

**TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
CASE NO. 19-0013486 CAF**

**MICHAEL BLANCHARD,
Complainant**

v.

**FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Respondent**

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**BEFORE THE OFFICE

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS**

DECISION AND ORDER

Michael Blanchard (Complainant) filed a complaint with the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) seeking relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 (Lemon Law) for alleged warrantable defects in his vehicle manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Respondent). A preponderance of the evidence shows that the subject vehicle has a warrantable defect that qualifies for warranty repair only.

I. Procedural History, Notice and Jurisdiction

Matters of notice of hearing¹ and jurisdiction were not contested and are discussed only in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The hearing in this case convened on April 7, 2020, by telephone, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on the same day. The Complainant, represented himself. Shirley Calderon-Pagan, Consumer Affairs Legal Analyst, represented the Respondent.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

1. Repurchase/Replacement Relief Requirements

A vehicle qualifies for repurchase or replacement if the respondent cannot “conform a motor vehicle to an applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting a defect or condition

¹ TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2001.051.

that creates a serious safety hazard or substantially impairs the use or market value of the motor vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts.”² In other words, (1) the vehicle must have a defect covered by an applicable warranty (warrantable defect); (2) the defect must either (a) create a serious safety hazard or (b) substantially impair the use or market value of the vehicle; and (3) the defect must currently exist after a “reasonable number of attempts” at repair.³ In addition, the Lemon Law imposes other requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, including (1) a written notice of the defect to the respondent, (2) an opportunity to cure by the respondent, and (3) a deadline for filing a Lemon Law complaint.

a. Serious Safety Hazard

The Lemon Law defines “serious safety hazard” as a life-threatening malfunction or nonconformity that: (1) substantially impedes a person’s ability to control or operate a vehicle for ordinary use or intended purposes, or (2) creates a substantial risk of fire or explosion.⁴

b. Substantial Impairment of Use or Value

i. Impairment of Use

In determining substantial impairment of use, the Department considers “whether a defect or nonconformity hampers the intended normal operation of the vehicle.” For instance, “while a vehicle with a non-functioning air conditioner would be available for use and transporting passengers, its intended normal use would be substantially impaired.”⁵

ii. Impairment of Value

The Department applies a reasonable purchaser standard for determining whether a defect substantially impairs the value of a vehicle. The reasonable purchaser standard “does not require an owner to present an expert witness or any technical or market-based evidence to show decreased value.” Instead, under this standard, “factfinders should put themselves in the position of a reasonable prospective purchaser of the subject vehicle and determine (based on the evidence

² TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

³ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604(a).

⁴ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.601(4).

⁵ *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).

presented) if the current condition of the vehicle would deter them from buying the vehicle or substantially negatively affect how much they would be willing to pay for the vehicle.”⁶

c. Reasonable Number of Repair Attempts

Generally, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity continues to exist after being subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁷

Alternatively, for serious safety hazards, a rebuttable presumption is established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[T]he same nonconformity creates a serious safety hazard and continues to exist after causing the vehicle to have been subject to repair two or more times by the manufacturer, converter, or distributor or an authorized agent or franchised dealer of a manufacturer, converter, or distributor and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁸

Additionally, for vehicles out of service at least 30 days, a rebuttable presumption may be established that the vehicle had a reasonable number of repair attempts if:

[A] nonconformity still exists that substantially impairs the vehicle’s use or market value, the vehicle is out of service for repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, and the attempts were made before the earlier of: (A) the date the express warranty expires; or (B) 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the owner.⁹

⁶ *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) (“[T]he Division’s interpretation that expert testimony or technical or market-based evidence is not required to show diminished value or use is consistent with the statute’s goal of mitigating manufacturers’ economic advantages in warranty-related disputes.”).

⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(1)(A) and (B).

⁸ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(2).

⁹ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(a)(3).

The 30 days described above does not include any period when the owner has a comparable loaner vehicle provided while the dealer repairs the subject vehicle.¹⁰

The existence of a statutory rebuttable presumption does not preclude otherwise finding a reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle based on different circumstances and fewer attempts.¹¹ Furthermore, the Department adopted a decision indicating that if a consumer presents the vehicle to a dealer for repair and the dealer fails to repair the vehicle, then that visit would constitute a repair attempt unless the consumer was at fault for the failure to repair the vehicle.¹²

d. Other Requirements

Even if a vehicle satisfies the preceding requirements for repurchase/replacement relief, the Lemon Law prohibits repurchase or replacement unless: (1) the owner or someone on behalf of the owner, or the Department has provided written notice of the alleged defect or nonconformity to the respondent;¹³ (2) the respondent was given an opportunity to cure the defect or nonconformity;¹⁴ and (3) the Lemon Law complaint was filed within six months after the earliest of: the warranty's expiration date or the dates on which 24 months or 24,000 miles had passed since the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to an owner.¹⁵

¹⁰ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605(c).

¹¹ *Ford Motor Company v. Texas Department of Transportation*, 936 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (“[T]he existence of statutory presumptions does not forbid the agency from finding that different circumstances or fewer attempts meet the requisite ‘reasonable number of attempts.’”).

¹² *DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Williams*, No. 03-99-00822-CV (Tex. App.—Austin, June 22, 2000, no writ) (not designated for publication) (Repair attempts include “those occasions when the fault for failing to repair the vehicle rests with the dealership.” Conversely, “those occasions when failure to repair the vehicle was the fault of the consumer would not be considered a repair attempt under the statute.”).

¹³ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(c)(1). 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.204 provides that “[u]pon receipt of a complaint for lemon law or warranty performance relief, the department will provide notification of the complaint to the appropriate manufacturer, converter, or distributor.” The Department’s notice of the complaint to the Respondent may satisfy the requirement to provide notice of the defect or nonconformity to the Respondent.

¹⁴ A respondent may delegate its opportunity to cure to a dealer. A repair visit to a dealer satisfies the opportunity to cure requirement when the respondent allows a dealer to attempt repair after written notice to the respondent. *Dutchmen Manufacturing, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division*, 383 S.W.3d 217, 221 and 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012); Texas Department of Transportation, *Kennemer v. Dutchman Manufacturing, Inc.*, MVD Cause No. 09-0091 CAF (Motor Vehicle Division Sept. 25, 2009) (Final Order Granting Chapter 2301, Subchapter M Relief). An opportunity to cure does not require an actual repair attempt but only a valid opportunity. *Id* at 2.

¹⁵ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(d)(2).

2. Warranty Repair Relief

Even if repurchase or replacement relief does not apply, a vehicle may still qualify for warranty repair if the vehicle has a “defect . . . that is covered by a manufacturer’s, converter’s, or distributor’s . . . warranty agreement applicable to the vehicle” and the vehicle owner notified the manufacturer, converter, distributor, or its authorized agent of the defect before the warranty’s expiration.¹⁶ The manufacturer, converter, or distributor has an obligation to “make repairs necessary to conform a new motor vehicle to an applicable . . . express warranty.”¹⁷

3. Burden of Proof

The law places the burden of proof on the Complainant.¹⁸ The Complainant must prove all facts required for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, the Complainant must present sufficient evidence to show that every required fact more likely than not exists.¹⁹ Accordingly, the Complainant cannot prevail where the existence of any required fact appears equally likely or unlikely.

4. The Complaint Identifies the Issues in this Proceeding

The complaint identifies the issues to be addressed in this proceeding.²⁰ The complaint must state “sufficient facts to enable the department and the party complained against to know the nature of the complaint and the specific problems or circumstances forming the basis of the claim for relief under the lemon law.”²¹ However, the parties may expressly or impliedly consent to

¹⁶ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204; 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(b)(3).

¹⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.603(a).

¹⁸ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.66(d).

¹⁹ *E.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Garza*, 164 S.W.3d 607, 621 (Tex. 2005).

²⁰ “In a contested case, each party is entitled to an opportunity . . . for hearing after reasonable notice of not less than 10 days.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2001.051; “Notice of a hearing in a contested case must include . . . a short, plain statement of the factual matters asserted.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.052. *See* TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(b) (“The complaint must be made in writing to the applicable dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor and must specify each defect in the vehicle that is covered by the warranty.”); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204(d) (“A hearing may be scheduled on any complaint made under this section that is not privately resolved between the owner and the dealer, manufacturer, converter, or distributor.”).

²¹ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(a)(3).

hearing issues not included in the pleadings.²² Implied consent occurs when a party introduces evidence on an unpleaded issue without objection.²³

5. Incidental Expenses

When repurchase or replacement is ordered, the Lemon Law provides for reimbursing the Complainant for reasonable incidental expenses resulting from the vehicle's loss of use because of the defect.²⁴ Reimbursable expenses include, but are not limited to: (1) alternate transportation; (2) towing; (3) telephone calls or mail charges directly attributable to contacting the manufacturer, distributor, converter, or dealer regarding the vehicle; (4) meals and lodging necessitated by the vehicle's failure during out-of-town trips; (5) loss or damage to personal property; (6) attorney fees, if the complainant retains counsel after notification that the respondent is represented by counsel; and (7) items or accessories added to the vehicle at or after purchase, less a reasonable allowance for use. The expenses must be reasonable and verifiable (for example, through receipts or similar written documents).²⁵ However, the Department's rules expressly exclude compensation for "any interest, finance charge, or insurance premiums."²⁶

B. Summary of Complainant's Evidence and Arguments

On March 15, 2019, the Complainant, purchased a new 2019 Ford F-250 from Grapevine Ford Lincoln, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Grapevine, Texas. The vehicle had eight miles on the odometer at the time of purchase. The vehicle's limited warranty provides bumper to bumper coverage for three years or 36,000 miles, whichever occurs first. On April 3, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent. On July 16, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the vehicle exhibited a "Service Charging System" message. In relevant part, the Complainant took the vehicle to a dealer for repair of the alleged issues as follows:

²² 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.42; TEX. R. CIV. P. 67.

²³ See *Gadd v. Lynch*, 258 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1953, writ ref'd).

²⁴ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.604.

²⁵ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209(a).

²⁶ 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.208(b)(1).

Date	Miles	Issue
4/1/19	1,771	Charging system
4/8/19 - 4/11/19	2,042	Charging system
4/10/19 - 4/17/19	2,070	Charging system
7/9/19 - 7/31/19	6,778	Charging system

The Complainant testified that the subject vehicle currently had 22,221 miles on the odometer. He affirmed that none of the repairs improved the charging system issue. He clarified that the issue occurred randomly. The Complainant first noticed the issue on March 16, 2019, the day after purchasing the vehicle. He explained that if he drove the vehicle often, the battery would drain and the vehicle would not start. The charging system warning would come on randomly and last occurred two or three days before the hearing. The Complainant incurred Uber charges to drop off and pick up the vehicle at the dealerships. He received a loaner vehicle for two repair visits.

On cross-examination, the Complainant explained that he asked for a specific date for a repair attempt by the Respondent's field service engineer (FSE) but was given a range of a couple of weeks. He elaborated that (in response to communications on August 8, 2019) he declined to leave the vehicle at the dealer until August 20th or 29th and an appointment was never made. He was not willing to bring the vehicle in early August for an appointment at the end of August but he was willing to bring the vehicle on the date of the appointment.

The Complainant further testified that the vehicle had four repairs, one of which he did not have documentation for. He pointed out that he had a loaner vehicle for one repair visit. Moreover, the loaner vehicle, an F-150, was not comparable to his vehicle, an F-250, because he could not tow his camper for 21 days.

C. Summary of Respondent's Evidence and Arguments

Ms. Calderon testified that the vehicle did not have four or more repair attempts in the applicable period, was not out of service for 30 days (a loaner vehicle was provided for most of the time), and did not have a serious safety hazard. Further, the Complainant did not allow an opportunity to repair the nonconformity. Ms. Calderon stated that she specified August 20th and 29th of 2019 as dates when the FSE would be available and that if the Complainant wished to drop off the vehicle earlier, an appointment for those dates could still be scheduled.

D. Analysis

As an initial matter, to qualify for any relief, whether warranty repair or repurchase/replacement, the law requires the vehicle to have a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty (warrantable defect)²⁷ that continues to exist, even after repair.²⁸ In part, the warranty generally states that:

Under your New Vehicle Limited Warranty if:

- your Ford vehicle is properly operated and maintained, and
- was taken to a Ford dealership for a warranted repair during the warranty period, then authorized Ford Motor Company dealers will, without charge, repair, replace, or adjust all parts on your vehicle that malfunction or fail during normal use during the applicable coverage period due to a manufacturing defect in factory-supplied materials or factory workmanship.²⁹

According to these terms, the warranty only applies to defects in materials or workmanship (manufacturing defects).³⁰

In this case, the vehicle continues to have a defect after reasonable repair attempts. Specifically, the evidence shows that the vehicle displayed the "Service Charging System" message two or three days before the April 7, 2020, hearing, while the fourth and last repair visit occurred in July of 2019. Further, though the Respondent contends that the vehicle did not have the required repair attempts, a repair attempt under the Lemon Law does not require an actual repair.³¹ Additionally, the vehicle was out of service for repair over 30 days without a comparable

²⁷ TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603(a), 2301.604(a); TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.204.

²⁸ TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.605.

²⁹ Complainant's Ex. 11, Limited One-Year Warranty.

³⁰ Courts have affirmed that warranty language covering "defects in material or workmanship" do not cover design issues. *E.g.*, *Whitt v. Mazda Motor of America*, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00343, 211-Ohio-3097, ¶¶ 18-21 ("The manufacturer's express warranty in the case sub judice provides: 'Mazda warrants that your new Mazda Vehicle is free from defects in material or workmanship' The trial court found the warranty did not cover claims of design defects. . . . The problems about which Appellants complained did not fall within the applicable expressed warranty."); *see GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc.*, 822 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) ("the language in the contract of May 12, 1980, expressly limited TCR's recovery only for defects in materials or workmanship to damages for repair or replacement value. No mention was made in the guarantee of remedies for design defects.").

³¹ *DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Williams*, No. 03-99-00822-CV (Tex. App.—Austin, June 22, 2000, no writ) (not designated for publication) (Repair attempts include "those occasions when the fault for failing to repair the vehicle rests with the dealership." Conversely, "those occasions when failure to repair the vehicle was the fault of the consumer would not be considered a repair attempt under the statute.").

loaner vehicle. As shown in testimony, the Complainant used his vehicle to tow a camper, which he could not do with the loaner vehicle. Finally, the Complainant must have provided an opportunity for the Respondent repair the vehicle. However, the record contains conflicting information whether such opportunity occurred. The Complainant stated that he was provided a two-week range of dates when the FSE would be available. He also indicated his belief that he was required to bring the vehicle in early August for an appointment on either August 20th or 29th. In contrast, Ms. Calderon testified she specified August 20th and 29th as the FSE's available dates and indicated that the Complainant could drop off the vehicle before then for an appointment on August 20th or 29th. The Complainant declined to bring the vehicle for repair believing that he had to leave his vehicle at a dealership for weeks while waiting for the scheduled appointment. Given these conflicting statements, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that the Respondent had an opportunity to cure. As a result, the vehicle only qualifies for repair relief.

III. Findings of Fact

1. On March 15, 2019, the Complainant, purchased a new 2019 Ford F-250 from Grapevine Ford Lincoln, a franchised dealer of the Respondent, in Grapevine, Texas. The vehicle had eight miles on the odometer at the time of purchase.
2. The vehicle's limited warranty provides bumper to bumper coverage for three years or 36,000 miles, whichever occurs first.
3. The warranty generally states that:

Under your New Vehicle Limited Warranty if:

- your Ford vehicle is properly operated and maintained, and
- was taken to a Ford dealership for a warranted repair during the warranty period,

then authorized Ford Motor Company dealers will, without charge, repair, replace, or adjust all parts on your vehicle that malfunction or fail during normal use during the applicable coverage period due to a manufacturing defect in factory-supplied materials or factory workmanship.

4. The Complainant took the vehicle to a dealer for repair as shown below:

Date	Miles	Issue
4/1/19	1,771	Charging system
4/8/19 - 4/11/19	2,042	Charging system
4/10/19 - 4/17/19	2,070	Charging system
7/9/19 - 7/31/19	6,778	Charging system

5. On April 3, 2019, the Complainant provided a written notice of defect to the Respondent.
6. On July 16, 2019, the Complainant filed a complaint with the Department alleging that the vehicle exhibited a “Service Charging System” message.
7. On October 21, 2019, the Department’s Office of Administrative Hearings issued a notice of hearing directed to all parties, giving them not less than 10 days’ notice of hearing and their rights under the applicable rules and statutes. The notice stated the time, place and nature of the hearing; the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing was to be held; particular sections of the statutes and rules involved; and the factual matters asserted.
8. The hearing in this case convened on April 7, 2020, by telephone, before Hearings Examiner Andrew Kang, and the record closed on the same day. The Complainant, represented himself. Shirley Calderon-Pagan, Consumer Affairs Legal Analyst, represented the Respondent.
9. The vehicle’s odometer displayed 22,221 miles at the time of the hearing.
10. The vehicle’s warranty was in effect at the time of the hearing.
11. The Complainant testified that he requested a specific date for the Respondent’s opportunity to repair but that the Respondent offered a two-week range for the repair. The Respondent presented testimony that Ms. Calderon specified August 20th and 29th of 2019, as dates for a repair by the Respondent’s field service engineer but she also indicated that the Complainant could drop off the vehicle in advance of the scheduled appointment. The Complainant declined to bring the vehicle for repair, believing that he would have had to leave the vehicle at a repair facility while waiting for an appointment.

IV. Conclusions of Law

1. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles has jurisdiction over this matter. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.601-2301.613 and 2301.204.
2. A hearings examiner of the Department's Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over all matters related to conducting a hearing in this proceeding, including the preparation of a decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the issuance of a final order. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.704.
3. The Complainant filed a sufficient complaint with the Department. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202.
4. The parties received proper notice of the hearing. TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2001.051, 2001.052. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.206(2).
5. The Complainant bears the burden of proof in this matter. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 206.66(d).
6. The Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. The Respondent did not have an opportunity to cure the alleged defect(s). This Order may not require repurchase or replacement of the vehicle without an opportunity to cure by the Respondent. TEX. OCC. CODE § 2301.606(c)(2).
7. The Complainant does not qualify for reimbursement of incidental expenses because the vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.603, 2301.604(a); 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.209.
8. If the Complainant's vehicle does not qualify for replacement or repurchase, this Order may require repair to obtain compliance with the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.204 and 2301.603; 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.208(e).
9. The Complainant's vehicle qualifies for warranty repair. The Complainant proved that the vehicle has a defect covered by the Respondent's warranty. TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.204 and 2301.603. The Complainant or an agent of the Complainant notified the Respondent or Respondent's agent of the alleged defect(s). TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.204 and 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.202(b)(3).

V. Order

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is **ORDERED** that the Complainant's petition for relief pursuant to Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.601-2301.613 is **DISMISSED**. It is **FURTHER ORDERED** that the Respondent shall make any repairs needed to conform the subject vehicle to the applicable warranty; specifically, the Respondent shall resolve the charging system nonconformity. Upon this Order becoming final under Texas Government Code § 2001.144:³² (1) the Complainant shall deliver the vehicle to the Respondent within 20 days; and (2) the Respondent shall complete the repair of the vehicle within **20 days** after receiving it. However, if the Department determines the Complainant's refusal or inability to deliver the vehicle caused the failure to complete the required repair as prescribed, the Department may consider the Complainant to have rejected the granted relief and deem this proceeding concluded and the complaint file closed under 43 Texas Administrative Code § 215.210(2).

SIGNED June 8, 2020



ANDREW KANG
HEARINGS EXAMINER
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

³² This Order does not become final on the date this Order is signed, instead: (1) this Order becomes final if a party does not file a motion for rehearing within 25 days after the date this Order is signed, or (2) if a party files a motion for rehearing within 25 days after the date this Order is signed, this Order becomes final when: (A) an order overruling the motion for rehearing is signed, or (B) the Department has not acted on the motion within 55 days after the date this Order is signed. Accordingly, this Order cannot become final (1) while a motion for rehearing remains pending; or (2) after the grant of a motion for rehearing.