which each dealer's MSR requirement is currently calculated (based on vehicle sales within District 3 of the DFW Zone) with the manner in which each dealers MSR scores is compared - which involves comparison of MSR scores of Bert Ogden Subaru to those of all the other dealers in the Central Region and DFW Zone.

To summarize, the PFD correctly finds that each dealer's MSR requirement is primarily based on sales of Subaru cars and comparable models of other line/makes within the relevant SOA district. But SOA then takes that MSR- a dealer's minimum sales requirement - and uses it as a metric to assign each dealer a score, which can be 100% of MSR, 75% of MSR, or- in extreme cases - more than 300% of the dealer's MSR. SOA then prepares comparative rankings, which were offered into evidence in this proceeding, comparing each dealer's MSR scores not just with those of other dealers in its district, but with the MSR scores of all the dealers in the DFW Zone

and in the SOA Central Region. SOA cites the comparative MSR score, and note the MSR requirement, as its grounds for terminating this dealer⁸.

b) Comparative Ownership Loyalty Program (“OLP”) Ranking

The NOIT claimed that Bert Ogden Subaru’s “Extraordinary” OLP (“Customer Service”) ranking for both purchase and service were not “Extraordinary” enough when compared to the other relative scores of other dealers within the DFW Zone. However, SOA admitted that there was no existing policy of comparative ranking either in the franchise agreement or as a SOA policy. A policy that comparative OLP scores would be grounds to terminate a dealer apparently came into existence for the first time in the August 2020 NOIT in which SOA was obligated to state its ‘specific grounds’ to terminate Bert Ogden Subaru. No such policy was referenced in the parties’ franchise agreement or any of the extensive SOA documentation provided to dealers to explain the OLP Program.

The PFD accepts the validity of this comparative OLP ranking in spite of its dubious origins in the NOIT and goes on to find that Bert Ogden Subaru was a “Poor” performing dealer despite the unchallenged evidence that its actual customer satisfaction scores were “Extraordinary” as defined by SOA. As set out in more detail below, Bert Ogden Subaru’s OLP scores are not and cannot be “good cause” to terminate a dealer. The unilateral creation of a previously non-existent standard by a manufacturer as grounds for the termination of a dealer has not previously been permitted and should not be allowed in this proceeding.

⁸ See Exhibit 172.

4. The PFD Ignores the Manufacturer's Role in a Dealer's Sales Performance

Bert Ogden Subaru sold all of the inventory it was provided to sell. As will be discussed below, the PFD ignores that SOA not only set the dealer's sales requirements, it also controlled the supply of vehicles to Bert Ogden Subaru. SOA admitted that, even if Bert Ogden Subaru had "turned" at the Zone level, it could have not met the SOA imposed sales requirements.

The PFD claims that Bert Ogden Subaru received a "meaningful" amount of "MAUI" vehicles (discretionary inventory distributed by SOA to dealers) without acknowledging that by not designating these vehicles as "SSLP" (whereby the sales were triggered as soon as the vehicles were delivered) the ability of MAUI units to increase a dealer's "earn" was substantially limited. Bert Ogden Subaru demonstrated substantial growth from 2017-2021 and a dealer should not be terminated because it could not meet a sales requirement for which the manufacturer controls the setting of the requirement and a dealer's ability to comply.

D. Bert Ogden Subaru Has Proposed an Alternative Sales Performance Metric to MSR

The PFD erroneously states, on P. 23, that Bert Ogden Subaru has not offered an alternative sales performance metric to SOA's preferred metric of MSR. This is incorrect. During the course of the hearing, and in its Closing Statement and Rebuttal to SOA's Closing Statement, Bert Ogden Subaru consistently proposed that the most appropriate metric for its sales performance is whether its sales increased or decreased in the years leading up to the hearing.

The graphic on page 18 of this document demonstrates that annual new car sales by this dealer rose from 325 in 2017 to just under 500 in 2021, a dramatic and steady improvement. Total sales, which include service and parts as well as new vehicles, rose even more sharply, from \$13.9 million in 2017 to \$22.1 million in 2020 (the last calendar year for which data was available at the time of the hearing). This is a reliable and probative metric because it tracks this dealer's

performance in its own market over a sufficient period of time to account for variations that may arise from extraneous factors, such as interruption of inventory due to chip shortages, the consequences of the COVID pandemic, and fluctuations of the Rio Grande Valley economy. This proposed sales performance metric confirms that Bert Ogden Subaru is a successful dealership with a consistent record of sales improvement. Just as important, this objective and easily verified sales performance metric does not suffer from the severe methodological flaws of MSR discussed elsewhere in these Exceptions.

E. The PFD Omits and/or Ignores Probative Evidence

The PFD omits testimony and/or exhibits which are probative evidence as to the issues in the case. The specific testimony and/or exhibits which were ignored and/or omitted by the PFD are set forth in **Attachment B**, which is organized by the following topic areas:

- sales in relation to the market;
- injury or benefit to the public;
- adequacy of service facilities;
- equipment, parts and personal in relation to other dealers;
- compliance with franchise

II. SUBARU'S PRIOR HISTORY OF FAILURE IN THE RGV

A. SOA Seeks to Ignore Over Three (3) Decades of Failure of its Product in the RGV

Pages 39-41 of the PFD are dismissive of Bert Ogden Subaru's argument that a 40-year history of Subaru dealership failures in the RGV (prior to this dealer's franchise, which began in 2009) is relevant to the ultimate issue of "good cause" for termination in this proceeding. The relevant factor to be considered in a termination case is a dealer's "sales relative to sales in the market." The ALJs cite no caselaw or TDMV precedent that this criteria and this term precludes the sales record of a dealer facing termination being compared to the sales of previous dealers of the same line make **in the same market area**.

Bert Ogden Subaru presented un rebutted evidence, summarized below, that SOA tried eight times between 1976 and 2009 to establish a successful Subaru dealership in the Rio Grande Valley, an area that includes the Pharr AOR, and failed each time. While markets evolve over time, many of the characteristics that define a market stay fairly constant over time. In this case, the predominant ethnicity (heavily Hispanic) of the market area did not change over these decades, nor did the fact that this area of Texas has historically been characterized by markedly lower levels of education and lower income. It goes without saying that the flat terrain and hot climate of the market area did not change over this time period, with the possible exception that the climate may have gotten even hotter and drier. Similarly, the low market demand for four wheel and all-wheel drive cars (as opposed to trucks) has not changed over time, a factor that has always limited the appeal of Subaru, which markets only one model which is not all-wheel drive. Yet the PFD ignores these significant and largely unchanged characteristics of the market area at issue in this hearing and insists that the only relevant comparison for "sales relative to sales in the market" should be a

dealer's sales compared to the contemporaneous sales of other dealers in other markets. This defies common construction of the term "market" and turns this statutory criteria on its head, giving greater weight to this dealer's sales compared to those of other dealer's in wholly dissimilar markets as opposed to comparing this dealer's sales to those of prior dealers in the same market.

THIS IS THE PHARR AOR PRIOR TO BERT OGDEN SUBARU⁹

DEALER NAME	APPOINTMENT DATE	BASIS FOR TERMINATION
Aleman Motor Co.	8/1/76	SOA Did Not Know
Mike Hale Subaru	3/1/83	SOA Did Not Know
Cameron Subaru	1/2/87	SOA Did Not Know
Tipton Motors	3/9/88	Voluntary Resignation
Burns Motors	3/29/90	Voluntary Resignation
Harlingen Subaru	11/1/96	Buy/Sell
Valley Subaru	5/21/2002	Buy/Sell
Rodriguez Subaru of South Texas	9/8/2005	Voluntary Resignation

⁹ See Exhibit 487.

B. The Texas Occupations Code Says Nothing About:

- 1) Minimum Sales Responsibility (“MSR”); and/or**
- 2) Other Minimum Sales Metrics**

In studiously ignoring its multi-decade history of futility within the Rio Grande Valley, SOA would restrict the definition of "sales relative to sales in the market" as being sales by Subaru dealer A compared to sales by Subaru dealer B in a given time frame, because that definition dovetails with Subaru's preferred metric: MSR, or minimum sales responsibility. But the Texas Occupations Code says nothing about MSR or other minimum sales metrics: far from the limited and restricted approach sought by SOA, the Code uses the language of market economics, in which “sales in the market” are not necessarily limited to a narrow time frame defined by a manufacturer seeking to terminate a dealership. If SOA had addressed this dealer’s “sales relative to sales in the market” in the larger context- sales relative to those of the other eight Subaru dealers who failed to establish the brand in the Rio Grande Valley, SOA would have to admit that this dealer’s sales far exceeded those of every prior Subaru dealer in the same market.

To the extent that local brand preference helps drive car sales, that preference may change over time, but it also may remain consistent. Subaru was a little-known brand when the first dealer opened shop in the RGV in the 1970s, and SOA’s own evidence shows that the brand remains little known today- especially among Hispanic car buyers - and most especially buyers in areas close to Mexico. In responding to the evidence of this dealer’s continually increasing unit sales, the PFD simply falls back on how this dealer’s MSR scores compared to those of other dealers in other parts of the DFW Zone, but not in the RGV. Since MSR is a flawed metric that does not track local brand preferences, the fact of significantly increasing unit sales should be afforded greater weight than comparative MSR scores with dealers as far away as Arkansas and New Mexico.

The PFD also dismisses the argument that the Bert Ogden Subaru MSR requirement increases when the Bert Ogden Group dealerships in the RGV sell more cars from manufacturers who provide adequate inventory. The PFD simply assumes that successful sales records at other Group dealerships somehow shows that the Group is more focused on other brands. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the Group is selling more of the other manufacturers' cars because of the fact that they have more of them in stock. The Group's success in selling other line/makes paradoxically does raise the MSR requirement for the one line make (Subaru) that a Bert Ogden dealership typically does not have a sufficient inventory of. This contradiction is yet another reason that MSR as assigned by SOA is not a reliable metric for "sales relative to sales in the market," at least in a market where the Group's success in selling other line/makes inadvertently penalizes Bert Ogden Subaru by driving up its MSR requirement.

**III.
TERMINATION IS NOT INTENDED FOR THIS
DEALER**

BERT OGDEN SUBARU'S PERFORMANCE

Year	Total Sales¹⁰ Revenue	Number of Vehicles Sold¹¹	OLP - Purchase¹²	OLP - Service¹³	Denied Warranty Claims¹⁴	Denied Recall Claims¹⁵
2017	\$13,972,889	325	892 Extraordinary	917 Extraordinary	0	0
2018	\$15,116,263 (8.2% growth)	344 (5.8% growth)	776 Extraordinary	819 Extraordinary	0	0
2019	\$16,387,078 (8.4% growth)	352 (2.3% growth)	810 Extraordinary	803 Extraordinary	0	0
2020	\$22,124,861 (35% growth)	432 (22.7% growth)	785 Extraordinary	791 Extraordinary	0	0
2021	Not in Evidence	Approximately 500 (15.7% growth)				

¹⁰ See Exhibit 489.

¹¹ Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 1866, ll7-19 (2021).

¹² Exhibit 43.

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ Hearing Record at Page 1875, ll 14-22.

¹⁵ Hearing Record at Page 1875, ll 23-25.

BERT OGDEN SUBARU SOLD ALL IT WAS GIVEN TO SELL

YEAR ENDING	ALLOCATED¹⁶	SOLD¹⁷
2017	339	325
2018	319	344
2019	357	352
2020	409	432

¹⁶ Exhibit 141.

¹⁷ Exhibit 172.

**BERT OGDEN SUBARU
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INVENTORY**

DATE	EXHIBIT NO.	INVENTORY REQUEST MADE BY BERT OGDEN
6/17/2009	310	To sell 40-50 units per month, Bert Ogden Subaru needs a new vehicle inventory of 80-90 units on the ground.
8/5/2011	325	“I desperately need more inventory now...”
1/23/2017	435	“I fail to understand how I can be expected to maintain Minimum ales Responsibility (MSR) without the necessary product from the manufacturer to do so.”
12/17/2018	408	“Our most significant constraint continues to be inventory.”
6/19/2019	409	“It’s hard to sell out of an empty wagon.”
5/11/2020	356	GM Geoff [Mauldin] expressed that he does not think it is possible to reach MSR without a substantial increase in inventory.
8/28/2020	410	“Without additional inventory it becomes almost impossible to grow out volume levels...”

BERT OGDEN SUBARU'S STAFFING¹⁸**2019**¹⁹

PERSONNEL	DESCRIPTION	REQUIRED	ACTUAL
P3	Certified Subaru Sales Manager	1	1 Mario Cavazos
P6	Certified/Exclusive Subaru New and Used Consultants	4	4 Armando Ramirez, Noel Gonzales, Mike Perez and Cody Sanchez
P10	Service Manager Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive
P12	Service Advisor Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive

2020²⁰

PERSONNEL	DESCRIPTION	REQUIRED	ACTUAL
P3	Certified Subaru Sales Manager	1	1 Jose Gill
P10	Service Manager Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive
P12	Service Advisor Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive

2021²¹

PERSONNEL	DESCRIPTION	REQUIRED	ACTUAL
P3	Certified Subaru Sales Manager	1	1 Jose Gill
P10	Service Manager Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive
P12	Service Advisor Designation	Exclusive	Exclusive

¹⁸ Only those categories for which SOA raised any issue are addressed.

¹⁹ Exhibit 17; Hearing Record at page 1685, ll 23-25; page 1686, ll 1-25; page 1687, ll 1-25; page 1988, ll 1- 25; page 1689, ll 1-15.

²⁰ Exhibit 18; Hearing Record at page 1690, ll 1-25; page 1691, ll 1-9.

²¹ Exhibit 19; Hearing Record at page 1691, ll 10-25; page 1692, ll 1-25; page 1693, ll 1-25; page 1694, l 1.

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The PFD did not reference or attempt to challenge much of the evidence set out above²² but the punitive remedy of termination calls for these facts about this AOR - and of Bert Ogden Subaru's performance – to be considered and addressed.

The notion that Bert Ogden Subaru is arguing that termination is improper due to post NOIT operations is not based on the record and is a mischaracterization of its contentions. Bert Ogden Subaru offered evidence, which was largely ignored in the PFD, that its operational record for years prior to and subsequent to the NOIT disproved “good cause” to terminate Bert Ogden Subaru.²³

The PFD ignored the continuous growth in overall sales revenue, the continuous and uninterrupted growth in overall vehicle sales and an Owner Loyalty Program (“OLP”) which scored Bert Ogden Subaru as “Extraordinary” based on the scale and survey developed and used by SOA for at least the four years prior to the NOIT. The PFD also ignored that the OLP metric relied upon by SOA was abandoned by SOA.

In short, SOA seeks to terminate Bert Ogden Subaru with respect to:

- 1) an alleged OLP minimum required scoring metric not expressly identified in any written agreement bargained-for by SOA and/or agreed to by Bert Ogden Subaru; and
- 2) an OLP format that was abandoned by SOA prior to this hearing

Critically, despite SOA bearing the burden of proof on the issue, SOA offered no evidence and the ALJs made no finding that Bert Ogden Subaru personnel were not otherwise “adequate”

²² See Appendix 1.

²³ On July 8, 2022, SOA finally completed an inspection of the Bert Ogden facilities and operations and confirmed that the prior SOA completed MSOGs were incorrect and set out erroneous information, as argued by Bert Ogden Subaru at the Hearing.

in relation to those of other dealers, as the statutory criteria would require.²⁴ Despite this failure, the PFD criticizes Bert Ogden Subaru for not offering evidence related to its ability to sell vehicles if it were fully staffed. This criticism not only inverts the burden of proof, but ignores the fact that Bert Ogden Subaru did offer evidence that it was fully staffed for the time period of 2019 through 2021, and evidence of the resulting growth of sales both in terms of units and revenue during that time period.

IV. SOA'S ALLOCATION AND MARKETING SYSTEM PLACE BERT OGDEN SUBARU AT A DISADVANTAGE

A. **Historical Sales in the Market Demonstrate the SOA Vehicle Allocation is Not Workable- and Bert Ogden Subaru Has Pointed This Out to SOA To No Avail**

The PFD assumes that a dealer must accept SOA's system of allocation and low "on the ground" inventory, rather than SOA accommodating a dealer that prefers a different system- even when that dealer has far more experience and expertise in selling cars in the market area. For purposes of illustration, the Bert Ogden Group has 23 franchises and 19 dealerships in the RGV, while SOA has only 13 dealerships in all of District 3 of the DFW Zone. SOA urges that the "good cause" factor "sales relative to sales in the market" must incorporate the unique SOA allocation system, but the numerous other US and foreign manufacturers for whom the Bert Ogden Group markets cars clearly do not consider SOA's low inventory model that to be the only or the best system.

Page 13 of the PFD quotes Casey Griffin's (SOA's Central Region Vice-President)

²⁴ The information included on the Minimum Standards Operating Guidelines ("MSOGs") and which were completed by SOA and used to argue Bert Ogden Subaru's claimed non-compliance were wildly inaccurate for at least the prior four years. These inaccuracies came despite SOA knowing that the information was incorrect. It was only after the hearing that SOA conducted a formal inspection and review and issued Bert Ogden Subaru a completely compliant report.

testimony that he did not think Mr. Vackar had a good understanding of Subaru's business model and philosophy. The PFD fails to note the evidence in the record that SOA and Mr. Griffin did not have a good understanding of the Bert Ogden Group's highly successful business model and philosophy. The first evidence of SOA misunderstanding the local sales model came back in 2009 when the Bert Ogden Subaru dealer principal wrote to SOA that to sell 40 to 50 units per month, Bert Ogden Subaru would need a new vehicle inventory of 80 to 90 units on the ground²⁵. Subaru ignored that information, and never provided that level of inventory.

Put another way, the PFD puts all the burden on the dealer to accommodate to SOA, and no burden on SOA to accommodate a dealership group with a multi-decade record of success selling cars at 18 other successful dealerships in the RGV. Whether or not SOA has a legal or business obligation to adapt to the marketing system and strategy of this dealer, SOA should not be allowed to terminate a dealer simply because it (SOA) has a unique allocation and inventory system that has never been proven to work at an RGV dealership.

The PFD did properly reject SOA's assertion made in the NOIT that Bert Ogden Subaru's Owner Loyalty Program ("OLP") scores amounted to a breach of the franchise agreement. However, the PFD erroneously adopted the SOA claim that Bert Ogden Subaru was a "poor" performing dealer based on its relative ranking with other Subaru dealerships. In doing so, the PFD ignored that SOA had never adopted or promulgated a franchise term or other policy that a dealer could be terminated based on relative OLP scores. Nor did the PFD mention the highly relevant evidence from the hearing that the "single satisfaction question" OLP program which Subaru relied on to urge termination of this dealer (and accepted in the PFD) had been abandoned by SOA approximately two weeks before the commencement of the hearing.

²⁵ Exhibit 310.

B. SOA Based Its Case on Selectively-Edited Evidence Which Concealed the Approximate 95% Positive Customer Narratives

SOA did not present this Tribunal with relevant and probative evidence on the question of customer satisfaction. Instead, it took its electronic scissors to that evidence and selectively-edited it to remove everything favorable to Bert Ogden Subaru. To cast Bert Ogden Subaru in the most unfavorable light, SOA edited customer narratives by removing the approximate 95% that were positive, leaving only a litany of complaints. Troy Poston, SOA's manager responsible for Bert Ogden Subaru for most of its time as a SOA dealer, testified as follows:

Q: "Mr. Poston, it would be unfair – if Subaru edited out all of the positive comments and left only the negative comments to the OLP narratives it has marked as exhibits in this case, which would be unfair and misrepresent Bert Ogden's true performance, true?"

A: True."²⁶

Like the testimony concerning the inapplicability of MSR, this evidence was not addressed in the PFD. The credible customer satisfaction evidence, which took into account actual satisfaction surveys by actual Bert Ogden customers, established that Bert Ogden Subaru had been rated "Extraordinary" in both Purchase and Service since at least 2017. By relying on cherry picked and anonymous "negative only" online reviews in the place of SOA's own customer satisfaction surveys, the PFD lets bad evidence chase out the good.

Franchise termination is a harsh and punitive action, which destroys most of a dealership's value, and the Occupations Cod makes it clear that the Legislature intended for termination to occur only after a careful and even-handed assessment of "all existing circumstances." This PFD, in its present configuration, does not contain such a careful and even-handed assessment,

²⁶ Hearing Record at page 189, ll 23-25 and page 190, ll 1-4.

and it is nowhere more arbitrary and unbalanced than in its acceptance of SOA's selective evidence on customer satisfaction and its acceptance of "comparative" rankings in place of actual customer satisfaction ratings.

**V.
SOA'S METRIC OF MSR- THROUGH
SEGMENTATION IS UNRELIABLE**

A. Overview of What SOA Contends that MSR – through “Segmentation” - Is

SOA (and its expert witness, Sharif Farhat) attempt to create the facade that MSR is the controlling factor which impacts dealership sales in the Pharr AOR. SOA and Farhat argue that MSR – through the concept of segmentation - takes into account all differences in markets. The premise of SOA's argument(s) is the misplaced claim that MSR - through segmentation - is a reliable benchmark and, as such, this Tribunal should ignore the following:

- 1) Demographic differences between markets; and
- 2) Brand preferences between markets.

The premise of SOA's reliance upon the theory that MSR – through segmentation – is the controlling factor which impacts dealership sales in the Pharr AOR is as follows:

- **MSR (through segmentation) is saying that the probability is exactly the same that somebody anywhere in the District or Zone (depending on which is used as the benchmark) will buy a Subaru Outback as they will a comparable General Motors offering**

Segmentation is not a reliable metric. The premise of SOA's argument as to MSR is that the black box referred to as “segmentation” controls for all variables and/or differences between markets (e.g. demographic factors, brand preferences). The Post-Trial Briefs submitted to the Tribunal on behalf of Bert Ogden Subaru were long – and this length may have diluted their critical points regarding the flaws of segmentation. As Blaise Pascal (mathematician and physicist) wrote:

“I have only made this letter longer because I have not had the time to make it shorter.”

The gravamen of SOA's view regarding the efficacy of MSR – through “Segmentation” is as follows:

- 1) SOA argues that MSR – through “Segmentation” - is a reliable Metric through which to measure Dealership Sales Performance;
- 2) SOA argues that the concept of MSR – through “Segmentation” - takes into account the differences in:
 - a) demographic factors and
 - b) brand preferences between markets in evaluating Dealership Sales Performance;
- 3) SOA argues that because it believes MSR – through “Segmentation” – takes into account and/or controls for all:
 - a) demographic factors and b) brand preferences between markets,there is no need to further evaluate and/or consider these variables

B. MSR is a Flawed Metric – Regardless of Whether Used in the Context Of:

- 1) An Allegation of Breach of the Franchise Agreement; and/or**
- 2) An Analysis of “Sales in relation to sales in the Market”**

The flaws which preclude the application of MSR as an appropriate metric for Bert Ogden Subaru's compliance with the Franchise Agreement are not rectified by the PFD's use of the same metric for its analysis of “sales in relation to sales in the market.” As discussed below, and consistent with the holdings in *Beck Chevrolet* and *Bates Nissan*, MSR is as flawed a metric for purposes of breach of contract issues as it is for assessing a dealer's sales in relation to the market. The underlying flaw of MSR in each case is the same. It wholly fails to take into account local market preferences.

The classic example of MSR as a flawed metric was the Detroit market and imported car sales. At one point, the economy of the Detroit area was based on the manufacture of cars by the US Big Three: Ford, GM, and Chrysler. People associated with the US auto industry had an

understandable consumer preference for the cars made by the companies that employed them and tens of thousands of their neighbors. It was not impossible to sell a Toyota or Datsun in Detroit in the 1970s, but no fair-minded observer could deny that local market preference made selling imports an uphill fight.

The same general scenario is applicable to sales of Subarus in the Pharr AOR. In addition to the fact that Subarus have never - over a fifty-year period - sold well in the Rio Grande Valley ("RGV"), the brand is little known among the predominantly Hispanic (including both Mexican American and Mexican national consumers), and none of the demographic factors that favor Subaru sales exist in the RGV or the Pharr AOR.

Furthermore, manufacturer/dealer franchises typically require a dealer to "effectively sell" the covered line/make in the dealer's AOR, or other defined sales territory.

In the franchise agreement at issue in this proceeding, the dealer agreed to "effectively sell Subaru Products to customers located in the Area of Responsibility." Sec. 10.2, "*Sales Performance*."

That same section states that dealer's performance "*will be evaluated by the Distributor on the basis of such reasonable criteria as Distributor may develop from time to time, including, but not limited to, those reasonable sales objectives that Distributor may establish and a comparison of Dealer's sales performance with other Subaru dealers.*" (emphasis added).

In fact, the only sales performance "criteria" that SOA ever used to evaluate Bert Ogden Subaru was MSR scores, and in particular its MSR scores in comparison to those of other Subaru dealers.

Even the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum that SOA required Bert Ogden Subaru to enter into was just a variation of SOA's reliance on MSR as its sole criteria for dealer's sales

performance. That agreement imposed sales requirements of 50%, 60% and 70% of the dealer's MSR over a three year period.

It is a distinction without a difference to say that *Beck* and *Bates Nissan* are not relevant authority on the validity of MSR as a metric in this case because those cases criticize and reject MSR "as a contractual performance criteria" while SOA invokes MSR in this case as a metric for "sales relative to sales in the market." In fact, SOA relies on MSR for both criteria- contractual performance and "sales relative to sales in the market."

In both scenarios - Bert Ogden Subaru's contractual compliance (including under the Sales Performance Agreement) and its "sales relative to sales in the market" - MSR is the same metric. In both scenarios, MSR fails as a valid metric due to the same basic flaw: it does not take into account local market preferences either in the way it is calculated or in the way it is used as an evaluation tool. This is true because SOA sets a dealer's MSR requirement based on how Subarus sells in comparison to other makes in a much wider area than that dealer's AOR. Before 2017, that much wider area consisted of about 43 Subaru AORs around Texas, New Mexico, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Mississippi. After 2017, SOA set a dealer's MSR requirement based on Subaru's comparative sales in 13 AORs, none of which shared the unique characteristics, brand preferences, and market demand profile of the Pharr AOR.

SOA then again relied on MSR to evaluate Bert Ogden Subaru by comparing its MSR *scores* to the MSR scores of Subaru dealers throughout the multi-state DFW Zone, which only compounded the underlying flaw arising from the fact that MSR fails to address local market preferences. Since MSR scores are based on sales a dealer makes in its AOR as well as sales it makes outside of its AOR, the use of MSR scores as a comparative metric was skewed unfairly against Bert Ogden Subaru because of its unique geographic disadvantage limiting sales outside

its AOR. A review of the forty plus AORs in the DFW Zone identified in SOA exhibits and expert testimony show that no other AOR is bounded on one side by a foreign nation (Mexico) where the dealer cannot sell cars, on another side by an ocean (the Gulf of Mexico), and on the other side by an extensive and thinly populated desert. While the evidence showed that Bert Ogden Subaru did achieve some sales outside of its AOR, it also showed that Subaru dealers in more favorable locations, including highly urbanized areas, were in a position to boost their MSR scores well above their competitors' scores by selling to customers in the populated areas outside their AORs.

SOA's methodology for 1) setting a dealer's MSR requirements and 2) calculating a dealer's MSR scores does nothing to address the effect of local market preferences of this dealer's AOR. This is precisely the issue raised in *Beck* and *Bates Nissan*. Just as MSR is an unreliable metric for determining contractual compliance, it is an unreliable metric for assessing the sales of a dealer in the RGV "relative to sales in the market."

C. "Segmentation" Is Not the Panacea Proclaimed by SOA

SOA contends that MSR – through "Segmentation" is a panacea which precludes consideration of: a) demographic factors and/or b) brand preferences between markets. Segmentation is not a panacea. On the contrary, SOA's own documents demonstrate that segmentation is flawed, unreliable and contradicts the foundation of the opinions of SOA's expert witnesses.

The PFD's discussion of the flaws raised by Bert Ogden Subaru (see pp. 25 and 26 of the PFD) fails to address the seminal point raised - segmentation, as used by SOA, is wholly unreliable as a way of predicting what each model within a segment will sell in any given market.

D. The Premise of “Segmentation” is the Identification of “What Sales Are Expected” – But this Premise is Erroneous and Flawed – as Demonstrated by SOA’s Own Document ►

the Sales Opportunity/Segment Analysis Report

The premise of SOA (and its experts at Urban Science) is that segmentation analysis based on the District or the Zone is predictive within any segment of *“what sales are expected”* in any given AOR. If that were true, there would be numerous examples of AORs in which the sales of a given model tracked, at least generally, the sales percentages for that same model in the District or the Zone. Instead, the data analyzed by Bert Ogden Subaru expert witness Joe Roesner showed conclusively that- at least in the Pharr AOR- models sold by locally preferred makes (like Nissan) sold more than twice the “expected” number of cars, while sales by other less preferred makes (like Hondas and Subaru) sold less than half the “expected” number. By way of example, the December 2016 and December 2017 SOA-prepared SOSA Reports demonstrate sales of vehicles wildly above and wildly below the benchmark. Stated another way, the SOSA Reports demonstrate sales wildly above and wildly below *“what sales are expected”* using the SOA segmentation model.



Sales Opportunity/Segment Analysis Report December 2016 RYTD
 AOR: 06004411 Pharr, TX
 Retailer: 040743 Bert Ogden Subaru - Edinburg, TX
 Performance Benchmark: Zone - 06004 CEN DFW

Compact Conventional	AOR Regs	AOR Share	B'mark Share	Net Gain
Total Segment Regs	5,315			
Nissan Sentra	1510	28.39%	12.16%	863
Chevrolet Cruze	524	9.85%	7.19%	141
Buick Verano	206	3.87%	1.48%	127
Ford Focus	499	9.38%	7.07%	123
Mazda Mazda3	254	4.78%	4.57%	11
Toyota IM	4	0.08%	0.14%	-3
Honda CR-Z	1	0.02%	0.11%	-5
Nissan Leaf	1	0.02%	0.25%	-12
Hyundai Elantra	440	8.27%	8.52%	-13
Chevrolet Volt	4	0.08%	0.44%	-19
Toyota Scion	17	0.32%	0.76%	-23
Volkswagen New Beetle	24	0.45%	0.95%	-27
Dodge Dart	117	2.20%	2.77%	-30
Subaru Impreza	15	0.28%	0.97%	-36
Volkswagen Golf	17	0.32%	1.10%	-41
Mitsubishi Mirage	48	0.90%	2.03%	-60
Toyota Prius	94	1.77%	3.80%	-108
Volkswagen Jetta	200	3.76%	5.88%	-112
Toyota Corolla	759	14.27%	17.02%	-146
Kia Forte	77	1.45%	5.89%	-236
Honda Civic	507	9.53%	18.91%	-392



Sales Opportunity/Segment Analysis Report December 2017 RYTD

AOR: 06004411 Pharr, TX
 Retailer: 040743 Bert Ogden Subaru - Edinburg, TX
 Performance Benchmark: Zone - 06004 CEN DFW

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Compact Conventional	AOR Regs	AOR Share	B'mark Share	Net Gain
Total Segment Regs	4,890			
Nissan Sentra	1404	28.71%	11.64%	836
Ford Focus	648	13.25%	7.78%	268
Chevrolet Cruze	447	9.14%	7.53%	79
Nissan Rouge Sport	161	3.29%	2.12%	67
FORD C-MAX	26	0.51%	0.38%	6
Buick Verano	26	0.53%	0.48%	2
Hyundai Ioniq	11	0.22%	0.38%	-8
Dodge Dart	23	0.47%	0.76%	-14
Volkswagen Golf CUV	2	0.04%	0.36%	-16
Chevrolet Volt	3	0.06%	0.39%	-16
Toyota IM	19	0.39%	0.94%	-27
Volkswagen New Beetle	19	0.39%	0.95%	-28
Hyundai Elantra	421	8.61%	9.19%	-28
Volkswagen Golf	5	0.10%	0.81%	-35
Mitsubishi Lancer	13	0.27%	0.99%	-36
Mazda Mazda3	166	3.37%	4.26%	-43
Subaru Impreza	20	0.41%	1.67%	-62
Volkswagen Jetta	214	4.38%	6.08%	-83
Toyota Prius	80	1.64%	3.54%	-93
Toyota Corolla	532	10.88%	14.61%	-183
Kia Forte	78	1.60%	6.60%	-246
Honda Civic	574	11.74%	18.43%	-327

The MSR/Segmentation model is based on a prediction of “*what sales are expected.*” If virtually no model within a segment is selling at the “expected” level, then the model is not reliable and not valid. The December 2016 and December 2017 SOSA Reports (as well as those for December 2018, December 2019 and December 2020) demonstrate that virtually no model within a segment sold at the “expected” level. Put more simply, what sells in the District as a whole or the Zone as a whole is not predictive of what sells in the Pharr AOR.

²⁷ Each SOSA Report demonstrates that the “segmentation” theory relied upon by SOA and its expert witness (Sharif Farhat) is unreliable:

- 1) A theory is not reliable when the theory relies upon a document (here, the SOSA Report(s)) which expressly contradicts the theory;
- 2) When a theory about what sales performance “is expected to occur” or “ought to occur” (utilizing segmentation analysis) is expressly contradicted by the proponent’s own document (here, the SOSA Report(s)), the theory is proven as flawed and unreliable;
- 3) This is not a case where a theory is evaluated and contradicted by reference to parole evidence, and/or extraneous documents. Here, the very document created by SOA (the SOSA Report(s)) expressly contradict SOA’s theory and demonstrates it is not reliable.

There can be different reasons or hypotheses why SOA's model is not at all predictive, but if it is not predictive the reasons why the model fails are not that important. The fact that the model fails is important. If the model fails, it cannot be a valid rationale for arguing or finding as a fact that Bert Ogden Subaru sales are not satisfactory “relative to sales in the market.” The bottom line is that the SOA's own SOSA Reports expressly contradict any notion the actual sales will be incongruent with “what sales are expected” by SOA. It follows:

- **A benchmark is not a benchmark when the actual sales data demonstrate that sales are not congruent with the benchmark**

For SOA (and its expert witness, Sharif Farhat), segmentation controls for everything. However, the information reflected in the ***SOSA Reports*** demonstrate that the SOA argument that MSR – through segmentation - takes into account all differences in markets is flawed. When reviewing the SOSA Reports from 2014 to 2020 (see **Appendix A** to the Post-Hearing Reply Brief of Bert Ogden Subaru), the objective facts and data demonstrate that the theory of SOA and Mr. Farhat is not supported by the underlying factual data. The unreliable nature of MSR – through segmentation - is seen in looking at each SOSA Report. One cannot reconcile the opinions proffered by SOA expert witness, Sharif Farhat, with the underlying factual data contained in the written SOSA Reports (reports which are prepared utilizing the premise of “segmentation”):

- 1) SOA claims that MSR – through segmentation - is a reliable benchmark;
- 2) If MSR – through segmentation - were a reliable benchmark, then the sales documented in each SOSA Report would be concentrated at or near the benchmark;
- 3) The factual data contained in the SOSA Reports (for the time periods of 2014 to 2020) clearly demonstrate that sales are not concentrated at or near the benchmark. Rather, the sales within each alleged “segment” vary wildly above and below the purported benchmark;

- 4) The lack of concentration of sales at the purported benchmark demonstrates that MSR – through segmentation - is not a reliable benchmark and/or metric;
- 5) Because there is no concentration of sales at the benchmark means that MSR – through segmentation - is not a benchmark.


Stated more bluntly, a benchmark is not a benchmark when the data demonstrates sales figures wildly above and wildly below it.

E. SOA's Data Demonstrates "Segmentation" Is Not Reliable

Joe Roesner, the expert retained by Bert Ogden Subaru, looked at the chart below (prepared by SOA's expert witness, Sharif Farhat) and explained as follows:

- "if MSR was truly picking up all variations outside of a dealer's control in its calculations" then you would expect to see one or more dealers on the light blue line in Exhibit 188.²⁸

²⁸ Hearing Record at page 2224, l 13 to page 2225, l 5.



Because of the nature of the data in Exhibit 188, Joe Roesner explained that “other facts than just MSR are driving sales.”²⁹

Further, each and every SOSA Report for the years 2014 through 2020 is evidence that the theory and the model proffered by SOA and Sharif Farhat are contradicted by the underlying facts and data assembled by SOA in reports addressing the precise subject matter in question – segmentation.

The evidence about what other makes and models Subaru buyers considered is relevant but not dispositive. What is essential is that a predictive model that fails to predict reality is not a


²⁹ Hearing Record at page 2225, ll 4-5.

reliable or valid model. This unreliable metric, which fails to predict the actual market experience, cannot underpin a valid finding of fact on the issue of "sales relative to sales in the market" to terminate a strong and performing dealer, like Bert Ogden Subaru³⁰.

F. The Regression Analysis Prepared by SOA's Expert (Sharif Farhat) Demonstrates that Factors Other Than MSR Share a Relationship With Dealership Sales

The version of a Regression Analysis prepared by SOA's own expert witness (Sharif Farhat) – which is not intentionally manipulated (by forcing the "Y Intercept" to Zero – makes clear that **over 46% of the variation in Dealership Sales are not related to MSR**. To be clear, SOA's own expert witness has prepared a Regression Analysis which readily admits that over 46% of the variation in Dealership Sales is related to a factor **other than MSR**. Therefore, over 46% of Dealership Sales are correlated to some factor (or factors) other than MSR – through "Segmentation". See *Exhibit 189-002* below:

³⁰ Texas law is clear that unreliable expert witness testimony is no legally no evidence. See *e.g. Seger v. Yorkshire Ins. Co.*, 503 S.W.3d 388, 410 n. 3 (Tex. 2016).



G. Texas Case Law Demonstrates that “Segmentation” is Not a Panacea Capable of Sufficiently Accounting for All Measurable Differences in Factors

When the Regression Analysis was not manipulated by SOA’s expert, it made clear that over 46% of the variation in Dealership Sales is related to a factor other than MSR. Therefore, segmentation does not sufficiently account for all measurable differences in factors.

Albeit a protest action with respect to the establishment and relocation of a Chevrolet dealership to the north Houston area, the case of *Austin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Board*, 212 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App. – Austin 2006, *pet. denied*) took the opportunity to evaluate and opine upon segmentation analysis. When addressing the “Adequacy of Representation” element in the Houston Market (under Texas Occupations Code §2301.652(a)(1) (in the context of a dispute between the parties as to the Texas Average Adjusted [“TAA”] and the Texas Multiple Dealer

Area [“MDA”]) the Austin Court of Appeals notes that “Landmark (Chevrolet) disputed that segmentation was capable of refining the TAA standard to account for the profound differences between the MDAs and the SDAs. 212 S.W.3d at 436. In evaluating the expert witness reports submitted, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that “the Board agreed that Anderson’s (expert witness for a party) segmentation analysis did not sufficiently account for all measurable differences.” 212 S.W.3d at 436-437. Therefore, in a reported decision, the Austin Court of Appeals has held that segmentation is not *ipso facto* the analytical tool the manufacturer claimed that it was.

**VI.
THE PFD FAILS TO CAPTURE THE NATURE,
QUANTITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF HOW SOA
IMPACTS SALES PERFORMANCE WITH ITS
TENDER OF MAUI & SSLP VEHICLES**

A. Pages 32 to 38 of the PFD Fail to Capture the Nature, Quantity and Significance of How SOA Impacts Sales Performance With Its Tender of MAUI & SSLP Vehicles

In pages 32 to 38, the PFD discusses how MAUI vehicles were provided by SOA to dealers. The PFD makes the following two (2) conclusory points which ignore critical evidence regarding MAUI vehicles and SSLP vehicles – each distributed at the discretion of SOA:

#1: Page 15 of PFD:

“Since the termination notice was issued, Bert Ogden increased its sales. For a few months, it was a significant increase. Beginning around August or September 2020, Bert Ogden’s sales performance almost doubled in a 90-day period. Since that time, however, the rate has slowed down.”

#2: Page 36 of PFD:

“From 2016 through January 2021, Bert Ogden received a total of 417 MAUI units, which was the 18th largest number of total MAUI vehicles in the DFW Zone. Bert Ogden argues that the dealership did not receive enough MAUI units until October and November 2020 – after it received the termination notice – and that its increased sales at that time reflect that it finally had sufficient inventory. Yet the evidence showed a fairly consistent number of MAUI units over the years – 92 in 2016, 80 in 2017, 76 in 2018, 86 in 2019 and 78 in 2020. As SOA points out, the evidence shows a dramatic sales increase beginning in August and September 2020, a time when it received no MAUI units.”

The PFD fails to take into account critical evidence regarding the following types of inventory provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru and other dealerships in the Zone and/or District:

- i) MAUI;
- ii) SSLP

**B. SOA’s Second Trial Witness – Zone Director Dave Adams –
Made a False Statement About the Number of MAUI Vehicles
Provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru**

The PFD’s incomplete summary and/or analysis of vehicle inventory provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru likely resulted from a campaign of misinformation which started at the outset of the hearing on the merits when SOA’s Zone Director (Dave Adams) testified inaccurately about vehicles provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru. On page 404 of the Transcript Dave Adams gave wholly inaccurate testimony when he stated that Bert Ogden Subaru had received, by far, the most MAUI vehicles:

- Q: (Mr. Cloutre):**
Now let’s stay on the MAUI for a second. In relation to other D/FW Zone retailers, how much MAUI did Bert Ogden receive?
- A: They earned by far the most.”**

Q: And despite receiving the most MAUI of any dealer in the D/FW Zone, now much did that - - you know, did it - - well did it help them meet their MSR?

A: Not at all.

Bert Ogden's expert witness, Joe Roesner, utilized SOA's own data (Exhibit 191.1) to demonstrate that this statement was wrong. Joe Roesner explained how Exhibit 191.1 refuted the contention that Bert Ogden received – by far – the most MAUI units. Specifically, *Exhibit 510* demonstrates the number of MAUI vehicles which SOA allocated to each dealer in the D/FW Zone³¹. *Exhibit 511* demonstrates the number of SSLP vehicles which SOA allocated to each dealer in the D/FW Zone³².

Reviewing *Exhibit 510*, Joe Roesner testified that SOA's own data absolutely refutes the contention Bert Ogden received – by far – the most MAUI vehicles in the D/FW Zone:

Q: Okay. So looking at Exhibit 510, any year did Bert Ogden get the most MAUI vehicles, quote, by far, as suggested by Mr. Adams?

A: No, they did not,..... And just - - you now, even looking just that one dealer, Austin Subaru versus Bert Ogden, you can see there's actually not a single year where Bert Ogden got more. So you couldn't even say that he (Bert Ogden Subaru) got by far the most in any particular year either.”³³

³¹ Hearing Record at page 2177, ll 1 to page 2190, ll 6.

³² Hearing Record at page 2711, ll 1 to page 2190, ll 6.

³³ Hearing Record at page 2189, ll 22 to page 2190, ll 15.

MAUI Allocation

	Allocation Month						Total
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021*	
AUSTIN SUBARU	122	201	211	242	145	20	941
FERGUSON SUBARU	174	291	154	135	147	16	917
SCOGGIN-DICKEY SUBARU	124	104	163	154	144	16	705
TEAM GILLMAN SUBARU NORTH	51	181	79	160	205	18	694
FIVE STAR SUBARU	365	58	111	65	82	8	689
GILLMAN SUBARU, INC	24	186	29	153	232	10	634
SUBARU OF CLEAR LAKE	71	212	100	45	155	0	583
BOB MOORE SUBARU	98	68	118	143	120	12	559
SEWELL SUBARU	106	117	90	101	120	21	555
RANDALL NOE SUBARU	89	42	22	138	227	0	518
ADVENTURE SUBARU	114	61	109	129	90	8	511
SUBARU OF BATON ROUGE	134	40	87	128	93	7	489
EWING SUBARU OF PLANO	0	0	68	160	222	18	468
NORTH PARK SUBARU	29	58	66	251	47	6	457
BRYAN SUBARU	85	89	24	127	123	4	452
SUBARU OF SANTA FE	124	93	62	53	103	13	448
Superior Subaru of Houston	0	0	252	29	133	14	428
BERT OGDEN SUBARU	92	80	76	86	78	5	417
JIM KERAS SUBARU, CO 040229	77	94	74	92	59	0	396
SUBARU OF LITTLE ROCK	117	82	52	92	20	0	363
GILES SUBARU	94	40	24	60	138	13	359
GILLMAN SUBARU	35	28	34	185	56	21	359
BROWN SUBARU	48	32	60	82	102	16	340
BRANDON TOMES SUBARU	49	45	57	71	94	10	326
SUBARU OF GEORGETOWN	68	14	43	63	116	16	320
CLEO BAY SUBARU	148	41	30	41	49	10	319
SUBARU OF PLANO	109	116	86	0	0	0	311
JIM KERAS SUBARU - HACKS CROSS, LLC	0	0	0	267	35	0	302
SUBARU EL PASO	0	0	90	88	119	0	297
NORTH PARK SUBARU DOMINION	39	49	54	58	82	0	282
DOUGLASS SUBARU	0	0	80	55	144	0	279
BALDWIN SUBARU	90	43	12	42	63	22	272
HUNDBURG SUBARU	54	32	47	64	67	6	270
STERLING SUBARU	83	80	9	32	59	3	266
HARVEY SUBARU	71	23	29	25	99	3	250
WEST HOUSTON SUBARU	21	116	13	10	89	0	249
JK SUBARU	71	48	10	43	73	0	245
PAUL MOAK AUTOMOTIVE, INC DBA PAUL MOAK SUBAR	47	50	34	48	50	0	229
HUFFINES SUBARU CORINTH	26	7	62	109	24	0	228
HICKS FAMILY SUBARU	0	0	0	83	126	5	214
PELTIER SUBARU	70	48	16	27	11	5	177
FIESTA SUBARU	0	0	0	24	141	9	174
HILEY SUBARU OF FORT WORTH	29	4	44	51	19	0	147
GARCIA SUBARU EAST 090507	87	13	12	25	0	0	137
GARCIA SUBARU EL PASO	118	17	0	0	0	0	135
JUBILEE MITSUBISHI	60	23	40	0	0	0	123
GARCIA SUBARU NORTH 401607	19	26	7	9	42	11	114
SUBARU OF MIDLAND ODESSA	0	0	15	70	24	0	109
CORPUS CHRISTI SUBARU	25	16	0	0	0	0	41
BASIN SUBARU	21	3	0	0	0	0	24
NORM REEVES SUBARU SUPERSTORE ROCKWALL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	3,468	2,971	2,855	4,115	4,367	346	18,122

* The last allocation month available is 1/2021.

SOURCE: The Foxconn Group, Inc.
DATA: Manufacturer Allocation Data File (Date 06/06/2021)
FILE: MAUI001.XLSX (MAUI-131016).XLSX

C. The PFD Does Not Discuss SSLP Vehicles – Vehicles Which Have a Significant, Immediate Impact Upon Dealership Sales

SSLP vehicles³⁴ have a significant and different impact upon dealership sales than MAUI vehicles. The PFD is silent on the issue of SSLP vehicles – a significant omission with respect to a matter which involves a dispute as to what factors impact dealership sales.

Joe Roesner testified that Bert Ogden Subaru received twenty-six (26) SSLP vehicles from 2016 to January of 2021. Of these twenty-six (26) SSLP vehicles, twenty (20) were received after the August 2020 Notice of Intent to Terminate³⁵

³⁴ SSLP is an acronym for Subaru Service Loaner Program.

³⁵ Hearing Record at page 2207, ll 6 to 10.

Mr. Roesner explained the significant impact which SSLP vehicles have upon the speed of a dealer's sales:

Q: And so how do SSLP vehicles impact the speed of a dealer's sales?

A: First off, as soon as they hit the dealership, they are put into servicer loaner status, and in the allocation system that counts as a sale. So rather than waiting for a customer to buy, it's immediately reported as sold for purposes of allocation.

So just example, Bert Ogden, those 20 vehicles, if we got - - go down to - - Bert Ogden is down below. In the 20 that came in after the termination actually occurred, we saw the sales spike up because those were immediately reported as sold, which means they come out of inventory and go into the sales rate. As so I've just discussed, that relative to other dealers has an impact of increasing your future allocation.”³⁶

In summary, the PFD (in its discussion of sales increases by Bert Ogden Subaru following the August 20, 2020 Notice of Termination) misinterprets the inventory allocation data. The PFD fails to analyze the specific, critical details set forth in *Exhibit 141* about the following:

- i) What type of Inventory was provided to Bert Ogden Subaru;
- ii) When this type of Inventory was provided to Bert Ogden Subaru;
- iii) The history when – and how much of – this type of Inventory was provided to Bert Ogden Subaru

The specific answers to the aforementioned questions demonstrate that the sales increases by Bert Ogden Subaru were attributable to SOA's decision to provide each of the following – **which cannot be lumped together as they have different consequences for sales and allocation purposes:**

- i) MAUI vehicles; and;
- ii) SSLP vehicles

³⁶ Hearing Record at page 2206, ll 7 to page 2207, ll

An analysis of *Exhibit 141* demonstrates the following:

- #1:** *Exhibit 141* identifies the Inventory Allocation by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru from January 2015 to February 2021;
- #2:** *Exhibit 141* describes the “type” of Inventory Allocation made by it to Bert Ogden Subaru

a.	Original VONs provided
b.	MAUI vehicles provided
c.	SSLP vehicles provided
d.	Total Allocated VONs

- #3:** In October 2020, SOA provided Bert Ogden Subaru with 15 MAUI vehicles;
- #4:** In November 2020, SOA provided Bert Ogden Subaru with 30 MAUI vehicles;
- #5:** Prior to November 2020 (dating back to January 2015), SOA had never previously provided at least 30 MAUI vehicles to Bert Ogden Subaru in one specific month;
- #6:** In October 2020 and November 2020, SOA provided Bert Ogden Subaru with a total of 45 MAUI vehicles;
- #7:** This provided of 45 MAUI vehicles is highest number of MAUI vehicles provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru in an consecutive two (2) month time period – dating back to January 2015. Moreover, it took from November 2019 (when 12 MAUI were provided) to July 2020 (when 7 MAUI units were provided) for Bert Ogden Subaru to receive a cumulative total of MAUI vehicles in excess of 45 (from November 2019 to July 2020, a total of 47 MAUI vehicles were provided to Bert Ogden Subaru);

- #8:** In November 2020, Bert Ogden Subaru received 20 SSLP vehicles. Prior to November 2020 (and dating back to January 2015), Bert Ogden Subaru had not received at least 20 SSLP Vehicles total – much less in one (1) month. From January 2015 to October 2020, Bert Ogden had only received 5 SSLP vehicles.

Joe Roesner testified regarding the significance of the receipt of 20 SSLP vehicles **after the August 20, 2020 Notice of Termination – and its impact on the sales of Bert Ogden Subaru:**

Q: In looking at Exhibit 511, how many SSLP vehicles did Bert Ogden Subaru receive from 2016 to January 2021?

A: Received a total of 26, 20 which occurred after the termination, notice of termination.³⁷

.....

Q: And so how do SSLP vehicles impact the speed of a dealer's sales?

A: First off, as soon as they hit the dealership, they are put into service loaner status, and in the allocation system that counts as a sale. So rather than waiting for a customer to buy, it's immediately reported as sold for purposes of the allocation.

So just example, Bert Ogden, those 20 vehicles, if we got - - go down to - - Bert Ogden is down below. In the 20 that came in after the termination actually occurred, we saw the sales spike up because those were immediately reported as sold, which means they come out of inventory and go into the sales rate. And so as I've just discussed that relative to other dealers has an impact of increasing your future allocation.”³⁸

D. The PFD Fails to Address How a Dealership in a “Case Study” Promoted by SOA’s Expert Witness Was the Beneficiary of Substantial SSLP Vehicles

SOA’s campaign of misinformation (initiated by the testimony of Zone Director, Dave Adams) continued with purported “case studies” (by SOA expert witnesses) on vehicle inventory provided to other dealerships. The Baton Rouge dealership was the subject of one such ad case study . The SOA expert witness argued that a change in ownership and management at the Baton Rouge Dealership was the impetus for increased dealership sales. However, the data in Exhibit

³⁷ Hearing Record page 2207, ll 6 to 10.

³⁸ Hearing Record page 2206, ll 7 to 22.

151 demonstrates that the Baton Rouge dealership received substantially more SSLP vehicles in that time frame than did Bert Ogden Subaru – a point SOA chooses to ignore.

SSLP Allocation

	Allocation Month						Total
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021*	
AUSTIN SUBARU	89	125	169	236	127	20	766
FERGUSON SUBARU	98	79	108	101	126	16	528
SEWELL SUBARU	94	113	84	95	105	16	507
BOB MOORE SUBARU	71	60	94	126	108	12	471
SCOGGIN-DICKEY SUBARU	52	85	101	110	92	12	452
SUBARU OF GEORGETOWN	57	12	30	61	108	16	284
ADVENTURE SUBARU	57	18	7	83	68	8	241
SUBARU OF PLANO	67	80	74	0	0	0	221
BRANDON TOMES SUBARU	32	21	38	48	71	10	220
JIM KERAS SUBARU, CO 040229	50	36	29	53	50	0	218
EWING SUBARU OF PLANO	0	0	12	77	102	18	209
TEAM GILLMAN SUBARU NORTH	21	10	10	48	93	18	200
FIVE STAR SUBARU	15	9	30	58	67	8	187
NORTH PARK SUBARU	24	29	31	54	36	6	180
PAUL MOAK AUTOMOTIVE, INC DBA PAUL MOAK SUBAR	36	29	33	33	45	0	176
GILLMAN SUBARU, INC.	18	10	18	45	69	10	170
NORTH PARK SUBARU DOMINION	19	24	9	42	71	0	165
BRYAN SUBARU	34	37	12	36	39	4	162
RANDALL NOE SUBARU	55	20	18	24	30	0	147
HUDSBURG SUBARU	44	25	24	10	35	6	144
SUBARU OF BATON ROUGE	13	10	27	49	41	2	142
SUBARU OF SANTA FE	24	19	31	32	27	3	136
BROWN SUBARU	9	13	24	39	39	6	130
SUBARU OF CLEAR LAKE	23	13	15	30	47	0	128
BALDWIN SUBARU	29	18	11	20	22	15	115
GILES SUBARU	5	7	10	14	58	8	102
GILLMAN SUBARU	16	10	0	0	43	16	85
SUBARU EL PASO	0	0	20	29	26	0	75
HILEY SUBARU OF FORT WORTH	3	4	30	23	14	0	74
HICKS FAMILY SUBARU	0	0	0	19	44	0	63
PIESTA SUBARU	0	0	0	0	57	4	61
JIM KERAS SUBARU - HACKS CROSS, LLC	0	0	0	21	31	0	52
HUFFINES SUBARU CORINTH	19	0	6	11	16	0	52
Superior Subaru of Houston	0	0	0	24	23	4	51
SUBARU OF LITTLE ROCK	27	19	5	0	0	0	51
SUBARU OF MIDLAND ODESSA	0	0	0	30	17	0	47
GARCIA SUBARU NORTH 401607	0	0	5	0	27	5	37
BERT OGDEN SUBARU	1	5	0	0	20	0	26
CORPUS CHRISTI SUBARU	21	4	0	0	0	0	25
CLEO BAY SUBARU	17	0	4	0	0	0	21
STERLING SUBARU	4	0	0	2	12	3	21
DOUGLASS SUBARU	0	0	6	6	4	0	16
PELTIER SUBARU	11	0	4	0	1	0	16
JUBILEE MITSUBISHI	6	3	4	0	0	0	13
JK SUBARU	5	3	0	0	3	0	11
HARVEY SUBARU	0	0	0	2	8	0	10
GARCIA SUBARU EAST 090507	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
BASIN SUBARU	8	0	0	0	0	0	8
WEST HOUSTON SUBARU	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
GARCIA SUBARU EL PASO	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
NORM REEVES SUBARU SUPERSTORE ROCKWALL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	1,190	950	1,133	1,691	2,029	246	7,239

* The last allocation month available is 1/2021.

SOURCE: The Foxconn Group, Inc.
DATA: Manufacturer Allocation Data File (Sales SOA000000)
FORMAT: MANUFACTURER SALES DATA TO THIRDS

**PROTESTANT'S
EXHIBIT
511**

Exhibit 151 demonstrates that the Baton Rouge Subaru dealership received **142 SSLP vehicles** – compared to **26 SSLP vehicles** received by Bert Ogden Subaru.

Joe Roesner discussed this critical fact:

Q: There's been testimony by expert witnesses on behalf of Subaru of America about making comparisons and case studies with Baton Rouge. Do you remember that, sir?

A: Yes. Mr. Lytle - - Subaru of Baton Rouge was one of - - I think it was Mr. Lytle. It's possible that it was Mr. Farhat. But it was a case study that was presented, basically saying that here's the change of dealership (ownership) and here's the surge in sales that occurred.

Q: And that Subaru of Baton Rouge being compared to Bert Ogden Subaru, how much did the dealership receive in SSLP allocation?

A: Received a total of 142 units.

Q: Relative to other dealerships identified in Exhibit 511, how does Bert Ogden compare in terms of SSLP vehicles?

A: It would be, I'm going to approximate, the bottom third of this list."³⁹

**VII.
THE PFD FAILS TO CONSIDER DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE FROM SOA CHRONICLING
DEALERSHIP SUCCESS OF BERT OGDEN
SUBARU BEFORE AND AFTER THE AUGUST 20,
2020 NOIT**

Page 15 of the PFD sets forth an incomplete summary and/or analysis of vehicle inventory provided by SOA to Bert Ogden Subaru:

- **“Since the termination notice was issued, Bert Ogden increased its sales. For a few months, it was a significant increase. Beginning around August or September 2020, Bert Ogden’s sales performance almost doubled in a 90-day period. Since that time, however, the rate has slowed down.”**

The PFD ignored evidence regarding vehicles provided to Bert Ogden by SOA (both MAUI and SSLP). However, the PFD also ignored documented success of Bert Ogden – before and after the August 20, 2020 NOIT - which includes as follows:

Date:	Exhibit #:	Accolade Made by SOA About Bert Ogden Subaru
January 20, 2020	412	Today is the 2 nd (10)-Day Close – 1/20/2020 Retail Sales Update “.....Bert Ogden is currently leading in pacing % of objective.”
February 1, 2020	426	DFW District 3 January 2020 Month-End Recap “When looking at % over prior year, we had some monster performances but Sterling Subaru and Bert Ogden lead at 39% over prior year!”

³⁹ Hearing Record at page 2207, ll 6 to page 2208, ll 19.

		Bert Ogden NPS Score: 100%
April 1, 2020	506	<p>EOM District 3 Fixed Operations Recap Report – March 2020</p> <p>As to FIRFT (Fix It Right the First Time):</p> <p>“The district averaged 94 and we had three (3) retailers with perfect scores of 100. Congratulations Bert Ogden Subaru, Superior Subaru and Hicks Family Subaru.”</p>
April 6, 2020	345	<p>Re: District 3 Sales, SAS & Starlink Sales Close Updated 4/6/2020</p> <p>“Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 33.3%!”</p>
May 20, 2020	507	<p>District 3 Hard Parts Business Plan – May 20, 2020 Update</p> <p>“Bert Ogden Subaru has gotten into the tire business and close to exceeding last year’s May sales!”</p>
May 29, 2020	346	<p>Re: District 3 Sales & Trade Up Advantage</p> <p>“Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top spot for % against objective at 123.3%”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hard Parts Business Projection vs. Objective 156.5%
June 2, 2020	347	<p>District 3 May Results Recap</p> <p>“Congrats to Superior Subaru, Bert Ogden Subaru and Hicks Family Subaru!”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bert Ogden Subaru was 140.0% as to the % Target Month to Date
June 8, 2020	348	<p>District 3 Sales, SAS & Starlink Updated 6/8/2020</p> <p>“Bert Ogden takes the top % against objective spot with 12.1%!”</p>
July 24, 2020	444	Service OLP

		“The District is led by Bert Ogden Subaru with a perfect NPS score of 100!”
August 10, 2020	349	District 3 Sales, SAS & Starlink Update 8/10/2020 “Bert Ogden takes the top % against objective spot with 22.5%!”
August 17, 2020	350	District 3 Sales, SAS & Starlink Updated “Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 47.5%!”
October 1, 2020	359	District 3 September Results Recap Bert Ogden Subaru is 103.3% of target
October 9, 2020	360	1 st (10) Day Sales-Close Update (10/9/20) “Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 22.2%!”
October 12, 2020	361	District 3 Sales, SAS & Starlink Update (10/12/2020) “Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 50%!”
October 15, 2020	362	District 3 Sales & Trade Up Advantage Update (10/15/20) “Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top & against objective spot with 69.4%!”
October 16, 2020	363	Q4 OLP Rankings & Customer Corner Update: Bert Ogden NPS = 100.0% “JK, Superior, Sterling, Clear Lake, Hicks, Team Gillman North, North Park and Bert Ogden are all starting out the quarter on the right foot with a 100 NPS score right out of the gate.”
October 30, 2020	364	District 3 Sales & Trade-Up Update (10/30/2020)

		“Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 155.6%!”
November 2, 2020	365	District 3 Sales, Close, SAS & Starlink Update 11/1/2020 “Bert Ogden Subaru takes the top % against objective spot with 175%!”
November 3, 2020	366	District 3 October 2020 Results Recap: “Bert Ogden Subaru finishing at the top spot for % against objective with 186.1!%” “Congrats to Hicks Family Subaru & Bert Ogden Subaru for setting both their best Octobers ever and ALL-TIME best months ever!”

The PFDs for prior TDMV termination cases are devoid of this type of record. Bert Ogden Subaru is a well-performing dealership whose efforts to grow this brand in this difficult market have been steady and effective. Evidence establishing this type of performance is wholly inconsistent with the “good cause” required for termination.

VIII. THE PFD FAILS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS OF THE PHARR AOR

SOA spends hundreds of thousands of dollars to have demographic data about its customers collected and analyzed. At trial the NVCS Reports for 2017, 2019 and 2022 were placed into evidence.⁴⁰ The NVCS Reports identify specific, distinctive and unique demographic characteristics shared by the Subaru purchasers. These demographic factors of a typical Subaru buyer are not the demographic factors of the Pharr AOR. This point was exhaustively made by Joe Roesner during the trial. The demographic factors of the Pharr AOR are not the demographic

⁴⁰ Exhibit 467 Appendix Pages 213 to 564.

factors of the balance of the District and/or Zone to which Bert Ogden Subaru is assigned. This point was exhaustively made by Joe Roesner during trial.

As a result, the following provision from page 31 of the PFD is erroneous:

“They (Bert Ogden Subaru) did not, however, present persuasive evidence that it is significantly harder to sell Subarus in the Rio Grande Valley than in Corpus Christi, San Antonio or Bryan.”

Page 25 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Post-Trial Brief captures – in one chart – a sample of the evidence which demonstrates the distinct demographic differences between the Pharr AOR and the District and Zone:

	Bert Ogden AOR	District Represented AORs – <u>Less the Bert Ogden AOR;</u>	Zone Represented AORs - <u>Less the Bert Ogden AOR</u>
Hispanic or Latino⁴¹	93.97%	43.48%	31.62%
2021 Households By Ethnicity (Hispanic/Latino)⁴²	90.32%	35.76%	24.89%
Median Age⁴³	30.33	35.22	35.91
2021 Estimated Median All Owner-Occupied Housing Value⁴⁴	\$92,815.80	\$209,669.16	\$214,266.14
2021 Estimated Median Household Income⁴⁵	\$39,927.30	\$65,136.06	\$65,197.10
Less Than 9th Grade Education⁴⁶	20.10%	8.04%	6.39%

⁴¹ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (2).

⁴² Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (4).

⁴³ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (3).

⁴⁴ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (4).

⁴⁵ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).

⁴⁶ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).

	Bert Ogden AOR	District Represented AORs – <u>Less the Bert Ogden AOR;</u>	Zone Represented AORs - <u>Less the Bert Ogden AOR</u>
Some High School No Diploma⁴⁷	13.31%	7.91%	7.41%
Total Population <u>Without</u> High Sch. Diploma⁴⁸	33.41%	15.95%	13.8%
Total Population with Bachelor's Degree or Higher⁴⁹	18.27%	31.08%	32.36%

The evidence and chart outlined above demonstrate that the demographics for the Pharr AOR are vastly different from that of: a) the average Subaru buyer; b) the average buyer in the District and/or the c) the average buyer in the Zone. By SOA's own documents, the Pharr AOR is a more difficult location to market Subaru vehicles. To claim otherwise is to engage in wishful thinking – at best – or willful deception.

IX. INJURY OR BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC

The PFD does not come to terms with the absence of any reliable testimony about how long the RGV would be without a Subaru dealer if Bert Ogden Subaru is terminated. It simply accepts SOA's assurance that it will “quickly replace the dealership.” That does not address whether RGV Subaru owners will be without a dealer for warranty work for weeks, months or close to a year.

⁴⁷ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).

⁴⁸ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).

⁴⁹ Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).

The most reliable testimony on this subject came from Bert Ogden Subaru witness Natasha del Barrio, the executive head of Bert Ogden Group and its numerous dealerships. She has had real world experience in replacing a discontinued dealership with a new dealership franchised by the same line/make, and her testimony was that a replacement of this type can seldom be accomplished in less than six months and may take a year. During that time frame, Subaru owners in different parts of the Rio Grande Valley would be forced to drive about 140 extra miles to Corpus Christi or 240 extra miles to San Antonio for Subaru warranty or recall service, or to purchase a new Subaru. No SOA witness ventured an opinion as to how long the TDMV approval process would take if a new franchisee applied to replace Bert Ogden Subaru at some as yet unnamed location in the Rio Grande Valley.

In assessing harm to the public, the PFD makes the unwarranted assumption that the Bert Ogden Subaru customer satisfaction scores of "outstanding" or close to outstanding are "low" because other dealers have higher scores. The PFD even utilizes the term "poor service" on pp. 53-54. This misrepresents the evidence. Every OLP survey from a Bert Ogden Subaru customer had the option to rate the dealer as "poor", "extraordinary", or another rating. Typically, a very low percentage, 2 to 4%, rated the dealership as "poor." It is grossly unfair and contrary to the evidence for the PFD to use the term "poor" to rate Bert Ogden Subaru sales or service when only one in 25 to 50 customers who rated Bert Ogden Subaru actually stated such an opinion when given the chance to do so, and most customer rated the dealer as "extraordinary."

X. CONCLUSION

The grounds cited in this PFD for “good cause” for termination bears no resemblance to TDMV precedent for dealer termination. Based on many decades of termination cases - both those in which termination was approved and those in which it was denied - Bert Ogden Subaru is not the type of dealer for which termination is appropriate. Furthermore, most of the grounds for termination relied on in the PFD were not found in the manufacturer’s Notice of Intent to Terminate. The PFD simply disregards the statutory requirement that the manufacturer provide the dealer a notice of termination disclosing the “specific grounds” for termination.

The PFD correctly found that SOA's assertion in the Notice of Intent to Terminate (“NOIT”) that Bert Ogden Subaru’s OLP scores were a breach of the franchise agreement was without merit. Having disposed of this claim, there is no dispute that the only “specific grounds” remaining in the NOIT were based on Subaru of America's desire to sell more cars – to increase market penetration.

The PFD ignores not only the statutorily required notice, but casually dismisses the statutory prohibition of termination based on a manufacturer’s desire for greater market penetration. Not only does the PFD rely on many grounds for termination first raised at the hearing, for which the NOIT provided no notice, it also relies upon manufacturer policies that exist nowhere in writing and on complaints for which the dealer never received notice and opportunity to cure, as required by the franchise agreement.

The Occupation Code's provisions for dealer termination were created by the legislature to protect a dealer who has invested money, time and energy in a franchised dealership, while balancing a manufacturer’s need to terminate failing and unethical dealers. The record shows that Bert Ogden Subaru is not the type of dealership for which the termination provisions were

intended. Termination of Bert Ogden Subaru based on the record this termination proceeding would deprive this and other dealerships in Texas of the statutory balance and protection required by the Texas Occupations Code. It would effectively put manufacturers in a position to terminate any dealer whose sales performance, under the manufacturer's preferred metric, was lower than those of other manufacturers - regardless of actual market demand and other relevant conditions in the dealer's area of responsibility.

The record in this case shows that Bert Ogden Subaru's sales in its market were far superior to sales achieved by the eight Subaru dealers who preceded in in that market. During a five-year period that preceded the hearing in this case, its sales were steadily growing as its investment in the Subaru brand began to take effect. The PFD ignores this evidence of steady sales growth and relies on a flawed metric, MSR, which this agency and the courts have repeatedly criticized as for failing to deal with the market reality of local brand preferences. The PFD also failed to address the credible expert testimony that SOA's reliance on "segmentation" confirms the unreliability of MSR as a metric and it wholly fails to predict actual performance of any particular make and model either in the Pharr AOR or anywhere else that Subaru sells cars in the DFW Zone.

Bert Ogden Subaru's consistently increasing sales performance over the years prior to and subsequent to SOA's NOIT is not a recent development triggered by receipt of the NOIT. It is the result of more than a decade of work by a respected and successful Rio Grande Valley dealer to build a little known and unpopular brand - which SOA had shuffled without success for decades from dealer to dealer.

It is true that sales of Subarus in the Rio Grande Valley have not kept pace with the rapidly growing numbers of new vehicles Bert Ogden Group has sold for other manufacturers. However, the PFD's conclusion that this gap was based on a perceived lack of commitment by Bert Ogden

Subaru is not supported by the evidence. This dealer sold every vehicle SOA gave it to sell. The evidence establishes that the other manufacturers did what SOA did not or would not do - they supplied Bert Ogden dealerships with enough inventory to be successful. As Mr. Vackar, the Bert Ogden Subaru dealer principal put it to SOA many years ago, “it’s hard to sell wares out of an empty wagon.”

The record of Bert Ogden Subaru is not like that of any dealer for which TDMV has approved the harsh remedy of termination. The PFD erroneously concludes that this dealer should lose its thirteen-year investment in time, energy and money building the Subaru brand in a uniquely difficult market because this manufacturer wants to gamble on a tenth dealer in the Rio Grande Valley. SOA should not be permitted to terminate a demonstrably capable dealer after refusing to provide that dealer the same level of inventory that made its affiliate dealerships successful in 22 other Rio Grande Valley franchises.

The PFD fails to deal with reliable and probative evidence⁵⁰ of Bert Ogden's satisfactory and improving performance, as outlined in **Attachment B** to these Exceptions. Far from imposing the burden of proof on the manufacturer as required in a termination proceeding, the PFD ignores much of the probative evidence and testimony offered by Bert Ogden Subaru.

Bert Ogden Subaru is not the type of dealer for which termination has been approved in Texas. Given the PFD’s reliance on SOA allegations not named in the NOIT and not identified in any notice and opportunity to cure, it effectively validates trial by ambush. This calls for a complete re-evaluation of the PFD.

⁵⁰ **Attachment B** is a table outlining the evidence offered by Bert Ogden Subaru which is ignored by the PFD.

This dealer has a solid and compliant floor plan, modern and well-designed facilities, a history of “extraordinary” customer service (“OLP”) scores, more than five years of steady sales growth and substantial investment. The PFD should be revised to deny the remedy of termination and to uphold the dealer's protest.

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEYS FOR PROTESTANT MCALLEN

JEEP, INC. D/B/A BERT OGDEN SUBARU

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 3, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ***“McAllen Jeep, Inc.’s d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru’s Exceptions to the Proposal for Decision”*** was served via email and certified mail, return receipt requested to the following:

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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Carol Hale, CLERK

February 9, 2023

ACCEPTED
608-21-0988 182
8/3/2022 7:05:52 pm
STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Carol Hale, CLERK

“ATTACHMENT A” TO EXCEPTIONS

MCALLEN JEEP, INC. D/B/A BERT OGDEN SUBARU’S OBJECTIONS TO TO THE FINDINGS OF FACT WITHIN THE PROPOSAL FOR DECISION

Complainant McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru (“Bert Ogden Subaru”) asserts the following objections to the Findings of Fact within The Proposal for Decision (“FF”) issued on July 19, 2022, which recommends the termination of Bert Ogden Subaru’s franchise by Subaru of America, Inc. (“SOA”).

I.

Failure to Include as a “Specific Ground” in the Notice of Intention to Terminate

Texas Occupations Code §2301.453 (c) required that SOA, like any other manufacturer, provide “written notice” “stating the specific grounds for the termination.” The record shows that the NOIT sent to Bert Ogden Subaru by SOA set forth only **three** grounds for termination. These grounds were the alleged failure of Bert Ogden Subaru to achieve 100% MSR, the alleged failure of Bert Ogden Subaru to achieve the sales called for in the 2017 Sales Performance Agreement and a claim that the **comparative** ranking of the Bert Ogden Subaru OLP Scores were a breach of sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the Dealer Agreement.

Within its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the PFD includes the following proposed finding of facts based on matters that were not identified in the NOIT as a “specific ground” for the termination:

FF 15, FF 16, FF 56, FF 69, FF 71, FF 72, FF 73, FF 74, FF 75, FF 76, FF 77, FF 78, FF 79, FF 80, and FF 88.

II.

SOA’s Failure to Give Notice and an Opportunity to Cure

Section 17.1 of the Dealer Agreement states s:

“In such event of 17.1.24 (a) through 17.1.24 (l), Distributor will notify Dealer of any such failure and will review with Dealer the nature and extent of such failure and the reasons which, in Distributor’s opinion, account for such failure. Thereafter, Distributor will provide Dealer with a reasonable opportunity to correct the failure. If Dealer fails to make substantial progress toward remedying such failure before the expiration of such period, Distributor may terminate the agreement.” (emphasis added)

Section 17.1.24 reads:

“Failure by Dealer to substantially fulfill, based upon evaluations by Distributor, its responsibilities, including but not limited to, the following:

- (a) Sale of Subaru Products; or
- (b) Maintenance of the Facilities and the approved location; or
- (c) Service of Subaru Products; or
- (d) Submission of accurate reports and other information as required under the Agreement or as may be reasonably requested by Distributor; or

- (e) Permitting Distributor SOA to make an examination or audit of Dealer's accounts and records concerning Dealer's business, after receipt of notice from Distributor or SOA requesting such examination or audit; or
- (f) Payment for Subaru Products or any other products or services purchased y Dealer from Distributor; or
- (g) Maintenance of net worth, net cash and net working capital in accordance with guidelines; or
- (h) Fulfillment of Dealer of Dealer's warranties or obligations; or
- (i) Dealer's performance under the Agreement, whether or not expressly identified herein as material in nature.

Within the findings of fact the PFD includes numerous proposed facts which relate to claimed breaches of the Dealer Agreement for which there was no notice, no reasonable opportunity to cure or which Bert Ogden Subaru made substantial progress toward remedying. These proposed findings of fact include:

FF 71, FF 72, FF 73, FF 74, FF 75, FF 76, FF 77, FF 78, FF 79, FF 80, FF 85, FF 86, FF 87, and FF 88.

III.

The Proposed Findings of Fact Misstate the Record

The PFDs misstates the record with regard to many of the proposed findings of fact. These factually inaccurate proposed findings of fact include:

FF 15, FF 25, FF 27, FF 28, FF 38, FF 39, FF 40, FF 41, FF 43, FF 44, FF 47, FF 49, FF 50, FF 51, FF 52, FF 56, FF 58, FF 60, FF 65, FF 66, FF 70, FF 71, FF 72, FF 73, FF 74, FF 75, FF 76, FF 77, FF 78, FF 79, FF 80, FF 86, FF 87, FF 88, FF 90, and FF 93.

IV. Specific Objections

FF 25 – 40.

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to numbers 25 - 40 of the Proposed Findings of Fact on the basis that they are vague, misstate the evidence and are not relevant to the issue of "good cause" for termination under the Occupations Code. The phrase "sales goals" is "undefined" and assumes that the statutory criteria "sales in relation to the market" is limited to a comparison of the affected dealer's sales with sales of other dealers in a Subaru of America defined area for some narrow (and also undefined time period). There is no dispute that Bert Ogden Subaru sold far more vehicle within its market areas, using any metric or standard of comparison, than any of the eight prior franchised Subaru dealers selling in the same market prior to the time Bert Ogden Subaru became the Subaru new car franchisee. Furthermore, SOA's termination of this dealer based on use of an arbitrary and capricious metric- "MSR" - is not supported by the law or the facts, given that SOA acknowledged to Bert Ogden Subaru that achieving MSR was "a long term goal" and not a standard for which compliance was required or expected by SOA.

FF 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51 and 52.

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51 and 52 in that they misstate the record. The record shows that SOA allocates vehicles not only upon its calculation of days of supply, but also through the discretionary distribution of Market Action Unit s ("MAUI.) vehicles. SOA's manipulation of the distribution of MAUI units and especially MAUI units which it categorizes as "SSLP" units greatly impacts the manner and quantity of vehicles allocated to

individual dealerships.

FF 50.

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 50 in that it misstates the record. The evidence is that SOA allocated the greatest number of SSLP MAUI units to Bert Ogden Subaru in the history of its dealership at or near the time of the Notice of Intent to Terminate, which allocation allowed it to generate the greatest "earn" of vehicles in the history of its dealership and thus allowing it to sell the highest number of number of units per month in the dealership history, so long as the increased discretionary inventory was provided.

FF 56

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 56 in that it misstates the record. The evidence is unchallenged that the dealer principal invested substantial sums into the Subaru dealership and that these investments will be lost if the franchise is terminated. That the investments were made in a manner coming from the Group rather than a single stand alone dealership does not remove the actual loss of investment caused by the termination. There is nothing in the law that permits this unreasonable application of the Good Cause Factors.

FF 60

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 60 in that it misstates the record. The PFD relies on e the comparative ranking of Bert Ogden Subaru's OLP scores as a basis for termination and disregards the objectively more reliable actual ratings by customers that its sales and service performance was "extraordinary." Where the evidence in the record contains an unambiguous factual

determination that customers rated a dealership as "extraordinary," it is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to rely on the less reliable metric of "comparative" OLP scores as good cause for termination.

FF 61 and 65-67

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 61 and 65- 67 in that they are not relevant to the issue of good cause for termination and misstate the record. There is no SOA policy or contractual term which calls for the comparison of one dealership's OLP scores to those of other dealers. There is no evidence that the use of OLP scores from one cohort in one AOR can reliably be used as a comparative tool against OLP scores from a different cohort in a different AOR for a different dealership. The undisputed evidence is that Bert Ogden Subaru's customers rated it as Extraordinary in both "purchase" and "service." These proposed finding of fact wrongly seek to base the termination of a dealership for not being "Extraordinary" enough.

FF 70-80

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 70 - 80 in that they are not relevant and misstate the record. The record shows that from 2019-2021, Bert Ogden Subaru had the number of exclusive employees required by SOA. This evidence was disregarded and ignored. Furthermore, none of these findings of fact relate to any specific complaint raised by SOA in the Notice of Intent to Terminate. Furthermore, the use of the comparison based on "VIO" (vehicles in operation) is not supported by the evidence and is not a requirement of the franchise agreement or any SOA policy. Furthermore, the ALJs' use of the phrase "Bert Ogden reported." does not reflect the actual evidence on these issues introduced at the hearing and misstates the record.

FF 86-87

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 86 and 87 in that they misstate the record. The evidence establishes and is admitted by SOA that even if Bert Ogden Subaru had “turned” vehicles at the Zone rate, SOA did not allocate it sufficient inventory to comply with SOA's unilaterally imposed sales performance agreement.

FF 88

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 88 in that it is not relevant to the issue of good cause for termination and misstates the record. The evidence is that from 2019-2021, Bert Ogden Subaru had the number of exclusive employees required by SOA. This evidence was disregarded and ignored. Furthermore, none of these findings of fact relate to any specific grounds asserted by SOA in the Notice of Intent to Terminate.

FF 90

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 90 for the reasons and grounds set out to FF 86-89 above.

FF 91 and 93

OBJECTION:

Bert Ogden Subaru objects to FF 91 and 93 in that they misstate the record and are not supported by the evidence. The evidence establishes, and is admitted by SOA, that Bert Ogden Subaru was not permitted to negotiate or modify the terms of either its franchise agreement or the Sales Performance Agreement which SOA cites as grounds for termination. They were a “take it or leave it” agreements for which the parties did not have comparable bargaining power and which

were effectively contracts of adhesion. That these non-negotiable terms were changed and new terms were imposed after Bert Ogden Subaru had made its investment in the dealership establishes the lack of enforceability of for reasons of public policy. s. The grounds for termination asserted by SOA in the NOIT generally confirm that this termination is based on SOA's r desire for greater market penetration. That inclusion in the NOITs of the assertion that Bert Ogden Subaru's "Extraordinary OLP" score amounted to a breach of the contract does not obviate the two other grounds relied on- MSR scores and the Sales Performance Agreement, both of which are based on market penetration metrics.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the cited Findings of Fact set out in the Proposal for Decision should be revised or disregarded.

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“ATTACHMENT B” TO EXCEPTIONS

EVIDENCE IGNORED

A. Sales in Relation to the Market

MSR is not an appropriate metric to calculate the sales of Bert Ogden Subaru in relation to sales in the Market.

1. Casey Griffin, the SOA employee charged with the responsibility to sign and serve the NOIT, admits that Bert Ogden Subaru was not required to achieve MSR for the years 2017 through 2020, while the addendum was in place. See Hearing Record at page 733, 1-12; page 716, ll 16-19.
2. SOA likewise concedes that it had represented MSR to Bert Ogden Subaru as a “long-term goal” and that SOA was not expecting Bert Ogden Subaru to meet the MSR SOA assigned to it. See Hearing Record at Page 716, ll 16-19; Hearing Record at Page 736, ll 15-18; Hearing Record at page 479, 1 21 to page 480, 1 1.; See also Hearing Record at page 981, ll 7-18; page 1926, ll 1- 25; page 1927, ll 1-7; Exhibit 321.
3. Bert Ogden Subaru’s actual aggregate sales increased over 50% between 2017 and 2021. See Exhibit 172 (sales for year end 2017-2019); Exhibit 63 (sales for year end 2020) and Hearing Record at page 1866, ll 7-9 (sales for year end 2021); Exhibit 489.
4. SOA’s computation of MSR ignores the brand preferences and demographic differences existing in this market area as compared to the other market areas within the DFW Zone. See Hearing Exhibit 467 at tab 9, page 5; Hearing Exhibit 467 at tab 6, pages 2, 3 and 6; Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (2); Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (4); Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (3); Exhibit 467, Tab (6), Page (6).
5. Joe Roesner looked at Exhibit 188 (a chart/graph utilized by SOA Expert, Sharif Farhat) and explained that “if MSR was truly picking up **all variations** (emphasis added) outside of a dealer’s control in its calculations” then you would expect to see one or more dealers exactly on the light blue line in Exhibit 188 entitled, “MSR. See Hearing Record at page 2224, ll 13 to page 2225, ll 5.
6. The regression analysis prepared by SOA’s expert, Sharif Farhat, which he did not manipulate (by forcing the y intercept to zero) clearly demonstrates that over 46% of dealerships sales are correlated to a factor other than MSR. See Exhibit 189-002.
7. Mr. Roesner notes that Exhibit 188 identifies a number of dealerships “that are well above and a number that are well below.” Hearing Record at page 2225, ll 2-5.

8. Because of the nature of this data in Exhibit 188, Joe Roesner explained that “other factors than just MSR are driving sales.” See Hearing Record at page 2225, ll 4-5.
9. According to Mr. Roesner, if the Subaru market segmentation genuinely adjusted for demographic factors and other market variations, it would be common for the SOSA Reports in most AORs to resemble the DFW Zone allocation used to set the “Benchmark”. In fact, sales in many AORs, including the Pharr AOR, vary wildly from the DFW Zone Benchmark. See Hearing Record at page 2256, ll 6 to page 2258, ll 21.
10. MSR is a flawed metric: Mr. Roesner addressed the fallacy of segmentation, explaining as follows: “And basically the MSR and segmentation is saying that the probability is exactly the same that somebody anywhere in the district or the zone, depending upon the benchmark being used, will buy an Outback as they will a comparable General Motors offering. And that’s just not the case.” See Hearing Record at Page 2274, ll 21 to page 2275, ll 1.
11. In his initial business plan, Mr. Vackar informed SOA of the inventory levels required to repeat the success he had achieved in his other franchises. At that point, SOA could have declined his application, or made it clear that it would not honor the inventory levels he set out as a critical component of his business plan. Instead after the application was approved and a substantial start up investment was made, SOA told Mr. Vackar for the first time that a natural disaster and year end issues precluded the supply of the level of inventory he had specifically set out as a component of success. See Exhibit 310; See also Hearing Record at page 2037, ll 20-25; page 2038, ll 1-21; page 2054, ll 3-25; page 2055 at ll 1-13; Exhibit 322; Also see Hearing Record at page 2069, ll 17-25; page 2070, ll 1-14.
12. Bert Ogden Subaru was never provided with a sufficient inventory to achieve MSR. See Hearing Exhibit 172 for data related to years 2017-2019; Exhibit 63 for 2020 information; Exhibit 141; Exhibit 172.
13. SOA was aware of these numbers and the lack of inventory to meet MSR requirements, and admitted that “you need inventory to sell vehicles.” See Hearing Record at page 974, ll 18-25.
14. The number of cars that SOA provided to Bert Ogden Subaru simply was never sufficient to enable it to meet its MSR. See Exhibit 321; Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 477, ll 3-18.
15. Bert Ogden made numerous requests for additional inventory so that it could increase its MSR percentage and its overall sales and its requests were largely ignored. See Hearing Record at page 243, ll 16-19; Exhibits 310, 325, 435, 408, 409, 356, and 410.

16. SOA's Zone Manager Dave Adams falsely testified at this hearing that SOA had provided Bert Ogden Subaru "...by far the most...." MAUI units in the DFW Zone to assist Bert Ogden Subaru to help it meet MSR. See Hearing Record at page 404, ll 13-20.
17. The SOA report which details allocation of discretionary units confirms that other dealers in the DFW Zone received far more than Bert Ogden Subaru. See Exhibit 191.1 and Exhibit 510.
18. According to Mr. Adams, even if Bert Ogden Subaru were to sell cars at the DFW Zone "sales efficiency" rate deemed acceptable by SOA, it could not comply with the sales requirements for the period July 1-2018 – June 30, 2020. See Exhibit 172; Exhibit 332.
19. During the time period covered by evidence admitted in this case, SOA never provided Bert Ogden Subaru with as many as 100 units at one time. The 61 units provided to Bert Ogden Subaru by SOA in November 2020 was the largest monthly allocation ever, by a factor of at least ten units. See Exhibit 141; Hearing Record at page 640 ll 17-25; page 641 ll 1; page 1790 ll 4-25; page 1791 ll 1-5; Exhibit 467 Paragraph 40-Tab 28; Exhibit 484 Paragraph 15-Tab 10.
20. The impact of SOA's historical failure to provide sufficient inventory is illustrated by the allocation made by SOA and the sales performance of Bert Ogden Subaru in the last quarter of 2020. When SOA finally provided a substantial number of discretionary cars in October and November 2020, Bert Ogden Subaru achieved record high sales. See Exhibit 141 and 142.
21. The manner in which Bert Ogden Subaru's sales record should be measured in this market is its continuous and steady sales growth over the past five years. See page 17 of the Post Reply Brief.
22. Bert Ogden Subaru, whose geographic isolation is compounded by its proximity to Mexico on one side (where it cannot sell Subarus), to an ocean (the Gulf of Mexico) on another, and to a thinly populated desert for a couple of hundred miles to the North. These geographic and demographic facts place Bert Ogden Subaru in one of the most unfavorable locations imaginable for capturing Subaru sales outside of a dealer's AOR. See Id.
23. It is not possible to compare sales by Bert Ogden Subaru and other dealers in the same AOR or general geographic area, because there are none. See Id.
24. The fact that Bert Ogden Subaru is the ninth SOA dealership in its market area and that has been far more successful than all predecessors provides the most meaningful comparison for Bert Ogden Subaru's "sales relative to sales in the market." See Id.

25. The Rio Grande Valley is the relevant “market” and other than the eight previous Subaru dealers there are no other dealers in this market to whom Bert Ogden Subaru may be fairly compared. See Id.
26. During the last five years, actual vehicle sales by Bert Ogden Subaru have increased each year and its MSR scores have increased by a factor of over 30%. See Id.
27. SOA's ignored the argument that Bert Ogden Subaru has made from the first day of the hearing in this case- that MSR was not an appropriate sales performance metric for this dealer and this market area, and that a more appropriate sales performance metric would be the steady and substantial growth in numbers of cars sold and overall sales over the five year period before the hearing. Bert Ogden Subaru continues to tender that metric as more appropriate for statutory factor one, this dealer's sales relative to sales in its market. See page 60-61 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Reply Brief.

C. Injury or Benefit to the Public

Bert Ogden Subaru’s “extraordinary OLP scores” do no reflect “poor” or “substandard service.”

1. SOA's scale for OLP scores go from 0 to 1000, with a score of 751 - 1000 being closest to the "extraordinary" scoring anchor. Under this SOA created scoring system, Bert Ogden Subaru's sales and service customers rated it closer to "extraordinary" than to "very good" for every year from 2016 through 2021. See Exhibit 43; Hearing Record at page 192, ll16-25; page 193, ll1-24; page 468, ll 5-20.
2. SOA's claim that a comparative ranking involving overall satisfaction scores by different buyers in different markets means that one dealer has provided “poor” service has no basis in reality. SOA offered no rationale that a comparative ranking alone establishes that one dealer's service was “poor”, especially when only about 2% of customers score that dealer as "poor" and the dealer's consensus score is "extraordinary." See page 71 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Reply Brief.
3. Comparative ranking, is a concept that is never mentioned in the dealer agreement or any of the voluminous SOA documents that explain the OLP program to dealers. See page 71 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Reply Brief.

4. Instead of recognizing the "outstanding" or "extraordinary" customer satisfaction ratings Bert Ogden Subaru consistently achieved (using SOA's own metric and scoring system), SOA relies on a highly curated compilation of anonymous customer verbatims deemed adverse to Bert Ogden Subaru. SOA **admits** its compilation of customer comments was structured to exclude and ignore every positive customer review and statement. See Hearing Record at page 189, ll 23-25 and page 190, ll 1-4.
5. SOA's compilation of anecdotal anonymous and selected customer comments is not reliable evidence. See page 72 of Bert Ogden Subaru's Reply Brief.
6. In deciding to terminate Bert Ogden Subaru, SOA **ignored** the consensus "extraordinary" customer sales and service satisfaction scores and instead focused entirely on how Bert Ogden Subaru's OLP scores compare to those of other dealers. Nothing in the SOA franchise agreements at issue in this case and nothing in Texas law supports the notion that a manufacturer may terminate a dealer because that dealer scores lower than other dealers in customer satisfaction surveys- especially when the dealer targeted for termination is consistently rated closest to "extraordinary." See page 3 of Bert Ogden Subaru's Closing Statement.
7. It is undisputed that there is no requirement for Bert Ogden Subaru to achieve any numerical or relative OLP ranking within the Zone, either in paragraph 4 (the paragraph cited in the NOIT) or anywhere else in the franchise agreement. See Exhibit 11; Note that SOA witnesses admitted that the Bert Ogden Subaru OLP score for the relevant time periods was closer to "Extraordinary" than "Very Good." See Hearing Record at page 192, ll16-25, page 193, ll1-24; and that there is no OLP ranking provision within the franchise agreement. Hearing Exhibit at Page 291, ll 13-17 and Page 292, ll 4-12.
8. As admitted by SOA, some dealer will always rank behind SOA's other dealers, and will therefore be out of the game, even with these "extraordinary" ratings. See page 3 of Bert Ogden Subaru's Closing Statement.
9. Until the end of 2021, SOA measured overall satisfaction of customers through two survey questions, one for service customers and one for sales customers. See Hearing Record at page 758 ll 7-18; page 827 ll 11-25; page 828 ll 1; page 829 ll 16-23.
10. The "overall satisfaction" question was the only question used and the sole basis in calculating the customer satisfaction score from 2016 until the end of 2021. See Hearing Record at page 830 ll 22-25; page 831 ll 1-25; page 832 ll 1.
11. The single "overall satisfaction score" SOA had relied on as the sole basis for purchase and service OLP scores was eliminated on December 31, 2021. After December 31, 2021, no Subaru customer will be asked the overall satisfaction question and it will not be scored, relied on, or reported to dealers. Hearing Record at page 772 ll 1-17; page 827 ll 11-25; page 828 ll 1-25; page 829 ll 1-10.

12. SOA's contention that Bert Ogden Subaru's OLP scores amount to a breach of the franchise or otherwise support a finding of “good cause” for termination is contradicted by the evidence. SOA offered no evidence that a dealer’s relative OLP ranking among dealers in the DFW Zone affects future purchases by Subaru owners and has admitted that it has never completed a study to answer the question. Given that Bert Ogden Subaru earned OLP sales and service scores in the “extraordinary” range (the highest rating possible) no logical inference can be drawn that its customers would not return for future sales and service needs. See page 5 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Closing Statement.
13. The **relative** ranking of a dealer who consistently receives “extraordinary” OLP scores from customers is not evidence of non-compliance with the franchise agreement. See page 16 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Reply Brief.
14. SOA offered no rationale that a comparative ranking alone establishes that one dealer's service was “poor”, especially when only about 2% of customers score that dealer as "poor" and the dealer's consensus score is "extraordinary." See page 71 of Bert Ogden Subaru’s Reply Brief.
15. The **undisputed evidence** about SOA’s OLP Program established the following:
 - The single question format of the SOA OLP survey was drafted and approved by SOA. See Hearing Record at page 758 ll 7-18; page 827 ll 11-25; page 828 ll 1; page 829 ll 16-23.
 - SOA was responsible for conducting the OLP surveys. See Hearing Record at page 758, ll 9 through page 759, ll 9.
 - SOA was responsible for assigning the OLP scoring system and the scoring anchors. See Exhibit 328.
 - Bert Ogden Subaru received a purchase OLP score closer to “extraordinary” than “very good” every year from 2017-2021. See Exhibit 43 and Hearing Record at page 192, ll 16-25; page 193, ll 1-24; page 468, ll 5-20.
 - Bert Ogden Subaru received a service OLP score closer to “extraordinary” than “very good” every year from 2017-2021. See Id.
 - SOA abandoned the use of the single “overall satisfaction” question score as the sole OLP score performance metric about two weeks before the Hearing. See Hearing record at page 180, ll 9 – 16. Exhibit 380.
16. On the other hand, there is **no evidence** that:
 - The SOA drafted Franchise Agreement required any specific OLP purchase score. See Exhibit 11.
 - The SOA drafted Franchise Agreement required any specific OLP service score. See Id.
 - The SOA drafted Franchise Agreement required any comparative ranking for OLP purchase score. See Id.
 - The SOA drafted Franchise Agreement required any comparative ranking for OLP service score. See Id.

- That SOA ever received any OLP annual score for either purchase or service other than a score closer to “extraordinary” than “very good” during its term as a SOA franchised dealer.

17. In its opening statement, SOA limited its argument to its speculative belief that a new dealer would sell more cars and employ more employees. See Hearing Record at page 21, ll 11-25; page 22, ll 1-23.
18. SOA concedes that it does know what length of time it would take the TDMC to approve a new franchise and award a new point. See Hearing Record at page 417, ll 12-25; page 418, ll 1-9; Hearing Record at page 255, ll 1-25.
19. The Bert Ogden Group, which currently has more than 20 dealerships in the Rio Grande Valley, has opened several new franchises during the tenure of the current CEO. The quickest time for the process was a few months, other new franchises took six months or more, and some took up to one year. See Hearing Record at page 1945, ll 2-13.
20. If TDMV approves a new Subaru franchise for the Rio Grande Valley, a new dealer will need to find a dealership location with both sales and service facilities, obtain parts, obtain vehicles, and train new employees in Subaru's special mechanical features. See Hearing Record at page 254, ll 13-20; page 1945, ll 2-13.
21. During the time these processes play out, existing Subaru owners would need to take their vehicles to the closest existing Subaru dealerships, Corpus Christi or San Antonio, for service. See Hearing Record at page 1944, ll 16-25.
22. The distance from points in the Rio Grande Valley to of these locations can vary from 180-240 miles depending on where the Subaru owners reside. See Hearing Record at page 1696, ll 13-19.

D. Adequacy of Service Facilities, Equipment, Parts, and Personnel in Relation to Other Dealers

There is little evidence comparing Bert Ogden Subaru to other dealers.

1. The NOIT does not raise any issue or claim with the adequacy of the dealer's equipment or parts nor does it identify it as a specific ground for termination. Casey Griffin testified that the NOIT did not contain any reference to the adequacy of the dealer's equipment or parts. See See Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 741, ll 4-15.
2. SOA never sent Bert Ogden Subaru a cure letter mentioning warranty service, the adequacy of dealer's service facilities, equipment or parts, or the adequacy of the dealer's investments. See Hearing Record at page 745 ll 4-7.

3. The evidence established that, at least for 2019 through the present, the number of certified/exclusive employees met or exceeded SOA's requirements. See Exhibits 15-19; Hearing Record at page 1686, l 1 through page 1694, ll 6.
4. Hector Flores offered conclusory testimony on the sufficiency and the number of employees at Bert Ogden Subaru, but he did not offer facts on the adequacy of Bert Ogden Subaru's service personnel as compared to other Subaru dealers. See Hearing record at page 1013, l 24 through page 1014, l 4.
5. The evidence from the MSOG reports relied on by SOA is that Bert Ogden Subaru employed certified parts and service employees from at least the period 2016 - 2021. See Exhibit 15-003 – 19-003 shows that Bert Ogden Subaru had certified parts and service employees (P11, P13, P14, P15).
6. Geoff Mauldin testified that, as it related to the requirement for exclusivity, (at least from 2019 – present), Bert Ogden Subaru had the required exclusive service employees. See Hearing Record at Page 1685, l 23 to Page 1701, l 17.
7. Bert Ogden Subaru also had the contractually required number of certified parts and service employees from 2017 through 2021. See Exhibits 15-19 and Hearing Record at Page 1685, l 23 to Page 1701, l 17.
8. Hearing Exhibits 489, 172, and the record at P. 1866, confirms that Bert Ogden Subaru's "number of vehicles sold" increased every year from 2017 to 2021, going from 325 in 2017 to 500 in 2021. Total sales (which includes parts and service) during the period 2017 through 2020 (2021 data not available at time of hearing) rose from \$13.9 million to \$22.1 million, the last year reflecting a one-year increase of 35%.
9. SOA offered no credible and persuasive evidence comparing the Bert Ogden Subaru facilities, equipment, parts, and personnel in relation to those of other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make. SOA's evidence about the level of parts inventory at Bert Ogden Subaru showed only that it varied over time in comparison to parts inventory of other Subaru dealers, but SOA offered no evidence that any customer was delayed or otherwise harmed at any time from lack of inventory at Bert Ogden Subaru. SOA's evidence about the reported value of equipment at Bert Ogden Subaru failed to take into account whether the value of that equipment had been amortized for accounting purposes. SOA offered no evidence that any Bert Ogden Subaru customer was delayed or harmed in any way due to a lack of equipment at Bert Ogden Subaru. See TOC§2301.455 (4).
10. Bert Ogden Subaru's facilities, equipment, and parts complied with the SOA requirements at all times relevant to the 2017 Franchise Agreement. See Exhibit 15; Exhibit 16; Exhibit 17 and Exhibit 18.

11. Bert Ogden Subaru's personnel and staffing complied with the SOA requirements at all times from 2019 through the date of the NOIT. See Exhibit 17, Exhibit 18, and Exhibit 19; Hearing Record at page 1685, ll 23-25; page 1686, ll 1-25; page 1687, ll 1-25; page 1988, ll 1-25; page 1689, ll 1-15; page 1690, ll 1-25; page 1691, ll 1-9; at page 1691, ll 10-25; page 1692, ll 1-25; page 1693, ll 1-25; page 1694, l 1.
12. Mr. Dubinsky, the individual who currently is and has been ultimately responsible for the SOA OLP program since its inception, could not state whether OLP scores that are closer to "extraordinary" than "very good" would be a basis for SOA to terminate a dealer. See Hearing Record at page 754 ll 9-11; page 755 ll 25; page 756 ll 1-4; page 823 ll 17-24.
13. Mr. Dubinsky agrees that neither SOA Ex. 25, the Understanding the Retailer Report, nor SOA Exhibit 26, the Navigation Guide, sets minimum acceptable percentiles for OLP scores. See Hearing Record at page 823 ll 1-6.
14. SOA's own metric for adequacy of customer service- Service OLP- Bert Ogden Subaru customers rated it as "Extraordinary" every year from 2017 through 2020. See Exhibit 43; Hearing Record at page 192, ll 16-25; page 193, ll 1-24; and page 468, ll 5-20.

F. Compliance with the Franchise

1. Casey Griffin, the SOA employee charged with the responsibility to sign and serve the NOIT, admits that Bert Ogden Subaru was not required to achieve MSR for the years 2017 through 2020, while the addendum was in place. See Hearing Record at page 733, 1-12; page 716, ll 16-19.
2. SOA likewise concedes that it had represented MSR to Bert Ogden Subaru as a "long-term goal" and that SOA was not expecting Bert Ogden Subaru to meet the MSR SOA assigned to it. See Hearing Record at Page 716, ll 16-19; Hearing Record at Page 736, ll 15-18; Hearing Record at page 479, l 21 to page 480, l 1.; See also Hearing Record at page 981, ll 7-18; page 1926, ll 1- 25; page 1927, ll 1-7; Exhibit 321.
3. Like the 2015 franchise agreement, the 2017 franchise agreement was a "form" agreement drafted by SOA and for which SOA permitted no changes. See Exhibit 11; Hearing Record at page 749 ll 16-25; Hearing Record at page 205, ll 15-25; page 206, ll 1-16.

4. The 2017 franchise agreement did not contain, either expressly or by reference any requirement of an OLP Purchase score or OLP Service score or any OLP ranking relative to the other Subaru dealers. See Hearing Record at page 1932, ll 13-17; page 1932, ll II 21-23.
5. The 2017 franchise agreement contained a sales performance addendum, which SOA required Bert Ogden Subaru to accept as a condition to execute the agreement. Sales performance targets in this addendum were based on reaching scores that were different percentages of MSR. See Exhibit 12.
6. Both SOA's sales metric MSR (minimum sales responsibility) and the sales requirements of the 2017 Sales Performance Agreement are metrics based on a dealer's sales. See Hearing Record at page 718 ll 18-25; page 719 ll 1-5.
7. MSR is a flawed metric: Mr. Roesner addressed the fallacy of segmentation, explaining as follows: "And basically the MSR and segmentation is saying that the probability is exactly the same that somebody anywhere in the district or the zone, depending upon the benchmark being used, will buy an Outback as they will a comparable General Motors offering. And that's just not the case." See Hearing Record at Page 2274, ll 21 to page 2275, ll 1.
8. While the sales performance numbers in the addendum were not reached, Bert Ogden was never allocated sufficient inventory to achieve those sales targets. See Exhibit 321; Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 477, ll 3-18.
9. During the time of the Sales Performance Addendum, SOA did not allocate a number of vehicles to Bert Ogden Subaru, including MAUI units, equal to the sales requirements of the Sales Performance Agreement. See Exhibit 321; Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 477, ll 3-18.
10. Bert Ogden Subaru was not provided with sufficient inventory to meet the Sales Performance Addendum for the periods July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2019 and July 1, 2019 – June 30, 2020, even if it would have sold its inventory at a satisfactory sales efficiency. See Exhibit 332 at page SOA 4285 and Exhibit 172 (Bert Ogden Subaru's actual sales, plus Dave Adams additional sales computation).
11. Bert Ogden Subaru made repeated requests, which were largely ignored, for additional inventory to allow it to increase its sales. See Exhibit 310; Exhibit 325; Exhibit 435; Exhibit 408; Exhibit 409; Exhibit 410; Hearing Record at page 1263 ll 5-18.
12. Mason DeLapp agrees that he was told by Geoff Mauldin that Bert Ogden Subaru experienced employee turnover because of a lack of inventory and therefore a lack of sales. See Hearing Record at page 1304 ll 7-21.

13. Bert Ogden Subaru did achieve growth in its actual sales numbers for the entire time period (2017-2020) of the addendum. See Exhibit 172 (sales for year end 2017-2019); Exhibit 63 (sales for year end 2020).
14. Bert Ogden Subaru's actual sales increased every year and from the end of 2017 through the end of 2021 increased approximately 52%. See Exhibit 172 (sales for year end 2017-2019); Exhibit 63 (sales for year end 2020) and Hearing Record at page 1866, ll 7-9 (sales for year end 2021).
15. In a contact report dated June 20, 2019, Dave Adams wrote that even if Bert Ogden Subaru was selling as efficiently as the Zone, based upon the inventory they were given to sell, it would sell 40 units a month. See Exhibit 321.
16. Dave Adams' testimony confirms that Bert Ogden Subaru was not being provided enough inventory, even if it was selling it at the Zone "efficiency level." Mr. Adams was asked:
- Q: Well, it [Exhibit 321 - a document authored by Dave Adams] says: We're providing them with additional inventory to hit 40 units per month. That's what it says. Right?
- A: Okay.
- Q: Right?
- A: Yes.
- Q: It doesn't say at least 40 units a month or approximately 40 units a month. It says 40 units per month. Right?
- A: Correct.
- Q: And you know that 40 units per month would still put Bert Ogden in breach of its sales performance addendum.
- A: Uh-huh.
- Q: Right.
- A: At this time.
- See Hearing Record at page 477, ll 3-18.
17. During the time period covered by evidence admitted in this case, SOA never provided Bert Ogden Subaru with as many as 100 units at one time. The 61 units provided to Bert Ogden Subaru by SOA in November 2020 was the largest monthly allocation ever, by a factor of at least ten units. See Exhibit 141; Hearing Record at page 640 ll 17-25; page 641 ll 1; page 1790 ll 4-25; page 1791 ll 1-5; Exhibit 467 Paragraph 40-Tab 28; Exhibit 484 Paragraph 15-Tab 10.
18. SOA was aware of these numbers and the lack of inventory to meet MSR requirements, and admitted that "you need inventory to sell vehicles." See Hearing Record at page 974, ll 18-25.

19. The number of cars that SOA provided to Bert Ogden Subaru simply was never sufficient to enable it to meet its MSR. See Exhibit 321; Exhibit 172; Hearing Record at page 477, ll 3-18.
20. During the time period covered by evidence admitted in this case, SOA never provided Bert Ogden Subaru with as many as 100 units at one time. The 61 units provided to Bert Ogden Subaru by SOA in November 2020 was the largest monthly allocation ever, by a factor of at least ten units. See Exhibit 141; Hearing Record at page 640 ll 17-25; page 641 ll 1; page 1790 ll 4-25; page 1791 ll 1-5; Exhibit 467 Paragraph 40-Tab 28; Exhibit 484 Paragraph 15-Tab 10.
21. The impact of SOA's historical failure to provide sufficient inventory is illustrated by the allocation made by SOA and the sales performance of Bert Ogden Subaru in the last quarter of 2020. When SOA finally provided a substantial number of discretionary cars in October and November 2020, Bert Ogden Subaru achieved record high sales. See Exhibit 141 and 142.
22. Exhibit 15 shows a commitment deficiency of 1 Certified Sales Manager and 1 Certified New & Used Sales Consultant. However, this commitment was made to SOA by Bert Ogden Subaru BEFORE SOA accepted and executed the agreement.
23. Exhibit 15 shows a commitment deficiency of 1 Exclusive Service Manager and 1 Exclusive Service Advisor. However, this commitment was made to SOA by Bert Ogden Subaru BEFORE SOA accepted and executed the agreement.
24. Exhibit 16 shows a commitment deficiency of 1 Certified Sales Manager and 1 Certified New & Used Sales Consultant.
25. Bert Ogden Subaru's personnel and staffing complied with the SOA requirements at all times from 2019 through the date of the NOIT. See Exhibit 17, Exhibit 18, and Exhibit 19; Hearing Record at page 1685, ll 23-25; page 1686, ll 1-25; page 1687, ll 1-25; page 1988, ll 1-25; page 1689, ll 1-15; page 1690, ll 1-25; page 1691, ll 1-9; at page 1691, ll 10-25; page 1692, ll 1-25; page 1693, ll 1-25; page 1694, l 1.
26. Geoff Mauldin testified as to the facts regarding staffing that addressed and refuted the complaint that two employees who were required to be exclusive were instead shared for the time period 2019 through 2021. See Hearing Record at page 1688, ll 21-25; page 1689, ll 1-15; page 1690, ll 1-25; page 1691, ll 1-9; at page 1691, ll 10-25; page 1692, ll 1-25; page 1693, ll 1-25; page 1694, l 1.

27. SOA is required under section 17.1.24 of the franchise agreement to notify Bert Ogden Subaru of any alleged failure to comply with the franchise as set out in subparagraphs (a)-(f) below and to provide a reasonable opportunity for Bert Ogden Subaru to cure any such claims for which notice is given prior to seeking to terminate the agreement (emphasis added):

- a. Sale of Subaru Products - 17.1.24(a);
- b. Maintenance of the Facilities and the approved location – 17.1.24(b);
- c. Service of Subaru Products – 17.1.24(c);
- d. Maintenance of net worth, net cash and networking capital in accordance with guidelines – 17.1.24((g);
- e. Fulfillment by Dealer of Dealer’s warranties and obligations (17.2.24(h); or
- f. Dealer’s performance under the Agreement, whether or not expressly identified herein as material in nature.

See Exhibit 11.

G. Enforceability of the Franchise from a Public Policy Standpoint

This was a take it or leave it contract.

1. SOA’s case for termination rests on its efforts to a contract it wrote and that Bert Ogden Subaru had no ability to negotiate:

Q: There is no negotiation between a retailer and Subaru of America with regard to the terms that are included within the standard provisions. Is that true?

A: That’s true.

See Hearing Record at page 205, ll 15-19.

2. The 2017 Franchise Agreement is a standard agreement, and it was not negotiated. The Standard Provisions in the Dealer Agreement are standard provisions and were not negotiated. See Exhibit 11; Hearing Record at page 749 ll 16-25; Hearing Record at page 205, ll 15-25; page 206, ll 1-16.
3. The 2017 Franchise Agreement contained a Sales Performance Addendum which was drafted by SOA and was not negotiated. See Exhibit 11; Hearing Record at page 749 ll 16-25; Hearing Record at page 205, ll 15-25; page 206, ll 1-16.
4. SOA is required under section 17.1.24 of the franchise agreement to notify Bert Ogden Subaru of any alleged failure to comply with the franchise as set out in subparagraphs (a)-(f) below and to provide a reasonable opportunity for Bert Ogden Subaru to cure any such claims for which notice is given prior to seeking to terminate the agreement (emphasis added):
 - a. Sale of Subaru Products - 17.1.24(a);

- b. Maintenance of the Facilities and the approved location – 17.1.24(b);
 - c. Service of Subaru Products – 17.1.24(c);
 - d. Maintenance of net worth, net cash and networking capital in accordance with guidelines – 17.1.24((g);
 - e. Fulfillment by Dealer of Dealer's warranties and obligations (17.2.24(h); or
 - f. Dealer's performance under the Agreement, whether or not expressly identified herein as material in nature.
- See Exhibit 11.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION

ACCEPTED
608-21-0988
8/19/2022 8:52:34 am
STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Carol Hale, CLERK

MCALLEN JEEP, INC. d/b/a BERT
OGDEN SUBARU

Protestant

v.
SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.,

Respondent

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SOAH DOCKET
NO. 608-21-0988.LIC

MVD DOCKET
NO. 21-0004-LIC

**RESPONDENT SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.'S REPLY TO PROTESTANT'S
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL FOR DECISION**

Respondent Subaru of America, Inc. ("SOA") submits this Reply to Protestant McAllen Jeep, Inc., d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru's ("Protestant" or "Bert Ogden") Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judges' ("ALJs") Proposal for Decision ("Exceptions").

I. INTRODUCTION

After a two-week trial on the merits, the ALJs assigned to this case entered a comprehensive, unanimous, Proposal for Decision ("PFD") finding that Bert Ogden's protest should be denied and that the termination of Bert Ogden's Subaru franchise should be approved.

In its Exceptions, Bert Ogden challenged virtually every substantive finding contained in the PFD. However, Bert Ogden has not and cannot overcome key facts that have been established in this proceeding. Among other things, the PFD and the record establish the following facts, which remain undisputed:

- Bert Ogden has failed to achieve even 50% of MSR since 2016 and has been the very worst performing retailer in the DFW Zone in terms of sales performance for several years. *See* PFD at p. 20-21; SOA's Post-Hearing Brief at p. 17.
- In its Sales Performance Addendums, Bert Ogden expressly conceded that it materially breached the terms of its Dealer Agreement by failing to meet the sales performance requirements set forth in the Agreement. *See* 2014 Sales Performance Addendum (Exhibit

5) at p. 1; Tr. Vol. 1 at 103:16-109:3 (Poston); 2017 Sales Performance Addendum (Exhibit 12) at p. 1-2; Tr. Vol. 8 at 2117:21-2118:8 (Vackar).

- Pursuant to the terms of the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden agreed to meet substantially reduced sales performance benchmarks which equated to 50% of current MSR from July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018; 60% of current MSR from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019; and 70% of current MSR from July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020. *See* PFD at p. 20.
- Bert Ogden failed to comply with even these vastly reduced requirements under the Sales Performance Addendum, and it fell short of its total sales obligation under the Addendum by **433 vehicle sales**. *See* PFD at p. 20 and 87; SOA's Post-Hearing Brief at p. 20.
- For years, Bert Ogden has consistently ranked last in the DFW Zone in terms of customer satisfaction with the service and purchase experience at Bert Ogden Subaru. To that end, in 2021, Bert Ogden ranked **third to last of approximately 640 SOA retailers in the entire nation** with respect to customer satisfaction with the purchase experience at the dealership. *See* PFD at p. 51-53 and 90; SOA's Post-Hearing Brief at p. 45-46.
- Bert Ogden's history of poor sales performance and customer service satisfaction has continued for nearly a decade despite SOA's enduring efforts to assist Bert Ogden with improving its sales and customer satisfaction performance. *See, generally*, SOA's Post-Hearing Brief and SOA's Response to Protestant's Post-Hearing Brief; *see also* PFD at p. 12-14; 36-38; 51-53; 60-63; and Findings of Fact ("FF") 21-23; 25; 32-36; 47-51; 61; 65.

As explained in detail below, and contrary to Protestant's claims, Protestant has not put forth any basis that would justify amendments to the PDF, much less a wholesale reversal of the ALJs' ultimate conclusions in this matter. Instead, Protestant's Exceptions are replete with arguments previously raised by Protestant and rejected by the ALJs. Further, Protestant has failed to articulate reasons why any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law in the PFD should be amended or rejected. For these reasons, SOA respectfully requests that Protestant's request for amendments to the PFD be denied.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Following the issuance of a comprehensive PFD, like the one in this case, Texas law permits the parties to seek correction or amendment of that decision in two different ways. First,

the ALJs may amend the proposal for decision: (1) in response to exceptions and replies to exceptions filed by the parties; or (2) to correct any clerical errors in the decision that do not result from judicial reasoning or determination. *See* Tex. Admin. Code § 155.507(d)(1); *Texas Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe and Supply, LLC*, 397 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. 2013). In either case, the party seeking an amendment must state specific grounds for any such change.

After the administrative law judge makes a determination regarding any exceptions, the proposal for decision is then submitted to the Texas New Motor Vehicle Board (the “Board”) for approval. 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 155.507. Under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.058(e), the Board may modify the proposal for decision only in limited circumstances and for limited reasons “if [it] determines (1) that the administrative law judge did not properly apply or interpret applicable law, agency rules, written policies provided under Subsection (c), or prior administrative decisions; (2) that a prior administrative decision on which the administrative law judge relied is incorrect or should be changed; or (3) that a technical error in a finding of fact should be changed.” *Id.* § 2001.058(e). If the Board changes a finding of fact or conclusion of law, the Board “shall state in writing the specific reason and legal basis for the change” and must “articulate a rational connection between an underlying agency policy and the altered finding of fact or conclusion of law.” *Id.*; *Sanchez v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Examiners*, 229 S.W.3d 498, 515 (Tex. App. 2007).

As discussed in detail below, Bert Ogden has not and cannot identify any improper application of applicable law, any prior administrative decisions that are incorrect or should be changed, or any technical error in any findings of fact that would support modification of the PFD. Accordingly, the PFD should be adopted and approved in its entirety.

III. ARGUMENT

In its lengthy Exceptions, Bert Ogden does not raise any challenge to several of the key Findings of Fact set forth in the PFD, including the following:

- That sales for the Subaru brand have been increasing, and have increased dramatically from a mere 7,500 units in the DFW Zone in 2009 to a total of 45,000 units in 2019. *See* PFD at FF 9.
- That Bert Ogden’s area of responsibility (“AOR”) under its Dealer Agreement with SOA is a growing market and is expected to continue to grow in the future. *Id.* at FF 19.
- That Bert Ogden entered into two separate Sales Performance Addenda that set out modified, lower sales requirements for Bert Ogden. *Id.* at FF 20; 21; 83.
- That Bert Ogden failed to meet even the substantially lower sales performance requirements in either of those Sales Performance Addenda. *Id.* at FF 23; 84.
- That Bert Ogden has not fully complied with the terms of its franchise agreement with SOA. *Id.* at FF 89; and
- That SOA intends to quickly establish a new replacement dealer, so any inconvenience to consumers in the market will be brief and is outweighed by the benefit the public will realize once a new dealer is established. *Id.* at FF 64.

Despite failing to challenge these critical findings (which are now deemed to be accepted), Protestant’s Exceptions raise a myriad of different objections to the findings and conclusions in the PFD. These Exceptions, however, do not raise any new or novel issues of law or fact, but instead simply reiterate the same arguments that Bert Ogden made during the hearing and in its post-hearing briefs—the same arguments that the ALJs fully considered and rejected.¹ As such,

¹ Given the length and repetitiveness of Bert Ogden’s Exceptions, and its apparent challenge to virtually every piece of evidence set forth in the PFD, this Response does not attempt to respond to every claim made by Protestant or restate all of SOA’s arguments from its post-hearing briefs. Instead, SOA incorporates those arguments by reference, and uses this Response to focus on the “bigger picture” issues Protestant has raised in its Exceptions. SOA’s decision not to address any individual issue raised by Bert Ogden’s Exceptions should not be construed as assent by SOA to any of those claims.

none of the arguments raised by Bert Ogden establish any compelling basis for the amendment or modification of any substantive finding or conclusion set forth in the PFD.

A. Evidence of Bert Ogden's Many Operational Deficiencies is Highly Relevant and was Properly Considered under Texas Law.

Bert Ogden first alleges that the ALJs erred as a matter of law by allowing SOA to effectively “rewrite” the Notice of Termination and by relying on evidence that it claims was not expressly set forth in the notice itself, including the extensive evidence presented about the many operational deficiencies at Bert Ogden Subaru that contribute to its poor sales and customer satisfaction performance. *See* Exceptions at p. 7-9 and 60-65. This allegation, however, is erroneous as a matter of law, inconsistent with the plain language of the relevant statutes and prior legal precedent, and misstates the contents of the Notice of Termination, itself.

Contrary to Bert Ogden's claim, Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a) does *not* state that the evidence in a termination must be limited to the grounds for termination set forth in the notice, but instead expressly provides that the Board “***shall consider all existing circumstances,***” including each of the seven statutory factors. *See* Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a) (emphasis added). Interpreting this provision, Texas decisions have repeatedly held that “the relevant factors for the Department to consider in making a good cause determination are ***both the grounds specified by the manufacturer in the Notice of Termination as well as the statutory factors set forth in Code § 2301.455(a).***” *Cecil Atkission Orange, LLC v. FCA US LLC*, MVD Docket No. 15-0015.LIC, SOAH Docket No. 608-15-4315.LIC (Tex. Dep't. of Motor Vehicles Aug. 17, 2017) at p. 6-7 (emphasis added).² Accordingly, there is no support for Bert Ogden's claim that the ALJs erred in considering evidence regarding their many operational deficiencies.

² *See also Star Houston, Inc. v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC*, MVD Docket No. 16-0018.LIC, SOAH Docket No. 608-16-4676.LIC (Tex. Dep't. of Motor Vehicles Oct. 12, 2020); *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America,*

There also is no support for Bert Ogden's claim that it was somehow "ambushed" by evidence of its operational deficiencies at the hearing. In addition to stating that SOA intended to terminate Bert Ogden Subaru based on its poor sales performance and "worst in class" customer satisfaction scores, as Bert Ogden admits in its Exceptions, the Notice of Termination expressly states that multiple "operational decisions and deficiencies" at the dealership contributed to its poor performance. With regard to those operational issues, the Notice of Termination states:

SOA has determined that the dealership's material and ongoing failure to fulfill its sales performance obligations is the result of operational decisions and deficiencies directly within Bert Ogden Subaru's control, including, but not limited to: its failure to *retain qualified management* and *personnel with exclusive and accountable focus on Subaru* operations; its *failure to adequately and effectively market and promote the sale of Subaru vehicles*; and *dealership management's refusal and/or unwillingness to take necessary and appropriate steps to improve the dealership's sales performance and operations* in order to meet its contractual obligations.

See Notice of Termination (Exhibit 172) at p. 4 (emphasis added). The Notice of Termination therefore gave Bert Ogden actual notice that SOA was extremely concerned with its operations, including, but not limited to, its management, staffing, and other issues.³ Indeed, after receiving this notice, Protestants had over 16 months to conduct discovery regarding the management, personnel, marketing, and other operational deficiencies that SOA expressly informed them were contributing to its poor performance. This is hardly an ambush.

Finally, Protestant challenged the ALJs' finding that SOA takes proposed terminations "very seriously" and tries to give its retailers an opportunity to resolve any problems on the grounds that SOA allegedly did not give it an opportunity to cure these operational deficiencies, including

Inc., MVD Docket Nos. 14-0010 LIC, 15-0013 LIC, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC, at pp. 5-6 (Tex. Dep't. of Motor Vehicles June 1, 2017).

³ All of these stated grounds for termination, including Bert Ogden's poor sales performance, poor customer satisfaction performance, and its operational issues—including its management, personnel, marketing, and other business decisions—are highly relevant to the statutory factors set forth in Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a).

pursuant to Section 17 of the Dealer Agreement. This claim, however, fails for multiple reasons. First, Protestant expressly admits that SOA did, in fact, give Bert Ogden written notice and a chance to cure the deficiencies in its sales and OLP performance in the form of three separate performance addenda that were signed by Bert Ogden. *See* Exceptions at p. 9. Second, the Notice of Termination makes clear that the basis for termination here was Bert Ogden Subaru's poor sales and customer service performance as set forth in those addenda, and that its operational deficiencies were a "contributing factor" to that poor performance. *See* Notice of Termination (Exhibit 172). Moreover, there is no dispute that the operational deficiencies raised at the hearing had been ongoing for many years (if not for over a decade) before the Notice of Termination was issued, and that SOA repeatedly consulted with Bert Ogden Subaru about these issues in an effort to provide it an opportunity to address them.⁴ Accordingly, there is simply no support for Bert Ogden's claim that it was ambushed by and had no opportunity to cure its operational issues prior to the Notice of Termination. Instead, the evidence made clear that Bert Ogden, simply failed to take the steps necessary to correct those deficiencies—and its performance suffered as a result.

B. Bert Ogden's Long History of Poor Sales, Poor Customer Satisfaction, and Materially Deficient Operations Make it Exactly the "Type of Dealer" Subject to Termination.

Despite the wealth of evidence regarding its long-term poor performance and unresolved deficiencies, Protestant also repeatedly alleged that Bert Ogden simply is not the type of failing dealer that is typically subject to termination, and that termination generally is reserved for dealers who were dishonest, falsified warranty or recall repairs, consistently failed to improve their sales,

⁴ *See e.g.* 2015 OLP Performance Addendum (Exhibit 7); Sales Performance Addendum (Exhibit 12); April 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 69) at p. 2; June 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 70) at p. 2-3; May 2020 Contact Report (Exhibit 76); Tr. Vol. 4 at 874:24-895:20 (Yannella); Tr. Vol. 1 at 176:12-177:22 (Poston); Tr. Vol. 2 at 302:22-308:21 (Adams); Tr. Vol. 5 at 1213:7-1221:8; 1233:5-16; and 1246:17-1247:7 (Delapp).

or consistently failed to invest in the brand. These arguments, however, mischaracterize Texas law and ignore the many deficiencies at Bert Ogden that provide the basis for this action.

First, contrary to Bert Ogden’s suggestion, the Texas Code does not limit termination actions to dealers who are dishonest or submit false information. In fact, the Texas Code does not even contain any express reference to dishonesty or the submission of false information in the statutory factors. *See* Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.455(a). The Code also does not establish any single “one-size-fits-all” approach to proposed terminations, but instead expressly provides that the Board “shall consider all existing circumstances,” including the seven factors set forth in Section 2301.455(a), and make a determination based on the totality of those circumstances. *Id.* Indeed, applying that express standard, this Board has previously upheld the termination of other dealers based on significant deficiencies in their performance and operations much like the ones at issue in this case, including poor sales performance, poor customer satisfaction, chronic staffing and personnel issues, and the like. *See, e.g., Cecil Atkission*, SOAH Docket No. 608-15-4315.LIC; *Star Houston*, SOAH Docket No. 608-16-4676.LIC. This case simply is not novel.

Second, although Bert Ogden repeatedly claims that it should not be terminated because it demonstrated “substantial” sales growth in the years prior to its termination, this allegation overstates the evidence to say the least. Below is chart showing Bert Ogden’s sales performance in the years prior to the Notice of Termination and 2020 when it received that Notice:

	Actual Sales	Expected Sales	MSR
2016	330	885	37.29%
2017	325	855	38.01%
2018	344	780	44.10%
2019	352	946	37.21%
2020	432	867	44.85%

See SOSA Reports (Exhibits 59-63). As this chart shows, from 2016 to 2019—one of the periods of greatest growth in the history of the Subaru brand—Bert Ogden’s sales volume increased a mere 22 units or 6.25% over a total of four years. This is not “substantial” growth by any measure.

Moreover, Bert Ogden’s overly-simplistic proposal for evaluating dealer sales performance—whether its sales went up or down in the years leading up to termination—is unreasonable on its face and inconsistent with Texas law. As the PFD correctly held, the Texas Code requires the Board to evaluate Bert Ogden’s sales—not in isolation—but in relation to the sales in the market. Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.455(a). This is because a dealer’s sales history alone does not take into consideration even the most fundamental of factors: whether that sales volume was appropriate given the size of the market and the amount of sales that could be made there. This distinction is illustrated by Bert Ogden’s own sales performance. While Bert Ogden’s raw sales increased slightly over time, those sales consistently accounted for just *fractions* of the opportunity available in this market, were *less than half* of its minimum sales responsibility, and were *far short* of the substantially reduced benchmarks set forth in the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum. See PFD at p. 40. Simply stated, Bert Ogden’s minor improvement from “materially deficient” to “just slightly less materially deficient” over a five-year period does not save its case.

This is particularly true as it relates to Bert Ogden’s performance after the Notice of Termination in 2020. While the ALJs and the Board may consider a dealer’s performance after a notice of termination, the Board has specifically held “[t]hat a dealership may have improved its performance and met standards after being given notice of intended termination *should not excuse many years of past poor performance by the dealership.*” *Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc.*, 2016 Westlaw 1534032 (Tex. SOAH Apr. 8, 2016), adopted, MVD Docket No. 14-0010.LIC, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC (Tex. Dept. of Motor Vehicles June 1, 2017) at 7

(emphasis added).⁵ The Board further held that post-notice performance improvements do not preclude a finding of good cause for termination. *Id.*⁶ Here, while Bert Ogden did improve somewhat⁷ after receiving the Notice of Termination, its performance remained materially deficient, and certainly was not enough to excuse its decades of poor performance.

Finally, in support of its claim that Bert Ogden is not the “type of dealer” that should be subject to termination, Protestant also includes several charts of various hand-picked metrics in an attempt to demonstrate that it actually is a strong performer for the Subaru brand. These charts, however, do not present the full picture and ignore the substantial evidence regarding Bert Ogden’s many long-term and material shortcomings:

- **Lack of Dedication to the Subaru Brand** – Numerous witnesses testified that Bert Ogden never prioritized learning about the Subaru business model, and never invested the time, energy, or resources to succeed with the brand. *See e.g.* Tr. Vol. 4 at 1072:6-13 (Flores) (“I don’t think Bert Ogden understands the brand at all”); Tr. Vol. 5 at 1253:11-18 (Delapp) (“A lack of focus from management and ownership, a lack of focus for OLP and customer experience, a lack of staffing, a lack of training, just a lack of buy-in to the Subaru culture for having a strong partnership and putting the customer experience above all else.”). Indeed, Bert Ogden representatives rarely attended retailer meetings hosted by SOA, and described them as “a waste of time.” *See* Lucio Designation at 28:13-29:12.

⁵ In its Exceptions, Protestant heavily criticizes the PFD’s discussion of *Bates Nissan* and one other prior Board decision, *All Star Imports*, on the ground that the PFD improperly relied on those decisions when rejecting Bert Ogden’s arguments about its alleged sales improvement. (Exceptions at 3-5) (“These opinions do not stand for the proposition for which they were offered and/or relied upon.”). The PFD, however, did not cite those cases in support of those conclusions at all, but instead expressly noted that *Protestant itself had relied on those cases in its post-hearing briefs* and that *the ALJs found those decisions to be inapposite and not persuasive*. (PFD at 39-40) (“[T]he ALJs find that argument unsupported by the caselaw Bert Ogden cites.”). Protestant’s lengthy discussion attempting to distinguish those decisions therefore is consistent with the PFD’s findings.

⁶ *See also Sweeten Truck Center, L.C. v. Volvo Trucks North America*, 2016 WL 4979826, at *2-3 (Tex. App. Austin, 2016) (holding that Sweeten Truck Center’s argument that the Board should consider only the most recent data regarding dealership performance in connection with analyzing the good cause factors under Tex. Occ. Code § 2301.455(a) is too narrow. “Were we to adopt Sweeten’s interpretation, a dealership could nearly always avoid a franchise modification by making improvements only after receiving notice of a proposed modification. Such a reading is not mandated by the statute’s plain language.”).

⁷ Bert Ogden was able to increase its sales from roughly 20-40 vehicles each month to 60 sales per month in late 2020. Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 76; Tr. Vol. 5 at 1396:3-1399:21 (Lytle).

- **Worst in Sales Performance** – Given this lack of dedication and understanding, Bert Ogden was the worst performing retailer in the entire DFW Zone in sales performance, and never made more than 49.8% of the sales expected in its market since 2016. *See* PFD at FF 25; Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 43; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1528:22-1529:18 (Farhat); *see also* Bert Ogden’s 2013 – 2021 SOSA Reports (Exhibits 56 – 64).
- **Worst in Customer Satisfaction** – Bert Ogden Subaru consistently ranked among the worst performing retailers in the Zone in customer satisfaction with their purchase experience, including ranking dead last in recent years. *See* Notice of Termination (Exhibit 172) at p. 4; Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 55. In fact, in 2021, Bert Ogden’s purchase satisfaction ranked *third to last out of the 640 SOA retailers in the nation*. *See* February 2021 Letter re: OLP Performance (Exhibit 129). Bert Ogden’s service satisfaction also has consistently ranked poorly and was next to last of all of the retailers in the Zone in 2020. *See* Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 56; 2019 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 53) at p. 45.
- **Lack of Adequate Staffing** – Unlike most of its peers, Bert Ogden Subaru has been consistently understaffed in virtually every aspect of its business. *See e.g.* Tr. Vol. 5 at 1360:8-12 (Lytle); Tr. Vol. 4 at 858:13-859:17; 860:25-861:13; 883:8-888:11 (Yannella); Tr. Vol. 5 at 1201:16-1202:7 and 1211:2-23 (Delapp); Tr. Vol. 2 at 303:1-304:9 (Adams).
- **Excessive Employee Turnover** – In addition to an overall lack of adequate staffing, Bert Ogden’s performance has been substantially hindered by the frequent employee turnover in its sales and service departments, which has caused serious deficiencies with respect to training and required Subaru certifications. Tr. Vol. 5 at 1218:13-1220:17 and 1253:11-21 (Delapp); Tr. Vol. 2 at 303:1-305:15 (Adams); Tr. Vol. 4 at 858:20-859:25 (Yannella); Tr. Vol. 4 at 1011:20-1014:14 (Flores).
- **Lack of Dedicated Staffing** – Unlike most of its peers, Bert Ogden repeatedly failed to maintain employees that are dedicated to the Subaru brand. This issue was prevalent at the dealership from the top down. This includes no exclusive General Manager, F&I manager, service manager, parts manager, service advisor, or sales staff.⁸
- **Using Subaru to Sell other Brands** – There is no dispute that none of Protestant’s sales consultants focus solely on selling Subarus, or that Bert Ogden’s sales consultants are free to sell customers non-Subaru brand vehicles. *Id.*; *see also* April 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 69) at p. 2; Tr. Vol. 4 at 879:21-880:10; 895:21-897:8 (Yannella); June 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 70) at p. 2; June 24, 2019 E-mail (Exhibit 115). Indeed, Protestant’s own General Manager claimed that “it’s important for them to keep the customer in the Bert Ogden Family, so it’s more important they sell them a car period versus a specific brand.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 1254:4-21 (Delapp). Indeed, SOA discovered several times where the dealership would respond to consumer inquiries about a Subaru vehicle

⁸ *See* 2017 MSOGs (Exhibit 15) at p. 3; 2018 MSOGs (Exhibit 16) at p. 3; 2019 MSOGs (Exhibit 17) at p. 3; 2020 MSOGs (Exhibit 18) at p. 3; 2021 MSOGs (Exhibit 19) at p. 3; May 2021 Contact Report (Exhibit 80) at p. 2; Tr. Vol. 2 at 303:1-305:15; 326:20-334:15 (Adams); Tr. Vol. 4 at 1046:6-1048:17 (Flores). Tr. Vol. 4 at 858:13-859:17, 860:25-861:13 and 883:8-888:11 (Yannella); Tr. Vol. 5 at 1201:16-1202:7, 1211:2-23 (Delapp).

with information—not about a Subaru—but about vehicles of another brand such as Mazda or Volvo. *See, e.g.*, Exhibit 115; Tr. Vol. 4 at 861:14-862:19; 895:21-897:8; and 897:18-898:5 (Yannella).

- **Poor Handling of Consumer Leads** – Bert Ogden has routinely employed an insufficient number of BDC personnel to respond to internet inquiries or “leads” from customers who have expressed interest in purchasing a Subaru vehicle. Tr. Vol. 4 at 861:14-862:19 and 881:24-883:15 (Yannella). For example, in 2019, Bert Ogden had *only one BDC agent* responding to about 400 inquiries per month—more than 2.5 times the amount that its own BDC Director admitted any agent could handle. *See* June 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 70) at p. 2; Tr. Vol. 4 at 881:19-884:6 (Yannella); Castillo Designation at 72:10-20. Accordingly, Bert Ogden consistently had some of the slowest response times of any dealers in the District, and one of the lowest sales “close rates” in the Zone. *See* June 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 70); August 2019 Contact Report (Exhibit 71); Tr. Vol. 4 at 881:19-884:6; 904:3-906:13 (Yannella).
- **Insufficient Parts Inventory** – Bert Ogden’s own financial statements report that the dealership has fractions of the parts and accessories inventory compared to other similarly sized Subaru retailers in the Zone, including times where it reported just \$5 in parts per VIO or *nine to ten times less* than other retailers of the same size. *See* Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 11 and 51.
- **Insufficient Service Equipment** – Bert Ogden’s own financial statements report that the dealership maintained mere fractions of the service equipment compared to other similarly sized Subaru retailers in the Zone, including times where it reported *just \$4,375 in service equipment* for the Subaru brand or about *63 times less* than other retailers of the same size. *See* Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 12 and 52.
- **Denying Warranty Service** – Bert Ogden refuses to provide vehicle maintenance services for Subaru vehicles over ten years old or with more than 100,000 miles. Tr. Vol. 4 at 863:2-864:3 (Yannella). Although Protestant alleges this was a one-time mistake during a mystery shop, Bert Ogden’s own General Manager explained this policy in detail as being necessary for older vehicles “the parts are too brittle at that point” and “could potentially break.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 864:4-20 (Yannella). Bert Ogden’s former General Manager also testified that the dealership had this same policy when he was managing the store. *See* Lucio Designation at 8:2-21; 11:8-12:19; 71:22-72:2 and 78:18-25.

These examples of Bert Ogden’s operational deficiencies all constitute material breaches of the Dealer Agreement, are directly relevant to the statutory factors set forth in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.455 and support the PFD’s recommendation that Bert Ogden’s franchise be terminated.

C. The PFD Correctly Found that Bert Ogden's Poor New Vehicle Sales in Relation to the Market Supports Termination of its Subaru Franchise.

Aside from Protestant's discussion about the minimal increase in its sales leading up to the Notice of Termination, there is no genuine dispute that Bert Ogden's sales performance was materially deficient and had been for decades. As the PFD found, Bert Ogden consistently has been the lowest-performing retailer in the entire DFW Zone for many years. *See* PFD at FF 25; Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 43; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1528:22-1529:18 (Farhat); *see also* Bert Ogden's 2013 – 2021 SOSA Reports (Exhibits 56 – 64). When compared to the amount of opportunity available in its own market, Bert Ogden's sales volume never crested 50% of that opportunity in any of the five years prior to its termination. *Id.* Indeed, Bert Ogden's MSR percentages for 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 were 37.3%, 38.0%, 44.1%, 37.2%, and 49.8%, respectively. *Id.*

There also is no dispute that the above level of performance is extremely poor and constitutes a material breach of the Dealer Agreement. Bert Ogden admitted as much in writing. As outlined throughout this case, on July 28, 2017, Bert Ogden executed a 2017 Sales Performance Addendum expressly admitting that: (1) its performance has failed to meet the Subaru minimum standards set forth in the Dealer Agreement as evidenced by its MSR; and (2) this failure to meet MSR "constitutes a material breach of the Agreement." *See* Sales Performance Addendum (Exhibit 12). In an effort to work with Bert Ogden, this Addendum also provided the dealership a three-year window of time to achieve substantially reduced sales performance benchmarks that were materially lower than its "expected sales" would be based on MSR alone:

- Increase Subaru new vehicle sales to 50% of current MSR or a total of 430 new Subaru vehicle sales within the twelve-month period starting July 1, 2017, and ending June 30, 2018.⁹

⁹ The Sales Performance Addendum allowed Bert Ogden to comply with sales performance benchmarks that were even lower than the benchmarks specifically listed in the Addendum if market conditions resulted in a decrease in Bert Ogden's MSR requirements at any point during the 3-year term of the Addendum. *See id.*

- Increase Subaru new vehicle sales to 60% of current MSR or a total of 516 new Subaru vehicle sales within the twelve-month period starting July 1, 2018, and ending June 30, 2019.
- Increase Subaru new vehicle sales to 70% of current MSR or a total of 602 new Subaru vehicle sales within the twelve-month period starting July 1, 2019, and ending June 30, 2020.

Id. Bert Ogden further agreed that its failure to achieve these benchmarks “shall constitute a material breach” of the Dealer Agreement. *Id.* at p. 2. Bert Ogden, however, failed to meet even the vastly reduced sales performance requirements in the Addendum. *See* Notice of Termination (Exhibit 172) at p. 3. Indeed, Protestant’s Exceptions do not even challenge the Finding of Fact that Bert Ogden failed to meet these substantially reduced benchmarks. *See* PFD at FF 23.

In its Exceptions, Protestant largely ignores the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum, including the fact that: (1) SOA voluntarily provided this dealer substantially reduced sales benchmarks; (2) Bert Ogden failed to meet any of these reduced benchmarks; and (3) Bert Ogden agreed that its failure to meet those benchmarks would be a material breach. Instead, Protestant devotes the majority of its brief to attacking SOA’s standard measurement of dealer performance—MSR—and alleging that it is not a reliable measure of sales performance. These arguments not only ignore the importance of the Sales Performance Addendum, but also are misplaced and unsupported by the evidence in this case.

1. MSR is a Reasonable and Reliable Sales Performance Metric.

Although Protestant alleges that MSR is not a reasonable metric, there is no dispute that MSR is the industry standard for evaluating dealer sales performance and is used (with some slight variations) by virtually all automotive companies in the United States. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 6; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1487:3-1488:10 (Farhat). This metric evaluates a dealer’s sales in relation to

the market, as required by Texas law, by comparing the number of actual sales made by the retailer to the number of sales it would be expected to make in its specific market. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 5-6; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1487:3-1488:25 (Farhat). Expected sales or MSR is calculated by: (1) multiplying the total number of competitive vehicles registered in its particular AOR by the average market share that Subaru achieves in its competitive segments within the District; and (2) then segment adjusting the data to account for any socioeconomic factors (such as age, income, or local economic factors) that may impact the specific type of vehicles consumers are purchasing in the market. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188); Tr. Vol. 6 at 1488:11-25; 1505:14-1510:13 (Farhat).

This metric also is a very reasonable, conservative, and achievable standard for evaluating retailer sales performance. In fact, MSR is so reasonable that approximately 72% of all Subaru retailers in the DFW Zone consistently achieve or exceed 100% of MSR, and from 2016 to 2020, the average percent of MSR by retailers in the Zone was 138.3%. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 8; 46; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1522:20-1524:6; 1534:4-12 (Farhat). Indeed, other than Bert Ogden—which performed a full 20 percentage points below the next lowest retailer in the Zone—only 5 of the other 42 retailers in the Zone had average MSR scores in the range of 60% to 80% from 2016 to 2020. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 44-45. As such, there is no support for the claim that Bert Ogden did not have a reasonable opportunity to achieve MSR—or the substantially reduced benchmarks set forth in the Sales Performance Addendum.

Despite these facts, Bert Ogden cites to several prior decisions in other matters in an attempt to show that MSR must be unreasonable because some courts have criticized the use of similar performance metrics by other automotive companies in certain situations. These arguments, however, ignore the prior decisions in Texas affirming the use of sales effectiveness as

a reasonable and appropriate measurement of dealer performance.¹⁰ Moreover, as the PFD properly held, the decisions relied on by Bert Ogden are wholly distinguishable from this case.

Protestant first cites to the New York decision in *Beck Chevrolet*, which held that General Motors' sales performance metric was not reasonable or appropriate in that specific case. *Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. General Motors LLC*, 53 N.E.3d 706 (N.Y. 2016). In that decision, the court found that General Motors uses of a statewide benchmark for evaluating dealer performance was unreasonable under the circumstances in that case because there was a measurable difference in brand performance between upstate New York and downstate New York where the dealer was located. *Id.* at 711; 713. Indeed, this difference was so prominent that only 4 of the 23 dealers in the downstate were able to achieve 100% RSE. *See Beck Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors LLC*, Docket No. 34452, at pp. 4, 13 (NY DMV May 31, 2016) (attached as **Exhibit A**). Moreover, Beck was not the worst performing dealer in the state by a long shot, and when Beck was compared to the other Chevrolet dealers under a more local "downstate" standard, its performance was in the "middle of the pack." *Id.* Accordingly, the *Beck* decisions held that General Motors' efforts to terminate only this one dealer rendered the standard "unreasonable in its application." *Id.*

These circumstances are wholly inapposite to the present case. As set forth above, SOA did not evaluate Bert Ogden's performance using a statewide benchmark at all, but instead used a more local, reasonable, and conservative standard—a district average—just like was suggested in *Beck*, itself. In addition, there is no suggestion that SOA's standards were unreasonable or unreasonably applied in this case. As set forth above, Bert Ogden Subaru consistently was the lowest performer in the entire state of Texas, not by a little, but by a full 20 percentage points. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 44-45. Moreover, given the more localized standard used by

¹⁰ *See, e.g., Cecil Atkission*, SOAH Docket No. 608-15-4315.LIC; *Star Houston*, SOAH Docket No. 608-16-4676.LIC.

SOA, approximately 72% of the Subaru retailers consistently achieved 100% MSR or more. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 8; 46. The circumstances at issue in this case are very different from those at issue in *Beck*.

The same is true of the other case relied on by Bert Ogden. *See Bates Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc.*, MVD Docket Nos. 14-0010 LIC, 15-0013 LIC, SOAH Docket No. 608-14-3211.LIC (Tex. Dep't. of Motor Vehicles June 1, 2017). In that case, Nissan sought to terminate the subject dealer not using a localized standard such as district average, but instead using a Central Region benchmark that included 14 entire states. *Id.* at 8. In addition, while the Nissan dealer was a consistent underperformer, its sales effectiveness improved to over 100% prior to the issuance of the notice of termination. *Id.* at 11. Despite this fact, the Board did not reject the use of sales effectiveness as a reliable metric (as Protestant claims), and even noted that it is “a reasonable tool to measure and compare NNA’s dealers in regard to their sales.” *Id.* at 12. Instead, that decision simply held that Nissan’s sales effectiveness metric was not adequately incorporated into the Nissan Dealer Agreement and thus could not be used to measure its performance under the contract. *Id.* 12-14. This same concern, however, is not an issue in this case given Bert Ogden’s execution of the 2017 Sales Performance Addendum and express acknowledgement that MSR is the proper measure of performance under the Dealer Agreement and that Bert Ogden’s failure to achieve MSR and the reduced benchmarks in the addendum constitute a material breach of the Dealer Agreement. *See* Sales Performance Addendum (Exhibit 12).

2. Protestant’s Arguments Regarding Segmentation Misconstrue SOA’s Position, the True Purpose of MSR, and the Evidence in this Case.

In its next attempt to discredit the use of MSR in this case, Protestant claims that SOA and its witnesses have hailed segmentation as “the panacea” that renders its sales performance metrics reasonable and appropriate, then launches an attack against this self-proscribed argument. *See*

Exceptions at p. 30-33. Contrary to Protestant's assertion, however, SOA is not alleging that MSR is reasonable solely because of its use of segmentation. Instead, SOA's witnesses expressly testified that there are several adjustments embodied within SOA's sales performance metric that, when taken together, operate to account for local market factors and consumer preferences:

- MSR is based only on competitive vehicles, and thus accounts for markets where consumers may have a preference for luxury vehicles, large SUVs, or pickup trucks that are not part of Subaru's product offerings. Tr. Vol. 1 at 95:22-65:4 (Poston).
- A retailer's MSR is based on the total number of industry registrations that were made in its particular AOR only, which accounts for any local market or economic factors that might affect consumer buying patterns in that market. Tr. Vol. 6 at 1552:17-1553:8 (Farhat); Tr. Vol. 4 at 857:10-24 (Yannella).
- SOA does not use a statewide average, but instead uses a District 3 average benchmark, which is more local and better reflects market conditions in this portion of the state. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 33; Tr. Vol. 1520:23-1521:12 (Farhat).
- SOA's calculation of MSR also is "segment adjusted" to account for "age, income, and other socioeconomic factors that impact the type of vehicles consumers purchase to meet their transportation needs" within a particular market. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at ¶ 19.

In addition to all of the adjustments above, SOA provided Bert Ogden Subaru a Sales Performance Addendum that substantially reduced its sales performance benchmark and only obligated the dealer to achieve fractions of the MSR calculation (50%, 60%, and 70%). Given all these adjustments and concessions, there is simply no support for Protestant's claim that SOA is relying solely on segmentation or that its sales performance standards in this case were unreasonable.

Protestant next offers two charts that contain revised versions of SOSA Reports and select examples of certain vehicles for which actual sales were either higher or lower than "expected." Protestant then relies on these charts to allege that segmentation must not be an accurate "predictor" of sales in the Pharr AOR. This argument misses the point. It is well established that MSR is not a "predictor" of what a particular dealership's *actual sales* of a particular model will

be, but instead is a rear-facing calculation of the amount of *sales opportunity* that was available in the market during that particular time period. How the dealership's actual sales will compare to that level of opportunity, however, depends on numerous factors—including many factors within each dealer's control. Indeed, Protestant's own expert agreed that a dealer's sales performance can be affected by that dealer's pricing, personnel, advertising, reputation, internal processes, business development programs, employee training, and other factors. Tr. Vol. 9 at 2388:12-2389:5 (Roesner). Accordingly, Protestant's reference to a few select charts showing that some vehicles sales were higher than expected and others were lower than expected proves little.¹¹

Protestant's attack on Mr. Farhat's regression model also fails for these same reasons. In his expert report, Mr. Farhat prepared two separate regression analyses which showed there is a strong relationship or correlation (of 54% to 91%) between a dealer's actual sales and the "expected sales" in the market as calculated using MSR. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 20-21; Appendix (Exhibit 189) at p. 2-3.¹² Relying on these analyses, Protestant then alleges that SOA's expert "admitted" that some percentage of dealership sales must be correlated to some factor other than MSR, as if this is some major concession. It is not, and in fact, we agree. As set forth above,

¹¹ Protestant also cites the decision in *Austin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Bd.*, 212 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App. 2006), as an example of a case in Texas criticizing sales effectiveness and segment adjusting. That decision, however, did not reject sales effectiveness at all. Instead, like the other decisions cited by Protestant, the court found that General Motors' use of a *statewide average* was less appropriate under the facts of that case, and found that using segmentation to adjust that *statewide average* alone did not account for all relevant factors—particularly where General Motors refused to address any of the criticisms of that standard raised by the dealer. *Id.* at 436-37. Importantly, however, the court expressly found that the use of sales effectiveness under narrower standard—the multi-dealer areas within Texas—was a reasonable and appropriate standard. *Id.* As discussed above, SOA similarly used a more narrowly focused and more local standard in this case.

¹² In a disingenuous attempt to discredit SOA's expert witness, Protestant claims that he "intentionally manipulated" his regression analyses by forcing the Y intercept to zero. Exceptions at 17. This allegation is simply false. As Protestant well knows, Mr. Farhat expressly testified that there are two different ways to perform these regressions—forcing the intercept through zero and not forcing the intercept through zero—and there are criticisms to both approaches. Tr. Vol. 6 at 1592:2-11 (Farhat). For that reason, Mr. Farhat expressly ran his analysis both ways for the ALJs, and both ways showed a strong relationship between sales and the sales expected in the market. *Id.*

all parties—including Protestant’s own expert—agree that a dealer’s actual sales results can be substantially impacted by many factors within its own control, including the dealer’s pricing, personnel, advertising, reputation, internal processes, business development programs, employee training, and other factors. Tr. Vol. 9 at 2388:12-2389:5 (Roesner).

As set forth in the Notice of Termination itself, and as proven by the great weight of the evidence, Bert Ogden Subaru’s material and ongoing failure to fulfill its sales performance obligations is the result of numerous operational deficiencies directly within its control, including, but not limited to: (1) its lack of dedication to the Subaru brand; (2) inadequate staffing levels; (3) excessive employee turnover; (4) lack of dedicated staffing; (5) poor leads management; (6) poor customer satisfaction; (7) cross-selling of other brands from the Subaru dealership; (8) insufficient parts inventory; (9) insufficient service equipment; and (10) improper warranty handling processes. *See Supra*, at Section B; Notice of Termination (Exhibit 172) at p. 4. All of these examples of the many operational and performance deficiencies at Protestant’s dealership support the PFD’s finding that Bert Ogden’s sales have been poor in relation to the sales available in the market, and the PFD’s conclusion recommending termination of its Subaru franchise.

3. Protestant’s Consistently and Materially Poor Sales Performance was not Caused by the Demographics in its Local Market.

Part and parcel with its arguments above, Bert Ogden’s Exceptions next restate the claim from its Post-Hearing Briefs that its sales performance is poor because the demographics in its AOR are not conducive to the sale of new vehicles (and particularly Subaru vehicles) due to the fact that consumers in its market generally are younger, less educated, Hispanic, and lower earning than consumers in other markets throughout the Zone. This allegation fails for several reasons.

First, there is zero evidence in the record that this particular market is not conducive to the sale of new vehicles. To the contrary, the evidence is undisputed that the Pharr AOR contains

nearly 1 million residents, and the population and number of households in this market has been rapidly growing since at least 2010. Farhat Report (Exhibit 188) at p. 63-67. It is also undisputed that this market has benefitted from high and increasing levels of employment throughout the last decade, and that there are numerous households with annual income exceeding \$25,000—including 71,000 households in this market with earnings of \$75,000 or more. *Id.* at p. 68; 71-72. Given these strong economic conditions, it is no surprise that this area contains dozens of automotive dealerships, including dealerships for luxury brands like Maserati, Lamborghini, Mercedes, BMW, and Lexus. *Id.* at p. 70. This is hardly a depressed market.

Indeed, Bert Ogden’s own dealer principal testified that this is a thriving area that can support a significant amount of new vehicle sales. Specifically, Mr. Vackar acknowledged that the Rio Grande Valley is not an economically struggling market, and instead testified that he agrees this area is “growing by leaps and bounds.” Tr. Vol. 8 at 2099:23-2100:5 (Vackar). Mr. Vackar also admitted that he has so much confidence in this market that he owns 22+ automotive franchises in the Valley, including several franchises for luxury brands like Cadillac, Maserati, Infiniti, and BMW. *Id.* at 2100:7-2101:4. The Bert Ogden Group has also been in the process of several large development projects for its various dealerships in the Valley, including a \$12 million new dealership facility for Cadillac, a \$10-to-\$12 million new facility for BMW, and additional new facilities for its Hyundai, Genesis, and Chrysler-Jeep dealerships. *Id.* at 2101:5-2102:12.

Even more relevant here, however, Bert Ogden’s own witnesses admitted the Pharr AOR actually is a strong market for the Subaru brand. Mr. Vackar expressly testified that he believes Subaru vehicles are a “great product,” and has confidence that the Subaru brand can sell in the Valley. Tr. Vol. 8 at 2108:2-16 (Vackar). Indeed, Mr. Vackar admitted he has so much confidence that the Subaru brand can be successful in the Valley that he would like to open a second Subaru

dealership in this same area, and he is willing to invest millions to construct such a facility. *Id.* at 2108:17-2109:24. Mr. Vackar also testified that he wouldn't be willing to invest millions of dollars in a new dealership if he didn't believe the Valley could support the Subaru product. *Id.*

Despite these admissions from its own dealer principal, Protestant still alleges that local demographics are the problem and relies on several regressions from its expert in an attempt to prove that point.¹³ However, Mr. Roesner's own regressions proved that two of the biggest factors Protestant raised during the hearing—household income and percentage of Hispanics—had no statistically significant correlation to achievement of MSR. *See Regression Analyses* (Exhibits 493 and 499); Tr. Vol. 9 at 2421:6-25 (Roesner). Although Protestant repeatedly argued that Bert Ogden was at a disadvantage because the Subaru brand performs better in markets with greater snowfall, this argument also proved to be a “distinction without a difference” given that none of the AORs in District 3 had annual snowfall of over 0.24 inches. *See PFD* at p. 28. Similarly, although Protestant claimed that customers in its market are younger and less educated, the retailer with the lowest median age in its AOR was achieving 115.7% of MSR, and several retailers with the lowest level of college degrees and high school diplomas were performing well above 100% MSR, including stores that achieved MSR scores of 103.1%, 125.9%, 132%, and 135.9%. Farhat Rebuttal (Exhibit 190) at p. 14-17. Accordingly, Protestant's claim that the demographics in its

¹³ Protestant also retreads its argument that this market must be unfavorable for the Subaru brand because the previous Subaru retailers who operated in this market before 2009 were unsuccessful. As the PFD correctly found, however, the history of the previous Subaru retailers in this market from 13 years ago (and more) is entirely irrelevant here. As set forth at the hearing, it is undisputed that the Subaru brand is very different today that it was in 2009—and particularly in Texas. As of 2019, the Subaru brand experienced twelve consecutive years of sales growth, and from 2009 to 2019, the number of Subaru vehicle sales in the DFW Zone grew from a mere 7,500 sales to approximately 45,000 sales—and increase of 500% in just 10 years. Tr. Vol. 1 at 68:16-69:21 (Poston). In addition, over the past decade, the Rio Grande Valley has been “booming in terms of economic opportunity” and has seen significant growth since 2010. *See Farhat Report* (Exhibit 188) at p. 63-66; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1553:9-1556:25 (Farhat). Accordingly, the experience of the previous Subaru retailers in the Valley from 13 years ago has no bearing on the market today.

AOR are the cause of its poor performance simply is not supported by the evidence and is directly contradicted by its own testimony and that of its expert witness.

4. Bert Ogden had more than Sufficient Inventory to Support and Grow its Sales.

Immediately after claiming that local market factors are hindering the sale of Subaru products in its AOR, Bert Ogden takes the wholly contradictory position that it actually needed more Subaru vehicles to sell to consumers in this same market. Contrary to this claim, there is substantial evidence supporting the finding that Bert Ogden had more than sufficient inventory, and that a lack of inventory was not the cause of its poor sales performance. *See* PFD at FF 49-51. Indeed, Protestant actually had an inventory advantage over the other Subaru retailers in the Zone in virtually every month from January 2016 to June 2021. During that time period:

- Bert Ogden Subaru consistently had a *higher days' supply of vehicles* than the other retailers in the DFW Zone—not a lower supply as Protestant suggests. Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 73-74; Tr. Vol. 5 at 1390:11-1391:2 and 1392:15-1393:19 (Lytle).
- Despite having higher inventory levels, Bert Ogden consistently had a *lower "sales to availability"* than the other retailers in the Zone. Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 76; Tr. Vol. 5 at 1396:3-1398:16 (Lytle). This means that Bert Ogden actually was making fewer sales out of its inventory than other retailers, and that its sales pace was substantially slower than other Subaru retailers in the Zone. *Id.* at 1401:3-14.
- Bert Ogden had additional inventory available that it could have used to make more sales in every month—including many months where it had 40 or more additional units it could have sold. *Id.* at 1399:6-9; Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 76.

In addition, from January 2015 to February 2021, SOA provided Bert Ogden a total of **484 MAUI vehicles** above and beyond its earned allocation—the third highest level of MAUI relative to sales of any retailer in the DFW Zone. *See* Allocation History (Exhibit 141); Lytle Report (Exhibit 187) at p. 21; Tr. Vol. 10 at 2458:9-2459:14) (Lytle). These facts are wholly undisputed. Indeed, Plaintiff's own expert admitted that (1) Bert Ogden's days' supply consistently exceeded Zone average; (2) Bert Ogden consistently sold its vehicles more slowly than Zone average; and (3) the

number of MAUI units allocated to Bert Ogden relative to its sales was higher than Zone average. Tr. Vol. 9 at 2427:8-17; 2432:13-17; 2434:3-6 (Roesner).¹⁴

Protestant does not challenge any of these facts. Nevertheless, Bert Ogden still attempts to levy several challenges to the findings in the PFD on allocation—all of which lack merit.

Subaru Cannot Establish a New Allocation System Just for Bert Ogden.

Protestant alleges the PFD should be amended because it is based on the assumption that Bert Ogden should have learned to operate under SOA's allocation system, rather than finding that SOA should be forced to revise its nationwide allocation system in order to accommodate Bert Ogden's preferred business model. This assertion lacks credibility and is not supported by the facts. As set forth at the hearing, SOA has established a uniform system for distributing its vehicles to all Subaru retailers nationwide in order to ensure that its system is fair to all of those retailers. Tr. Vol. 2 at 539:14-540:22 (Teti). This system, which is based in large part on days' supply, is the same type of allocation system used by virtually every automotive company in the country. Tr. Vol. 5 at 1385:10-19 (Lytle); Tr. Vol. 9 at 2426:21-24 (Roesner). Given these facts, there is no support for Protestant's claim that SOA should abandon its uniform allocation system, disregard industry standard processes, and establish a special allocation process that benefits Bert Ogden to the detriment of other Subaru retailers. Indeed, as the PFD found, this is not a reasonable approach and would undermine SOA's entire allocation system. *See* PFD at p. 35; Tr. Vol. 2 567:6-15 (Teti).

¹⁴ On Page 20 of its Exceptions, Bert Ogden sets forth a chart identifying seven instances where it asked SOA for additional inventory in an attempt to show that allocation must have been the problem. This chart, however, only tells half the story. Although Protestant chose not to share this fact, the record is replete with evidence that SOA actually did provide Bert Ogden Subaru additional inventory not once or even seven times, but in almost every month from January 2015 to February 2021. (*See, e.g.*, Exhibits 118, 120, 121, 124, 141, 144, 147, 148). During that time period, SOA provided Bert Ogden Subaru with a total of **484 MAUI vehicles** above and beyond its earned allocation. *See* Allocation History (Exhibit 141); Tr. Vol. 2 at 580:14-582:15 (Teti); Tr. Vol. 1 at 140:18-141:17 (Poston).

The Fact that Bert Ogden “Eventually” Sold Every Vehicle it Received is a Red-Herring.

Although Bert Ogden’s inventory levels were consistently higher than the other Subaru retailers in the Zone, Protestant next alleges that its inventory must have been the problem because it sold every vehicle that was allocated to it. *See* Exceptions at p. 19. This allegation, however, demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of how SOA’s allocation systems work. As explained at the hearing, a retailer’s allocation of vehicles is determined in large part by one primary factor—its sales. Tr. Vol. 6 at 1470:3-15 (Lytle). Given this fact, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy that there will be a correlation between a retailer’s sales and its allocations. *Id.* at 1454:14-1456:13 (Lytle). It also is axiomatic that every retailer will eventually sell every vehicle allocated to them. *Id.* at 1454:14-1456:13 (Lytle). As such, the proper question is not whether a retailer actually sold the vehicles it received, but whether it sold those vehicles quickly and efficiently in order to earn more in the future. Once again, it is undisputed that Bert Ogden consistently (1) sold its vehicles more slowly and (2) made fewer sales compared to its available inventory than other retailers. Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 76; Tr. Vol. 6 at 1396:3-1398:16; 1471:13-15 (Lytle). This track record of doing less (sales) with more (inventory) demonstrates that the cause of Bert Ogden’s poor performance was its own operations, not SOA’s allocation system.

MAUI and SSLP Units are not the Cause of Bert Ogden’s Poor Performance.

Protestant also claims that the PFD’s conclusions on allocation are incomplete and misstate the record because they allegedly fail to address the significance of MAUI and SSLP units. Bert Ogden first challenges the PFD’s findings that Bert Ogden regularly had a greater days’ supply of vehicles than other Subaru retailers on the basis that these conclusions do not appropriately consider the impact of MAUI and SSLP units, which it believes “greatly impact” a dealer’s allocations. Contrary to this allegation, however, SOA’s calculations of days’ supply—in the

ordinary course of business and for purposes of this hearing—were not limited to vehicles allocated under its computerized methodology, but specifically included all vehicles allocated to Bert Ogden—including MAUI and SSLP units. Tr. Vol. 2 at 574:8-23 (Teti). Accordingly, as set forth above, Bert Ogden’s relative level of inventory was higher than the other retailers in the Zone even when all MAUI and SSLP units are taken into account.¹⁵

In addition to the claim above, Protestant also alleges that the PFD erred in not addressing SSLP vehicles because those units can be reported as sold immediately and thus can speed up the dealer’s sales rate. *See* Exceptions at p. 42-45. Although Protestant relies heavily on the testimony of its expert, that same expert admitted he was not familiar with SOA’s process for allocating SSLP units in the first place. Tr. Vol. 9 at 2438:17-25; 2447:6-11 (Roesner) (“I don’t personally know.”). This admission is significant because the only evidence at trial is that SSLP vehicles are not allocated by SOA at all, but instead are ***ordered by each dealer*** up to a pre-determined level that is consistent for all dealers. Tr. Vol. 10 at 2464:14-2466:12 (Lytle). Accordingly, if there is a disparity in the amount of SSLP units that Bert Ogden received, that disparity would be the result of Bert Ogden’s own decision not to order more units—not any decision by SOA. *Id.*¹⁶

¹⁵ Protestant once again claims that Mr. Adams misled the ALJs by testifying that Bert Ogden received the most MAUI vehicles of any retailer in the DFW Zone. *See* Exceptions at p. 39-40. This allegation ignores the testimony in this case about what vehicles actually constitute MAUI units. Tr. Vol. 2 at 480:18-21 (Adams) (“I think we’re going to have an issue with what the definition of a MAUI unit is.”). As explained at the hearing, SOA’s records reflecting the number of MAUI units received by a dealer are not limited solely to “discretionary” units, but includes vehicles that are provided to dealers for many reasons, including under SOA’s service loaner program, for facility relocations and renovations, for the opening of a new dealership, and related to dealership buy-sells. Tr. Vol. 2 at 430:16-24 (Adams); Tr. Vol. 2 at 565:20-566:11 (Teti); Allocation Methodology (Exhibit 20). As Mr. Adams attempted to explain at the hearing before being cut off, aside from those other categories of vehicles, Bert Ogden Subaru did in fact receive among the highest—if not the highest—amount of pure “discretionary” MAUI units of all retailers in the Zone. *Id.*; *see also* Exhibits 510 and 511.

¹⁶ SOA’s expert also analyzed Bert Ogden’s day’s supply, excluding SSLP units, and found that there was no material change in its inventory levels relative to other retailers. Tr. Vol. 10 at 2461:2-2463:22 (Lytle); Exhibit 194.

Bert Ogden's Ability to Increase Sales Post-Termination Show the Flaws in its Case.

Protestant also alleges that the PFD's findings on allocation are incorrect because Bert Ogden was able to increase its sales after the Notice of Termination when it received 45 additional MAUI vehicles, which allegedly shows that allocation was the issue all along. This argument clearly misstates the evidence at the hearing. As an initial matter, the PFD correctly found that SOA provided Bert Ogden with consistent MAUI support not just in those months, but for years leading up to the NOT. Allocation History (Exhibit 141). In fact, there were several time periods where SOA provided Bert Ogden even more MAUI units, including 62 units over a five-month period in 2016, and 52 units over a four-month period in 2019. *Id.* None of these efforts, however, resulted in any notable improvement to Bert Ogden's sales rate. Days' Supply Chart (Exhibit 142); Tr. Vol 3 at 598:9-599:12 (Teti).

Moreover, while Protestant was able to increase its sales rate around the time of the Notice of Termination, the data actually shows a different cause for that increase. Unlike previous times when the dealership received significant additional vehicles but failed to improve its sales performance, faced with potential termination, Bert Ogden suddenly was able to increase its efficiency and sell deeper into its inventory than ever before. Tr. Vol 3 at 599:13-601:12 (Teti); Tr. Vo. 5 at 1396:25-1399:21 (Lytle). While not sustained, this short-term increase in sales demonstrates that Bert Ogden's historical poor sales performance over the past many years was a result of its lack of effort and operational deficiencies—not SOA's allocation system.

D. Customer Service Satisfaction and SOA's Owner Loyalty Program.

In another attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the PFD, Bert Ogden has raised three primary objections to the ALJs' findings and conclusions regarding SOA's method of evaluating customer service satisfaction, which is known as the Owner Loyalty Program or "OLP."

Specifically, Protestant contends that Bert Ogden cannot be terminated for poor customer service satisfaction scores because: (1) OLP performance is not an obligation under the Dealer Agreement; (2) despite Bert Ogden's low OLP survey score rankings relative to other retailers, Bert Ogden's customers scored the dealership closer to "extraordinary" than "very good" on customer surveys; and (3) SOA has recently abandoned its use of the OLP system in gauging customer service satisfaction levels. *See e.g.* Exceptions at p. 6-8 and 22-25. As explained below, not only are these arguments erroneous, but they have also been previously considered and rejected by the ALJs.

1. Protestant's Dealer Agreement Contains Customer Service Obligations and Protestant has Materially Breached those Obligations.

Bert Ogden's contention that its Dealer Agreement does not contain customer satisfaction obligations is simply false. *See* Exceptions at p. 6. It is undisputed that pursuant to the Dealer Agreement, Bert Ogden committed to, among other things, achieving "the highest level of customer satisfaction possible" and providing "the best possible customer service." *See* Dealer Agreement (Exhibit 11) at p. 11 and 19. In addition, Bert Ogden's Dealer Agreement—like the dealer agreements of all other SOA retailers—specifically incorporates, as part of the Agreement, the terms and provisions of the Subaru Owner Loyalty Program Reference Guide. *See* Dealer Agreement (Exhibit 11) at p. 31; Owner Loyalty Program Reference Guide (Exhibit 26); Tr. Vol. 1 at 165:22-167:1 (Poston).

Moreover, for several years, Bert Ogden has been well aware that the dealership's performance in terms of customer service is materially deficient and non-compliant with the standards required under its Dealer Agreement. In 2015, SOA and Bert Ogden entered into an OLP Performance Addendum for the purpose of addressing Bert Ogden's ongoing failure to provide an adequate level of customer service. *See* OLP Addendum (Exhibit 7); Tr. Vol. 1 at 164:11-168:19 (Poston). Under the terms of said Addendum, Bert Ogden expressly acknowledged that its OLP

scores of 738 for purchase satisfaction and 799 for service satisfaction were deficient and constituted “**a material breach**” of the minimum standards for customer service under the Dealer Agreement. *See* OLP Addendum (Exhibit 7) at p. 1 (emphasis added); Tr. Vol. 8 at 2124:24-2125:21 (Vackar). Pursuant to the OLP Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden agreed that by the end of 2016, it would improve its purchase and service experience satisfaction scores to meet the Central Region average scores, which were 911 for purchase satisfaction and 878 for service satisfaction. *See* OLP Addendum (Exhibit 7) at p. 1. Bert Ogden further agreed that its failure to maintain its purchase and service satisfaction scores at or above the regional average would constitute a “material breach” of its Dealer Agreement. *Id.*

Based on the clear and unambiguous terms of the OLP Performance Addendum, Bert Ogden has understood that its OLP scores in the last few years for purchase and service satisfaction—which were well below the DFW Zone average—were not compliant with the minimum standards for customer service required under its Dealer Agreement. In fact, on a number of occasions, SOA warned Bert Ogden that, based on its OLP scores, the dealership was out of compliance with its customer satisfaction obligations. *See e.g.* February 14, 2020 Letter re: OLP Performance (Exhibit 125); Tr. Vol. 2 at 343:6-345:19 (Adams).

2. Comparative Retailer OLP Ranking is an Appropriate and Reasonable Component of SOA’s OLP System and Viewing a Retailer’s OLP Scores in Isolation Would Not Serve the Goals of the OLP System.

As set forth in its Exceptions and Post-Hearing Briefing, Bert Ogden continues to take issue with the fact that SOA focuses on retailer rankings in connection with its assessment of customer satisfaction. *See e.g.* Exceptions at p. 6, 18, and 22-24; Protestant’s Post-Hearing Brief at p. 3. Bert Ogden contends that because its customer ratings are purportedly “closest to extraordinary,” the fact that Bert Ogden’s OLP scores are consistently among the lowest in the

Zone (if not the Nation) is immaterial to the evaluation of customer satisfaction with the purchase and service experiences at its dealership. *Id.* at p. 3 and 47. This is simply not the case.

Retailer OLP rankings are an important part of SOA's OLP system because the rankings place an individual retailer's customer satisfaction scores in context and allow SOA to identify the retailers with which customers are the least satisfied. Tr. Vol. 3 at 761:3-18 and 776:17-777:24 (Dubinsky). A retailer, such as Bert Ogden, that consistently ranks at or very near the bottom of all retailers in its Zone indicates that the retailer has some significant and unresolved issues with respect to the purchase and/or service experience it is offering its customers. *Id.* at 806:20-808:8. As the ALJs accurately explained in the PFD, "SOA has used OLP comparative rankings since at least 1998." *See* PFD at p. 52. "Bert Ogden's disagreement with SOA's method of using comparative rankings...is not a reason to discount it as a useful instrument for identifying the lowest performing retailers so that SOA can help those retailers improve the customer service experience. This is a legitimate goal of the OLP program, and one that would not be served by review of a dealer's scores in isolation." *Id.*

Moreover, it is important to note that Bert Ogden's overall purchase and service satisfaction scores have continuously been not just below, but well below the average scores for Subaru retailers in the DFW Zone. *See* Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 55; 2017 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 51) at p. 18; 2018 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 52) at p. 22; 2019 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 53) at p. 24; 2020 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 54) at p. 24; 2021 Q3 OLP Report (Exhibit 55) at p. 19; Tr. Vol. 5 at 1369:4-1370:18 (Lytle). By way of example and without limitation, as of December 2019, Bert Ogden's purchase satisfaction score was 772 compared to the DFW Zone average score of 881, and, as of September 2021, Bert Ogden's purchase satisfaction score was 784 compared to the Zone average score of 904. *See* 2019 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 53) at p. 24;

and 2021 Q3 OLP Report (Exhibit 55) at p. 19. Likewise, with respect to service satisfaction, as of June 2020, Bert Ogden's satisfaction score was 736 compared to the Zone average of 843, and as of September 2021, Bert Ogden's service satisfaction score was 765 compared to the Zone average of 825. *See* 2020 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 54) at p. 44; and 2021 Q3 OLP Report (Exhibit 55) at p. 45. For reference, a chart detailing Bert Ogden's December 2016 through September 2021 OLP performance is provided below. Unlike the chart on page 18 of Bert Ogden's Exceptions, the chart below includes Zone average OLP scores as well as Bert Ogden's OLP rankings, both of which provide critical context for Bert Ogden's individual OLP scores.

	Protestant's OLP Purchase Score	Zone Average OLP Purchase Score	Protestant's OLP Purchase Ranking	Protestant's OLP Service Score	Zone Average OLP Service Score	Protestant's OLP Service Ranking
Q4 2016 ¹⁷	934	935	22 of 39	840	910	38 of 39
Q4 2017 ¹⁸	853	938	42 of 42	962	926	2 of 42
Q4 2018 ¹⁹	786	858	40 of 43	822	817	22 of 43
Q4 2019 ²⁰	772	881	43 of 45	805	831	33 of 45
Q4 2020 ²¹	831	897	44 of 44	795	843	43 of 44
Q3 2021 ²²	784	904	44 of 44	765	825	40 of 44

¹⁷ *See* 2016 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 50).

¹⁸ *See* 2017 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 51).

¹⁹ *See* 2018 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 52).

²⁰ *See* 2019 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 53); Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 55-56.

²¹ *See* 2020 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 54); Lytle Report (Exhibit 186) at p. 55-56.

²² *See* 2021 Q3 OLP Report (Exhibit 55).

Given that Bert Ogden's OLP scores are considerably lower than the DFW Zone average and the dealership ranks among the worst performers in the Zone in terms of customer satisfaction, this is not a situation in which Bert Ogden's customer service performance is merely slightly below the performance of other retailers. To the contrary, Protestant's OLP scores are materially deficient and there are serious customer dissatisfaction issues with specific aspects of the Subaru experience at the dealership. As the ALJs correctly concluded in the PFD, "SOA's use of comparative rankings is not a recent development, and Bert Ogden should not be surprised that their consistently low rankings would eventually have some consequence... SOA's use of comparative rankings is appropriate and reasonable, and Bert Ogden's consistently low rankings demonstrate that termination of the dealership agreement would benefit the public." *See* PFD at p. 52-53.

3. SOA Has Not Abandoned OLP as a Measure of Customer Satisfaction.

In both its Exceptions and its post-hearing briefing, Bert Ogden has attempted to insinuate that, as of January 1, 2022, SOA had fully abandoned its OLP system. *See e.g.* Exceptions at p. 22-24; Protestant's Post-Hearing Brief at p. 5 and 46-47. As SOA's National Owner Loyalty Manager, George Dubinsky, testified, "there could be nothing further from the truth." Tr. Vol. 3 at 771:20-772:9 (Dubinsky). The only change that SOA implemented regarding OLP was its elimination of the overall satisfaction component of the OLP customer survey, and the remaining components of the OLP system remain in place. *Id.* at 771:20-773:13.

Importantly, Bert Ogden has provided no support for its contention that SOA's method of evaluating customer satisfaction should be disregarded as unreliable because SOA recently changed one of the survey questions in the OLP customer questionnaire. Indeed, the former inclusion of overall purchase and service satisfaction scores in SOA's OLP system does not in any way render SOA's method of measuring customer satisfaction invalid. There is nothing inherently

wrong or unreliable with the overall purchase and service satisfaction component of OLP, and Bert Ogden has not identified any specific problem with this component other than the fact that it is no longer included in customer surveys and retailer OLP reports as of January 1, 2022. *See* Exceptions at p. 22-24; Protestant’s Brief at p. 5 and 46-47. Contrary to Bert Ogden’s unsubstantiated claims, overall satisfaction scores constituted a valid part of SOA’s OLP system for over two decades, and this metric is widely used throughout the automotive industry. Tr. Vol. 3 at 773:5-13 and 829:16-23 (Dubinsky); Tr. Vol. 1369:4-17 (Lytle). SOA’s recent discontinuation of the overall satisfaction component of OLP does not in any way mean that this metric is or was unreliable. Tr. Vol. 3 at 771:20-773:13 (Dubinsky). SOA simply decided to reconfigure its OLP surveys by removing the overall satisfaction component—the rest of the OLP survey remains unchanged. *Id.*

Moreover, the overall purchase and service satisfaction scores were just one component of SOA’s OLP system, which also includes a Key Satisfaction Indicator (“KSI”) section, and a Net Promoter Score (“NPS”) section. Tr. Vol. 3 at 756:15-765:11 (Dubinsky). Notably, Bert Ogden has performed poorly with respect to **all three components of OLP**. *See e.g.* 2018 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 52) at p. 22-27; 2019 Q4 OLP Report (Exhibit 53) at p. 23-25; and 2021 Q3 OLP Report (Exhibit 55) at p. 15-20; Tr. Vol. 3 at 1214:21-1215:2 (Delapp). The KSI section also provides insight into the specific reasons for customer dissatisfaction with the purchase and service experiences at Bert Ogden Subaru, which serves to substantiate the reliability of Bert Ogden’s substandard overall satisfaction scores. *Id.*; Tr. Vol. 3 at 756:15-757:13 (Dubinsky). As set forth in the PFD, the ALJs found the evidence of Bert Ogden’s “consistently low OLP rankings” to be “most persuasive” and based on the OLP evidence presented during the hearing²³, the ALJs

²³ In an attempt to distract from the overwhelming evidence of customer dissatisfaction with the purchase and service experience at Bert Ogden Subaru, Protestant has claimed that SOA unfairly presented evidence of only negative customer comments from the dealership’s OLP customer surveys. *See* Exceptions at p. 25. This contention deserves

correctly concluded that “the Rio Grande Valley is being served by a Subaru dealership that, its customers say, provides a below-average customer service experience. *See* PFD at p. 51 and 53.

E. SOA’s Establishment of a Replacement Retailer and Impact on Consumers

Protestant also challenges the PFD’s conclusion that the termination of Bert Ogden and installation of a more effective replacement dealer in this market will benefit the public. Notably, Protestant does not challenge Finding of Fact 64, which concludes that SOA intends to install a new dealer quickly and that “any inconvenience will be brief and is outweighed by the benefit the public will realize once a new dealer is established.” Instead, Protestant claims that the PFD does not sufficiently address how long customers may be without sales or service representation in the market, and simply accepts SOA’s evidence that it will replace the dealer quickly. Protestant further claims that the “most reliable” evidence on this issue was from its own witnesses about their experience opening other franchises for other brands under completely different circumstances. *See* Exceptions at p. 52-53.

These allegations, however, ignore the wealth of evidence introduced by SOA’s witnesses about the establishment of a replacement dealer in this very instance. As presented at the hearing, SOA has already been contacted by two existing retailers who operate Subaru dealerships in Austin and San Antonio about opening a replacement dealership in the Valley. Tr. Vol. 2 at 417:7-418:14 (Adams). Although Bert Ogden suggests it could take months or years to construct and staff a new dealership in this market, both of those interested parties already have existing dealership facilities and existing dealership employees in the Valley. *Id.* Given these facts, multiple SOA witnesses

a response only to clarify that Bert Ogden and SOA have equal access to customer comments contained in Bert Ogden’s customer surveys regardless of whether those comments are positive or negative. Tr. Vol. 3 at 784:7-786:4 (Dubinsky). Moreover, during the hearing, Bert Ogden had every opportunity to present evidence of customer comments that it deemed to be “positive,” and Bert Ogden did, in fact, present such evidence. *See e.g.* Tr. Vol. 7 at 1878:19-1881:14 (Mauldin); Tr. Vol. 3 at 813:6-818:14 (Dubinsky).

testified that it could have a replacement retailer up and running, at least in temporary facilities, relatively quickly and in a matter of weeks. *Id.* at 418:15-420:2; Tr. Vol. 1 at 178:3-179:3; 253:15-255:4 (Poston). SOA also presented evidence from the Texas DMV that a new retailer's license application could be completed in 7-10 days. Tr. Vol. 2 at 418:15-420:2 (Adams).

Accordingly, there is no support for Bert Ogden's conclusory suggestion that it could take months or years to establish a replacement dealer in this market. Instead, given the material issues with Bert Ogden's performance and operations discussed above, the evidence strongly supports the PFD's finding that any short-lived inconvenience to customers would be far outweighed by the long-term benefits provided by a new and more effective retailer in this market.

IV. CONCLUSION

Protestant's Exceptions request a complete reversal of the ALJs' findings and legal conclusions set forth in the PFD that good cause exists for the termination of Protestant's Subaru Dealer Agreement. Protestant is seeking this reversal without acknowledging the pertinent facts and applicable law that undeniably support the good-cause determination. Moreover, Protestant has not established that the ALJs came to any factual or legal conclusion that is unsupported by the record. For the reasons set forth above, SOA respectfully requests that the ALJs deny each and every exception that Protestant has raised and affirm the findings and conclusions in the PFD.

Dated this 18th day of August, 2022.

< Signature on Following Page >

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this document was served upon the following this
18th day of August, 2022 in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a:

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EXHIBIT A

**Department of
Motor Vehicles**DEBORAH V. DUGAN
Chairman**APPEALS BOARD**P.O. BOX 2935 • EMPIRE STATE PLAZA • ALBANY, NY 12220-0935

June 14, 2016

**GENERAL MOTORS LLC
DANIEL ADAMCHECK
39 OLD RIDGE ROAD, SUITE 1
DANBURY, CT 06810**

Re: NOTICE OF APPEAL DECISION
Appeal Docket No.: 34452
Case No.: FMD201302A

Dear Appellant:

The above-referenced Administrative Appeal was decided by the Appeals Board on the date indicated on the enclosed Decision of Appeal, pursuant to Article 3-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

This is a final, administrative determination of the Department. Any further appeal of an adverse decision should be made to the New York State Supreme Court pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Very truly yours,

APPEALS BOARD
PROCESSING UNIT

Encl.:

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NYS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS BOARD
DECISION OF APPEAL

GENERAL MOTORS LLC
C/O DANIEL ADAMCHECK
39 OLD RIDGE ROAD, SUITE 1
DANBURY, CT 06810
FRANCHISE MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER - CASE NO.: FMD2013-02

DOCKET NO.: 34452
DECIDED BY BOARD: MAY 31, 2016

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) §471-a of the Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act (Article 17-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law), Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. (Beck), a franchised motor vehicle dealer located in Yonkers, New York, filed a Request for Adjudicatory Proceeding with the Department of Motor Vehicles seeking review of a Notice of Non-Renewal of Dealer Sales and Service Agreement by General Motors LLC (GM), the franchisor and appellant. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge prohibited the termination pursuant to reasons stated in GM's termination letter of June 11, 2013, because GM failed to establish due cause to terminate Beck's franchise. GM now appeals the Administrative Law Judge's determination.

A transcript was submitted and reviewed.

PRESERVED ARGUMENTS

1. The Administrative Law Judge erred in concluding that, under VTL §463(2)(d)(1), GM's non-renewal notice relied solely on Beck's failure to meet its Retail Sales Index (RSI) requirements, because the notice specifically cites various considerations on which GM relied in addition to Beck's unsatisfactory RSI scores, GM presented substantial evidence at the hearing that it relied on these other considerations, and the evidence collectively established that GM had due cause not to renew Beck's dealer agreement.
2. The DMV erred as a matter of law in refusing to recognize the collateral estoppel effect in this proceeding of an earlier ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that GM's RSI does not constitute "an unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair sales or other performance standard in determining a franchised motor vehicle dealer's compliance with a franchise agreement" under Section 463(2)(gg) of the VTL.
3. The Administrative Law Judge's Decision is not supported by substantial evidence where it is undisputed that Beck breached its commitments under the Dealer Agreement and Participation Agreement, GM's performance standard was previously held to be fair and reasonable after a plenary trial, and Beck failed to cure its performance within a reasonable time after GM's notice of default.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beck filed a Request for Adjudicatory Proceeding pursuant to Article 17-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, seeking to challenge the termination of its Motor Vehicle Franchise Agreement by GM. Beck sought a determination prohibiting GM from terminating Beck's franchise because GM lacked due cause and did not act in good faith. Pursuant to VTL §471-a(3), GM requested a resolution of the dispute without a hearing. VTL §471-a(3) specifies that such requests are only to be granted

where no unresolved material issue of fact is presented in the matter. The Administrative Law Judge, after consideration of the presented papers, issued a determination without a hearing and recognized the collateral estoppel effect of a decision issued by the Federal District Court regarding an action that had been filed prior to the issuance by GM of the Notice of Non-Renewal of Beck's franchise agreement. (The Federal District Court found that the use by GM of a New York Statewide standard to assess Beck, an exclusively downstate dealership, to be reasonable.) The Administrative Law Judge found that Beck's failure to reach the established sales scores was a material breach of the contract and that Beck was provided a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect. The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that there was no evidence that GM acted in bad faith in seeking termination of the franchise agreement.

Beck appealed the original determination of the Administrative Law Judge issued without a hearing to the Administrative Appeals Board. The Administrative Appeals Board reversed and remanded, finding that the issuance of a determination without a hearing was not proper as there were unresolved material issues of fact presented. In particular, the Appeals Board found that the determination by the Federal Court was not binding in the Department's administrative adjudication and that the Administrative Law Judge had failed to address whether or not factors beyond Beck's control were the cause of Beck's failure to achieve the required sales index.

Upon remand and after a full hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found in Beck's favor, concluding that the use of a statewide sales standard to assess the performance of a dealer in the downstate area of New York was not reasonable. In particular, the Administrative Law Judge found that, for "the New York City metropolitan area, the RSI standard of GM is unreasonable as it does not realistically reflect the Chevrolet sales challenges that Beck and other New York metropolitan dealers face, and GM is not applying the RSI uniformly to all dealers in New York..." "GM's method of determining the RSI as applied for metropolitan NYC is unreasonable and the performance of Beck otherwise materially meets the standards of GM; therefore, GM lacks due cause to terminate Beck's franchise." The Administrative Law Judge further found that, contrary to the assertions of GM, GM had not established any other reason for the termination of the franchise agreement other than Beck's failure to meet the Retail Sales Index.

GM now appeals the most recent determination of the Administrative Law Judge.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The primary subject matter of this proceeding is GM's proposed termination of a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement and a 2009 supplemental Participation Agreement. These contracts were entered into as part of a bankruptcy reorganization effort by GM and superseded any previous franchise agreements between the parties and GM's predecessor-in-interest. During the predecessor's bankruptcy proceeding, Beck entered a wind-down agreement to terminate its franchise in exchange for a money payout. After GM acquired certain assets of the predecessor, GM agreed to rescind Beck's wind-down agreement and issued Beck a Participation Agreement. The Participation Agreement in conjunction with Beck's Dealer Sales and Services Agreement allowed Beck to operate as a GM franchise operation. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, Beck would be subject to periodic review of its sales performance and would be required to achieve a Retail Sales Index (RSI) score of 100 or greater. These performance standards were modified by the Participation Agreement in Paragraph 9, wherein Beck was required to achieve RSI scores of 70 for 2010, 85 for 2011, and 100 for 2012.

Beck failed to achieve the RSI scores required by the agreements. Beck's yearly score for 2010 was 50.1, 50.9 for 2011, and 50.6 for 2012. Beck was provided a yearly sales performance report by GM, detailing the score for the preceding year. On June 8, 2012, GM issued Beck a Notice of Breach

of GM's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement and Participation Agreement, citing Beck's failure to reach the required RSI scores as a breach of the contract and providing a cure period through May 31, 2013. Beck's RSI scores did not improve to the required levels. On June 11, 2013, GM issued Beck a Notice of Nonrenewal of Dealer Sales and Service Agreement which indicated that GM was terminating its Participation Agreement because Beck's "RSI for calendar 2011 was only 50.9, which constituted a breach" of both the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement and Participation Agreement.

The RSI is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, where the numerator is a dealer's actual sales and the denominator is a dealer's expected sales. Expected sales are determined by applying the Chevrolet brand's state market share, in each vehicle segment where Chevrolet competes, to the competitive vehicles registered in the dealer's assigned market area.

Beck does not deny that it failed to reach the RSI scores contained in the Agreement. Rather, Beck contends that the use of a statewide standard in calculating the scores is not appropriate or reasonable as the market for the Chevrolet brand in downstate New York is dramatically different from the market in the remainder of the state. Beck further contends that the failure to achieve the required scores was due to factors beyond its control.

LITIGATION HISTORY

Beck filed an action against GM, the franchisor, in state Supreme Court for claims arising under the Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act. GM removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Federal District Court). Beck filed a second amended complaint asserting claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act, including a claim alleging that GM used an unreasonable, arbitrary and unfair performance standard, pursuant to VTL §463(2)(gg). After a bench trial, the Federal District Court held against Beck, and Beck appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Federal Court of Appeals) determined that resolution of the appeal depended upon unsettled New York law and certified a question of law to the New York Court of Appeals regarding whether a performance standard requiring average performance based on statewide sales data in order for a dealer to retain its dealership was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair under VTL §463(2)(gg) because it does not account for local variations beyond adjusting for the local popularity of general vehicle types.

TESTIMONY/EVIDENCE

Hearing dates: 9/22/14, 9/23/14, 9/24/14

The GM Manager of Dealer Network Planning Analysis, Alvon Giguere, testified that, as part of its 2009 bankruptcy, GM needed to restructure the dealer network and eliminate some dealerships. (Transcript 39) As part of this restructuring, Westchester County was cut from eight Chevrolet dealers to four. (Transcript 40) Beck was originally one of the dealers to be "wound down" and removed from the network. Beck would have then been replaced by a "backfill." (Transcript 41) After a series of negotiations, GM ultimately agreed to let Beck remain. (Transcript 41) In addition to the usual dealer agreement, Beck was also assigned an escalating sales standard as part of a Participation Agreement. (Transcript 42-43)

The sales standard used to judge dealers by GM is the Retail Sales Index (RSI). (Transcript 11) The RSI is a mathematical calculation that takes the dealer's actual retail sales divided by "dealer opportunities," using the expected sales based on a segment adjusted state average (market penetration) and multiplied by 100 to convert the number into an index. (Transcript 12-13) GM looks at individual products that GM offers and at the state average penetration for that product

within the competitive group of the segment. GM uses its statewide market share multiplied by the vehicle registrations in the dealer's assigned territory (commonly referred to as its AGSSA – area of geographic sales and service advantage) to calculate "dealer opportunities." (Transcript 12-13, 17, 22) The witness believed that the segment adjustment process takes into account many of the economic and demographic differences from market to market. (Transcript 28-29) The witness acknowledged that, given the differences in markets between upstate and downstate, the New York Dealers Association had raised concerns that a statewide market share standard was not appropriate for downstate dealers. (Transcript 27-28) The witness believed that the use of a statewide standard for calculating the RSI was reasonable. (Transcript 44)

As part of the new Participation Agreement, Beck was required to achieve an escalating sales standard. In 2010, Beck would be required to achieve an RSI of 70. In 2011, Beck would be required to achieve an RSI of 85. In 2012, Beck would be required to achieve an RSI of 100. (Transcript 43) An RSI of 100 represents an average dealer within the state, and is generally the required sales effectiveness for a dealer. (Transcript 12-13) Beck failed to meet the required standard in each of the years.

On cross examination, the witness acknowledged that, as the RSI of 100 represents an average dealer, approximately half of the GM dealers in the state do not satisfy the sales requirement each year and that it was fairly typical for a significant number of dealers to achieve an RSI score below 100. (Transcript 85-86) The witness further acknowledged that, as a general trend, upstate dealers perform better than downstate dealers. (Transcript 82) Further, when compared to the other downstate dealerships, Beck's sales performance was "approximately in the middle." In fact, only four of the 23 downstate dealerships met an RSI of 100. (Transcript 90) Beck's total sales did improve during the timeframe of the Participation Agreement, from 218 vehicles in 2009, to 417 vehicles in 2013, a 93 percent increase. (Transcript 92-94) The witness further acknowledged that if the RSI were calculated using a New York metropolitan area standard as opposed to a statewide standard, Beck's RSI would approximately double. (Transcript 101)

The GM Northeast Regional Director for Sales, Service and Marketing, Daniel Adamcheck, testified that he was directly involved in the decision not to renew Beck's franchise. (Transcript 121) "The dealership is located in a very strong area we believe is good for Chevrolet and good for the dealership in that market. The dealership, from a physical standpoint, is one that has let time kind of slip by, and has not been kept up over time, has somewhat deteriorated quicker than the market around it had." (Transcript 124) During the bankruptcy reorganization, Beck had initially accepted an offer to wind down. (Transcript 125-126) Eventually, Beck indicated a desire to continue in business. Ultimately, there was an "influx of senators and congressman asking General Motors" to "look at things closer" regarding dealerships that were being wound down. There was also an "unbelievable persistence" from the management of Beck, indicating that they were going to improve operations going forward. (Transcript 129-130) Beck did not raise any complaints regarding the RSI calculation formula prior to signing the Participation Agreement. However, after signing, Beck became "very adversarial." The witness further explained, "...every request, every question was challenged and we went back and forth on every single issue." (Transcript 142-143, 145)

The witness acknowledged that the primary reason for termination of Beck was its failure to meet the RSI requirements. However, another reason for termination was that Beck had not put forth sufficient effort to improve its operations. (Transcript 173, 176)

GM provided dealerships in Beck's position several programs to help them improve sales, including the Dealer Performance Agreement Program (DPAP), the Essential Brand Element (EBE), and the Supplemental Facilities Improvement Program (SFIP). One of the programs offered as part of the

Essential Brand Element project allowed dealerships to receive money to be used towards upgrading facilities, marketing and training. (Transcript 160-164) The funds were earned by the dealership through the purchase from GM of additional inventory that was available beyond the normal allotment procedure. Product was in short supply at the time. (Transcript 153-154) The witness noted that Beck did not order all of the vehicles made available to it through this program. (Transcript 158-159) Beck never completed the facility upgrades it agreed to upon its participation in these programs (Transcript 179-195), never shared any marketing or business plans with GM (Transcript 212-213), and never prepared the GM prescribed business plan. (Transcript 147-151) As of the time of the hearing, Beck had received \$882,000 in EBE funds and had not performed the required facility image upgrades. (Transcript 207)

The witness noted that other downstate dealers had made operational changes which had resulted in improved sales. The witness did not believe that GM's market penetration prevented sales improvements from occurring. GM's lack of leasing programs did not impede dealerships from improving sales. Further, while imports did offer leasing arrangements, these were regarded as an alternate to traditional sales due to the "credit crunch" which was going on at the time. (Transcript 271-280)

On cross examination, the witness acknowledged that GM had extended the deadline for Beck to complete the renovations until April 30, 2014, which was after the Notice of Termination was issued. The witness further acknowledged that the EBE money was earned by the dealership for accepting the additional allocation of vehicles. Beck had to pay GM for these vehicles. (Transcript 331-332) Mr. Adamcheck thought it was reasonable for GM to allow Beck to continue with the EBE facilities upgrade program despite the breach notice. (Transcript 338) The witness also indicated that there had never been a problem with Beck meeting its customer satisfaction or capitalization requirements under the Participation Agreement (Transcript 339-340)

The witness further stated that when GM got out of the leasing market, it "did create a void in the market," (Transcript 343) because of the loss of a portfolio of people who wanted to lease and were creditworthy and could go to some of the other manufacturers that were leasing at the time. (Transcript 344-345) The dealers had no control over the decision to cease the leasing programs, but had to deal with the repercussions of that decision. (Transcript 346) The witness further acknowledged that there were several downstate dealerships that had RSI levels lower than Beck's, but none of those dealers received a breach notice from GM, and GM did not attempt to terminate the other dealerships. (Transcript 413-416)

A Dealer Network Analysis, Customer Relationship Management and Site Analysis Consultant from Urban Science Applications, Sharif Farhat, was called as a witness on behalf of GM. The witness testified that he performed an analysis of the Beck facility, in which he measured the performance of the dealer and then analyzed the likely causes of the performance. (Transcript 447) The witness used sales and registration data to assess how the dealer and brand were performing relative to the general market. (Transcript 449) The primary conclusion of the witness was that Beck did not achieve required sales benchmarks and that its poor performance was not due to factors outside of its control. (Transcript 461)

The witness further concluded that the use of a state average in calculating sales performance was appropriate and reasonable. The use of such a standard is objective and does not change from year to year. All of the dealers involved are subject to the same laws and tax requirements. If the dealer were to use a smaller area, any changes to the smaller area could be subjective. (Transcript 471-472) The witness noted that several downstate dealers were able to reach the required RSI in 2012. (Transcript 485-486) Applying the statewide standard to the calculation of Beck's expected RSI, Beck was expected to sell 662 vehicles in 2012. It actually sold 335 vehicles, resulting in an

RSI of 50.6 for the year. (Transcript 481) The witness did not believe that the goal for Beck to sell 662 cars was unreasonable. (Transcript 491-492.) The dominant dealership for sales in the Yonkers area, where Beck is located, is Curry Chevrolet, which is located in Scarsdale. This suggests that consumers are rejecting Beck, rather than the Chevy brand. (Transcript 511)

The witness further concluded that Beck's poor performance was caused by its own poor operations. (Transcript 558) The witness visited the facility and found, "it's not a good-looking store." (Transcript 560) The witness reviewed Beck's advertising, and found that the advertising effort was "very low." (Transcript 563-564) The witness noted that Beck showed a significant improvement in the end of 2012, during a period of time in which Beck briefly hired a different sales manager and increased its advertising budget. "I think with additional effort this dealership could improve dramatically. Its own actions show that opportunity is there for improvement. But for whatever reasons, it chose not to do that." (Transcript 492-493)

The witness further concluded that factors beyond Beck's control were not the cause of its poor performance. The witness ran models controlling for territory designation (Transcript 510), Buffalo and Rochester manufacturing bias (GM has manufacturing facilities in the Buffalo/Rochester area which can lead to artificially inflated sales numbers in this area) (Transcript 522), import bias (Transcript 523), and leasing bias (Transcript 534-535). In every instance, Beck's performance remained poor when compared to other facilities. The witness further opined that unemployment, another factor cited by Beck, is, "a very poor indicator for new vehicle demand." (Transcript 548.)

On cross examination, the witness acknowledged that the New York metropolitan media market is the largest in the country, but has the fourth lowest General Motors market share in the country. (Transcript 663-665) The witness further acknowledged that Beck's sales increased from 218 vehicles in 2009 to 417 vehicles in 2013, a 93 per cent increase. (Transcript 677)

Hearing date: 9/29/14 – 9/30/14

On September 30, 2014, a Financial Background Consultant from Urban Science Applications, Herbert Walter, was called as a witness on behalf of GM. The witness had a background in quantitative analysis, accounting and finance, and was qualified as an expert on financial operations of motor vehicle dealerships. (Transcript 215-219) The witness analyzed Beck's operations and finance, reviewing in particular "management decisions of the Beck dealership as it relates to the Participation Agreement, to see if the Beck dealership made changes in its operations and management decisions to implement or to take on the requirements of and changes needed to implement the Participation Agreement." In particular, the witness was looking at sales, advertising, inventory, and use of leverage tools. (Transcript 221)

In performing the analysis, the witness reviewed the Participation Agreement, Beck's financial statements, composite financial statements for other dealerships, inventory and sales records, and other expert reports submitted in conjunction with this matter. (Transcript 223) Based upon this analysis, the witness formed an opinion. "I found that Beck did not make changes in its operations management decisions over time, following the signature on the Participation Agreement, meaning 2010 through 2012." (Transcript 225) The witness found that Beck was not a strong financial performing dealership. Beck had access to funds, inventory, and customers that were sufficient to make additional sales. (Transcript 226)

The witness noted that over the time period in question, Beck was substantially less profitable than other similar dealerships. (Transcript 229-230) From 2010 to 2012, Beck's sales volume did not grow. (Transcript 235) Beck did not change its pricing strategy. (Transcript 251-252) They did not leverage the unencumbered property to obtain finance to improve operations. (Transcript 231)

Beck reduced its expenditures on advertising. (Transcript 272-273) They lowered the sales force from 6.5 sales people to 5.5 sales people. (Transcript 289-292) Beck did not accept additional inventory allocation which would have allowed additional sales. (Transcript 302-305) Beck spent less on staff training than comparable facilities, and very little on capital improvements to the facility. (Transcript 313, 317) "They didn't really change the pricing on any kind of consistent basis. They didn't change their advertising until you get to late '12 and into '13 there is some changes. They have reduced their sales staff. Their training is below the comparison groups. They don't have the profitability of the other dealerships. They have the availability of additional inventory. So, they have the opportunity, and as you can see with this, working capital." (Transcript 319) On cross-examination, the witness acknowledged that none of the areas of Beck's finances and operations the witness had discussed were the basis for terminating Beck's franchise (Transcript 325).

On September 29, 2014, Russell Geller, the Vice President and General Manager for Beck, testified that Beck had entered into, and agreed to the terms of the post-bankruptcy Participation Agreement. (Transcript 191) Beck did not raise any formal objection to the use of the statewide standard for calculating the RSI prior to entering the Participation Agreement. (Transcript 199) As GM had never before raised any issues with Beck with regard to a low RSI, "...we didn't put much credence to the fact that we weren't hitting 100...There was never anything that was ever done to my dealership as well as hundreds of thousands of other dealerships...Never in my wildest dreams after nine years of not hitting RSI did I ever think that GM would actually enact a termination against me based on this. Their previous behavior never showed me that." (Transcript 199-200) The witness acknowledged that Beck did not achieve the RSI requirements set forth in the Agreement. (Transcript 204-205) The Notice of Breach indicated that the only basis for breach was not obtaining the RSI of 85 for 2011. No other reason for the breach was provided (Transcript 374) The witness did not know why GM singled Beck out for termination based on failing to achieve the performance standard. (Transcript 376) Beck consistently scored better in customer satisfaction, including cleanliness and attractiveness of the facility, overall purchase and delivery experience, and service, than other GM dealers, in its zone, region and entire network, including other GM dealers near Beck who had RSI scores below Beck. (Transcript 379-385)

On September 30, 2014, Russell Geller further testified that he has always thought that GM's expected sales were too high. (Transcript 31) The witness cited to numerous factors beyond Beck's control that contributed to its inability to meet the RSI goals.

The witness noted that under the Participation Agreement, GM was required to provide assistance in creating an action plan to improve sales. GM refused to do so unless Beck provided a written business plan on GM's template through the DART system. The witness noted that under the Participation Agreement, a written business plan was voluntary and not required to trigger GM's obligation. (Transcript 3-4, 8) In 2011, Beck completed all parts of the GM business plan template except the sales forecast section. (Transcript 5-6) Beck did not complete a sales forecast section for GM's business plan because GM inserted a network planning volume (NPV) in the template, which was substantially different from Beck's RSI figure, representing a number between 30-40 per cent higher than the RSI. Beck did not complete the section of the GM template because this would require Beck to submit sales data that would be entered into a calculation formula using NPV figures which would increase the RSI calculation by 30 to 40 percent. (Transcript 7-8) The witness did not know why GM would use a NPV figure which was different in Beck's business plan, if GM required Beck to satisfy the RSI under its Dealer Agreement or Participation Agreement. The witness provided GM with marketing information in an email in 2011 (Transcript 9-10) and completed the sales forecast portion of the business plan to GM for 2012. (Transcript 13) Beck did not receive any feedback from GM regarding the business plans that were submitted. (Transcript

11, 14-15, 16) Although GM promised in writing to assist Beck to achieve its performance requirements, GM never provided any assistance in Beck's efforts to sell GM cars. (Transcript 18)

In order to properly execute its own business plan, the witness believed Beck needed specific additional vehicle allocations. The witness made a request to his District Manager. "He had led me to believe that if I provided a wish list to him that I would receive some or all of the wish list." (Transcript 12) Beck requested additional allocation of vehicles, including 10 Sonics, 20 Cruises, with a total of 80 vehicles, trucks and cars as a wish list to GM, in addition to the vehicles Beck would normally request. Beck never received the requested vehicles. (Transcript 12-13) Beck was offered additional vehicles through the special allocation program. As part of this program, Beck was offered 200 cars up front. "If I'm selling approximately 30 vehicles a month and the industry standard is to stock a 65 to 75 day supply, and I'm now asked to buy 200 cars upfront, it was a staggering number." (Transcript 20-21) The facility did take 40 of the vehicles, but did not have space for all of those that were offered. (Transcript 24.) This allowed some room for sales growth. (Transcript 27-28) Another special allocation was offered in 2011 and 2012. This program consisted heavily of Malibus and Traverses. "These two car lines were experiencing national double-digit sales losses, and the New York market was exhibiting similar sales losses." (Transcript 37-38) The witness believed that GM was trying to use Beck as a scapegoat. "It was indicative to me that these vehicles could not be wholesaled to other dealers, because they were obviously turning them away. And General Motors looked to me to be the scapegoat to take these vehicles. And I was not going to let that happen." (Transcript 38) The only vehicles Beck did accept from this offer were 20 Equinoxes. (Transcript 39)

The witness testified that, for some time in 2011, GM was manipulating Beck's sales objective numbers on the GM weekly sales sheets that were sent to all dealers. The witness asked a GM representative why every other dealer wasn't receiving the same inflated sales objective figures on the sales sheets as Beck. Without prior notice, Beck was removed from the daily sales report. This led to a lack of trust by both employees inside the facility and throughout the industry. Not being on the sales sheet cast negative aspersions to the dealership and cast doubt if the dealership was actually in business with GM. Beck was the only dealer out of 63 dealers in the New York zone not to appear on the sales sheet for a year and a month. As a result of this, Beck's sales manager left the facility. This action by GM also made hiring new employees difficult. (Transcript 42-49) In February 2012, Beck was put back on the list with high sales objective numbers. In July 2012, Beck's correct sales objectives began appearing on the monthly report again. (Transcript 52)

Beck's sales were also affected by GM exiting the leasing market in 2008. Prior to this, leasing constituted 75 percent of sales for the facility. After GM exited the leasing market in 2008, Beck's percentage dropped down to 46 percent (Transcript 71-72) The witness indicated that his interpretation, as well as other dealers' interpretation, was that GM's RSI standard was a goal, but when the RSI became an application of termination and only towards Beck, it was unreasonable. (Transcript 73)

The witness further noted that Beck increased, not decreased its advertising spending after it entered the Participation Agreement. (Transcript 77) Further, the reduction in salespeople was the result of winding up a co-located Saab dealership, and did not result in a reduction of Chevrolet salespeople. More than half of Beck's sales staff had received the GM Mark of Excellence Award in 2012. (Transcript 78) The witness believed that Beck made appropriate expenditures for staff training. (Transcript 79-81)

The witness testified that GM constantly compared Beck to Major Chevrolet, another local dealership. The witness knew the sales performance of Major Chevrolet to be poor or as poor as everyone else's. Suddenly, Major Chevrolet's sales performance shot from an RSI in the 50's to

over 100. A contributory factor to Major Chevrolet's increased RSI was that during the time period in question, GM placed a GM financial representative inside of the other dealership, giving them an unfair sales advantage that was afforded to no other dealer. (Transcript 82) Beck asked to be provided the same benefit, but the request was denied. (Transcript 83-84)

Throughout the time in question, Beck took a lower gross profit per vehicle than other dealerships in the area in order to compete. (Transcript 85) Going forward, Beck has a plan which places an emphasis on internet and smart phone advertising, with a projected 12 percent sales growth. (Transcript 104-106)

Hearing date: 10/1/14

The Vice President of the Fontana Group, Ted Stockton, an expert witness in sales performance requirements enforced by automotive manufacturers upon auto dealers, testified that he was hired by Beck as a consultant on sales performance requirements in the automotive dealership industry to analyze the reasonableness of the use of GM's RSI calculations in drawing conclusions about the quality of Beck's sales performance. (Transcript 4-8) The witness concluded that, for multiple reasons, GM's RSI calculations do not provide a reasonable measure of the quality of a dealer's sales efforts. (Transcript 10-11) This is for two principal reasons. First, the RSI is based in part on expected sales within the assigned territory of the dealership. This is not a good practice because most dealerships sell less than 40 percent of their vehicles to consumers within their own territory. (Transcript 10-12) The second problem with the calculation is that the use of a statewide average is based in large part on unfounded assumptions. "This assumption that the State average market share is applicable to all parts, all subsections of the State simply doesn't hold up." (Transcript 13-14) There were factors that from the design of the RSI statistic the witness could tell were not accounted for and had the potential of affecting market share and were certainly outside the control of the dealer. (Transcript 16)

The witness noted that, with respect to the use of a statewide standard, the GM market share in Beck's sales area is "around 50 to 60 percent of the State average." (Transcript 46) The most statistically significant demographic factors affecting market share for automobile dealers are age, education level, and income of the consumers. These demographic issues matter and are outside of the control of the dealership. (Transcript 18-19) The witness noted that Chevrolet market shares are significantly affected by the level of population with a four-year degree, as well as the level of competition. Product segmentation used in calculating the RSI does not account for all of these variables. (Transcript 15) The Chevrolet market share is also very sensitive to leasing. "The higher the lease concentration, the lower Chevrolet's market share." (Transcript 22)

The witness also found that Chevrolet's market was sensitive to the amount of interbrand competition "to a statistically significant degree." (Transcript 24) "Beck's particular market is not particularly favorable in terms of the types of vehicles that consumers purchase. So Beck is on the losing end. All other things being equal, Beck is at a disadvantage. And statewide we show that that turns into a market share deficit." (Transcript 26-27) Further affecting the statewide average are two major manufacturing facilities in the Buffalo area. There are no such facilities in Beck's territory. The presence of such facilities increases sales in the local region for several reasons. First, GM provides discounts to employees and family members from the facility. Second, there is a perceived self-interest of consumers who live near the manufacturing facility regarding the local community and economy. (Transcript 44-45)

The witness further explained that the GM assigned territories do not accurately reflect local consumer opinions regarding convenience. "If we had a consumer driven or a market behavior driven dealer area, it would not match well to the GM AGSSA (territory assignments)." (Transcript

33-36.) The witness studied the general consumer patterns outside of the automotive industry in this region, and found, "they prefer to shop to the north, they prefer to shop around New Rochelle, and they tend to leave the area around Beck for their normal shopping." (Transcript 31)

The witness applied an "R squared" analysis to the data. The witness explained that what the data is "... resoundingly telling us is that the decision to incorporate upstate New York in the analysis is not just unreliable, it deletes from any reliability that we would see there... It means that you have two separately performing, separately concentrated, separately oriented markets." (Transcript 39-40)

Hearing date: 10/2/14

The President of the Fontana Group, Joseph Roesner, testified that he was hired by Beck as a sales performance consultant. The witness reviewed the data and analyzed Beck's performance and concluded that the sales performance requirements imposed by GM on Beck are not reasonable. (Transcript 8-9) The witness noted that at any point in time, 50 percent of the total dealer body for Chevrolet is below the 100 RSI requirement and could be subject to termination. The witness determined that, in New York, there are "... identifiable differences between two portions of the state that would be the downstate area and the upstate area." Only one market in the New York metropolitan area was able to meet the RSI calculated using a state average in either 2011 or 2012. (Transcript 9) There are factors that cause fluctuations in the RSI calculation that are outside of a dealer's control, including the market share of the Chevrolet brand, overall industry performance, and unusual factors that may apply to other dealers in the state. (Transcript 10)

Considering the significant, identifiable differences between the downstate and upstate, "the state standard is not an appropriate benchmark, particularly for purposes of termination." (Transcript 10) The witness explained that 83 percent of Chevrolet dealers are located upstate. (Transcript 11) The overall Chevrolet market share for the state of New York is 12.24 percent. However, the Chevrolet market share for the nine downstate counties of New York is only 6.3 percent, compared with a market share of 18.4 percent for the upstate counties. (Transcript 13, 16) "So you can see that the registration effectiveness in the nine downstate counties is less than half of what it is for the balance of New York." This obviously indicates, "... differences in these two areas downstate versus upstate as to the acceptance of the Chevrolet product." These differences are caused by several factors, including the presence of General Motors manufacturing plants in Buffalo and Rochester, and the representation discrepancies for import brands in upstate New York versus downstate New York. (Transcript 17-18)

If the RSI calculation is controlled for the Buffalo and Rochester area bias, the RSI for Beck increases from 60.3 to 70.2 during the period of July through December 2012, which constituted the provided cure period. Controlling for import bias causes the RSI to increase from 60.3 to 91.1. If both factors are controlled for simultaneously, the RSI goes to 98.92. (Transcript 24-26)

The witness recalculated the RSI for Beck using the Chevrolet market share of the nine downstate New York counties. Under this calculation, Beck had an RSI of 92.04 for 2011, 86.12 for 2012, and 98.92 for the cure period. (Transcript 28-29) Beck's sales fell in the middle when compared to the other dealerships in GM's own defined "New York City zone." (Transcript 29-32)

The witness explained that GM adjusts the RSI for segment, breaking the auto industry into segments based upon usage and size, (grouping together pick-up trucks, small, medium and luxury SUVs, sedans, etc.) with no additional adjustments. The RSI calculation does not account for all of the demographic, socioeconomic, factories, or representation issues that exist in one area versus another. (Transcript 42)

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The determination should be affirmed. The testimony and evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to support the findings of the Administrative Law Judge.

VTL §463(2)(d)(1) provides in pertinent part that it shall be unlawful for any franchisor to terminate, cancel or refuse to renew the franchise of any franchised motor vehicle dealer except for due cause, regardless of the terms of the franchise.

VTL §463(2)(e)(1) provides in pertinent part that any franchised motor vehicle dealer who receives a written notice of termination may have a review of the threatened termination by requesting an adjudicatory proceeding, as provided in VTL §§469 and 471-a.

VTL §463(2)(e)(2) provides that the issues to be determined in a review of a termination "are whether the franchisor's notice of termination was issued with due cause and in good faith. The burden of proof shall be upon the franchisor to prove that due cause and good faith exist. The franchisor shall also have the burden of proving that all portions of its current or proposed sales and service requirements for the protesting franchised new motor vehicle dealer are reasonable. The determination of due cause shall be that there exists a material breach by a new motor vehicle dealer of a reasonable and necessary provision of a franchise if the breach is not cured within a reasonable time after written notice of the breach has been received from the manufacturer or distributor."

VTL §463(2)(e)(3) provides in pertinent part that the franchisor shall provide notification in writing to the dealer that the dealer has 180 days to correct dealer sales and service performance deficiencies or breaches and that the franchise is subject to termination if the dealer does not correct those deficiencies or breaches. If the termination is based upon performance of the dealer in sales and service then there shall be no due cause if the dealer substantially complies with the reasonable performance provisions of the franchise during such cure period, and, no due cause if the failure to demonstrate such substantial compliance was due to factors which were beyond the control of such dealer.

VTL §463(2)(gg) provides that it shall be unlawful for any franchisor, notwithstanding the terms of any franchise contract, to "use an unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair sales or other performance standard in determining a franchised motor vehicle dealer's compliance with a franchise agreement."

The appellant, GM, contends that the Administrative Law Judge committed error in determining that GM's Non-Renewal Notice relied solely on Beck's failure to meet its Retail Sales Index requirements. Pursuant to VTL §463(e)(3), prior to issuing the Notice of Non-Renewal of Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, GM, the franchisor, was required to provide a notification in writing to the dealer that the dealer had 180 days to correct any dealer sales and service performance deficiencies or other breaches. Thus, the Notice of Non-renewal of Dealer Sales and Service Agreement dated June 11, 2013 must be read in conjunction with the June 8, 2012 Notice of Breach of GM Dealer Sales and Service Agreement and Participation Agreement, which preceded it. The sole basis of breach cited in the initial Notice of Breach was Beck's failure to meet the required retail sales performance. The Notice of Breach stated that "GM is providing this notice to Dealer that Dealer has failed to meet its performance obligations with respect to sales and is in material breach of the Dealer Agreement." Within the subsequent Notice of Non-Renewal, GM refers to operational deficiencies necessary to meet Beck's sales improvement obligations. However, these alleged deficiencies were not part of the original Notice of Breach.

Moreover, the operational deficiencies cited by GM in the Notice of Non-Renewal are all disputed by Beck, raising an issue of credibility, which the Administrative Law Judge was in the best position to address, having seen and heard the witnesses. In concluding that Beck did not perform poorly with respect to the operational requirements of the Participation Agreement, the Administrative Law Judge mentions numerous factors, including Beck's high Consumer Satisfaction Index scores, Beck's high level of working capital exceeding GM requirements by 30 percent, Beck's out performance of other dealerships in district, zone, and regional training standards, Beck's new car advertising, which exceeded district, zone, and regional averages, and Beck's average gross profit per vehicle, which was below the district and zone averages, indicating that Beck vehicles were not priced too high. The Administrative Law Judge noted that Beck's personnel had received commendations and awards from GM. Further, while GM had expressed concerns regarding the appearance of the facility, the Administrative Law Judge indicates that the photos of Beck's facility which were submitted by Beck are in "marked contrast" to those that were submitted by GM. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge committed no error.

Beck appealed the determination of the Federal District Court that GM's performance metrics were not unfair or unreasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Federal Court of Appeals) certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether a franchisor's sales performance standard that uses "average" performance based on statewide sales data in order to determine a dealer's compliance with a franchise agreement was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair" under VTL §263(2)(gg) because it does not account for local variations beyond adjusting for the local popularity of general vehicle. (See, Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. General Motors, LLC, 787 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2015)). The Federal Court of Appeals indicated that the question was being certified to the New York Court of Appeals because the law regarding New York's Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act was insufficiently developed for the court to ascertain its proper interpretation.

In response, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that GM's Retail Sales Index (RSI) was unlawful under VTL §463(2)(gg) because it does not account for local variations beyond adjusting for the local popularity of general vehicle types (Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 03412 (May 3, 2016)). The Court stated "...GM's exclusion of local brand popularity or import bias rendered the standard unreasonable and unfair because these preference factors constitute market challenges that impact a dealer's sales performance differently across the state. It is unlawful under section 463(2)(gg) to measure a dealer's sales performance by a standard that fails to consider the desirability of the Chevrolet brand itself as a measure of a dealer's effort and sales ability." (*Id.* at 7)

GM's argument that the Administrative Law Judge erred as a matter of law in refusing to recognize the collateral estoppel effect of a disposition following a bench trial by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Federal District Court) is unavailing in light of the recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals. As acknowledged by the appellant when requesting a stay of the instant proceeding pending the New York Court of Appeals answer to the first question certified by the Federal Court of Appeals, which the Board granted, it is clear that the resolution of the certified question by the New York Court of Appeals has a direct and significant impact on the outcome of this proceeding. The determination of the New York Court of Appeals is binding and consistent with the Administrative Law Judge's decision that GM lacked due cause to terminate Beck's franchise because, among other reasons, GM's sales performance standard was unfair and not reasonably applied.

The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the application of a statewide standard was not reasonable in this instance was supported by substantial evidence in the record. As the Administrative Law Judge points out, most of the dealers in the New York City metropolitan area were not meeting GM's statewide RSI standard and were not being terminated. In fact, among the

underperforming dealers in the 9 downstate counties, GM was proceeding against Beck only, rendering the standard was unreasonable in its application. Beck's overall sales from 2009 (the time of the GM bankruptcy) to 2014 almost doubled from 218 sales to 417 sales, yet Beck's RSI went only from 40.4 to 50.2 when calculated using the statewide standard. Moreover, the evidence presented during the hearing established that, when compared to other similarly situated Chevrolet dealers in downstate New York, Beck's performance fell approximately in the middle of all of the dealers in this region. When calculations of the RSI were made using the Chevrolet market share in this downstate region, Beck's sales came very close to the 100 RSI goal. Moreover, evidence indicated that Beck met or exceeded the other requirements of the Participation Agreement.

Beck also indicated there were several factors beyond its control which affected the failure to reach the targeted RSI requirements. Consumer bias towards import vehicles, the effect of GM's exit from leasing programs, the education, age, and income demographics of the territory, and consumer patterns demonstrating preference for shopping to the north, particularly towards the New Rochelle area, are all factors which are outside of Beck's control. Pursuant to VTL §463(2)(e)(3), there is no cause for termination, "if the failure to demonstrate such substantial compliance was due to factors which were beyond the control of such dealer."

DECISION BY THE BOARD

The determination is affirmed. The original decision remains.

State Office of Administrative Hearings

Kristofer S. Monson
Chief Administrative Law Judge

October 17, 2022

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608-21-0988
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Pegah Nasrollahzadeh, CLERK

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RE: Docket Number 608-21-0988.LIC; Texas Department of Motor Vehicles No. 21-0004-LIC; McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru v. Subaru of America Inc.,

Dear Parties:

The Administrative Law Judges have reviewed the exceptions and response filed in this matter. Bert Ogden Subaru's exceptions largely reurge the same issues raised in its brief, and for the reasons set out in the Proposal for Decision, the ALJs recommend rejecting them. The ALJs would note, however, that contrary to the exceptions, nothing in the PFD relied on the decisions in *All Star Imports* or *Bates Nissan*. Indeed, the ALJs agree with the exceptions letter that *All Star Imports* had nothing to do with the issue of sales, which is why on page 39-40, the PFD specifically noted that *All Star Imports*, while cited by Bert Ogden, did not support its position that a contract could not be terminated when sales had increased. Similarly, we found that *Bates Nissan* did not stand for that position, either.


Because we recommend changes be made to the PFD, it is ready for consideration.

Sincerely,



Susan Rodriguez

Presiding Administrative Law Judge



Rebecca Smith

Co-Presiding Administrative Law Judge

CC: Service List

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Status as of 10/19/2022 12:31 PM CST

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Associated Case Party: McAllen Jeep, Inc. d/b/a Bert Ogden Subaru

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
JAMES COUSAR		james.cousar@hklaw.com	10/19/2022 12:17:02 PM	SENT

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
ACTION ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Patricia Ueckert, Vehicle Titles and Registration Division Operations Section Director
Agenda Item: 6
Subject: Specialty Plate Design

RECOMMENDATION

Action Item. The Vehicle Titles and Registration Division seeks board approval or denial for one plate design submitted for your consideration. The plate design is from the marketing vendor, My Plates.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Clemson University is a new plate design.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

Costs incurred by the department related to the My Plates program and an \$8 administrative fee per plate are recouped from the My Plates vendor. Revenue generated from the sale of vendor specialty license plates is split between the state (General Revenue Fund) and My Plates. The details of the revenue splits can be found in Section IV (State/Contractor Revenue Sharing) of the Specialty License Plate Marketing contract.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

Statutory authority for the board to approve vendor specialty license plates and invite the public's comment on proposed vendor plate designs are in Texas Transportation Code §504.851(g) and (g-1) (1). Statutory authority for a sponsor of a specialty license plate under Texas Transportation Code Chapter 504, Subchapter J, to contract with the private vendor authorized under Texas Transportation Code §504.851 for the marketing and sale of the specialty license plate is in Texas Transportation Code §504.6011. Statutory authority for the board to approve non-profit organization specialty license plates and invite the public's comment on proposed plate designs are in Texas Transportation Code §504.801. The board's approval criteria are clarified in Texas Administrative Code §217.45 Specialty License Plates, Symbols, Tabs, and Other Devices, and §217.52 Marketing of Specialty License Plates through a Private Vendor.

The vendor contract (Statement of Work paragraph #2, Marketing Services) specifies that following the board's contingent approval of a plate, the vendor must get at least 200 commitments within six months of the approval for a plate to be produced (*existing* plates must also maintain 200 registrations to stay in the program). My Plates' procedure is to first offer a plate to the public to register their interest. Following the board's contingent approval, My Plates then offers a plate online for prepaid orders and confirms when 200 prepaid orders are achieved.

TxDMV's procedure is to invite comments on all proposed plates ahead of the board's review. The department's intent is to determine if there are any unforeseen public concerns about a plate design. The department publishes a 10-day

“like/dislike/comment-by-email” survey, called an eVIEW, on its website. Although the survey counts the public’s “likes” and “dislikes,” it is unscientific and not used as an indicator of a plate’s popularity.

The plate design listed below was presented to the public in a December 2022 eVIEW. No negative comments were received. The count of the public’s “like/dislikes” are noted below with each design.

Clemson University	NEW	
435 people liked this design and 293 did not		

Clemson University (New)



TEXAS SPECIALTY PLATE BUSINESS

Vehicle Titles and
Registration Division
Special Plates Unit (5FTEs) 02/23



VTR Director
Annette Quintero

FEB. 2023



New in Feb. 2023

RING IN THE NEW YEAR WITH NEW VENDOR PLATES

SLP AVAILABLE
MILITARY AND DV
RESTRICTED USE
STATE SPECIALTY
VENDOR SPECIALTY

531
194
51
148
138



	LINKED	UNLINKED	TOTAL
1. ANIMAL FRIENDLY	7,443	254	7,697
2. CONSERVATION: HORNED LIZARD	6,308	207	6,515
3. STATE OF THE ARTS	4,566	165	4,731
4. CONSERVATION: BLUEBONNET	4,595	198	4,793
5. CONSERVATION: WHITE-TAILED DEER	3,236	151	3,387
6. TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY	2,247	045	2,292
7. BIG BEND NATIONAL PARK	2,013	107	2,120
8. CONSERVATION: HUMMINGBIRD	1,932	113	2,045
9. CONSERVATION: LARGE MOUTH BASS	1,922	106	2,028
10. CONSERVATION: CAMPING	1,883	107	1,990



1. CLASSIC BLACK	57,324	10,197	67,521
2. LARGE STAR WHITE/BLACK	40,086	6,830	46,916
3. TEXAS BLACK 1845	17,628	4,022	21,650
4. LONE STAR BLACK	13,956	3,025	16,981
5. CARBON FIBER	11,703	2,641	14,344
6. LONE STAR 1836	4,963	862	5,825
7. LONE STAR BLK/SILV	4,224	1,075	5,299
8. TEXAS VINTAGE BLACK	4,144	702	4,846
9. TEXAS A&M (MAROON)	4,101	588	4,689
10. WHITE	3,383	833	4,671



1. DISABLED VETERAN	206,459	7,358	213,817
2. DV U.S. ARMY	50,102	1,917	52,019
3. DV U.S. MARINE CORPS	27,186	903	28,089
4. DV U.S. AIR FORCE	22,507	775	23,282
5. DV U.S. NAVY	19,755	722	20,477
6. DV BRONZE STAR MEDAL	13,987	425	14,412
7. PURPLE HEART	13,337	346	13,683
8. MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL	12,546	466	13,012
9. U.S. MARINE CORPS	12,230	474	12,704
10. U.S. ARMY	10,551	433	10,984

SPECIAL PLATES UNIT CUSTOMER SERVICE STATISTICS FY 2023

25,294

8,309

20

4,401

1,112

12

1,522

Personalized Plate
Applications Reviewed
(96% Approved)

Telephone Calls

Walk-in
Customers

Emails

Refunds

Public Information
Open Records

Correspondence
(Including Plate
Applications)

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
BRIEFING ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Glenna Bowman, Chief Financial Officer
Agenda Item: 7.A
Subject: Legislative Appropriations Request (LAR) Update

RECOMMENDATION

Briefing item with no recommendation.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To provide a briefing on the Fiscal Year 2024-2025 Legislative Appropriations Request (LAR) and the recommended appropriations as included in the initial House Bill 1 (H.B.1) and Senate Bill 1 (S.B.1)

FINANCIAL IMPACT

In January 2023, the House of Representatives and the Senate filed their respective versions of the state's budget bills, H.B. 1 and S.B. 1, respectively. Both introduced bills include identical levels of baseline funding for the department totaling \$376.4. million for the biennium. The individual fiscal year amounts are \$193.7 million in FY 2024 and \$182.7 million in FY 2025.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles submitted its LAR to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB) on August 12, 2022. During the fall, LBB staff analyzed the LARs for all state agencies and made initial funding recommendations. On January 18, 2023, the introduced versions of the state's budget bills were filed.

Both H.B.1 and S.B.1 include all baseline funding increases requested by TxDMV, except for funding associated with the department's Exceptional Item for Additional Authorized FTEs. Major baseline increases include postage, sticker paper, Data Center Services, PC Replacement, and Regional Service Center facilities maintenance. The introduced bills also provide 100% of the requested exceptional item funding for the Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority (MVCPA), including the ability to carryforward unexpended balances within the biennium, as well as between biennia (from FY 2023 to FY 2024).

The introduced bill does not include the other exceptional items requested by TxDMV. This is not unusual at this point in the appropriations process. Exceptional items have been resubmitted for consideration by the Legislature and include the department's original exceptional item list (except for MVCPA, which is already included in both bills), and an exceptional item for license plate production to replenish inventory reserves and account for cost increases resulting from inflation. The department also updated the amount requested for the Camp Hubbard Renewal project and added funding associated with the requested additional FTEs.

In addition to the specific items related to the TxDMV appropriations request, the introduced appropriations bill includes the following provisions that impact all state agencies:

- Salary increase for all employees – 5% in 2024 and an additional 5% in 2025, including a supplemental appropriation for the last three months (June, July and August) of FY 2023.



- Capital budget minimum threshold is changed from \$100k to \$500k, so no capital rider is needed for TxDMV vehicles for the FY 2024-25 biennium.
- Changed DCS rider to allow all agencies to transfer INTO the DCS appropriation – so we can cover bills without having to go to LBB for approval.

TxDmv is scheduled to appear before the Senate Finance Committee for its first budget hearing of the 88th Legislature on February 14, 2023.

LAR Update

FY 2024 – 2025

Legislative Appropriations Request



Texas Department *of* Motor Vehicles

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Appropriations Process

- ❑ Agencies submit LAR
- ❑ LBB analyzes and makes recommendations
- ❑ Introduced bill is filed
 - It is normal for exceptional items to NOT be included
- ❑ Based on introduced bill, exceptional items may be revised



Introduced Bill Compared to LAR

Description	Amount	FTEs
HB1/SB1, Introduced	\$376.4 million	808.0
LAR Baseline Request	\$348.9 million	808.0
Difference	+ \$27.5 million	0.0

- Includes all requested baseline funding increases, except for funding associated with the department's Exceptional Item for Additional Authorized FTEs.
- Major baseline increases requested and approved:
 - Postage, sticker paper, and AAMVA fees
 - Technology initiatives and Data Center Services
 - Automation Project and PC Replacement
 - Regional Service Center facilities maintenance
- Includes increases for statewide salary increases, as well as adjustments for growth in MyPlates vendor fees and Data Center Services support.
- Includes approved exceptional item for full funding for MVCPA.



Full Funding for MVCPA

- 100% of the requested exceptional item funding for Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority (MVCPA) was approved.
- \$8.8 million designated for Border Security (Art IX, Sec 7.10) – compared to current \$8.4 million earmark
- New rider #10 appropriates 100% of MVCPA revenues collected pursuant to Transportation Code, Section 1006.153 to MVCPA, with a directive that revenues cover both the direct and indirect costs of MVCPA. It further provides UB authority within the biennium, as well as between biennia (from FY 2023 to FY 2024).
- The corresponding FTEs for MVCPA were originally submitted with the Exceptional Item for Additional Authorized FTEs and are not included in the introduced bill.



Revised Exceptional Items

The introduced bill does not include the other exceptional items requested by TxDMV. This is not unusual at this point in the state appropriations process.

Exceptional items have been resubmitted for consideration by the Legislature.

Exceptional Item	FY 2024	FY 2025	Action	Notes
RTS Replacement Phase One	\$ 6,750,000	\$ -	No Change	
Additional Regional Service Center Locations	\$ 2,474,389	\$ 1,004,022	No Change	
Camp Hubbard Renewal *	\$ 143,000,000		Keep As Amended	Amount and Narrative Updated
Additional Authorized FTEs	\$ 1,857,560	\$ 1,857,560	Keep As Amended	Amount and Narrative Updated
License Plate Production	\$ 3,700,000	\$ 1,500,000	New	New

* Does not include debt service payments.



Other Provisions

- Salary increase for all employees – 5% in 2024 and an additional 5% in 2025 – including a supplemental appropriation for the last three months (June, July, August) of FY 2023.
- Capital budget minimum threshold changed from \$100k to \$500k (so no capital rider needed for vehicles)
- Changed DCS rider to allow all agencies to transfer INTO the DCS appropriation – so we can cover bills without having to go to LBB for approval
- Senate Finance hearing scheduled for Feb 14th

**Texas Department of Motor Vehicles**

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Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
BRIEFING ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Eric Horn, Director of Accounting Operations
Agenda Item: 7.B
Subject: Annual Financial Report and Non-Financial Report

RECOMMENDATION

Briefing item with no recommendation.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Annual Financial Report is prepared in accordance with Texas Government Code, Section 2101.011 and reporting requirements established by the Comptroller of Public Accounts (CPA). The report is not audited but could be considered for audit by the State Auditor's Office as part of the State of Texas Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. The annual report was submitted to the CPA by the November 20, 2022, deadline.

Government Code Section § 2101.0115 requires state agencies to submit an Annual Report of Nonfinancial Data to the Governor's Office, State Auditor's Office, Legislative Budget Board and the Legislative Reference Library. TxDMV submitted this report by the established deadline of December 31, 2022.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, TxDMV reported revenue of \$1.9 billion dollars in state funds, as follows:

State Highway Fund (0006)	\$1,701,523,762
TxDMV Fund (0010)	\$ 186,364,814
General Revenue (0001) (MVCPA Appropriations)	\$ 15,097,493

FY 2022 expenditures totaled \$177,453,424, including \$13,823,476 paid from the General Revenue Fund 0001 and \$163,490,161 paid from the Texas Department of Motor Vehicle Fund 0010.

Revenues and Expenditures are detailed on Exhibits A-2 for all General and Consolidated Funds and B-2 for Special Revenue Funds.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION***Annual Financial Report******Exhibit I – Combined Balance Sheet (Statement of Net Assets)***

The TxDMV closed FY 2022 with a net asset balance increase of \$10,172,631. The total net asset amount as of August 31, 2022 was \$338.7 million.

- Cash in State Treasury is the net of revenues collected and deposited less appropriated expenses in the TxDMV Fund.
- Legislative Appropriations represents the unspent appropriations in the General Revenue (Fund 0001.) This includes any benefits appropriations. Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority (MVCPA) is the only item funded from Fund 0001.



Texas Department of Motor Vehicles

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- Accounts Receivable (A/R) represents the amounts due from County Tax Assessor-Collectors and Regional Offices less collections. The decrease of \$4.25 million in A/R compared to the prior year is primarily a timing difference in counties processing deposits at year end.
- In Capital Assets, the non-current asset had a net increase of \$2.30 million due to the inclusion of long-term lease agreements under Right to Use Asset – Buildings, per implementation of Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 87, *Leases* in FY 2022.

Exhibit II – Combined Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances

Revenues

The TxDMV collected \$1.9 billion in FY 2022 with an increase in revenue of approximately \$39.34 million or 2.1% from the previous year.

- Federal Revenues decreased \$460,376 in FY 2022 due the completion of billings related to the Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) 2018 grant in FY 2021.
- Licenses, Fees and Permits reflects only the revenue collected and reportable by the TxDMV. In 2022, TxDMV Fund 0010 revenue from the issuance of licenses, fees, and permits totaled approximately \$185 million. Revenue deposited to the State Highway Fund increased by approximately \$9 million, or 0.5% compared to FY 2021.

Expenditures

Expenditures totaled \$177.45 million (after adjustments) and increased approximately \$7.48 million compared to the prior year primarily due to an increase in Other Operating Expenditures for design services related to the Camp Hubbard Renewal project.

- Salaries and Wages increased \$1.6 million compared to the prior year as a result of salary equity adjustments for eligible employees
- Professional Fees and Services reflect a net decrease of \$2.3 million compared to FY 2021 primarily due to the completion of the FY 2021 Automation project for webDEALER.
- Materials & Supplies reflect an increase of \$1.3 million primarily due the purchase of laptops for the counties and Regional Service Centers (RSCs).
- Other Operating Expenditures reflect a net increase from FY 2021 of \$3.4 million primarily due to payment to the Texas Facilities Commission (TFC) for design services for the Camp Hubbard Renewal project.

Annual Report of Nonfinancial Data

This annual report contains non-financial information that depicts the department's operational activities during the fiscal year. It includes various schedules required by Government Code 2101.0115 Financial Information Required of State Agencies. The following items are of particular interest.

- **Appropriation Item Transfer Schedule** identifies transfers of appropriated money between the department's appropriated strategies.
- **HUB Strategic Plan Progress Form** provides a percentage of historically underutilized businesses (HUBs) used by the department for specific procurement categories.
 - TxDMV takes a proactive approach to the HUB program. In the new virtual environment, TxDMV continues reaching out to potential HUB vendors through virtual spot-bid fairs, and with online training sessions and online introductory meetings between vendors and department business and purchasing staff.



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- **Indirect Cost Schedule** provides detailed information about expenditures paid by or on behalf of the TxDMV for employee benefits including Social Security benefits, health insurance, retirement contributions, benefit replacement pay, and workers' and unemployment compensation. It also includes indirect costs related to services provided by oversight agencies like the Comptroller, Attorney General, Department of Information Resources, and State Auditor.
 - The Statewide Cost Allocation Plan (SWCAP) identifies and allocates costs the State incurs for central services such as accounting, computing, payroll and other statewide support provided by specific agencies. Agencies reimburse General Revenue from other funding sources based on an allocation of current year appropriated funds. In FY 2022, there was a decrease of approximately \$203K for the CAPPS (Centralized Accounting & Payroll/Personnel System) costs allocated from the Comptroller of Public Accounts.
- **Schedule of Professional/Consulting Fees and Legal Service Fees** provides an itemized list of fees paid for professional, consulting and legal services. The schedule includes the name of the vendor, the amount paid, and the reason the services were provided.
 - In FY 2022, there was a decrease of approximately \$2.3 million in expenditures attributable to Data Center Services, primarily related to the completion of the webDEALER project.

Professional/Consulting Services Vendors – Expenditures over \$300,000 in FY 2022

Name	Amount	Service Provided
Apex Systems Inc	1,343,917.40	Information Technology Services
Bansar Technologies Inc	953,429.80	Information Technology Services
Carahsoft Technology Corporation	1,166,239.55	Information Technology Services
Loblolly Consulting LLC	341,945.01	Information Technology Services
NF Consulting Services	940,791.60	Information Technology Services
Nipun Systems Inc	843,023.20	Information Technology Services
Sistema Technologies Inc	463,133.22	Information Technology Services
Southwest Research Institute	704,584.57	Information Technology Services
TEKsystems Inc	829,595.32	Information Technology Services
Texas Department of Information Resources	10,690,803.30	Data Center Services
Texas Department of Information Resources	390,769.90	Information Technology Services
Texas Govlink Inc	1,407,203.30	Information Technology Services

- **Schedule of Space Occupied** lists the name and address of each building the department occupies, the total amount of square feet leased, and the amount of square feet used in a state-owned building. It also lists the cost per square foot leased, the annual and monthly costs of leased space, and the name of each lessor.
- **Schedule of Vehicles Purchased** lists the vehicles purchased during this fiscal year.
 - One vehicle was procured during FY 2022.
- **Alternative Fuel Program Status** lists by fiscal year the number of vehicles purchased that use alternative fuel. Fuel usage is listed with the number of gallons used during the year.
- **Schedule of Itemized Purchases** identifies proprietary purchases that are procured from one vendor without considering an equivalent product to be supplied by another vendor. The schedule must provide a written justification explaining the need for the specifications, the reasons that competing products were not satisfactory and additional information as required by the CPA. The schedule identifies each product purchased, the amount of the purchase, and the name of the vendor.



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- Explore Information Service LLC wrote the source code for the Texas International Apportioned Registration (TxIRP) and is the only vendor that can provide support services for this application.
- Johnson Controls is the vendor responsible for the JCI HVAC system installed in Camp Hubbard facilities and owns the controllers that are integrated with this system.



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Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2022



Presented By:
Finance and Administrative Services Division
February 8, 2023



Exhibit II – Statement of Revenue, Expenditures and Changes in Net Assets (Income Statement)



Revenues



Expenditures









Exhibit I – Combined Balance Sheet (Statement of Net Assets)





Texas Department *of* Motor Vehicles

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Annual Report of Nonfinancial Data Fiscal Year 2022

Presented By:
Finance and Administrative Services Division
February 8, 2023



Annual Report of Nonfinancial Data





- Report of nonfinancial schedules required by Government Code 2101.0115, previously included in the Annual Financial Report
- Schedules
 - Appropriation Item Transfers
 - Historically Underutilized Businesses Strategic Plan Progress
 - Indirect Cost Schedule
 - Space Occupied
 - Vehicles Purchased
 - Alternative Fuel Program Status
 - Itemized Purchases
 - Professional/Consulting Fees & Legal Services Fees



Nonfinancial Data Highlights



Professional/Consulting Fees & Legal Service Fees



The Professional Services - Other category includes: Educational/Training Services, Financial & Accounting Services, Legal Services-Approved by SOAH (State Office of Administrative Hearings) and Professional Services-Other.



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Questions?



Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
BRIEFING ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Salem Chuah, Internal Audit Division Director
Agenda Item: 7.C
Subject: Internal Audit Division Status Update: Internal and External Engagements, including the State Auditor's Office Audit

RECOMMENDATION

Briefing Only.

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This status update provides information on current Internal Audit Division (IAD) activities on internal and external engagements.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

None.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

Internal Engagements

IAD is going through the initial planning process for the Hiring Process Audit. The preliminary objective is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the hiring process and whether policies and procedures are followed consistently. The objective will be narrowed during the planning process prior to starting fieldwork.

IAD completed the FY 2023 risk assessment for the second six months, created the FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months) for Board approval, and conducted recommendation follow-up for the first quarter. There are 28 recommendations from internal audits that are being tracked with 8 that are overdue. Divisions have been making progress on the overdue recommendations, and IAD continues to meet with those divisions on a quarterly basis to ensure recommendation implementation.


External Engagements

The final report for the Comptroller of Public Accounts' desk audit on dual/multiple employment continues to be in-progress.



The State Auditor's Office (SAO) continues its audit on the Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority's (MVCPA) grant processes and TxDMV's temporary tags. The SAO conducted an end of fieldwork meeting to communicate preliminary findings in mid-December 2022. The exit conference is expected in early February with the report publicly released in March 2023.

Internal Audit Division Status

Internal Engagements

	Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hiring Process Audit
	Fieldwork	N/A
	Reporting	N/A
	Completed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FY2023 Risk Assessment (Second Six Months) FY2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months) Recommendation Implementation Follow-up (First Quarter)

External Engagements

	In-Progress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CPA: Dual/Multiple Employment Desk Audit SAO: MVCPA Grant Processes and Temporary Tags
	Completed	N/A

Legend

CPA: Comptroller of Public Accounts

SAO: State Auditor's Office

Board Meeting Date: 2/9/2023
ACTION ITEM

To: Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
From: Salem Chuah, Internal Audit Division Director
Agenda Item: 7.D
Subject: FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months)

RECOMMENDATION

Recommendation to approve the FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months).

PURPOSE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves an internal audit plan each year to be in compliance with the Texas Internal Auditing Act (Texas Government Code 2102.008). The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months) provides information on risk-based audits, advisory services, required activities, value-added services, and division initiatives. The Internal Audit Plan was developed based on the risk assessment results.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

None.

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

The Texas Internal Auditing Act (Texas Government Code 2102.008) states that the annual audit plan developed by the internal auditor must be approved by the state agency's governing board or by the administrator of a state agency if the state agency does not have a governing board.

The Internal Audit Division (IAD) produces two internal audit plans, one for each half of the fiscal year, starting in fiscal year 2020. The FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months) serves as an update to Internal Audit Plan for the first six months, which was approved by the TxDMV Board on August 11, 2022.

The FY 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months) covering the period of March 1, 2023 to August 31, 2023, provides information on risk-based audits, advisory services, required activities, value-added services, and division initiatives for approval.

Audits, Advisory Services, and Required Activities

IAD identified four engagements to be conducted during the second six months of the fiscal year. Out of the four engagements, two engagements are risk-based audits and two engagements are required activities:

- **Hiring Process Audit:** the preliminary objective is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the hiring process and whether policies and procedures are followed consistently.
- **Regional Service Center (RSC) Audit:** the preliminary objective is to assess the culture at RSCs, whether RSCs adequately serve its customers, and whether RSCs process transactions uniformly.

- **FY 2024 Risk Assessment and Internal Audit Plan:** an enterprise-wide risk assessment to identify risk areas for the upcoming year. This report will be submitted to the State Auditor's Office.
- **Audit Recommendation Implementation Status:** an engagement to verify if outstanding audit recommendations have been fully implemented.

Value-Added Services and Divisional Initiatives

IAD also conducts value-added services and works on division initiatives to further enhance organizational value and improve IAD's effectiveness and efficiency. Items in these categories include investigations on fraud, waste, and abuse, external audit/review coordination, workgroup participation, dashboard refinement, and staff development.



**Texas Department
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Fiscal Year 2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months)

Internal Audit Division

February 2023

Tables of Contents

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Detailed Information.....	2
Risk-Based Engagements and Required Activities	2
Value-Added Services and Division Initiatives	3
Scope and Methodology.....	5
Scope.....	5
Risk Assessment	5
Hour Analysis	Error! Bookmark not defined.

Executive Summary

The Internal Audit Division (IAD) audit plan for fiscal year (FY) 2023 is divided into six month plans. The FY2023 Internal Audit Plan (Plan) for the second six months covers the period of March 2023 through August 2023. This Plan includes risk-based audits, advisory services, required activities, value-added services, and division initiatives as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Summary of the FY2023 Internal Audit Plan (Second Six Months):

	Audits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hiring Process (carryover from first six months)• Regional Service Center
	Advisory Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• As requested/needed
	Required Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• FY2024 Risk Assessment and Internal Audit Plan• Audit Recommendation Implementation Status
	Value-Added Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Investigations on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse• External Coordination Efforts• Workgroup Participation / Ad-hoc Advisory• Department Training
	Division Initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Communication and Dashboard Refinement• TeamMate+ Enhancements• Staff Development & Hiring

Detailed Information

Risk-Based Engagements and Required Activities

Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the risk-based engagements and required activities that will be conducted in the second six months of FY2023. The information includes engagement name, engagement hours, division impacted (if applicable), and background/objective. Table 3 provides information on alternative engagements in place of the risk-based engagements presented from Table 1.

Table 1. Risk-Based Engagements for FY2023 (Second Six Months)

Engagement	Hours	Division Impacted	Preliminary Engagement Information
Hiring Process Audit (carryover from first six months)	600	Human Resources Division	The hiring process includes various aspects such as screening, interviewing, and onboarding. This audit will determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the hiring process and whether policies and procedures are followed consistently.
Regional Service Center Audit	650	Vehicle Titles and Registration	The Vehicle Title and Registration (VTR) Division is the largest division at TxDMV. Regional Service Centers (RSCs) provide various motor-related services to TxDMV customers. This audit could assess the culture at selected RSCs, whether RSCs adequately serve its customers, and whether RSCs process transactions uniformly.

Table 2. Required Engagements

Engagement	Hours	Description
Audit Recommendation Implementation Status Follow-up	60	An engagement to verify if outstanding audit recommendations have been fully implemented.

FY2024 Risk Assessment and Internal Audit Plan	250	An enterprise-wide risk assessment to identify risk areas for the upcoming year. The Internal Audit Plan will be submitted to the State Auditor's Office.
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Table 3. Contingency Engagements

Engagement	Hours	Division Impacted	Preliminary Engagement Information
Key Performance Indicators Audit	550	Department-wide	There are 72 key performance indicators (KPIs) that are reported to the Board on a monthly and/or quarterly basis. KPIs help the Board and Management determine whether the organization is meeting operational and strategic goals. This audit could determine the accuracy of the reported performance metrics and the adequacy of related control systems over the collection and reporting of selected performance metrics.
Motor Carrier and Motor Vehicle Investigation Audit	600	Enforcement Division	The Criminal Investigations Division was merged into the Enforcement Division in 2021. This audit could examine processes and controls related to the investigation and complaint process.

Value-Added Services and Division Initiatives

Value-Added Services

- **Investigations on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse:** Detecting, tracking, and reviewing any internal fraud, waste, and abuse allegations or State Auditor's Office Hotline complaints. IAD investigates internal fraud, waste, and abuse allegations and administers the Fraud Pulse Survey twice a year.
- **External Coordination Efforts:** Coordinating external audits or reviews by providing audit status updates and facilitating management responses to recommendations.
- **Workgroup Participation / Ad-hoc Advisory:** Participating in TxDMV workgroups, such as the Executive Steering Committee and the Governance Team, to help identify unforeseen risks in

enterprise projects or activities. IAD also sets aside hours to address any short-term assessment or information requests by TxDMV staff.

- **Department Training:** Providing training to help TxDMV staff understand their responsibilities for audits, recommendation implementation, and prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Division Initiatives

- **Communication and Dashboard Refinement:** Communicating audit and advisory results in a digestible manner with icons, pictures, and graphics. Also, continuing to refine dashboards to show monthly and quarterly IAD metrics, maintain communication sites to show the Department's risk management, governance, and engagement information.
- **TeamMate+ Enhancements:** Enhancing the software's functionality by continuing to update the risks stored within the software, creating and automating reports, and staying current on best practices for optimized software functionality.
- **Staff Development & Hiring:** Taking the minimum required hours of training each year (40 hours) in accordance with auditing standards. This includes creating development plans to obtain required knowledge, skills, and abilities for audit and advisory services. Hiring internal audit staff to fill all IAD vacancies and providing training to integrate new hires into the office.

Scope and Methodology

Scope

The Internal Audit Plan covers engagements and activities for the second six months of FY2023, March 2023 to August 2023.

Risk Assessment

Risk Methodology

The audit plan was developed using a risk-based methodology, which incorporated input from TxDMV Board members, Executive management, Division management, and risks identified by audit staff through previous engagements and observations. IAD also analyzed TxDMV information and reviewed internal audit and industry publications to identify and rank potential audit topics by risk. In addition, IAD collected information on the potential controls that were in place to mitigate the identified risks.

Each risk was reviewed using approved Department risk guidance that included the following factors:

- Financial impact
- Operational effectiveness and efficiency impact
- Legal or regulatory impact
- Brand or reputational impact
- Degree of change in the program, function, or process
- Degree of complexity
- Control design strength

Risks identified were scored using the above factors to determine the engagements for the second six month internal audit plan and contingency engagements.

The risk scores ranged from zero, which is the lowest risk score, to five, which is the highest risk score. Table 4 provides information on the risk scores and definitions for each category.

Table 4. Risk Scores


Risk Category	Scores	Definition
High	> 3.99	The risk may substantially hinder the Department, division, and/or function in achieving its objectives or goals.
Medium-High	3.00 – 3.99	The risk may significantly hinder the Department, division, and/or function in achieving its objectives or goals.
Medium	2.00 – 2.99	The risk should be monitored on a regular basis to ensure it does not become an issue; however, it is not currently hindering the Department, division, or function from achieving its objectives or goals.
Low	< 2.00	The risk is mostly mitigated and may not hinder the Department, division, or function from achieving its objectives or goals.

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)

Methodology

Once all risks were reviewed and ranked, the audit team evaluated each risk using the COSO *Internal Control – Integrated Framework*. The framework integrates three broad objectives (Operations, Reporting, and Compliance) and ties those objectives to risks and controls through five internal control components and four structural levels as depicted in Figure 2, COSO cube. The COSO cube depicts how the internal controls framework has a direct relationship between objectives, the components needed to achieve objectives, and a typical organizational structure.

Figure 2. COSO Cube



The definition for the COSO Internal Control Components are as follows:

- **Control Environment:** The foundation for an internal control system. The Control Environment is a set of standards, processes, and structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal control across the organization. It provides the discipline and structure to help an entity achieve its objectives. The TxDMV Board and executive management establish the tone at the top regarding the importance of internal control including expected standards of conduct.
- **Risk Assessment:** The processes used to determine how risk is to be managed. TxDMV management assesses the risks facing the entity as it seeks to achieve its objectives.
- **Control Activities:** The actions TxDMV management established through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes information systems.
- **Information and Communication:** The quality of information TxDMV management and staff generate and use to communicate and support the internal control system on an ongoing and iterative basis.
- **Monitoring:** The activities TxDMV management established to assess the quality of performance over time. The activities include ongoing evaluations, separate evaluations, or some combination of the two. The activities are used to ascertain whether each of the five components of internal control, are present and functioning.

Board Policy Documents

Governance Process (10/13/11)

Strategic Planning (10/13/11)

Board Vision (4/7/16)

Agency Boundaries (9/13/12)

Texas Department of Motor Vehicles TxDMV Board Governance Policy

1. PURPOSE

The directives presented in this policy address board governance of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TxDMV).

2. SCOPE

The directives presented in this policy apply to the TxDMV Board and TxDMV agency personnel who interact with the Board. The TxDMV Board Governance Policy shall be one that is comprehensive and pioneering in its scope.

3. POLICY

3.1. TxDMV Board Governing Style

The Board shall govern according to the following general principles: (a) a vision for the agency, (b) diversity in points of view, (c) strategic leadership, providing day-to-day detail as necessary to achieve the agency vision, (d) clear distinction of Board and Executive Director roles, (e) collective decision making, (f) react proactively rather than reactively and with a strategic approach. Accordingly:

3.1.1. The Board shall provide strategic leadership to TxDMV. In order to do this, the Board shall:

3.1.1.1. Be proactive and visionary in its thinking.

3.1.1.2. Encourage thoughtful deliberation, incorporating a diversity of viewpoints.

3.1.1.3. Work together as colleagues, encouraging mutual support and good humor.

3.1.1.4. Have the courage to lead and make difficult decisions.

3.1.1.5. Listen to the customers and stakeholders needs and objectives.

3.1.1.6. Anticipate the future, keeping informed of issues and trends that may affect the mission and organizational health of the TxDMV.

3.1.1.7. Make decisions based on an understanding that is developed by appropriate and complete stakeholder participation in the process of identifying the needs of the motoring public, motor vehicle industries,

and best practices in accordance with the mission and vision of the agency.

- 3.1.1.8. Commit to excellence in governance, including periodic monitoring, assessing and improving its own performance.
- 3.1.2. The Board shall create the linkage between the Board and the operations of the agency, via the Executive Director when policy or a directive is in order.
- 3.1.3. The Board shall cultivate a sense of group responsibility, accepting responsibility for excellence in governance. The Board shall be the initiator of policy, not merely respond to staff initiatives. The Board shall not use the expertise of individual members to substitute for the judgment of the board, although the expertise of individual members may be used to enhance the understanding of the Board as a body.
- 3.1.4. The Board shall govern the agency through the careful establishment of policies reflecting the board's values and perspectives, always focusing on the goals to be achieved and not the day-to-day administrative functions.
- 3.1.5. Continual Board development shall include orientation of new Board members in the board's governance process and periodic board discussion of how to improve its governance process.
- 3.1.6. The Board members shall fulfill group obligations, encouraging member involvement.
- 3.1.7. The Board shall evaluate its processes and performances periodically and make improvements as necessary to achieve premier governance standards.
- 3.1.8. Members shall respect confidentiality as is appropriate to issues of a sensitive nature.

3.2. TxDMV Board Primary Functions/Characteristics

TxDMV Board Governance can be seen as evolving over time. The system must be flexible and evolutionary. The functions and characteristics of the TxDMV governance system are:

- 3.2.1. Outreach
 - 3.2.1.1. Monitoring emerging trends, needs, expectations, and problems from the motoring public and the motor vehicle industries.
 - 3.2.1.2. Soliciting input from a broad base of stakeholders.

3.2.2. Stewardship

- 3.2.2.1. Challenging the framework and vision of the agency.
- 3.2.2.2. Maintaining a forward looking perspective.
- 3.2.2.3. Ensuring the evolution, capacity and robustness of the agency so it remains flexible and nimble.

3.2.3. Oversight of Operational Structure and Operations

- 3.2.3.1. Accountability functions.
- 3.2.3.2. Fiduciary responsibility.
- 3.2.3.3. Checks and balances on operations from a policy perspective.
- 3.2.3.4. Protecting the integrity of the agency.

3.2.4. Ambassadorial and Legitimizing

- 3.2.4.1. Promotion of the organization to the external stakeholders, including the Texas Legislature, based on the vision of the agency.
- 3.2.4.2. Ensuring the interests of a broad network of stakeholders are represented.
- 3.2.4.3. Board members lend their positional, professional and personal credibility to the organization through their position on the board.

3.2.5. Self-reflection and Assessment

- 3.2.5.1. Regular reviews of the functions and effectiveness of the Board itself.
- 3.2.5.2. Assessing the level of trust within the Board and the effectiveness of the group processes.

3.3. Board Governance Investment

Because poor governance costs more than learning to govern well, the Board shall invest in its governance capacity. Accordingly:

- 3.3.1. Board skills, methods, and supports shall be sufficient to ensure governing with excellence.

- 3.3.1.1. Training and retraining shall be used liberally to orient new members, as well as maintain and increase existing member skills and understanding.
 - 3.3.1.2. Outside monitoring assistance shall be arranged so that the board can exercise confident control over agency performance. This includes, but is not limited to, financial audits.
 - 3.3.1.3. Outreach mechanisms shall be used as needed to ensure the Board's ability to listen to stakeholder viewpoints and values.
 - 3.3.1.4. Other activities as needed to ensure the Board's ability to fulfill its ethical and legal obligations and to represent and link to the motoring public and the various motor vehicle industries.
- 3.3.2. The Board shall establish its cost of governance and it will be integrated into strategic planning and the agency's annual budgeting process.

3.4. Practice Discipline and Assess Performance

The Board shall ensure the integrity of the board's process by practicing discipline in Board behavior and continuously working to improve its performance. Accordingly:

- 3.4.1. The assigned result is that the Board operates consistently with its own rules and those legitimately imposed on it from outside the organization.
 - 3.4.1.1. Meeting discussion content shall consist solely of issues that clearly belong to the Board to decide or to monitor according to policy, rule and law. Meeting discussion shall be focused on performance targets, performance boundaries, action on items of Board authority such as conduct of administrative hearings, proposal, discussion and approval of administrative rule-making and discussion and approval of all strategic planning and fiscal matters of the agency.
 - 3.4.1.2. Board discussion during meetings shall be limited to topics posted on the agenda.
 - 3.4.1.3. Adequate time shall be given for deliberation which shall be respectful, brief, and to the point.
- 3.4.2. The Board shall strengthen its governing capacity by periodically assessing its own performance with respect to its governance model. Possible areas of assessment include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - 3.4.2.1. Are we clear and in agreement about mission and purpose?

- 3.4.2.2. Are values shared?
- 3.4.2.3. Do we have a strong orientation for our new members?
- 3.4.2.4. What goals have we set and how well are we accomplishing them?
- 3.4.2.5. What can we do as a board to improve our performance in these areas?
- 3.4.2.6. Are we providing clear and relevant direction to the Executive Director, stakeholders and partners of the TxDMV?
- 3.4.3. The Board Chair shall periodically promote regular evaluation and feedback to the whole Board on the level of its effectiveness.

Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Strategic Planning Policy

1. PURPOSE

The directives presented in this policy address the annual Strategic Planning process at the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TxDMV).

2. SCOPE

The directives presented in this policy apply to the TxDMV Board and TxDMV agency personnel who interact with the Board. TxDMV Strategic Planning Policy attempts to develop, document and expand its policy that is comprehensive in its scope in regards to the strategic planning process of the Board and the Department beyond that of the state strategic planning process.

3. POLICY

3.1. TxDMV Board Strategic Planning

This policy describes the context for strategic planning at TxDMV and the way in which the strategic plan shall be developed and communicated.

- 3.1.1. The Board is responsible for the strategic direction of the organization, which includes the vision, mission, values, strategic goals, and strategic objectives.
- 3.1.2. TxDMV shall use a 5-year strategic planning cycle, which shall be reviewed and updated annually, or as needed.
- 3.1.3. The 5-year strategic plan shall be informed by but not confined by requirements and directions of state and other funding bodies.
- 3.1.4. In developing strategic directions, the Board shall seek input from stakeholders, the industries served, and the public.
- 3.1.5. The Board shall:
 - 3.1.5.1. Ensure that it reviews the identification of and communication with its stakeholders at least annually.
 - 3.1.5.2. Discuss with agency staff, representatives of the industries served, and the public before determining or substantially changing strategic directions.

- 3.1.5.3. Ensure it receives continuous input about strategic directions and agency performance through periodic reporting processes.
- 3.1.6. The Board is responsible for a 5-year strategic plan that shall identify the key priorities and objectives of the organization, including but not limited to:
 - 3.1.6.1. The creation of meaningful vision, mission, and values statements.
 - 3.1.6.2. The establishment of a Customer Value Proposition that clearly articulates essential customer expectations.
 - 3.1.6.3. A Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis, to be updated annually.
 - 3.1.6.4. An assessment of external factors or trends (i.e., customer needs, political factors, economic factors, industry trends, technology factors, uncertainties, etc.)
 - 3.1.6.5. Development of the specific goals and objectives the Department must achieve and a timeline for action.
 - 3.1.6.6. Identification of the key performance indicators to measure success and the initiatives that shall drive results.
 - 3.1.6.7. Engage staff at all levels of the organization, through the executive director, in the development of the strategic plan through surveys, interviews, focus groups, and regular communication.
 - 3.1.6.8. Ensure the strategic planning process produces the data necessary for LBB/GOBPP state required compliance while expanding and enhancing the strategic plan to support the needs of the TxDMV. The overall strategic plan shall be used as a tool for strategic management.
- 3.1.7. The Board delegates to the Executive Director the responsibility for **implementing** the agency's strategic direction through the development of agency wide and divisional operational plans.

Texas Department of Motor Vehicles TxDMV Goals and Objectives

1. PURPOSE

The information presented in this policy addresses the goals and key objectives of the Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TxDMV) as they relate to the mission, vision, and values of the TxDMV.

2. SCOPE

The scope of this policy is to define the desired state the TxDMV Board is working to achieve. This policy is designed to be inspirational in outlining the desired state of the agency that supports the TxDMV Board vision and meeting agency goals.

3. TxDMV MISSION

To serve, protect and advance the citizens and industries in the state with quality motor vehicle related services.

4. TxDMV VISION

The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles sets the standard as the premier provider of customer service in the nation.

5. TxDMV VALUES

To earn the trust and faith of all citizens of Texas with transparency, efficiency, excellence, accountability, and putting stakeholders first.

5.1. Transparency – Being open and inclusive in all we do.

5.2. Efficiency – Being good stewards of state resources by providing products and services in the most cost-effective manner possible.

5.3. Excellence – Working diligently to achieve the highest standards.

5.4. Accountability – Accepting responsibility for all we do, collectively and as individuals.

5.5. Stakeholders – Putting customers and stakeholders first, always.

6. TxDMV GOALS

6.1. GOAL 1 – Performance Driven

The TxDMV shall be a performance driven agency in its operations whether it is in customer service, licensing, permitting, enforcement or rule-making. At all times the TxDMV shall mirror in its performance the expectations of its customers and stakeholder by effective, efficient, customer-focused, on-time, fair, predictable and thorough service or decisions.

6.1.1. Key Objective 1

The TxDMV shall be an agency that is retail-oriented in its approach. To accomplish this orientation TxDMV shall concentrate the focus of the agency on:

- 6.1.1.1. Delivering its products and services to all of its customers and stakeholders in a manner that recognizes that their needs come first. These needs must be positively and proactively met. TxDMV works for and with its customers and stakeholders, not the other way around.
- 6.1.1.2. Operating the agency's licensing and registration functions in a manner akin to how a private, for-profit business. As a private, for-profit business, TxDMV would have to listen to its customers and stakeholders and implement best practices to meet their needs or its services would no longer be profitable or necessary. Act and react in a manner that understands how to perform without a government safety net and going out of business.
- 6.1.1.3. Simplify the production and distribution processes and ease of doing business with the TxDMV. Adapting and maintaining a business value of continuous improvement is central to TxDMV operations and processes.
- 6.1.1.4. All operations of the TxDMV shall stand on their own merits operationally and financially. If a current process does not make sense then TxDMV shall work within legislative and legal constraints to redesign or discard it. If a current process does not make or save money for the state and/or its customers or stakeholders then TxDMV shall work within legislative and legal constraints to redesign or discard it. TxDMV shall operate as efficiently and effective as possible in terms of financial and personnel needs. Divisions should focus on cost savings without sacrificing performance. Division directors are accountable for meeting these needs and applicable measures. All division directors are collectively responsible for the performance of TxDMV as a whole.
- 6.1.1.5. Focus on revenue generation for transportation needs as well as the needs of its customers.
- 6.1.1.6. Decisions regarding the TxDMV divisions should be based on the overriding business need of each division to meet or provide a specific service demand, with the understanding and coordination of overarching agency-wide needs.

- 6.1.1.7. Developing and regularly updating a long-range Statewide Plan describing total system needs, establishing overarching statewide goals, and ensuring progress toward those goals.
- 6.1.1.8. The TxDMV shall establish a transparent, well-defined, and understandable system of project management within the TxDMV that integrates project milestones, forecasts, and priorities.
- 6.1.1.9. The TxDMV shall develop detailed work programs driven by milestones for major projects and other statewide goals for all TxDMV divisions.
- 6.1.1.10. The TxDMV, with input from stakeholders and policymakers, shall measure and report on progress in meeting goals and milestones for major projects and other statewide goals.

6.2. GOAL 2 – Optimized Services and Innovation

The TxDMV shall be an innovative, forward thinking agency that looks for ways to promote the economic well-being and development of the industries it serves as well as the State of Texas within the legislative boundaries that have been established for the agency.

6.2.1. Key Objective 1

The TxDMV shall achieve operational, cultural, structural and financial independence from other state agencies.

- 6.2.1.1. Build the TxDMV identity. This means that TxDMV shall make customers aware of what services we offer and how they can take advantage of those services.
- 6.2.1.2. Build the TxDMV brand. This means that TxDMV shall reach out to the stakeholders, industries we serve and the public, being proactive in addressing and anticipating their needs.
- 6.2.1.3. Determine immediate, future, and long term facility and capital needs. TxDMV needs its own stand-alone facility and IT system as soon as possible. In connection with these needs, TxDMV shall identify efficient and effective ways to pay for them without unduly burdening either the state, its customers or stakeholders.
- 6.2.1.4. All regulations, enforcement actions and decision at TxDMV shall be made in a timely, fair and predictable manner.

6.2.2. Key Objective 2

Provide continuous education training on business trends in the industry with a particular emphasis on activities in Texas.

6.2.3. Key Objective 3

Provide continuous outreach services to all customers and stakeholders to access their respective needs and wants. This includes helping frame legislative or regulatory issues for consideration by other bodies including the legislature.

6.2.4. Key Objective 4

Examine all fees to determine their individual worth and reasonableness of amount. No fee shall be charged that cannot be defended financially and operationally.

6.3. GOAL 3 – Customer-centric

The TxDMV shall be a customer-centric agency that delivers today's services and decisions in a positive, solution-seeking manner while ensuring continuous, consistent and meaningful public and stakeholder involvement in shaping the TxDMV of tomorrow.

6.3.1. Key Objective 1

The TxDMV shall seek to serve its customer base through a creative and retail oriented approach to support the needs of its industries and customers.

6.3.2. Key Objective 2

The TxDMV shall develop and implement a public involvement policy that guides and encourages meaningful public involvement efforts agency-wide.

6.3.3. Key Objective 3

The TxDMV shall develop standard procedures for documenting, tracking, and analyzing customer complaint data. Successful problem resolution metrics should be monitored to support continuous improvement activities that shall permanently improve customer facing processes.

6.3.4. Key Objective 4

The TxDMV shall provide a formal process for staff with similar responsibilities to share best practices information.

6.3.5. Key Objective 5



The TxDMV shall provide central coordination of the Department's outreach campaigns.

6.3.6. Key Objective 6

The TxDMV shall develop and expand user friendly, convenient, and efficient website applications.

6.3.7. Key Objective 7

TxDmv shall timely meet all legislative requests and mandates.

Agency Operational Boundaries as Defined by Department Policies of the TxDMV Board (Board)

The Board is responsible for the policy direction of the agency. The Board's official connection to the day-to-day operation of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TxDMV) and the conduct of its business is through the Executive Director of the TxDMV (ED) who is appointed by the Board and serves at its pleasure. The authority and accountability for the day-to-day operations of the agency and all members of the staff, except those members who report directly to the Board, is the sole responsibility of the ED.

In accordance with its policy-making authority the Board has established the following policy boundaries for the agency. The intent of the boundaries is not to limit the ability of the ED and agency staff to manage the day-to-day operations of the agency. To the contrary, the intent of the boundaries is to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the ED so as to liberate the staff from any uncertainty as to limitations on their authority to act in the best interest of the agency. The ED and staff should have certainty that they can operate on a daily basis as they see fit without having to worry about prior Board consultation or subsequent Board reversal of their acts.

The ED and all agency employees shall act at all times in an exemplary manner consistent with the responsibilities and expectations vested in their positions. The ED and all agency employees shall act in a manner consistent with Board policies as well as with those practices, activities, decisions, and organizational circumstances that are legal, prudent, and ethical. It is the responsibility of the ED to ensure that all agency employees adhere to these boundaries.

Accordingly, the TxDMV boundaries are as follows:

1. The day-to-day operations of the agency should be conducted in a manner consistent with the vision, mission, values, strategic framework, and performance metrics as established by the Board. These elements must not be disregarded or jeopardized in any way.
2. A team-oriented approach must be followed on all enterprise-wide decisions to ensure openness and transparency both internally and externally.
3. The agency must guard against allowing any financial conditions and decision which risk adverse fiscal consequences, compromise Board financial priorities, or fail to

show an acceptable level of foresight as related to the needs and benefits of agency initiatives.

4. The agency must provide timely, accurate, and honest information that will afford the Board, public, stakeholders, executive branch and the legislature the best ability to evaluate all sides of an issue or opportunity before forming an opinion or taking action on it. Any information provided that is intentionally untimely, inaccurate, misleading or one-sided will not be tolerated.
5. The agency must take all reasonable care to avoid or identify in a timely manner all conflicts of interest or even the appearance of impropriety in awarding purchases, negotiating contracts or in hiring employees.
6. The agency must maintain adequate administrative policies and procedures that are understandable and aid in staff recruitment, development and retention.
7. The agency must maintain an organizational structure that develops and promotes the program areas from an enterprise-wide perspective. No organizational silos or sub-agencies will be allowed. We are the TxDMV.
8. The agency must empower its entire staff to deliver a positive customer experience to every TxDMV customer, stakeholder or vendor to reduce their effort and make it easier for them to do business with the TxDMV.
9. The agency must at all times look to flattening its organizational structure to reduce cost as technology advances allow.
10. Agency staff shall anticipate and resolve all issues timely.
11. The agency must maximize the deployment and utilization of all of its assets – people, processes and capital equipment – in order to fully succeed.
12. The agency must not waste the goodwill and respect of our customers, stakeholders, executive branch and legislature. All communication shall be proper, honest, and transparent with timely follow-up when appropriate.
13. The agency should focus its work efforts to create value, make sure that processes, programs, or projects are properly designed, budgeted and vetted as appropriate with outside stakeholders to ensure our assumptions are correct so positive value continues to be created by the actions of the TxDMV.
14. The ED through his or her staff is responsible for the ongoing monitoring of all program and fiscal authorities and providing information to the Board to keep it apprised of all program progress and fiscal activities. This self-assessment must result in a product that adequately describes the accomplishment of all program

goals, objectives and outcomes as well as proposals to correct any identified problems.

15. In advance of all policy decisions that the Board is expected to make, the ED will provide pertinent information and ensure board members understand issues/matters related to the pending policy decision. Additionally, the ED or designee will develop a process for planning activities to be performed leading up to that particular policy decision and the timeframe for conducting these planning activities. It is imperative that the planning process describes not only when Board consideration will be expected but also when prior Board consultation and involvement in each planning activity will occur.
16. In seeking clarification on informational items Board members may directly approach the ED or his or her designee to obtain information to supplement, upgrade or enhance their knowledge and improve the Board's decision-making. Any Board member requests that require substantive work should come to the Board or Committee Chairs for direction.
17. The agency must seek stakeholder input as appropriate on matters that might affect them prior to public presentation of same to the Board.
18. The agency must measure results, track progress, and report out timely and consistently.
19. The ED and staff shall have the courage to admit a mistake or failure.
20. The ED and staff shall celebrate successes!

The Board expects the ED to work with agency staff to develop their written interpretation of each of the boundaries. The ED will then present this written interpretation to the Board prior to discussion between the Board and ED on the interpretation. The Board reserves the right to accept, reject or modify any interpretation. The intent is that the Board and the ED will come to a mutually agreeable interpretation of agency boundaries that will then form the basis of additional written thought on the part of the ED and staff as to how these boundaries will influence the actions of the agency.