

**TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES  
CASE NO. 20-0006197 CAF**

**KIM-NGA DO,**  
**Complainant**

**v.**

**JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH  
AMERICA, LLC,**  
**Respondent**

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**BEFORE THE OFFICE  
  
OF  
  
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS**

**DECISION AND ORDER**

Kim-Nga Do (Complainant) filed a complaint with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) seeking relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 (Lemon Law) for alleged warrantable defects in his vehicle distributed by Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Respondent). A preponderance of the evidence does not show that the subject vehicle has a currently existing warrantable defect. Consequently, the Complainant’s vehicle does not qualify for repurchase/replacement or warranty repair.

**I. Procedural History, Notice and Jurisdiction**

Matters of notice of hearing<sup>1</sup> and jurisdiction were not contested and are discussed only in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The hearing in this case convened on August 6, 2020, by video conference, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on August 14, 2020. Donald McGee, the Complainant’s spouse, represented the Complainant. John Chambless, attorney, represented the Respondent.

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<sup>1</sup> TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.051.

## II. Discussion

### A. Applicable Law

#### 1. Repurchase/Replacement Relief Requirements

A vehicle qualifies for repurchase or replacement if the respondent cannot “conform a motor vehicle to an applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting a defect or condition that creates a serious safety hazard or substantially impairs the use or market value of the motor vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts.”<sup>2</sup> In other words, (1) the vehicle must have a defect covered by an applicable warranty (warrantable defect); (2) the defect must either (a) create a serious safety hazard or (b) substantially impair the use or market value of the vehicle; and (3) the defect must currently exist after a “reasonable number of attempts” at repair.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the Lemon Law imposes other requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, including (1) a written notice of the defect to the respondent, (2) an opportunity to cure by the respondent, and (3) a deadline for filing a Lemon Law complaint.

##### a. Serious Safety Hazard

The Lemon Law defines “serious safety hazard” as a life-threatening malfunction or nonconformity that: (1) substantially impedes a person’s ability to control or operate a vehicle for ordinary use or intended purposes, or (2) creates a substantial risk of fire or explosion.<sup>4</sup>

##### b. Substantial Impairment of Use or Value

###### i. Impairment of Use

In determining substantial impairment of use, the Department considers “whether a defect or nonconformity hampers the intended normal operation of the vehicle.” For instance, “while a vehicle with a non-functioning air conditioner would be available for use and transporting passengers, its intended normal use would be substantially impaired.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

<sup>3</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

<sup>4</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.601(4).

<sup>5</sup> *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).

**ii. Impairment of Value**

The Department applies a reasonable purchaser standard for determining whether a defect substantially impairs the value of a vehicle. The reasonable purchaser standard “does not require an owner to present an expert witness or any technical or market-based evidence to show decreased value.” Instead, under this standard, “factfinders should put themselves in the position of a reasonable prospective purchaser of the subject vehicle and determine (based on the evidence presented) if the current condition of the vehicle would deter them from buying the vehicle or substantially negatively affect how much they would be willing to pay for the vehicle.”<sup>6</sup>

**c. Reasonable Number of Repair Attempts**

Generally, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity continues to exist after being subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.<sup>7</sup>

Alternatively, for serious safety hazards, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity creates a serious safety hazard and continues to exist after causing the vehicle to have been subject to repair two or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) (“We find that this interpretation of the standard required for demonstrating substantial impairment is reasonable and consistent with the statute’s plain language which requires a showing of loss in market value. . . . [T]he Division’s interpretation that expert testimony or technical or market-based evidence is not required to show diminished value or use is consistent with the statute’s goal of mitigating manufacturers’ economic advantages in warranty-related disputes.”).

<sup>7</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(1)(A) and (B).

<sup>8</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(2).

Additionally, for vehicles out of service at least 30 days, a rebuttable presumption may be established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[A] nonconformity still exists that substantially impairs the vehicle's use or market value, the vehicle is out of service for repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.<sup>9</sup>

The 30 days described above does not include any period when the owner has a comparable loaner vehicle provided while the dealer repairs the subject vehicle.<sup>10</sup>

The existence of a statutory rebuttable presumption does not preclude otherwise finding a reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle based on different circumstances and fewer attempts.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the Department adopted a decision indicating that if a consumer presents the vehicle to a dealer for repair and the dealer fails to repair the vehicle, then that visit would constitute a repair attempt unless the consumer was at fault for the failure to repair the vehicle.<sup>12</sup>

#### **d. Other Requirements**

Even if a vehicle satisfies the preceding requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, the Lemon Law prohibits repurchase or replacement unless: (1) the owner or someone on behalf of the owner, or the Department has provided written notice of the alleged defect or nonconformity to the respondent;<sup>13</sup> (2) the respondent was given an opportunity to cure the defect or nonconformity;<sup>14</sup> and (3) the Lemon Law complaint was filed within six months after the earliest

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<sup>9</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(3).

<sup>10</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(c).

<sup>11</sup> *Ford Motor Company v. Texas Department of Transportation*, 936 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (“[T]he existence of statutory presumptions does not forbid the agency from finding that different circumstances or fewer attempts meet the requisite ‘reasonable number of attempts.’”).

<sup>12</sup> *DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Williams*, No. 03-99-00822-CV (Tex. App.—Austin, June 22, 2000, no writ) (not designated for publication) (Repair attempts include “those occasions when the fault for failing to repair the vehicle rests with the dealership.” Conversely, “those occasions when failure to repair the vehicle was the fault of the consumer would not be considered a repair attempt under the statute.”).

<sup>13</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(c)(1). 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.204 provides that “[u]pon receipt of a complaint for lemon law or warranty performance relief, the department will provide notification of the complaint to the appropriate manufacturer, converter, or distributor.” The Department’s notice of the complaint to the Respondent may satisfy the requirement to provide notice of the defect or nonconformity to the Respondent.

<sup>14</sup> A respondent may delegate its opportunity to cure to a dealer. A repair visit to a dealer satisfies the opportunity to cure requirement when the respondent allows a dealer to attempt repair after written notice to the

of: the warranty's expiration date or the dates on which 24 months or 24,000 miles had passed since the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to an owner.<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Warranty Repair Relief

Even if repurchase or replacement relief does not apply, a vehicle may still qualify for warranty repair if the vehicle has a “defect . . . that is covered by a manufacturer's, converter's, or distributor's . . . warranty agreement applicable to the vehicle” and the vehicle owner notified the manufacturer, converter, distributor, or its authorized agent of the defect before the warranty's expiration.<sup>16</sup> The manufacturer, converter, or distributor has an obligation to “make repairs necessary to conform a new motor vehicle to an applicable . . . express warranty.”<sup>17</sup>

## 3. Burden of Proof

The law places the burden of proof on the Complainant.<sup>18</sup> The Complainant must prove all facts required for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, the Complainant must present sufficient evidence to show that every required fact more likely than not exists.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, the Complainant cannot prevail where the existence of any required fact appears equally likely or unlikely.

## 4. The Complaint Identifies the Issues in this Proceeding

The complaint identifies the issues to be addressed in this proceeding.<sup>20</sup> The complaint must state “sufficient facts to enable the department and the party complained against to know the

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respondent. *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 221 and 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012); Texas Department of Transportation, *Kennemer v. Dutchman Manufacturing, Inc.*, MVD Cause No. 09-0091 CAF (Motor Vehicle Division Sept. 25, 2009) (Final Order Granting Chapter 2301, Subchapter M Relief). An opportunity to cure does not require an actual repair attempt but only a valid opportunity. *Id* at 2.

<sup>15</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(d)(2).

<sup>16</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204; 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(b)(3).

<sup>17</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.603(a).

<sup>18</sup> 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.66(d).

<sup>19</sup> *E.g.*, *Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Garza*, 164 S.W.3d 607, 621 (Tex. 2005).

<sup>20</sup> “In a contested case, each party is entitled to an opportunity . . . for hearing after reasonable notice of not less than 10 days.” TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2001.051; “Notice of a hearing in a contested case must include . . . a short, plain statement of the factual matters asserted.” TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2001.052. *See* TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(b) (“The complaint must be made in writing to the applicable dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor and must specify each defect in the vehicle that is covered by the warranty.”); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(d) (“A hearing may

nature of the complaint and the specific problems or circumstances forming the basis of the claim for relief under the lemon law.”<sup>21</sup> However, the parties may expressly or impliedly consent to hearing issues not included in the pleadings.<sup>22</sup> Implied consent occurs when a party introduces evidence on an unpleaded issue without objection.<sup>23</sup>

## 5. Incidental Expenses

When repurchase or replacement is ordered, the Lemon Law provides for reimbursing the Complainant for reasonable incidental expenses resulting from the vehicle’s loss of use because of the defect.<sup>24</sup> Reimbursable expenses include, but are not limited to: (1) alternate transportation; (2) towing; (3) telephone calls or mail charges directly attributable to contacting the manufacturer, distributor, converter, or dealer regarding the vehicle; (4) meals and lodging necessitated by the vehicle’s failure during out-of-town trips; (5) loss or damage to personal property; (6) attorney fees, if the complainant retains counsel after notification that the respondent is represented by counsel; and (7) items or accessories added to the vehicle at or after purchase, less a reasonable allowance for use. The expenses must be reasonable and verifiable (for example, through receipts or similar written documents).<sup>25</sup> However, the Department’s rules expressly exclude compensation for “any interest, finance charge, or insurance premiums.”<sup>26</sup>

### B. Summary of Complainant’s Evidence and Arguments

On April 10, 2018, the Complainant, purchased a new 2017 Land Rover Range Rover Sport from Momentum Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Houston, Texas. The vehicle had 23 miles on the odometer at the time of purchase. The vehicle’s limited warranty provides bumper to bumper coverage for four years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first.

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be scheduled on any complaint made under this section that is not privately resolved between the owner and the dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor.”).

<sup>21</sup> 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(a)(3).

<sup>22</sup> 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.42; TEX. R. CIV. P. 67.

<sup>23</sup> See *Gadd v. Lynch*, 258 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1953, writ ref’d).

<sup>24</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604.

<sup>25</sup> 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209(a).

<sup>26</sup> 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.208(b)(1).

On November 25, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent. On December 25, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the check engine light illuminated in association with a hose detaching from the turbo exhaust manifold.

In relevant part, the Complainant took the vehicle to a dealer for repair of the alleged issues as follows:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Miles</b>	<b>Issue</b>
01/18/2019	6,732	Check engine light on
07/03/2019	10,396	Check engine light on - software error
07/18/2019- 07/26/2019	11,281	Check engine light on - particulate filter
07/30/2019- 10/10/2019	11,480	Check engine light on

After the ultimate diagnosis, Mr. McGee testified that they picked up the subject vehicle about January 8, 2020. The Complainant explained that the check engine light came on last year. She first noticed this at the beginning of January 2019. The first two repair visits, she left the dealer with the vehicle the same day. On July 18th, she left the vehicle at the dealer and the dealer provided a loaner vehicle. She picked up the vehicle about 10 days later and the check engine light came on. She left the vehicle at the dealer again on July 30, 2019. The dealership called in October. After coming in to pick up the vehicle, before driving a whole block, the vehicle shook badly and would not accelerate. She turned around and went back to the dealership, driving only about four miles per hour. She left the vehicle at the dealership and the vehicle stayed until January (2020). She did not see the check engine light come on after picking up the vehicle in January. She stated that there were four repair attempts for the issue in the complaint. The last time the check engine light came on was July 30th (of 2019). She explained that the vehicle stayed at the dealership for most of the end of 2019 and she kept having to call and follow up on the vehicle and did not get to enjoy using it. Mr. McGee believed the vehicle was ready on the last day or two of December (2019) but they wanted to talk with the dealer. On January 8, 2020, the dealer suggested driving the vehicle for a few weeks and meeting again. Mr. McGee discussed with the dealer, the possibility of getting an extended warranty but he ultimately did not get a response from the dealership.

On cross-examination, the Complainant averred that she had not been in any accidents. She elaborated that she had a tire replaced because of a flat. Mr. McGee added that the flat occurred on the way to the dealer for maintenance. She did not know how the flat tire occurred.

### **C. Summary of Respondent's Evidence and Arguments**

Brandon Sangster, senior customer service technical specialist, testified in repair order (RO) 39929, the check engine light related to a needed service action in a bulletin. There is an update to the PCM (powertrain control module) changing the parameters for the DEF (diesel exhaust fluid) warning system, which can have a check engine light associated. He elaborated that update changed the parameters for when the DEF message appears and did not necessarily indicate a problem. This issue did not occur again. In RO 43259, the technician found a trouble code for the diesel particulate efficiency filter which had an associated PCM update. The code is no longer there and the issue is considered fixed. The Complainant drove for weeks between the visits to update software. In RO 43569, the technician found a code but the vehicle already had the latest software. The technician checked the hardware next. The technician replaced the diesel particulate filter due to an internal part failure. In RO 43782, the technician found the prior diesel particulate filter repair resulted in damage to the turbo. The technician opened a technical assistance (TA) case to get more support. The technician was advised to inspect clamps and order parts. The parts originated from the UK, so they may take a long time to arrive. After testing, ordering and replacing a series of parts without resolving the problem, the technician found a leaking engine mount and replaced it which did not resolve the problem. Ultimately, the technician found damage to the exhaust pressure control valve caused by a prior repair and replaced the part, which fixed the issue. Mr. Sangster elaborated that because the dealer does not commonly keep the parts, parts must be ordered from the UK, which can take an extended time.

On cross-examination, Mr. Sangster explained that he did not physically see the subject vehicle but did review the case file, repair orders, TA case, and customer service calls. He acknowledged that he had reviewed videos and photos in the TA case.

### **D. Analysis**

As an initial matter, to qualify for any relief, whether warranty repair or repurchase/replacement, the law requires the vehicle to have a defect covered by the Respondent's



warranty (warrantable defect) that continues to exist after repairs.<sup>27</sup> In this case, the warranty generally states that:

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, warrants that during the warranty period, if a Land Rover vehicle is properly operated and maintained, repairs required to correct defects in factory-supplied materials or factory workmanship will be performed without charge upon presentment for service at an authorized Land Rover retailer; any component covered by this warranty found to be defective in materials or workmanship will be repaired, or replaced, without charge with a new or remanufactured part distributed by Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, at its sole option.

The warranty period for the vehicle begins on the date of the first retail sale, or on the date of entry into demonstrator or company service, whichever occurs first. The basic warranty period is for four (4) years or until the vehicle has been driven 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first.

According to these terms, the warranty only applies to defects in materials or workmanship (manufacturing defects).<sup>28</sup> A defectively manufactured vehicle has a flaw because of some error in making it at the factory, such as incorrect assembly or the use of a broken part. Manufacturing defects exist when the vehicle leaves the manufacturing plant. Unlike manufacturing defects, issues that do not arise from manufacturing, such as the vehicle's design characteristics (which exist before manufacturing) or improper dealer repairs (which occur after manufacturing) are not warrantable defects. Because the warranty only covers manufacturing defects, any non-manufacturing problems do not qualify for relief.

As described above, the evidence must show that a warrantable defect continues to exist after repairs. Consequently, defects only occurring before repairs cannot support any relief. In this case, the evidence reflects that the vehicle does not have a currently existing defect. The Complainant testified that the check engine light did not illuminate after picking up her vehicle from the dealer in January 2020, nor did she notice any shaking or failure to accelerate. Moreover,

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<sup>27</sup> TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603(a), 2301.604(a); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204.

<sup>28</sup> Courts have affirmed that warranty language covering “defects in material or workmanship” do not cover design issues. *E.g.*, *Whitt v. Mazda Motor of America*, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00343, 211-Ohio-3097, ¶¶ 18-21 (“The manufacturer’s express warranty in the case sub judice provides: ‘Mazda warrants that your new Mazda Vehicle is free from defects in material or workmanship . . . .’ The trial court found the warranty did not cover claims of design defects. . . . The problems about which Appellants complained did not fall within the applicable expressed warranty.”); *see GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc.*, 822 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“the language in the contract of May 12, 1980, expressly limited TCR’s recovery only for defects in materials or workmanship to damages for repair or replacement value. No mention was made in the guarantee of remedies for design defects.”).

a faulty dealer repair damaged the pressure control valve, which caused the check engine light addressed by the last repair visit (i.e., this check engine light did not arise from a manufacturing defect). The dealer replaced the damaged pressure control valve at the July 30, 2019, service visit, resolving the latest check engine light issue. Also, as shown in the record, different, unrelated issues may trigger the check engine light, which did not necessarily indicate the existence of a manufacturing defect. In conclusion, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that the vehicle has a currently existing warrantable defect.

### III. Findings of Fact

1. On April 10, 2018, the Complainant, purchased a new 2017 Land Rover Range Rover Sport from Momentum Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Houston, Texas. The vehicle had 23 miles on the odometer at the time of purchase.
2. The vehicle's limited warranty provides bumper to bumper coverage for four years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first.
3. The Complainant took the vehicle to a dealer for repair as shown below:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Miles</b>	<b>Issue</b>
01/18/2019	6,732	Check engine light on
07/03/2019	10,396	Check engine light on - software error
07/18/2019- 07/26/2019	11,281	Check engine light on - particulate filter
07/30/2019- 10/10/2019	11,480	Check engine light on

4. On November 25, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent.
5. On December 25, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the check engine light illuminated associated with a hose detaching from the turbo exhaust manifold.
6. On March 10, 2020, the Department's Office of Administrative Hearings issued a notice of hearing directed to all parties, giving them not less than 10 days' notice of hearing and their rights under the applicable rules and statutes. The notice stated the time, place and nature of the hearing; the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing was to

be held; particular sections of the statutes and rules involved; and the factual matters asserted.

7. The hearing in this case convened on August 6, 2020, by video conference, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on August 14, 2020. Donald McGee, the Complainant's spouse, represented the Complainant. John Chambless, attorney, represented the Respondent.
8. The vehicle's odometer displayed 15,018 miles at the time of the hearing.
9. The vehicle's warranty was in effect at the time of the hearing.
10. The dealership completed the last repairs in December of 2019.
11. The Complainant retrieved the vehicle from the dealership in January of 2020.
12. The vehicle did not exhibit a check engine light or any other complained of issue after January 2020.

#### **IV. Conclusions of Law**

1. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles has jurisdiction over this matter. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.601-2301.613 and 2301.204.
2. A hearings examiner of the Department's Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over all matters related to conducting a hearing in this proceeding, including the preparation of a decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the issuance of a final order. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.704.
3. The Complainant filed a sufficient complaint with the Department. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202.
4. The parties received proper notice of the hearing. TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2001.051, 2001.052. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.206(2).
5. The Complainant bears the burden of proof in this matter. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 206.66(d).

6. The Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. The Complainant did not prove that the vehicle has a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603 and 2301.604(a).
7. The Complainant does not qualify for reimbursement of incidental expenses because the vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603, 2301.604(a); 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209.
8. The Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for warranty repair. The Complainant did not prove that the vehicle has a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.204 and 2301.603.
9. The Respondent remains responsible to address and repair or correct any defects that are covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.603.

#### V. Order

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is **ORDERED** that the Complainant's petition for relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 is **DISMISSED**.

**SIGNED October 19, 2020**



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**ANDREW KANG**  
**HEARINGS EXAMINER**  
**OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS**  
**TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES**